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To keep up with new developments in Internet Law, read my Technology & Marketing Law 
blog at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ and Tertium Quid blog at Forbes at 
http://blogs.forbes.com/ericgoldman/ and follow me at Twitter at 
https://twitter.com/#!/ericgoldman. 
 
Please email me any comments or corrections: egoldman@gmail.com.  
 
To make sure you always are looking at the most current language, I have excluded the text 
of most statutes and similar rulesets from the reader and instead just provided links in the 
table of contents.  However, Internet law is principally a statute-driven course, so make 
sure to review the statutes!  
 
Editing Notes: 
 Textual omissions are noted with ellipses 
 Omitted footnotes are not indicated, but all footnote numbers are original 
 In-text citations are omitted without indication (including parenthetical 
explanations and some parallel citations) 
 Although I have tried to preserve the original formatting (such as italics, bold and 
blockquotes), some of this formatting may have changed or been lost in the 
conversion. 
 
To improve readability, I have aggressively stripped out case citations and parenthetical 
explanations (more so than in most casebooks).  If you are interested in the court’s actual 
words or intend to quote or cite one of these opinions, I STRONGLY recommend that you 
pull the actual opinion and read the unedited version. 
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I. What is Cyberspace?  Who Regulates It? 
 
 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
Per curiam 
 
[Editor’s note: per Congress’ request, litigation against the Communications Decency Act 
proceeded to a three judge district court panel.  This excerpt is Section II of that court’s 
decision, the Findings of Fact.  The litigants stipulated to the first 48 paragraphs of these 
factual findings, and the remainder was issued per curiam.] 
 
…The Nature of Cyberspace 
The Creation of the Internet and the Development of Cyberspace 
 
1. The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which 
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a 
network of networks. This is best understood if one considers what a linked group of 
computers—referred to here as a “network”—is, and what it does. Small networks are now 
ubiquitous (and are often called “local area networks”). For example, in many United States 
Courthouses, computers are linked to each other for the purpose of exchanging files and 
messages (and to share equipment such as printers). These are networks. 
 
2. Some networks are “closed” networks, not linked to other computers or networks. Many 
networks, however, are connected to other networks, which are in turn connected to other 
networks in a manner which permits each computer in any network to communicate with 
computers on any other network in the system. This global Web of linked networks and 
computers is referred to as the Internet. 
 
3. The nature of the Internet is such that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
its size at a given moment. It is indisputable, however, that the Internet has experienced 
extraordinary growth in recent years. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the 
Internet, and by 1989, the number stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over 
1,000,000 computers were linked. Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide, of 
which approximately 60 percent located within the United States, are estimated to be 
linked to the Internet. This count does not include the personal computers people use to 
access the Internet using modems. In all, reasonable estimates are that as many as 40 
million people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible communication 
Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year 
1999. 
 
4. Some of the computers and computer networks that make up the Internet are owned by 
governmental and public institutions, some are owned by non-profit organizations, and 
some are privately owned. The resulting whole is a decentralized, global medium of 
communications—or “cyberspace”—that links people, institutions, corporations, and 
governments around the world. The Internet is an international system. This 
communications medium allows any of the literally tens of millions of people with access to 
the Internet to exchange information. These communications can occur almost 
instantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of 
people interested in a particular subject, or to the world as a whole. 
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5. The Internet had its origins in 1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced Research 
Project Agency (“ARPA”), and was called ARPANET. This network linked computers and 
computer networks owned by the military, defense contractors, and university laboratories 
conducting defense-related research. The network later allowed researchers across the 
country to access directly and to use extremely powerful supercomputers located at a few 
key universities and laboratories. As it evolved far beyond its research origins in the United 
States to encompass universities, corporations, and people around the world, the 
ARPANET came to be called the “DARPA Internet,” and finally just the “Internet.” 
 
6. From its inception, the network was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining 
series of redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly 
transmitting communications without direct human involvement or control, and with the 
automatic ability to re-route communications if one or more individual links were damaged 
or otherwise unavailable. Among other goals, this redundant system of linked computers 
was designed to allow vital research and communications to continue even if portions of the 
network were damaged, say, in a war. 
 
7. To achieve this resilient nationwide (and ultimately global) communications medium, the 
ARPANET encouraged the creation of multiple links to and from each computer (or 
computer network) on the network. Thus, a computer located in Washington, D.C., might be 
linked (usually using dedicated telephone lines) to other computers in neighboring states or 
on the Eastern seaboard. Each of those computers could in turn be linked to other 
computers, which themselves would be linked to other computers. 
 
8. A communication sent over this redundant series of linked computers could travel any of 
a number of routes to its destination. Thus, a message sent from a computer in Washington, 
D.C., to a computer in Palo Alto, California, might first be sent to a computer in 
Philadelphia, and then be forwarded to a computer in Pittsburgh, and then to Chicago, 
Denver, and Salt Lake City, before finally reaching Palo Alto. If the message could not 
travel along that path (because of military attack, simple technical malfunction, or other 
reason), the message would automatically (without human intervention or even knowledge) 
be re-routed, perhaps, from Washington, D.C. to Richmond, and then to Atlanta, New 
Orleans, Dallas, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and finally to Palo Alto. This type of 
transmission, and re-routing, would likely occur in a matter of seconds. 
 
9. Messages between computers on the Internet do not necessarily travel entirely along the 
same path. The Internet uses “packet switching” communication protocols that allow 
individual messages to be subdivided into smaller “packets” that are then sent 
independently to the destination, and are then automatically reassembled by the receiving 
computer. While all packets of a given message often travel along the same path to the 
destination, if computers along the route become overloaded, then packets can be re-routed 
to less loaded computers. 
 
10. At the same time that ARPANET was maturing (it subsequently ceased to exist), 
similar networks developed to link universities, research facilities, businesses, and 
individuals around the world. These other formal or loose networks included BITNET, 
CSNET, FIDONET, and USENET. Eventually, each of these networks (many of which 
overlapped) were themselves linked together, allowing users of any computers linked to any 
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one of the networks to transmit communications to users of computers on other networks. It 
is this series of linked networks (themselves linking computers and computer networks) 
that is today commonly known as the Internet. 
 
11. No single entity—academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit—administers the 
Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of 
separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use 
common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with other 
computers (which in turn exchange communications and information with still other 
computers). There is no centralized storage location, control point, or communications 
channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to 
control all of the information conveyed on the Internet. 
 
How Individuals Access the Internet 
 
12. Individuals have a wide variety of avenues to access cyberspace in general, and the 
Internet in particular. In terms of physical access, there are two common methods to 
establish an actual link to the Internet. First, one can use a computer or computer terminal 
that is directly (and usually permanently) connected to a computer network that is itself 
directly or indirectly connected to the Internet. Second, one can use a “personal computer” 
with a “modem” to connect over a telephone line to a larger computer or computer network 
that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Internet. As detailed below, both direct 
and modem connections are made available to people by a wide variety of academic, 
governmental, or commercial entities. 
 
13. Students, faculty, researchers, and others affiliated with the vast majority of colleges 
and universities in the United States can access the Internet through their educational 
institutions. Such access is often via direct connection using computers located in campus 
libraries, offices, or computer centers, or may be through telephone access using a modem 
from a student’s or professor’s campus or off-campus location. Some colleges and 
universities install “ports” or outlets for direct network connections in each dormitory room 
or provide access via computers located in common areas in dormitories. Such access 
enables students and professors to use information and content provided by the college or 
university itself, and to use the vast amount of research resources and other information 
available on the Internet worldwide. 
 
14. Similarly, Internet resources and access are sufficiently important to many corporations 
and other employers that those employers link their office computer networks to the 
Internet and provide employees with direct or modem access to the office network (and thus 
to the Internet). Such access might be used by, for example, a corporation involved in 
scientific or medical research or manufacturing to enable corporate employees to exchange 
information and ideas with academic researchers in their fields. 
 
15. Those who lack access to the Internet through their schools or employers still have a 
variety of ways they can access the Internet. Many communities across the country have 
established “free-nets” or community networks to provide their citizens with a local link to 
the Internet (and to provide local-oriented content and discussion groups). The first such 
community network, the Cleveland Free-Net Community Computer System, was 
established in 1986, and free-nets now exist in scores of communities as diverse as 
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Richmond, Virginia, Tallahassee, Florida, Seattle, Washington, and San Diego, California. 
Individuals typically can access free-nets at little or no cost via modem connection or by 
using computers available in community buildings. Free-nets are often operated by a local 
library, educational institution, or non-profit community group. 
 
16. Individuals can also access the Internet through many local libraries. Libraries often 
offer patrons use of computers that are linked to the Internet. In addition, some libraries 
offer telephone modem access to the libraries’ computers, which are themselves connected 
to the Internet. Increasingly, patrons now use library services and resources without ever 
physically entering the library itself. Libraries typically provide such direct or modem 
access at no cost to the individual user. 
 
17. Individuals can also access the Internet by patronizing an increasing number of 
storefront “computer coffee shops,” where customers—while they drink their coffee—can 
use computers provided by the shop to access the Internet. Such Internet access is typically 
provided by the shop for a small hourly fee. 
 
18. Individuals can also access the Internet through commercial and non-commercial 
“Internet service providers” that typically offer modem telephone access to a computer or 
computer network linked to the Internet. Many such providers—including the members of 
plaintiff Commercial Internet Exchange Association—are commercial entities offering 
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Some Internet service providers, however, are 
non-profit organizations that offer free or very low cost access to the Internet. For example, 
the International Internet Association offers free modem access to the Internet upon 
request. Also, a number of trade or other non-profit associations offer Internet access as a 
service to members. 
 
19. Another common way for individuals to access the Internet is through one of the major 
national commercial “online services” such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft 
Network, or Prodigy. These online services offer nationwide computer networks (so that 
subscribers can dial-in to a local telephone number), and the services provide extensive and 
well organized content within their own proprietary computer networks. In addition to 
allowing access to the extensive content available within each online service, the services 
also allow subscribers to link to the much larger resources of the Internet. Full access to the 
online service (including access to the Internet) can be obtained for modest monthly or 
hourly fees. The major commercial online services have almost twelve million individual 
subscribers across the United States. 
 
20. In addition to using the national commercial online services, individuals can also access 
the Internet using some (but not all) of the thousands of local dial-in computer services, 
often called “bulletin board systems” or “BBSs.” With an investment of as little as $2,000.00 
and the cost of a telephone line, individuals, non-profit organizations, advocacy groups, and 
businesses can offer their own dial-in computer “bulletin board” service where friends, 
members, subscribers, or customers can exchange ideas and information. BBSs range from 
single computers with only one telephone line into the computer (allowing only one user at 
a time), to single computers with many telephone lines into the computer (allowing multiple 
simultaneous users), to multiple linked computers each servicing multiple dial-in telephone 
lines (allowing multiple simultaneous users). Some (but not all) of these BBS systems offer 
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direct or indirect links to the Internet. Some BBS systems charge users a nominal fee for 
access, while many others are free to the individual users. 
 
21. Although commercial access to the Internet is growing rapidly, many users of the 
Internet—such as college students and staff—do not individually pay for access (except to 
the extent, for example, that the cost of computer services is a component of college tuition). 
These and other Internet users can access the Internet without paying for such access with 
a credit card or other form of payment. 
 
Methods to Communicate Over the Internet 
 
22. Once one has access to the Internet, there are a wide variety of different methods of 
communication and information exchange over the network. These many methods of 
communication and information retrieval are constantly evolving and are therefore difficult 
to categorize concisely. The most common methods of communications on the Internet (as 
well as within the major online services) can be roughly grouped into six categories: 
 
(1) one-to-one messaging (such as “e-mail”), 
 
(2) one-to-many messaging (such as “listserv”), 
 
(3) distributed message databases (such as “USENET newsgroups”), 
 
(4) real time communication (such as “Internet Relay Chat”), 
 
(5) real time remote computer utilization (such as “telnet”), and 
 
(6) remote information retrieval (such as “ftp,” “gopher,” and the “World Wide Web”). 
 
Most of these methods of communication can be used to transmit text, data, computer 
programs, sound, visual images ( i.e., pictures), and moving video images. 
 
23. One-to-one messaging. One method of communication on the Internet is via electronic 
mail, or “e-mail,” comparable in principle to sending a first class letter. One can address 
and transmit a message to one or more other people. E-mail on the Internet is not routed 
through a central control point, and can take many and varying paths to the recipients. 
Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not “sealed” or secure, and can be accessed or 
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient (unless the message is 
encrypted). 
 
24. One-to-many messaging. The Internet also contains automatic mailing list services 
(such as “listservs”), [also referred to by witnesses as “mail exploders”] that allow 
communications about particular subjects of interest to a group of people. For example, 
people can subscribe to a “listserv” mailing list on a particular topic of interest to them. The 
subscriber can submit messages on the topic to the listserv that are forwarded (via e-mail), 
either automatically or through a human moderator overseeing the listserv, to anyone who 
has subscribed to the mailing list. A recipient of such a message can reply to the message 
and have the reply also distributed to everyone on the mailing list. This service provides the 
capability to keep abreast of developments or events in a particular subject area. Most 
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listserv-type mailing lists automatically forward all incoming messages to all mailing list 
subscribers. There are thousands of such mailing list services on the Internet, collectively 
with hundreds of thousands of subscribers. Users of “open” listservs typically can add or 
remove their names from the mailing list automatically, with no direct human involvement. 
Listservs may also be “closed,” i.e., only allowing for one’s acceptance into the listserv by a 
human moderator. 
 
25. Distributed message databases. Similar in function to listservs—but quite different in 
how communications are transmitted—are distributed message databases such as 
“USENET newsgroups.” User-sponsored newsgroups are among the most popular and 
widespread applications of Internet services, and cover all imaginable topics of interest to 
users. Like listservs, newsgroups are open discussions and exchanges on particular topics. 
Users, however, need not subscribe to the discussion mailing list in advance, but can 
instead access the database at any time. Some USENET newsgroups are “moderated” but 
most are open access. For the moderated newsgroups, all messages to the newsgroup are 
forwarded to one person who can screen them for relevance to the topics under discussion. 
USENET newsgroups are disseminated using ad hoc, peer to peer connections between 
approximately 200,000 computers (called USENET “servers”) around the world. For 
unmoderated newsgroups, when an individual user with access to a USENET server posts a 
message to a newsgroup, the message is automatically forwarded to all adjacent USENET 
servers that furnish access to the newsgroup, and it is then propagated to the servers 
adjacent to those servers, etc. The messages are temporarily stored on each receiving 
server, where they are available for review and response by individual users. The messages 
are automatically and periodically purged from each system after a time to make room for 
new messages. Responses to messages, like the original messages, are automatically 
distributed to all other computers receiving the newsgroup or forwarded to a moderator in 
the case of a moderated newsgroup. The dissemination of messages to USENET servers 
around the world is an automated process that does not require direct human intervention 
or review. 
 
26. There are newsgroups on more than fifteen thousand different subjects. In 1994, 
approximately 70,000 messages were posted to newsgroups each day, and those messages 
were distributed to the approximately 190,000 computers or computer networks that 
participate in the USENET newsgroup system. Once the messages reach the approximately 
190,000 receiving computers or computer networks, they are available to individual users of 
those computers or computer networks. Collectively, almost 100,000 new messages (or 
“articles”) are posted to newsgroups each day. 
 
27. Real time communication. In addition to transmitting messages that can be later read 
or accessed, individuals on the Internet can engage in an immediate dialog, in “real time”, 
with other people on the Internet. In its simplest forms, “talk” allows one-to-one 
communications and “Internet Relay Chat” (or IRC) allows two or more to type messages to 
each other that almost immediately appear on the others’ computer screens. IRC is 
analogous to a telephone party line, using a computer and keyboard rather than a 
telephone. With IRC, however, at any one time there are thousands of different party lines 
available, in which collectively tens of thousands of users are engaging in conversations on 
a huge range of subjects. Moreover, one can create a new party line to discuss a different 
topic at any time. Some IRC conversations are “moderated” or include “channel operators.” 
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28. In addition, commercial online services such as America Online, CompuServe, the 
Microsoft Network, and Prodigy have their own “chat” systems allowing their members to 
converse. 
 
29. Real time remote computer utilization. Another method to use information on the 
Internet is to access and control remote computers in “real time” using “telnet.” For 
example, using telnet, a researcher at a university would be able to use the computing 
power of a supercomputer located at a different university. A student can use telnet to 
connect to a remote library to access the library’s online card catalog program. 
 
30. Remote information retrieval. The final major category of communication may be the 
most well known use of the Internet-the search for and retrieval of information located on 
remote computers. There are three primary methods to locate and retrieve information on 
the Internet. 
 
31. A simple method uses “ftp” (or file transfer protocol) to list the names of computer files 
available on a remote computer, and to transfer one or more of those files to an individual’s 
local computer. 
 
32. Another approach uses a program and format named “gopher” to guide an individual’s 
search through the resources available on a remote computer. 
 
The World Wide Web 
 
33. A third approach, and fast becoming the most well-known on the Internet, is the “World 
Wide Web.” The Web utilizes a “hypertext” formatting language called hypertext markup 
language (HTML), and programs that “browse” the Web can display HTML documents 
containing text, images, sound, animation and moving video. Any HTML document can 
include links to other types of information or resources, so that while viewing an HTML 
document that, for example, describes resources available on the Internet, one can “click” 
using a computer mouse on the description of the resource and be immediately connected to 
the resource itself. Such “hyperlinks” allow information to be accessed and organized in 
very flexible ways, and allow people to locate and efficiently view related information even 
if the information is stored on numerous computers all around the world. 
 
34. Purpose. The World Wide Web (W3C) was created to serve as the platform for a global, 
online store of knowledge, containing information from a diversity of sources and accessible 
to Internet users around the world. Though information on the Web is contained in 
individual computers, the fact that each of these computers is connected to the Internet 
through W3C protocols allows all of the information to become part of a single body of 
knowledge. It is currently the most advanced information system developed on the Internet, 
and embraces within its data model most information in previous networked information 
systems such as ftp, gopher, wais, and Usenet. 
 
35. History. W3C was originally developed at CERN, the European Particle Physics 
Laboratory, and was initially used to allow information sharing within internationally 
dispersed teams of researchers and engineers. Originally aimed at the High Energy Physics 
community, it has spread to other areas and attracted much interest in user support, 
resource recovery, and many other areas which depend on collaborative and information 
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sharing. The Web has extended beyond the scientific and academic community to include 
communications by individuals, non-profit organizations, and businesses. 
 
36. Basic Operation. The World Wide Web is a series of documents stored in different 
computers all over the Internet. Documents contain information stored in a variety of 
formats, including text, still images, sounds, and video. An essential element of the Web is 
that any document has an address (rather like a telephone number). Most Web documents 
contain “links.” These are short sections of text or image which refer to another document. 
Typically the linked text is blue or underlined when displayed, and when selected by the 
user, the referenced document is automatically displayed, wherever in the world it actually 
is stored. Links for example are used to lead from overview documents to more detailed 
documents, from tables of contents to particular pages, but also as cross-references, 
footnotes, and new forms of information structure. 
 
37. Many organizations now have “home pages” on the Web. These are documents which 
provide a set of links designed to represent the organization, and through links from the 
home page, guide the user directly or indirectly to information about or relevant to that 
organization. 
 
38. As an example of the use of links, if these Findings were to be put on a World Wide Web 
site, its home page might contain links such as those: 
 
* THE NATURE OF CYBERSPACE 
* CREATION OF THE INTERNET AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERSPACE 
* HOW PEOPLE ACCESS THE INTERNET 
* METHODS TO COMMUNICATE OVER THE INTERNET 
 
39. Each of these links takes the user of the site from the beginning of the Findings to the 
appropriate section within this Adjudication. Links may also take the user from the original 
Web site to another Web site on another computer connected to the Internet. These links 
from one computer to another, from one document to another across the Internet, are what 
unify the Web into a single body of knowledge, and what makes the Web unique. The Web 
was designed with a maximum target time to follow a link of one tenth of a second. 
 
40. Publishing. The World Wide Web exists fundamentally as a platform through which 
people and organizations can communicate through shared information. When information 
is made available, it is said to be “published” on the Web. Publishing on the Web simply 
requires that the “publisher” has a computer connected to the Internet and that the 
computer is running W3C server software. The computer can be as simple as a small 
personal computer costing less than $1500 dollars or as complex as a multi-million dollar 
mainframe computer. Many Web publishers choose instead to lease disk storage space from 
someone else who has the necessary computer facilities, eliminating the need for actually 
owning any equipment oneself. 
 
41. The Web, as a universe of network accessible information, contains a variety of 
documents prepared with quite varying degrees of care, from the hastily typed idea, to the 
professionally executed corporate profile. The power of the Web stems from the ability of a 
link to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical location. 
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42. Information to be published on the Web must also be formatted according to the rules of 
the Web standards. These standardized formats assure that all Web users who want to 
read the material will be able to view it. Web standards are sophisticated and flexible 
enough that they have grown to meet the publishing needs of many large corporations, 
banks, brokerage houses, newspapers and magazines which now publish “online” editions of 
their material, as well as government agencies, and even courts, which use the Web to 
disseminate information to the public. At the same time, Web publishing is simple enough 
that thousands of individual users and small community organizations are using the Web 
to publish their own personal “home pages,” the equivalent of individualized newsletters 
about that person or organization, which are available to everyone on the Web. 
 
43. Web publishers have a choice to make their Web sites open to the general pool of all 
Internet users, or close them, thus making the information accessible only to those with 
advance authorization. Many publishers choose to keep their sites open to all in order to 
give their information the widest potential audience. In the event that the publishers 
choose to maintain restrictions on access, this may be accomplished by assigning specific 
user names and passwords as a prerequisite to access to the site. Or, in the case of Web 
sites maintained for internal use of one organization, access will only be allowed from other 
computers within that organization’s local network. 
 
44. Searching the Web. A variety of systems have developed that allow users of the Web to 
search particular information among all of the public sites that are part of the Web. 
Services such as Yahoo, Magellan, Altavista, Webcrawler, and Lycos are all services known 
as “search engines” which allow users to search for Web sites that contain certain 
categories of information, or to search for key words. For example, a Web user looking for 
the text of Supreme Court opinions would type the words “Supreme Court” into a search 
engine, and then be presented with a list of World Wide Web sites that contain Supreme 
Court information. This list would actually be a series of links to those sites. Having 
searched out a number of sites that might contain the desired information, the user would 
then follow individual links, browsing through the information on each site, until the 
desired material is found. For many content providers on the Web, the ability to be found by 
these search engines is very important. 
 
45. Common standards. The Web links together disparate information on an ever-growing 
number of Internet-linked computers by setting common information storage formats 
(HTML) and a common language for the exchange of Web documents (HTTP). Although the 
information itself may be in many different formats, and stored on computers which are not 
otherwise compatible, the basic Web standards provide a basic set of standards which allow 
communication and exchange of information. Despite the fact that many types of computers 
are used on the Web, and the fact that many of these machines are otherwise incompatible, 
those who “publish” information on the Web are able to communicate with those who seek 
to access information with little difficulty because of these basic technical standards. 
 
46. A distributed system with no centralized control. Running on tens of thousands of 
individual computers on the Internet, the Web is what is known as a distributed system. 
The Web was designed so that organizations with computers containing information can 
become part of the Web simply by attaching their computers to the Internet and running 
appropriate World Wide Web software. No single organization controls any membership in 
the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or 
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services can be blocked from the Web. From a user’s perspective, it may appear to be a 
single, integrated system, but in reality it has no centralized control point. 
 
47. Contrast to closed databases. The Web’s open, distributed, decentralized nature stands 
in sharp contrast to most information systems that have come before it. Private information 
services such as Westlaw, Lexis/Nexis, and Dialog, have contained large storehouses of 
knowledge, and can be accessed from the Internet with the appropriate passwords and 
access software. However, these databases are not linked together into a single whole, as is 
the World Wide Web. 
 
48. Success of the Web in research, education, and political activities. The World Wide Web 
has become so popular because of its open, distributed, and easy-to-use nature. Rather than 
requiring those who seek information to purchase new software or hardware, and to learn a 
new kind of system for each new database of information they seek to access, the Web 
environment makes it easy for users to jump from one set of information to another. By the 
same token, the open nature of the Web makes it easy for publishers to reach their 
intended audiences without having to know in advance what kind of computer each 
potential reader has, and what kind of software they will be using…. 
 
72. Although parental control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or 
for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually explicit images 
unaccompanied by suggestive text unless those who configure the software are aware of the 
particular site. 
 
73. Despite its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a 
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing 
sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their 
children will soon be widely available. 
 
Content on the Internet 
 
74. The types of content now on the Internet defy easy classification. The entire card 
catalogue of the Carnegie Library is on-line, together with journals, journal abstracts, 
popular magazines, and titles of compact discs. The director of the Carnegie Library, Robert 
Croneberger, testified that on-line services are the emerging trend in libraries generally. 
Plaintiff Hotwired Ventures LLC organizes its Web site into information regarding travel, 
news and commentary, arts and entertainment, politics, and types of drinks. Plaintiff 
America Online, Inc., not only creates chat rooms for a broad variety of topics, but also 
allows members to create their own chat rooms to suit their own tastes. The ACLU uses an 
America Online chat room as an unmoderated forum for people to debate civil liberties 
issues. Plaintiffs’ expert, Scott Bradner, estimated that 15,000 newsgroups exist today, and 
he described his own interest in a newsgroup devoted solely to Formula 1 racing cars. 
America Online makes 15,000 bulletin boards available to its subscribers, who post 
between 200,000 and 250,000 messages each day. Another plaintiffs’ expert, Howard 
Rheingold, participates in “virtual communities” that simulate social interaction. It is no 
exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought. 
 
75. The Internet is not exclusively, or even primarily, a means of commercial 
communication. Many commercial entities maintain Web sites to inform potential 
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consumers about their goods and services, or to solicit purchases, but many other Web sites 
exist solely for the dissemination of non-commercial information. The other forms of 
Internet communication—e-mail, bulletin boards, newsgroups, and chat rooms—frequently 
have non-commercial goals. For the economic and technical reasons set forth in the 
following paragraphs, the Internet is an especially attractive means for not-for-profit 
entities or public interest groups to reach their desired audiences. There are examples in 
the parties’ stipulation of some of the non-commercial uses that the Internet serves. 
Plaintiff Human Rights Watch, Inc., offers information on its Internet site regarding 
reported human rights abuses around the world. Plaintiff National Writers Union provides 
a forum for writers on issues of concern to them. Plaintiff Stop Prisoner Rape, Inc., posts 
text, graphics, and statistics regarding the incidence and prevention of rape in prisons. 
Plaintiff Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc., offers information on safer sex, the transmission 
of HIV, and the treatment of AIDS. 
 
76. Such diversity of content on the Internet is possible because the Internet provides an 
easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to reach a large audience, potentially of millions. 
The start-up and operating costs entailed by communication on the Internet are 
significantly lower than those associated with use of other forms of mass communication, 
such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. This enables operation of their own 
Web sites not only by large companies, such as Microsoft and Time Warner, but also by 
small, not-for-profit groups, such as Stop Prisoner Rape and Critical Path AIDS Project. 
The Government’s expert, Dr. Dan R. Olsen, agreed that creation of a Web site would cost 
between $1,000 and $15,000, with monthly operating costs depending on one’s goals and 
the Web site’s traffic. Commercial online services such as America Online allow subscribers 
to create Web pages free of charge. Any Internet user can communicate by posting a 
message to one of the thousands of newsgroups and bulletin boards or by engaging in an on-
line “chat”, and thereby reach an audience worldwide that shares an interest in a particular 
topic. 
 
77. The ease of communication through the Internet is facilitated by the use of hypertext 
markup language (HTML), which allows for the creation of “hyperlinks” or “links”. HTML 
enables a user to jump from one source to other related sources by clicking on the link. A 
link might take the user from Web site to Web site, or to other files within a particular Web 
site. Similarly, by typing a request into a search engine, a user can retrieve many different 
sources of content related to the search that the creators of the engine have collected. 
 
78. Because of the technology underlying the Internet, the statutory term “content 
provider,” which is equivalent to the traditional “speaker,” may actually be a hybrid of 
speakers. Through the use of HTML, for example, Critical Path and Stop Prisoner Rape 
link their Web sites to several related databases, and a user can immediately jump from the 
home pages of these organizations to the related databases simply by clicking on a link. 
America Online creates chat rooms for particular discussions but also allows subscribers to 
create their own chat rooms. Similarly, a newsgroup gathers postings on a particular topic 
and distributes them to the newsgroup’s subscribers. Users of the Carnegie Library can 
read on-line versions of Vanity Fair and Playboy, and America Online’s subscribers can 
peruse the New York Times, Boating, and other periodicals. Critical Path, Stop Prisoner 
Rape, America Online and the Carnegie Library all make available content of other 
speakers over whom they have little or no editorial control. 
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79. Because of the different forms of Internet communication, a user of the Internet may 
speak or listen interchangeably, blurring the distinction between “speakers” and “listeners” 
on the Internet. Chat rooms, e-mail, and newsgroups are interactive forms of 
communication, providing the user with the opportunity both to speak and to listen. 
 
80. It follows that unlike traditional media, the barriers to entry as a speaker on the 
Internet do not differ significantly from the barriers to entry as a listener. Once one has 
entered cyberspace, one may engage in the dialogue that occurs there. In the argot of the 
medium, the receiver can and does become the content provider, and vice-versa. 
 
81. The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human 
communication. 
 
Sexually Explicit Material On the Internet 
 
82. The parties agree that sexually explicit material exists on the Internet. Such material 
includes text, pictures, and chat, and includes bulletin boards, newsgroups, and the other 
forms of Internet communication, and extends from the modestly titillating to the hardest-
core. 
 
83. There is no evidence that sexually-oriented material is the primary type of content on 
this new medium. Purveyors of such material take advantage of the same ease of access 
available to all users of the Internet, including establishment of a Web site. 
 
84. Sexually explicit material is created, named, and posted in the same manner as 
material that is not sexually explicit. It is possible that a search engine can accidentally 
retrieve material of a sexual nature through an imprecise search, as demonstrated at the 
hearing. Imprecise searches may also retrieve irrelevant material that is not of a sexual 
nature. The accidental retrieval of sexually explicit material is one manifestation of the 
larger phenomenon of irrelevant search results. 
 
85. Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users 
worldwide. Similarly, once a user posts a message to a newsgroup or bulletin board, that 
message becomes available to all subscribers to that newsgroup or bulletin board. For 
example, when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site nudes by 
Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new exhibit will travel to 
Baltimore and New York City, those images are available not only in Los Angeles, 
Baltimore, and New York City, but also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing—wherever 
Internet users live. Similarly, the safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web 
site, written in street language so that the teenage receiver can understand them, are 
available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague. A chat room organized by 
the ACLU to discuss the United States Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation would transmit George Carlin’s seven dirty words to anyone who enters. 
Messages posted to a newsgroup dedicated to the Oklahoma City bombing travel to all 
subscribers to that newsgroup. 
 
86. Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from 
entering any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station, or cable system, 
Internet technology necessarily gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience. Because 
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the Internet is a network of networks (as described above in Findings 1 through 4), any 
network connected to the Internet has the capacity to send and receive information to any 
other network. Hotwired Ventures, for example, cannot prevent its materials on mixology 
from entering communities that have no interest in that topic. 
 
87. Demonstrations at the preliminary injunction hearings showed that it takes several 
steps to enter cyberspace. At the most fundamental level, a user must have access to a 
computer with the ability to reach the Internet (typically by way of a modem). A user must 
then direct the computer to connect with the access provider, enter a password, and enter 
the appropriate commands to find particular data. On the World Wide Web, a user must 
normally use a search engine or enter an appropriate address. Similarly, accessing 
newsgroups, bulletin boards, and chat rooms requires several steps. 
 
88. Communications over the Internet do not “invade” an individual’s home or appear on 
one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content “by accident.” A 
document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before the document 
itself takes the step needed to view it, and in many cases the user will receive detailed 
information about a site’s content before he or she need take the step to access the 
document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content. 
Even the Government’s witness, Agent Howard Schmidt, Director of the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigation, testified that the “odds are slim” that a user would come across a 
sexually explicit site by accident. 
 
89. Evidence adduced at the hearing showed significant differences between Internet 
communications and communications received by radio or television. Although content on 
the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away from the user, the receipt of information on 
the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely 
turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve 
material and thereby to use the Internet unattended. 
 
Obstacles to Age Verification on the Internet 
 
90. There is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is accessing 
material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms. An e-mail address 
provides no authoritative information about the addressee, who may use an e-mail “alias” 
or an anonymous remailer. There is also no universal or reliable listing of e-mail addresses 
and corresponding names or telephone numbers, and any such listing would be or rapidly 
become incomplete. For these reasons, there is no reliable way in many instances for a 
sender to know if the e-mail recipient is an adult or a minor. The difficulty of e-mail age 
verification is compounded for mail exploders such as listservs, which automatically send 
information to all e-mail addresses on a sender’s list. Government expert Dr. Olsen agreed 
that no current technology could give a speaker assurance that only adults were listed in a 
particular mail exploder’s mailing list. 
 
91. Because of similar technological difficulties, individuals posting a message to a 
newsgroup or engaging in chat room discussions cannot ensure that all readers are adults, 
and Dr. Olsen agreed. Although some newsgroups are moderated, the moderator’s control is 
limited to what is posted and the moderator cannot control who receives the messages. 
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92. The Government offered no evidence that there is a reliable way to ensure that 
recipients and participants in such fora can be screened for age. The Government presented 
no evidence demonstrating the feasibility of its suggestion that chat rooms, newsgroups and 
other fora that contain material deemed indecent could be effectively segregated to “adult” 
or “moderated” areas of cyberspace. 
 
93. Even if it were technologically feasible to block minors’ access to newsgroups and 
similar fora, there is no method by which the creators of newsgroups which contain 
discussions of art, politics or any other subject that could potentially elicit “indecent” 
contributions could limit the blocking of access by minors to such “indecent” material and 
still allow them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that 
content was not indecent. 
 
94. Likewise, participants in MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) and MUSEs (Multi-User 
Simulation Environments) do not know whether the other participants are adults or 
minors. Although MUDs and MUSEs require a password for permanent participants, they 
need not give their real name nor verify their age, and there is no current technology to 
enable the administrator of these fantasy worlds to know if the participant is an adult or a 
minor. 
 
95. Unlike other forms of communication on the Internet, there is technology by which an 
operator of a World Wide Web server may interrogate a user of a Web site. An HTML 
document can include a fill-in-the-blank “form” to request information from a visitor to a 
Web site, and this information can be transmitted back to the Web server and be processed 
by a computer program, usually a Common Gateway Interface (cgi) script. The Web server 
could then grant or deny access to the information sought. The cgi script is the means by 
which a Web site can process a fill-in form and thereby screen visitors by requesting a 
credit card number or adult password. 
 
96. Content providers who publish on the World Wide Web via one of the large commercial 
online services, such as America Online or CompuServe, could not use an online age 
verification system that requires cgi script because the server software of these online 
services available to subscribers cannot process cgi scripts. There is no method currently 
available for Web page publishers who lack access to cgi scripts to screen recipients online 
for age. 
 
The Practicalities of the Proffered Defenses 
 
Note: The Government contends the CDA makes available three potential defenses to all 
content providers on the Internet: credit card verification, adult verification by password or 
adult identification number, and “tagging”. 
 
Credit Card Verification 
 
97. Verification of a credit card number over the Internet is not now technically possible. 
Witnesses testified that neither Visa nor Mastercard considers the Internet to be 
sufficiently secure under the current technology to process transactions in that manner. 
Although users can and do purchase products over the Internet by transmitting their credit 
card number, the seller must then process the transaction with Visa or Mastercard off-line 
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using phone lines in the traditional way. There was testimony by several witnesses that 
Visa and Mastercard are in the process of developing means of credit card verification over 
the Internet. 
 
98. Verification by credit card, if and when operational, will remain economically and 
practically unavailable for many of the non-commercial plaintiffs in these actions. The 
Government’s expert “suspect[ed]” that verification agencies would decline to process a card 
unless it accompanied a commercial transaction. There was no evidence to the contrary. 
 
99. There was evidence that the fee charged by verification agencies to process a card, 
whether for a purchase or not, will preclude use of the credit-card verification defense by 
many non-profit, non-commercial Web sites, and there was no evidence to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs’ witness Patricia Nell Warren, an author whose free Web site allows users to 
purchase gay and lesbian literature, testified that she must pay $1 per verification to a 
verification agency. Her Web site can absorb this cost because it arises in connection with 
the sale of books available there. 
 
100. Using credit card possession as a surrogate for age, and requiring use of a credit card 
to enter a site, would impose a significant economic cost on non-commercial entities. 
Critical Path, for example, received 3,300 hits daily from February 4 through March 4, 
1996. If Critical Path must pay a fee every time a user initially enters its site, then, to 
provide free access to its non-commercial site, it would incur a monthly cost far beyond its 
modest resources. The ACLU’s Barry Steinhardt testified that maintenance of a credit card 
verification system for all visitors to the ACLU’s Web site would require it to shut down its 
Web site because the projected cost would exceed its budget. 
 
101. Credit card verification would significantly delay the retrieval of information on the 
Internet. Dr. Olsen, the expert testifying for the Government, agreed that even “a minute is 
[an] absolutely unreasonable [delay] ... [P]eople will not put up with a minute.” Plaintiffs’ 
expert Donna Hoffman similarly testified that excessive delay disrupts the “flow” on the 
Internet and stifles both “hedonistic” and “goal-directed” browsing. 
 
102. Imposition of a credit card requirement would completely bar adults who do not have a 
credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any blocked material. At 
this time, credit card verification is effectively unavailable to a substantial number of 
Internet content providers as a potential defense to the CDA. 
 
Adult Verification by Password 
 
103. The Government offered very limited evidence regarding the operation of existing age 
verification systems, and the evidence offered was not based on personal knowledge. 
AdultCheck and Verify, existing systems which appear to be used for accessing commercial 
pornographic sites, charge users for their services. Dr. Olsen admitted that his knowledge 
of these services was derived primarily from reading the advertisements on their Web 
pages. He had not interviewed any employees of these entities, had not personally used 
these systems, had no idea how many people are registered with them, and could not testify 
to the reliability of their attempt at age verification. 
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104. At least some, if not almost all, non-commercial organizations, such as the ACLU, Stop 
Prisoner Rape or Critical Path AIDS Project, regard charging listeners to access their 
speech as contrary to their goals of making their materials available to a wide audience free 
of charge. 
 
105. It would not be feasible for many non-commercial organizations to design their own 
adult access code screening systems because the administrative burden of creating and 
maintaining a screening system and the ongoing costs involved is beyond their reach. There 
was testimony that the costs would be prohibitive even for a commercial entity such as 
HotWired, the online version of Wired magazine. 
 
106. There is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual Web browsers, 
would be discouraged from retrieving information that required use of a credit card or 
password. Andrew Anker testified that HotWired has received many complaints from its 
members about HotWired’s registration system, which requires only that a member supply 
a name, e-mail address and self-created password. There is concern by commercial content 
providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising and revenue 
because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely available and 
frequently visited. 
 
107. Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were implemented, the 
Government presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that the user of 
the password or credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card 
verification and adult password verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a 
substantial number of Internet content providers. 
 
The Government’s “Tagging” Proposal 
 
108. The feasibility and effectiveness of “tagging” to restrict children from accessing 
“indecent” speech, as proposed by the Government has not been established. “Tagging” 
would require content providers to label all of their “indecent” or “patently offensive” 
material by imbedding a string of characters, such as “XXX,” in either the URL or HTML. If 
a user could install software on his or her computer to recognize the “XXX” tag, the user 
could screen out any content with that tag. Dr. Olsen proposed a “-L18” tag, an idea he 
developed for this hearing in response to Mr. Bradner’s earlier testimony that certain 
tagging would not be feasible. 
 
109. The parties appear to agree that it is technologically feasible—”trivial”, in the words of 
plaintiffs’ expert—to imbed tags in URLs and HTML, and the technology of tagging 
underlies both plaintiffs’ PICS proposal and the Government’s “-L18” proposal. 
 
110. The Government’s tagging proposal would require all content providers that post 
arguably “indecent” material to review all of their online content, a task that would be 
extremely burdensome for organizations that provide large amounts of material online 
which cannot afford to pay a large staff to review all of that material. The Carnegie Library 
would be required to hire numerous additional employees to review its online files at an 
extremely high cost to its limited budget. The cost and effort would be substantial for the 
Library and frequently prohibitive for others. Witness Kiroshi Kuromiya testified that it 
would be impossible for his organization, Critical Path, to review all of its material because 
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it has only one full and one part-time employee. 
 
111. The task of screening and tagging cannot be done simply by using software which 
screens for certain words, as Dr. Olsen acknowledged, and we find that determinations as 
to what is indecent require human judgment. 
 
112. In lieu of reviewing each file individually, a content provider could tag its entire site 
but this would prevent minors from accessing much material that is not “indecent” under 
the CDA. 
 
113. To be effective, a scheme such as the -L18 proposal would require a worldwide 
consensus among speakers to use the same tag to label “indecent” material. There is 
currently no such consensus, and no Internet speaker currently labels its speech with the -
L18 code or with any other widely-recognized label. 
 
114. Tagging also assumes the existence of software that recognizes the tags and takes 
appropriate action when it notes tagged speech. Neither commercial Web browsers nor 
user-based screening software is currently configured to block a -L18 code. Until such 
software exists, all speech on the Internet will continue to travel to whomever requests it, 
without hindrance. Labelling speech has no effect in itself on the transmission (or not) of 
that speech. Neither plaintiffs nor the Government suggest that tagging alone would shield 
minors from speech or insulate a speaker from criminal liability under the CDA. It follows 
that all speech on any topic that is available to adults will also be available to children 
using the Internet (unless it is blocked by screening software running on the computer the 
child is using). 
 
115. There is no way that a speaker can use current technology to know if a listener is 
using screening software. 
 
116. Tags can not currently activate or deactivate themselves depending on the age or 
location of the receiver. Critical Path, which posts on-line safer sex instructions, would be 
unable to imbed tags that block its speech only in communities where it may be regarded as 
indecent. Critical Path, for example, must choose either to tag its site (blocking its speech in 
all communities) or not to tag, blocking its speech in none. 
 
The Problems of Offshore Content and Caching 
 
117. A large percentage, perhaps 40% or more, of content on the Internet originates outside 
the United States. At the hearing, a witness demonstrated how an Internet user could 
access a Web site of London (which presumably is on a server in England), and then link to 
other sites of interest in England. A user can sometimes discern from a URL that content is 
coming from overseas, since InterNIC allows a content provider to imbed a country code in 
a domain name. Foreign content is otherwise indistinguishable from domestic content (as 
long as it is in English), since foreign speech is created, named, and posted in the same 
manner as domestic speech. There is no requirement that foreign speech contain a country 
code in its URL. It is undisputed that some foreign speech that travels over the Internet is 
sexually explicit. 
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118. The use of “caching” makes it difficult to determine whether the material originated 
from foreign or domestic sources. Because of the high cost of using the trans-Atlantic and 
trans-Pacific cables, and because the high demand on those cables leads to bottleneck 
delays, content is often “cached”, or temporarily stored, on servers in the United States. 
Material from a foreign source in Europe can travel over the trans-Atlantic cable to the 
receiver in the United States, and pass through a domestic caching server which then 
stores a copy for subsequent retrieval. This domestic caching server, rather than the 
original foreign server, will send the material from the cache to the subsequent receivers, 
without placing a demand on the trans-oceanic cables. This shortcut effectively eliminates 
most of the distance for both the request and the information and, hence, most of the delay. 
The caching server discards the stored information according to its configuration (e.g., after 
a certain time or as the demand for the information diminishes). Caching therefore 
advances core Internet values: the cheap and speedy retrieval of information. 
 
119. Caching is not merely an international phenomenon. Domestic content providers store 
popular domestic material on their caching servers to avoid the delay of successive searches 
for the same material and to decrease the demand on their Internet connection. America 
Online can cache the home page of the New York Times on its servers when a subscriber 
first requests it, so that subsequent subscribers who make the same request will receive the 
same home page, but from America Online’s caching service rather than from the New York 
Times’s server. 
 
120. Put simply, to follow the example in the prior paragraph, America Online has no 
control over the content that the New York Times posts to its Web site, and the New York 
Times has no control over America Online’s distribution of that content from a caching 
server. 
 
Anonymity 
 
121. Anonymity is important to Internet users who seek to access sensitive information, 
such as users of the Critical Path AIDS Project’s Web site, the users, particularly gay 
youth, of Queer Resources Directory, and users of Stop Prisoner Rape (SPR). Many 
members of SPR’s mailing list have asked to remain anonymous due to the stigma of 
prisoner rape. 
 
Plaintiffs’ Choices Under the CDA 
 
122. Many speakers who display arguably indecent content on the Internet must choose 
between silence and the risk of prosecution. The CDA’s defenses—credit card verification, 
adult access codes, and adult personal identification numbers—are effectively unavailable 
for non-commercial, not-for-profit entities. 
 
123. The plaintiffs in this action are businesses, libraries, non-commercial and not-for-profit 
organizations, and educational societies and consortia. Although some of the material that 
plaintiffs post online—such as information regarding protection from AIDS, birth control or 
prison rape—is sexually explicit and may be considered “indecent” or “patently offensive” in 
some communities, none of the plaintiffs is a commercial purveyor of what is commonly 
termed “pornography.” 
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Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
Ellis, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of those similarly situated, sues his Internet 
service provider (ISP) for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the ISP wrongfully 
refused to prevent participants in an online chat room from posting or submitting harassing 
comments that blasphemed and defamed plaintiff’s Islamic religion and his co-religionists. 
Specifically, plaintiff claims his ISP’s failure to prevent chat room participants from using 
the ISP’s chat room to publish the harassing and defamatory comments constitutes a 
breach of the ISP’s customer agreement with plaintiff and a violation of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. 
 
At issue on a threshold dismissal motion are 
 
(i) the now familiar and well-litigated question whether a claim, like 
plaintiff’s, which seeks to hold an ISP civilly liable as a publisher of third 
party statements is barred by the immunity granted ISP’s by the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
 
(ii) the less familiar, indeed novel question whether an online chat room is a 
“place of public accommodation” under Title II, and 
 
(iii) the rather prosaic question whether plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is 
barred by the very contract on which he relies, namely the Member 
Agreement contract. 
 
For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s claims do not survive threshold inspection and must 
therefore be dismissed. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff Saad Noah, a Muslim, is a resident of Illinois and was a subscriber of defendant 
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)’s Internet service until he cancelled the service in July of 
2000. AOL, which is located in the Eastern District of Virginia, is, according to the 
complaint, the world’s largest Internet service provider, with more than 30 million 
subscribers, or “members,” worldwide. Defendant AOL Time Warner Inc. is the parent 
company of AOL. 
 
Among the many services AOL provides its members are what are popularly known as 
“chat rooms.” These occur where, as AOL does here, an ISP allows its participants to use its 
facilities to engage in real-time electronic conversations. Chat room participants type in 
their comments or observations, which are then read by other chat room participants, who 
may then type in their responses. Conversations in a chat room unfold in real time; the 
submitted comments appear transiently on participants’ screens and then scroll off the 
screen as the conversation progresses. AOL chat rooms are typically set up for the 
discussion of a particular topic or area of interest, and any AOL member who wishes to join 
a conversation in a public chat room may do so. 
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Two AOL chat rooms are the focus of plaintiff’s claims: the “Beliefs Islam” chat room and 
the “Koran” chat room. It is in these chat rooms that plaintiff alleges that he and other 
Muslims have been harassed, insulted, threatened, ridiculed and slandered by other AOL 
members due to their religious beliefs. The complaint lists dozens of harassing statements 
made by other AOL members in these chat rooms on specified dates, all of which plaintiff 
alleges he brought to AOL’s attention together with requests that AOL take action to 
enforce its member guidelines and halt promulgation of the harassing statements. The 
statements span a period of two and one-half years, from January 10, 1998 to July 1, 2000, 
and are attributable to various AOL chat room participants only by virtue of a screen name. 
A representative sample of the reported offensive comments follows: 
 
(i) On January 10, 1998 the AOL Member with the screen name “Aristotlee” 
wrote “islam is meaniglessssss thought,” “allahsdick cut offfffffff,” “dumballah 
bastard,” “allah assssshole,” “allajs dick is in holy dick place hey.” “FUCK 
ALLAH,” etc. 
 
(ii) On April 26, 1998, “Twotoneleg” wrote “I HATE MUSLIMS,” “THE 
KORAN SUCKS,” etc., and “BOSS30269” wrote “I LIKE SHOOTING 
MUSLIMS,” “I WILL BOMB THE MIDDLE EAST,” and “FUCK ISLAM.” 
 
(iii) On November 4, 1998, “Hefedehefe” wrote “SMELLY TOWEL HEADS” 
and “MUSLIM TOWEL HEADS.” 
 
(iv) On July 11, 1999, “Jzingher” wrote “The Koran and Islam are creations of 
Satan to distract people from the true faith which is Judaism. Mohammed 
was merely a huckster who found a simple people he could manipulate.” 
 
(v) On July 18, 1999 “SARGON I” wrote “Qura’n lies about everything-a 
Satan made verses of darkness and destruction!”, “Mohammed was no shit, 
only a killer, thief, a liar and a adulterer!”, and “BYE STUPID 
MUSLIMS....ALL GO TO HELL.” 
 
(vi) On July 1, 2000, “DXfina3000 wrote “muslims suck,” “they suck ass,” 
“korans is use to wipe ass,” “fuckin muslins,” and “well allah can suck my 
dick you peice of ass.” 
 
Plaintiff understandably complained about these offensive, obnoxious, and indecent 
statements, initially through the channels provided by AOL for such complaints and 
eventually through emails sent directly to AOL’s CEO Steve Case. Plaintiff alleges that 
although he reported every one of the alleged violations to AOL, AOL refused to exercise its 
power to eliminate the harassment in the “Beliefs Islam” and “Koran” chat rooms. 
Moreover, plaintiff contends that AOL gave a “green light” to the harassment of Muslims in 
these forums, claiming that such harassment was not tolerated in chat rooms dealing with 
other subjects and faiths. In protest, plaintiff cancelled his AOL account in July 2000. 
Plaintiff further alleges that other Muslim members of AOL have also complained to AOL 
about similar harassing statements. 
 
The relationship between AOL and each of its subscribing members is governed by the 
Terms of Service (“TOS”), which include a Member Agreement and the Community 
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Guidelines. The Member Agreement is a “legal document that details [a member’s] rights 
and obligations as an AOL member,” and it requires, inter alia, that AOL members adhere 
to AOL’s standards for online speech, as set forth in the Community Guidelines. These 
Guidelines state, in pertinent part, that 
 
... You will be considered in violation of the Terms of Service if you (or others 
using your account) do any of the following: .... 
 
* Harass, threaten, embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is 
unwanted. This means: ... don’t attack their race, heritage, etc.... 
 
* Transmit or facilitate distribution of content that is harmful, abusive, 
racially or ethnically offensive, vulgar, sexually explicit, or in a reasonable 
person’s view, objectionable. Community standards may vary, but there is no 
place on the service where hate speech is tolerated. 
 
* Disrupt the flow of chat in chat rooms with vulgar language, abusiveness, ... 
 
The Member Agreement states that AOL has the right to enforce these Community 
Guidelines “in its sole discretion.” In response to a violation, “AOL may take action against 
your account,” ranging from “issuance of a warning about a violation to termination of your 
account.” AOL’s Community Action Team is responsible for enforcing the content and 
conduct standards and members are encouraged to notify AOL of violations they observe 
online. Importantly, however, the Member Agreement states that AOL members “... also 
understand and agree that the AOL Community Guidelines and the AOL Privacy Policy, 
including AOL’s enforcement of those policies, are not intended to confer, and do not confer, 
any rights or remedies upon any person.” 
 
Plaintiff filed this pro se action on September 3, 2002, claiming that AOL’s alleged refusal 
to intervene to stop the harassing statements and enforce the TOS constitutes (i) 
discrimination in a place of public accommodation, in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and (ii) a breach of AOL’s TOS and the Member Agreement. 
The action purports to be a class action, brought on behalf of plaintiff and all others 
similarly situated. 
 
In addition to these claims raised in the complaint, plaintiff seems to assert a third claim 
against defendants in his response to the motion to dismiss, where he alleges new facts 
concerning several incidents involving disciplinary actions taken by AOL against plaintiff 
and other, unnamed Muslim AOL members. Although the nature of the incidents is not 
entirely clear, plaintiff alleges that AOL discriminated against plaintiff and other Muslim 
AOL members by issuing false warnings against them and terminating their accounts in an 
effort to silence their pro-Islam speech. Plaintiff alleges his own AOL account was briefly 
terminated by AOL and subsequently reinstated, but his past messages were not restored. 
Relying on these incidents, plaintiff belatedly claims a violation of his First Amendment 
rights and of the First Amendment rights of similarly situated Muslims. Although not 
properly pled in the complaint, given plaintiff’s pro se status this claim will nonetheless be 
considered on this motion to dismiss as if it had been raised in the original complaint. 
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Defendants AOL and AOL Time Warner filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on 
January 22, 2003. Nearly a month later, two days before the motion was noticed for a 
hearing, plaintiff belatedly requested and ultimately received, as a matter of grace, an 
extension of time until March 7, 2003, in which to file his response. Plaintiff missed this 
deadline as well, filing his response on March 10, 2003. Thereafter, defendants filed their 
reply on March 17, 2003. Because the issues and governing authorities are adequately set 
forth in the pleadings, oral argument is unnecessary and may be dispensed with, and this 
motion is appropriately disposed of on the papers…. 
 
IV. 
 
Plaintiff’s Title II claim fails for two alternate and independent reasons. First, plaintiff’s 
claim against AOL is barred because of the immunity granted AOL, as an interactive 
computer service provider, by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
Second, plaintiff’s claim fails because a chat room is not a “place of public accommodation” 
as defined by Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). Each dismissal ground is separately 
addressed…. 
 
[in Section A, the court concludes that AOL is immunized by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).] 
 
B. 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff’s Title II claim is not barred by § 230, it must 
nonetheless be dismissed for failure to state a claim because AOL’s chat rooms and other 
online services do not constitute a “place of public accommodation” under Title II. 
 
Title II provides that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the 
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Title II defines a 
“place of public accommodation” as follows: 
 
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of 
public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter ... 
 
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to 
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building 
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence; 
 
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or 
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the 
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the 
premises of any retail establishment; or any gas station; 
 
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or 
other place of exhibition or entertainment; and 
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(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of 
any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the 
premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and 
(B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). 
 
The theory of plaintiff’s Title II claim is that he was denied the right of equal enjoyment of 
AOL’s chat rooms because of AOL’s alleged failure to take steps to stop the harassing 
comments and because of AOL’s warnings to plaintiff and brief termination of plaintiff’s 
service. In this regard, plaintiff contends that the chat rooms are “place[s] of ... 
entertainment” and thus within the public accommodation definition. Yet, as the relevant 
case law and an examination the statute’s exhaustive definition make clear, “places of 
public accommodation” are limited to actual, physical places and structures, and thus 
cannot include chat rooms, which are not actual physical facilities but instead are virtual 
forums for communication provided by AOL to its members. 
 
Title II’s definition of “places of public accommodation” provides a list of “establishments” 
that qualify as such places. This list, without exception, consists of actual physical 
structures; namely any “inn, hotel, motel, ... restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch 
counter, soda fountain, ... gasoline station ... motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 
sports arena [or] stadium.” In addition, § 2000a(b)(4) emphasizes the importance of physical 
presence by referring to any “establishment ... which is physically located within” an 
establishment otherwise covered, or “within ... which” an otherwise covered establishment 
“is physically located.” (emphasis added) Thus, in interpreting the catchall phrase “other 
place of exhibition or entertainment” on which plaintiff relies, the statute’s consistent 
reference to actual physical structures points convincingly to the conclusion that the phrase 
does not include forums for entertainment that are not physical structures or locations. 
 
As the Supreme Court has held, § 2000a(b)(3) should be read broadly to give effect to the 
statute’s purpose, namely to eliminate the “daily affront and humiliation” caused by 
“discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.” 
(emphasis added). This broad coverage stems from a “natural reading of [the statute’s] 
language,” which should be “given full effect according to its generally accepted meaning.” 
As such, it is clear that the reach of Title II, however broad, cannot extend beyond actual 
physical facilities. Given Title II’s sharp focus on actual physical facilities, such as inns, 
motels, restaurants, gas stations, theaters, and stadiums, it is clear that Congress intended 
the statute to reach only the listed facilities and other similar physical structures, not to 
“regulate a wide spectrum of consensual human relationships.” 
 
This emphasis on actual physical facilities is reinforced by the cases rejecting Title II claims 
against membership organizations. In Welsh, the plaintiffs, who were atheists, claimed that 
the Boy Scouts of America violated Title II in denying them membership, arguing that the 
Boy Scouts were a “place of ... entertainment.” The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel in 
Welsh concluded that the Boy Scouts of America is not a “place of public accommodation” 
under Title II because it is not “closely connected to a particular facility.” In doing so, the 
Welsh majority distinguished the Boy Scouts from membership organizations in which 
membership “functions as a ‘ticket’ to admission to a facility or location,” that have been 
consistently held to be places of public accommodation under Title II. Similarly, the Ninth 
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Circuit in Clegg held that the Cult Awareness Network, a nonprofit organization that 
provides information to the public concerning cults and supports former cult members, was 
not a “place of public accommodation” because it had “no affiliation with any public facility.” 
In short, it is clear from the cases considering membership organizations that status as a 
place of public accommodation under Title II requires some connection to some specific 
physical facility or structure. As noted in Welsh and Clegg, to ignore this requirement is to 
ignore the plain language of the statute and to render the list of example facilities provided 
by the statute superfluous. 
 
In arguing that places of public accommodation are not limited to actual physical facilities 
under Title II, plaintiff turns to the case law interpreting the analogous “place of public 
accommodation” provision under Title III of the Americans With Disability Act (ADA). 
While the case law concerning places of public accommodation under the ADA is more 
abundant than that under Title II, it is not entirely uniform. Yet, a detour into the parallel 
ADA cases is instructive and ultimately supports the conclusion that “places of public 
accommodation” must consist of, or have a clear connection to, actual physical facilities or 
structures. 
 
The circuits are split regarding the essential question whether a place of public 
accommodation under the ADA must be an actual concrete physical structure. On the one 
hand, as plaintiff notes, the First Circuit has held that “places of public accommodation” 
under Title III of the ADA are not limited to actual physical facilities. See Carparts 
Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 
12, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a trade association which administers a health 
insurance program, without any connection to a physical facility, can be a “place of public 
accommodation”).9 On the other hand, the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in similar cases 
involving health insurance programs, followed the logic of Welsh and Clegg in holding that 
places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA must be physical places. Thus, it 
appears that the weight of authority endorses the “actual physical structure” requirement 
in the ADA context as well. 
 
Most significantly, two more recent ADA cases involving fact situations much closer to 
those at bar reaffirm the principle that a “places of public accommodation,” even under the 
ADA’s broader definition, must be actual, physical facilities. In one case, the plaintiffs 
claimed that Southwest Airlines was in violation of the ADA because its “southwest.com” 
web site was incompatible with “screen reader” programs and thus inaccessible to blind 
persons. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1316 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002). Thus, the question presented was whether the airline’s web site, which serves as 
an online ticket counter, constitutes a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA. The 
                                                 
9 In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit in Carparts relied on the ADA’s more expansive definition of 
“place of public accommodation,” in particular its inclusion of a “travel service,” “insurance office,” and “other 
service establishments” as places of public accommodation. Focusing on these terms, the First Circuit concluded 
that “Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include providers of services which do not 
require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure,” and thus that the Title III of the ADA is not 
limited to “physical structures which person must enter to obtain goods and services.” Simply put, the Carparts 
court found it irrational to conclude that Title III of the ADA reaches those who enter an office to purchase 
insurance services, but not those who purchase them over the mail or by telephone. Notably, Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act does not include a “travel service,” “insurance office,” or “other service establishments” in its 
definition, making the relevance of Carparts and its progeny to Title II questionable, at best. 
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Access Now court held that places of public accommodation under the ADA are limited to 
“physical concrete structures,” and that the web site was not an actual physical structure. 
Rejecting the invitation to endorse the Carparts approach and apply the ADA to Internet 
web sites despite their lack of physical presence, the Access Now court concluded that “[t]o 
expand the ADA to cover ‘virtual’ spaces would create new rights without well-defined 
standards.”11 Similarly, in another case, plaintiff contended that the defendant’s digital 
cable system was in violation of the ADA because its on-screen channel guide was not 
accessible to the visually impaired. Here too, the district court rejected the notion that the 
digital cable system was a “place of public accommodation,” because “in no way does 
viewing the system’s images require the plaintiff to gain access to any actual physical 
public place,” Furthermore, the Torres court sensibly concluded that the mere fact that the 
digital cable system relied on physical facilities to support and transmit its services did not 
convert the cable service into a “physical public place.”  
 
In sum, whether one relies on the Title II case law or looks to the broader ADA definition of 
public place of accommodation, it is clear that the logic of the statute and the weight of 
authority indicate that “places of entertainment” must be actual physical facilities. With 
this principle firmly established, it is clear that AOL’s online chat rooms cannot be 
construed as “places of public accommodation” under Title II. An online chat room may 
arguably be a “place of entertainment,” but it is not a physical structure to which a member 
of the public may be granted or denied access, and as such is fundamentally different from 
a “motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, [or] stadium.” Although a chat 
room may serve as a virtual forum through which AOL members can meet and converse in 
cyberspace, it is not an “establishment,” under the plain meaning of that term as defined by 
the statute. Unlike a theater, concert hall, arena, or any of the other “places of 
entertainment” specifically listed in § 2000a(b), a chat room does not exist in a particular 
physical location, indeed it can be accessed almost anywhere, including from homes, 
schools, cybercafes and libraries. In sum, although a chat room or other online forum might 
be referred to metaphorically as a “location” or “place,” it lacks the physical presence 
necessary to constitute a place of public accommodation under Title II. Accordingly, even if 
plaintiff’s Title II claim were not barred by § 230’s grant of immunity to service providers, it 
would be fail on the independent ground that AOL’s chat rooms are not places of public 
accommodation. 
  
V. 
 
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim must likewise be dismissed because the contractual 
rights plaintiff claims are simply not provided for in AOL’s Member Agreement. The plain 
language of the Member Agreement makes clear that AOL is not obligated to take any 
action against those who violate its Community Guidelines. Thus, the Member Agreement 
provides that AOL “has the right to enforce them in its sole discretion,” and that “if you ... 
violate the AOL Community Guidelines, AOL may take action against your account.” 
(emphasis added). The Member Agreement also states that “[y]ou also understand and 
agree that the AOL Community Guidelines and the AOL Privacy Policy, including AOL’s 
                                                 
11 But see Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Carparts approvingly and 
stating, in dicta, that Title III of the ADA reaches “the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s 
office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space)”) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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enforcement of those policies, are not intended to confer, and do not confer, any rights or 
remedies upon any person.” (emphasis added). The Member Agreement states that while 
AOL “reserve[s] the right to remove content that, in AOL’s judgment, does not meet its 
standards or does not comply with AOL’s current Community Guidelines ... AOL is not 
responsible for any failure or delay in removing such material.” 
 
In light of this plain contractual language, plaintiff cannot claim that AOL breached a duty 
to protect him from the harassing speech of others; the Member Agreement expressly 
disclaims any such duty…. 
 
Furthermore, plaintiff’s attempt to cast this claim as a third-party beneficiary claim is 
unavailing. Under the Member Agreement, AOL no more owes a duty to other AOL 
members to enforce its Community Guidelines than it does with respect to plaintiff. 
 
E. 
 
Finally, plaintiff’s belatedly-raised First Amendment claim is easily disposed of at this 
stage. In essence, plaintiff claims that AOL violated his First Amendment rights by issuing 
him warnings and briefly terminating his account, allegedly in response to his pro-Islamic 
statements. Yet, even assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, the First Amendment is 
of no avail to him in these circumstances; it does not protect against actions taken by 
private entities, rather it is “a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal 
or state.” Plaintiff does not argue that AOL is a state actor, nor is there any evident basis 
for such an argument. See Green, 318 F.3d at 472 (noting that AOL is a “private, for profit 
company” and rejecting the argument that AOL should be treated as a state actor); Cyber 
Promotions Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(rejecting the argument that AOL is a state actor). Accordingly, because AOL is not a state 
actor, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must be dismissed. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Who do you find more sympathetic—Noah or AOL? 
 
Why didn’t AOL do more to enforce its user agreement and clean up the chatrooms?   
 
Are the hostile comments experienced by Noah a problem? 
 
Why should we treat online spaces differently than physical spaces? 
 
Cyberspace and “Places of Public Accommodation.”  Regarding the boundary between 
cyberspace and real space, most cases have reached a similar conclusion to the Noah ruling.  
See, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52711 (N.D. Cal. 2011): 
 
Despite its frequent use of terms such as “posts” and “walls,” Facebook 
operates only in cyberspace, and is thus is not a “place of public 
accommodation” as construed by the Ninth Circuit.  While Facebook’s 
physical headquarters obviously is a physical space, it is not a place where 
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the online services to which Young claims she was denied access are offered 
to the public. 
 
But see National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 2012 WL 2343666 (D. Mass. June 
19, 2012) (finding that Netflix qualified as a place of public accommodation for purposes of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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Geolocation: Core To The Local Space And Key To Click-Fraud Detection 
by Chris Silver Smith 
Search Engine Land 
http://searchengineland.com/geolocation-core-to-the-local-space-and-key-to-click-fraud-
detection-11922 
Aug 13, 2007 at 8:20am ET 
 
…How it works 
 
At its most basic, online geolocation we’re referring to is an attempt to identify the actual 
physical location of internet users. There are a few different ways that this may be 
accomplished. The best-known method is to take the user’s IP address, which is transmitted 
with every internet request, and to look up the organization and physical address listed as 
the owner of that IP address. Anyone can do this, by querying the Whois information at 
ARIN – the American Registry for Internet Numbers. (Note: this is NOT the same as a 
domain name Whois query! Many IP addresses may not be associated with a domain name 
at all, so a domain name Whois of an IP address may not get you geolocation info.) 
 
For instance, let’s say that I noticed that a visitor to my website came in on IP address 
216.64.210.100, according to my server’s log files. I can query ARIN for that IP address, and 
I see that it’s an address included within a block of IP addresses owned by The Coca-Cola 
Company: 
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I could then perhaps figure that this visitor was an employee of The Coca-Cola Company, 
perhaps reading an article in the series of pieces I recently did about the Coca-Cola website. 
Indeed, my Google Analytics report is showing that I got a few visits from people associated 
with Coca-Cola during that time: 
 
 
 
Since I can identify visitors from The Coca-Cola Company, I could deliver up content 
specific to them—I’ve heard stories about Google and Yahoo delivering up ads for 
engineering positions to the employees of Microsoft in Redmond using this method, for 
instance.  More importantly, I can now assume that this user is likely to be physically 
located in Atlanta, Georgia—so I know their City, State, Zip Code, Designated Metro Area, 
and Country! 
 
Naturally, it’s likely not feasible to automatically perform an ARIN lookup with each visitor 
to your website before delivering up data, because it would take too long.  So, there are a 
few companies out there who are aggregating and caching the network data and either 
providing lookup tables or web service lookups to those who wish to deliver location-specific 
content or who are using the data for reporting or fraud detection purposes. 
 
Some ISPs which provide internet access through hotels may now be providing the physical 
locations of their networks of access points to the geolocation data aggregators as well, and 
in many cases these ISPs are hosting the default web page portals of local information to 
the hotel visitors.  Some ISPs may also be quietly providing geolocational data to the 
aggregators as well, allowing all their customers to be geolocated to varying degrees. 
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Also, internet service providers who host Wi-Fi hotspots throughout the world are providing 
data to various of these aggregators, allowing the hotspots’ IP addresses to be associated 
with precise physical addresses. 
 
Mobile phones are able to be geolocated by triangulating their location from area cell phone 
towers, and there are increasing numbers of wireless devices such as phones, PDAs, and 
laptops which are getting integrated with GPS satellite pinpointing, paving the way to 
associate precise coordinates with them.  As more mobile devices like the iPhone leverage 
Wi-Fi access, there will be a variety of geolocational methods which will be able to pinpoint 
mobile users. 
 
Who provides the geolocation data? 
 
Quova is considered the best-in-class (probably with a price tag to match) of the geolocation 
data aggregators, and their data is apparently used by Google, Yahoo!, and MSN to 
geotarget content and ads, and likely for the purposes of analytics and fraud detection as 
well. They were founded in 2000 and they geolocate users through IP address location data 
as well as tracing network gateways and router locations. They also likely traceroute users 
coming through proxies to better determine location to some degree, and they analyze 
request latency of users passing through proxies to help determine physical distance from 
the proxy servers’ physical locations. 
 
Quova recently partnered with Mexens Technology in order to supplement their IP/network 
location data with Wi-FI hotspot locations, device GPS, and wireless tower triangulation. 
 
Quova uses Pricewaterhouse Coopers to audit their geolocation data, and are perhaps the 
only company allowing independent, third-party validation testing of this sort. Their 
GeoDirectory Data Sheet states that PwC does this auditing by testing Quova data against 
“…large, independent third-party data sets of actual web users…”. I interpret that to mean 
that PwC likely obtains IP addresses from some ISPs who tell them the countries and 
states associated with the IP addresses, and they check to see how accurately the Quova 
data identifies the locations of those addresses…. 
 
[the article discusses some other vendors of geolocation information] 
 
I’ve just touched on some of the companies that are most-interesting to me who are 
providing geolocation products and services. There are likely quite a number of companies 
which are also doing this in-house to some degree. For instance, I wouldn’t be surprised if 
Google wasn’t geolocating through querying and caching of ARIN data on top of data they’re 
receiving from other providers listed above. Considering how vital geolocation data is to the 
policing of click-fraud, Google could be building out their own complete geolocation data 
aggregation infrastructure. Further, it’s also been suggested that Google is likely using 
domain’s registration data through Google’s status as a registrar to assist in associating 
websites with geographic locations for Google Maps—not precisely the geolocation of users 
I’m covering here, but a closely related method that could be useful to local SEO. 
 
Many mobile service providers are also using the geolocational information associated with 
their devices in order to deliver up location-specific information on their own, without the 
assistance of the geolocation data aggregators. 
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How geolocation is used in the local space and in general internet marketing: 
 
Targeting Ads to user’s locality – ads could be targeted by varying levels of locality 
including ZIP Code, City, Metro Area (DMA), Region, State, Company, Country, and Time 
Zone. For example, I just performed a search in Google for “personal injury lawyers”, and 
you can see that they displayed a number of ads for lawyers who’ve targeted ads to the 
Dallas, Texas metro area where I’m writing this article: 
 
 
 
Targeting locally apropos content to users, including language delivery, currency such as 
pounds/euros/dollars/yen/etc—providing native users’ currency on e-com pages and order 
forms, location-specific text/images, customization of web search results which may have a 
local component, automating Store Locator pages for retailers, etc. 
 
Content Restriction: there are frequently some contractual/legal limits on what products 
and services can be sold where. Uses include restricting online gambling from US users; 
enforcement of trade embargoes so that certain items won’t be sold to countries disallowed 
by federal laws; some items can only be sold in particular areas of the world and some 
promotional contests are only allowed by certain states or provincial rules. 
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Financial Fraud Detection: denying sales to possibly compromised credit cards or bank 
accounts – for instance, if the IP address of the online user is in suspect foreign country, but 
account owner address is in the US. 
 
Identity Fraud Detection: geolocation provides additional signal for logins for protecting 
user identities. 
 
Advertising Fraud Detection: filtering out invalid or fraudulent clicks – products/services 
only available in one country, but Pay-Per-Click advertising clicks are coming from another. 
 
Potential Detection of DoS Attacks: many requests coming in from a wide variety of natural-
looking IP addresses, but geolocation of requestors shows requests actually coming all from 
one primary location. 
 
Internet Analytics Applications: analyzing and showing from where visitors viewed a 
website, and quantifying how many come from particular locations. 
 
Site Server Locations for SEO: there’s some supposition that websites hosted in the country 
who’s audience they’re targeting might actually get better rankings within search engines 
targeting that country’s users. 
 
The issue of error rates 
 
From the very beginning, geolocation providers have been asked about how much error is 
involved in their ability to pinpoint web users, and from the very beginning geodata 
consumers have noticed some amount of errors happening. There are a lot of anecdotal tales 
of ads and content being incorrectly displayed for users when their geolocation has been 
incorrectly assessed. 
 
The classic example of IP locating error is caused where a large internet service provider 
may provide web access across the world, but the block of their users’ IP addresses are all 
associated with the ISP’s corporate headquarters or network office in one location. With 
simplistic IP address mapping, all those users could be geolocated by aggregators to that 
single corporate office location, even though they might in actuality be spread out in many 
areas. The most famous example of this is the AOL proxy server issue wherein geolocation 
aggregators were originally unable to pinpoint AOL users and incorrectly associating them 
all with their Virginia address. 
 
Quova used to claim to have beat the AOL proxy barrier to identify where their requests 
originate, but specific terminology touting this ability has been considerably toned down 
these days in Quova’s collateral materials, and their GeoDirectory data sheet merely 
mentions that they have included a flag for AOL. One assumes that their confidence factors 
rating for geolocation and general proxy detection/locating ability might be used to give 
some level of AOL user identification ability, but the flag must be provided so that the 
geodata consumers could opt to not geolocate AOL users if they presumed the data to be too 
error-prone. 
 
While the AOL proxy issue is the most famous, many other ISPs likely have some similar 
barriers to pinpointing their users. Using one of the previously-mentioned geolocation 
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services, I just now checked my IP address and was mapped to Keller, Texas, even though 
I’m writing this 20 miles away. Large corporations likely have this going on as well. For 
instance, in the Coca-Cola IP address example I gave above, I’d bet that the company is 
large enough that they probably have offices throughout the states and world, and their 
employees addresses might be prone to being incorrectly mapped to their headquarters 
locations. 
 
Since IP address mapping using ARIN registrar data could be so prone to error at the more 
granular levels, a number of the geolocation providers rush to quote accuracy estimates 
based on the broader, country and regional levels: 
 
Quova: “…In audited tests using large, independent third-party data sets of 
actual web users, Quova’s country level accuracy was measured at 99.9%. US 
state level accuracy was measured at approximately 95%.” 
 
IP2Location: “…over 95 percent matching accuracy at the country level…” 
 
Another factor occurs when users specifically choose to route their requests through a proxy 
in order to anonymize their internet usage, either for privacy reasons, or for the sake of 
hiding criminal activities. A number of sites out there provide free or paid anonymizing 
services, allowing users to submit their internet requests which then get filtered through 
another layer of services before the requests reach content providers’ servers. 
 
Obviously, geolocation accuracy could be more accurate through network route mapping 
and enhancing IP registration data with data from the large ISPs, along with Wi-Fi and 
mobile device location data. 
 
Users browsing the internet through mobile phones and other wireless devices now pose an 
additional proxying problem, since most of the wireless carriers will display only a central 
IP address for all of their users, and any attempts at network routing will be stymied by the 
fact that wireless network traffic isn’t being monitored. For the companies who are 
providing content through these wireless carriers’ mobile portals, they may be supplied 
geolocation info by the carriers, but this may not help most webmasters who don’t have 
such partnerships. As more mobile device users demand open access to the entire internet, 
the mobile carrier’s proxies may become an increasing source of error in geolocation data. 
 
Freshness of data weighs in as well since IP address blocks change over time, so if an IP 
location source doesn’t update their database, it can result in incorrect targeting, just as 
with this incident related by Barry Schwartz where a Texas school district kept getting 
content from Google Canada. 
 
The biggest problem in assessing the error rates of geolocation data is the simple fact that 
there’s no way to really test well for accuracy. The one and only company which publicly 
states that it uses external auditing (Quova), provided by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, is 
apparently testing by comparing their geodata with large datasets where they know the 
physical locations of the users associated with the IP addresses. But, how broad is that 
comparison data? Is the testing comparison working the same as when users are 
dynamically being geotargeted through the data in real-time? Does data from just a few 
major ISPs (assuming that’s what’s being used) really represent the majority of internet 
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users? Does it take into account the huge amount of corporate employees browsing during 
their workdays? (I’d guess not, since most large corporations probably shouldn’t be sharing 
the locational information associated with their employee’s IP addresses.) What’s the 
estimate for accuracy at the city-level and postal-code level? 
 
At best, this is only an estimation and not direct test results for accuracy, so we don’t know 
what the error rate really is. 
 
To be fair, it’s simply not possible for any of us to know the actual error rates involved, 
since it’s impossible to assess whether all internet users are being accurately geolocated 
through any of these services. We can only sample some amount of users, and decide 
whether that sample set should be considered representative of all usage or not. 
 
On one hand, this inability to assess error rates more precisely is highly concerning, 
particularly for the paid search industry, since it makes the entire policing structure of 
click fraud appear to be built upon a house of cards. 
 
On the other hand, the filtering of suspect clicks is primarily based upon identifying the 
country where the click is originating. Countries with higher apparent rates of fraudulent 
clicks tend to be flagged as less-trustable, and those clicks are discounted from billing. 
Based on the logic that most ISPs are fairly country-specific, and that most large companies 
might use completely different IP address blocks for their employees in different countries, 
I’m willing to believe the industry’s published accuracy rates of 99.9% to 95% at country-
level geolocation. But, when you’re speaking in terms of processing billions upon billions of 
clicks, and millions of dollars, 5% to 0.1% can still amount to a whole lot of money… 
 
Even considering the higher accuracy of country/regional geolocation, there’s still cause for 
concern for advertisers who are buying ads and targeting at the more granular levels—are 
their ads being shown to the right demographic groups, and are their clicks coming from 
the qualified buyers they’re seeking? The more granular levels of geolocation are apparently 
still considered to be much more error-prone, and the industry remains quiet about it. 
 
Other downsides to use of geolocation: 
 
Geolocation is probably a very bad method for targeting languages! Better to use content 
negotiation through browsers, using the language-accept headers to choose which 
languages to display to users (this is what the W3C recommends). While using geolocation 
to choose which language to deliver up to an user, search engine spiders may all come in 
from a central location or from one of their regional data centers, so using geolocation for 
language targeting would not be best practice and could result in less-optimal natural 
search marketing. 
 
Even delivering up local-oriented content by geolocation of users can be dicey, if one doesn’t 
properly handle search engine spiders. Last year, I informed representatives from 
Amazon.com on how their geolocation for the purpose of delivering up their yellow pages 
links was ruinous to their SEO of that section, since Googlebot was apparently being 
delivered up all Washington, D.C. content, keeping the rest of their national content 
unavailable for indexing. Geolocation can be great for targeting content to users, but design 
a default for unidentifiable users and search engine bots. 
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Geolocation can creep out users who don’t understand how it works and can raise user 
privacy concerns. Most users still don’t realize their physical locations are being mapped 
while they’re browsing, so many still don’t quite know enough about the technology to be 
concerned. The industry hasn’t really addressed this as well as it could. Quova’s FAQ is 
rather dismissive of privacy concerns, saying only “Since accuracy is limited to zip code 
level, Quova does not pinpoint individual user locations…”, though this seems a bit 
inaccurate since they are also apparently incorporating GPS, Wi-Fi, and wireless tower 
triangulation through Mexens Technology—meaning the pinpointing of users could be a 
whole lot more accurate than mere ZIP code level. 
 
Geolocation can reveal some information you wanted to keep confidential, which is why it 
should be on the radar screens of privacy advocates. Don’t want your competitors knowing 
you’re examining some of their pages every day? If you’re viewing from a unique city where 
average users are unlikely to be viewing your competitor’s site pages, you might want to try 
dialing up through an ISP outside of your town or going through a distant proxy or two 
before viewing their pages, just to try to obscure your geolocation info. Or, call up a friend 
in another state to send you screen-grabs of the site. 
 
For travel-based industries, filtering out PPC clicks from suspect foreign countries could 
result in undercounting of valid consumer traffic. That’s cool if you’re a travel business 
advertising in PPC networks, since it may get you more free ads and higher apparent 
conversion rates. But, it’s not so cool for the ad network companies and publishers 
displaying those ads – they’re likely getting a little less revenue than they should since 
some of the “good” traffic is inevitably going to be thrown away with the “bad”. 
 
Summary 
 
Geolocation is here to stay in the online local space. Its use in fraud detection and 
regulatory compliance is only deepening, and geolocation reporting in web analytics has 
become a standard. Geolocation data is a necessity for the geotargeting of ads, and that 
would appear to be an increasingly popular choice amongst marketers as online advertising 
continues to gain traction among local businesses. 
 
Geolocation use in targeting relevant content to users is still in something of an 
experimental stage, and few sites seem to be really making simultaneously extensive and 
effective use of it. 
 
It should not really be used in content mediation for delivering different languages, since 
this likely will not allow the various translations of the site pages to be properly indexed in 
the search engines for various countries/tongues. 
 
Geolocation may have a factor in effective SEO—anecdotal evidence and logical reasoning 
would indicate that it could make sense that a site hosted within a particular country might 
be more relevant to that country’s citizens than in other countries. I would guess that this 
factor wouldn’t apply as much for higher-PR sites or publicly-traded companies, but there’s 
not a lot of research evidence out there. 
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The biggest issue with geolocation is the lack of transparency in how the aggregators are 
gathering the data, and how high the error rates may be with all the levels of granularity. 
The geolocation providers all desire to keep their methods proprietary, but this competitive 
need for confidentiality makes it difficult for companies to try to estimate relative levels of 
accuracy amongst the providers. Many companies may be using cheaper providers than 
they should for the purposes of advertising click-fraud detection, leaving themselves open to 
liability of fraud claims, and causing innocent advertisers to be paying higher amounts 
than they should. Considering how geolocation has become such a major component of the 
policing of click-fraud, it’s surprising that there hasn’t been a wider demand for 
transparency and standardized methods for testing accuracy. The leaders in the industry 
should pursue a greater degree of openness and a greater variety of auditing methods to 
check accuracy. 
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II. Jurisdiction 
 
Evaluating if Personal Jurisdiction is Proper 
 
Step 1: Even if personal jurisdiction is proper, is judgment enforceable? 
 
Step 2: General jurisdiction?  Requires physical presence or “systematic and continuous 
contacts” 
 
Step 3: If no, did defendant consent?  If no, specific jurisdiction needs to be established 
 
Step 4: Does state long-arm statute confer jurisdiction? 
 
Step 5: If yes, does jurisdiction satisfy Constitutional Due Process?  Alternative tests: 
 
a) Minimum contacts test 
 
 Minimum contacts with the forum… 
o “purposeful availment” of state’s laws 
 …Comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
o “reasonably anticipate” being haled into court 
 
b) “Effects Test”: Defendant expressly aims intentional tortious actions at state and causes 
foreseeable harm 
 
c) In rem (15 USC §1125(d)(2)) 
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Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v . Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) 
Oberdorfer, District Judge. 
 
Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. and Geoffrey, Inc. (“Toys”) brought this action against Step Two, S.A. and 
Imaginarium Net, S.L. (“Step Two”), alleging that Step Two used its Internet web sites to 
engage in trademark infringement, unfair competition, misuse of the trademark notice 
symbol, and unlawful “cybersquatting,” in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501 et 
seq., and New Jersey state law. The District Court denied Toys’ request for jurisdictional 
discovery and, simultaneously, granted Step Two’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. We hold that the District Court should not have denied Toys’ request for 
jurisdictional discovery. We therefore reverse and remand for limited jurisdictional 
discovery, relating to Step Two’s business activities in the United States, and for 
reconsideration of personal jurisdiction with the benefit of the product of that discovery, 
with a view to its renewing administration of the case, in the event the District Court finds 
that it does have jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
Toys, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New Jersey, owns retail stores 
worldwide where it sells toys, games, and numerous other products.  In August 1999, Toys 
acquired Imaginarium Toy Centers, Inc., which owned and operated a network of 
“Imaginarium” stores for the sale of educational toys and games.  As part of this 
acquisition, Toys acquired several Imaginarium trademarks, and subsequently filed 
applications for the registration of additional Imaginarium marks.  Prior to Toys’ 
acquisition, the owners of the Imaginarium mark had been marketing a line of educational 
toys and games since 1985 and had first registered the Imaginarium mark with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office in 1989.  Toys currently owns thirty-seven 
freestanding Imaginarium stores in the U.S., of which seven are located in New Jersey.  In 
addition, there are Imaginarium shops within 175 of the Toys “R” Us stores in the U.S., 
including five New Jersey stores. 
 
Step Two is a Spanish corporation that owns or has franchised toy stores operating under 
the name “Imaginarium” in Spain and nine other countries.  It first registered the 
Imaginarium mark in Spain in 1991, and opened its first Imaginarium store in the Spanish 
city of Zaragoza in November 1992.  Step Two began expanding its chain of Imaginarium 
stores by means of a franchise system in 1994.  It has registered the Imaginarium mark in 
several other countries where its stores are located. There are now 165 Step Two 
Imaginarium stores. The stores have the same unique facade and logo as those owned by 
Toys, and sell the same types of merchandise as Toys sells in its Imaginarium stores.  
However, Step Two does not operate any stores, maintain any offices or bank accounts, or 
have any employees anywhere in the United States. Nor does it pay taxes to the U.S. or to 
any U.S. state.  Step Two maintains that it has not directed any advertising or marketing 
efforts towards the United States.  The record does, however, indicate some contacts 
between Step Two and the United States: for example, a portion of the merchandise sold at 
Step Two’s Imaginarium stores is purchased from vendors in the United States.  
Additionally, Felix Tena, President of Step Two, attends the New York Toy Fair once each 
year. 
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In the mid-1990s, both parties turned to the Internet to boost their sales. In 1995, 
Imaginarium Toy Centers, Inc. (which Toys later acquired) registered the domain name 
<imaginarium.com> and launched a web site featuring merchandise sold at Imaginarium 
stores. In 1996, Step Two registered the domain name <imaginarium.es>, and began 
advertising merchandise that was available at its Imaginarium stores. In April 1999, 
Imaginarium Toy Centers registered the domain name <imaginarium.net>, and launched 
another web site where it offered Imaginarium merchandise for sale. In June 1999, Step 
Two registered two additional “Imaginarium” domain names, <imaginariumworld.com> 
and <imaginarium-world.com>. In May 2000, Step Two registered three more domain 
names: <imaginariumnet.com>, <imaginariumnet.net>, and <imaginariumnet.org>. Step 
Two’s web sites are maintained by Imaginarium Net, S.L., a subsidiary of Step Two, S.A. 
formed in 2000. 
 
At the time this lawsuit was filed, four of the aforementioned sites operated by Step Two 
were interactive, allowing users to purchase merchandise online. When buying 
merchandise via Step Two’s web sites, purchasers are asked to input their name and email 
address, as well as a credit card number, delivery address, and phone number. At no point 
during the online purchase process are users asked to input their billing or mailing address. 
The web sites provide a contact phone number within Spain that lacks the country code 
that a user overseas would need to dial. Moreover, the prices are in Spanish pesetas and 
Buros, and goods ordered from those sites can be shipped only within Spain. Step Two’s 
Imaginarium web sites are entirely in Spanish. 
 
Visitors to the four sales-oriented Step Two web sites may elect to receive an electronic 
newsletter, or sign up for membership in “Club Imaginarium,” a promotional club with 
games and information for children. Each registrant for Club Imaginarium is required to 
provide a name and an email address. At the time this suit was filed, there was a section 
for “voluntary information,” including the registrant’s home address, on the Club 
Imaginarium registration page. This optional portion of the page required users to choose 
from a pull-down list of Spanish provinces, and did not accommodate mailing addresses in 
the United States. After joining Club Imaginarium via the web site, registrants receive an 
automatic email response. 
 
Mr. Tena submitted an affidavit stating that Step Two had not made any sales via its web 
sites to U.S. residents. Toys, however, adduced evidence of two sales to residents of New 
Jersey conducted via Step Two’s Imaginarium web sites. These purchases were initiated by 
Toys. Lydia Leon, a legal assistant in the Legal Department of Geoffrey, Inc., made the first 
purchase. Ms. Leon, a resident of New Jersey, purchased a toy via 
<www.imaginariumworld.com> on January 23, 2001. The second purchase was made in 
February 2001 by Luis M. Lopez, an employee of Darby & Darby P.C., attorneys for Toys. 
Mr. Lopez is also a resident of New Jersey, and accessed <www.imaginarium.es> to make 
his purchase. 
 
For both of these sales, the items were shipped to Angeles Benavides Davila, a Toys 
employee in Madrid, Spain; Ms. Benavides Davila then forwarded the items to the offices of 
Geoffrey, Inc. in New Jersey. Both purchases were made with credit cards issued by U.S. 
banks. Additionally, both purchasers received in New Jersey an email confirming their 
purchases, and a subsequent email with a login and password to access Club Imaginarium. 
One of the two purchasers also separately registered for Club Imaginarium, exchanged 
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emails with a Step Two employee about his purchase, and received a copy of an email 
newsletter from Step Two. Aside from these two sales, there is no evidence in the record of 
a sale to anyone in the United States. After learning of these two sales, Mr. Tena submitted 
a second affidavit stating that his company does not know where its purchasers reside, as 
that information is not apparent from a purchaser’s email address, and Step Two keeps 
records only of shipping addresses…. 
 
II. 
 
In the following discussion, we first consider the standard for personal jurisdiction based 
upon a defendant’s operation of a commercially interactive web site, as articulated by courts 
within this circuit and other Courts of Appeals. In light of that standard and the arguments 
presented in the proceeding below, we then assess the propriety of the District Court’s 
denial of jurisdictional discovery. 
 
A. Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Operation of a Web Site 
 
The advent of the Internet has required courts to fashion guidelines for when personal 
jurisdiction can be based on a defendant’s operation of a web site. Courts have sought to 
articulate a standard that both embodies traditional rules and accounts for new factual 
scenarios created by the Internet. Under traditional jurisdictional analysis, the exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction requires that the “plaintiff’s cause of action is related to or 
arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Beyond this basic nexus, for a 
finding of specific personal jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires (1) that the “defendant ha[ve] constitutionally sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with 
the forum,” id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)), and (2) 
that “subjecting the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice,’” id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945)). The first requirement, “minimum contacts,” has been defined as “‘some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger 
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). Second, jurisdiction exists only if its exercise “comports with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” i.e., the defendant “should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in that forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 
The precise question raised by this case is whether the operation of a commercially 
interactive web site accessible in the forum state is sufficient to support specific personal 
jurisdiction, or whether there must be additional evidence that the defendant has 
“purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging in activity in that state. Prior 
decisions indicate that such evidence is necessary, and that it should reflect intentional 
interaction with the forum state. If a defendant web site operator intentionally targets the 
site to the forum state, and/or knowingly conducts business with forum state residents via 
the site, then the “purposeful availment” requirement is satisfied. Below, we first review 
cases from this and other circuits that articulate this requirement. Next, we consider the 
role of related non-Internet contacts in demonstrating purposeful availment. We then 
assess whether the “purposeful availment” requirement has been satisfied in the present 
case. 
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1. The “Purposeful Availment” Requirement in Internet Cases 
 
a. Third Circuit Cases 
 
The opinion in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of 
an Internet web site. The court in Zippo stressed that the propriety of exercising 
jurisdiction depends on where on a sliding scale of commercial interactivity the web site 
falls. In cases where the defendant is clearly doing business through its web site in the 
forum state, and where the claim relates to or arises out of use of the web site, the Zippo 
court held that personal jurisdiction exists. In reaching this conclusion, the Zippo court 
relied on CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), which found the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper where the commercial web site’s interactivity 
reflected specifically intended interaction with residents of the forum state. 
 
Analyzing the case before it, the Zippo court similarly underscored the intentional nature of 
the defendant’s conduct vis-a-vis the forum state. In Zippo, the defendant had purposefully 
availed itself of doing business in Pennsylvania when it “repeatedly and consciously chose 
to process Pennsylvania residents’ applications and to assign them passwords,” knowing 
that the contacts would result in business relationships with Pennsylvania customers. The 
court summarized the pivotal importance of intentionality as follows: 
 
When a defendant makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the 
residents of a forum state, ‘it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there.’ 
... If [the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania, ... it could have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania 
residents. 
 
Since Zippo, several district court decisions from this Circuit have made explicit the 
requirement that the defendant intentionally interact with the forum state via the web site 
in order to show purposeful availment and, in turn, justify the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction. As another district court in this Circuit put it, “[c]ourts have repeatedly 
recognized that there must be ‘something more’ ... to demonstrate that the defendant 
directed its activity towards the forum state.” 
 
b. Case Law from Other Circuits 
 
Several Courts of Appeals decisions have adopted “purposeful availment” requirements that 
are consistent with the principles articulated in the Zippo line of cases. The Fourth Circuit, 
in ALS Scan v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), expressly 
incorporated an “intentionality” requirement when fashioning a test for personal 
jurisdiction in the context of the Internet: 
 
a State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a 
person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity 
into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other 
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within 
the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts. 
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In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit 
considered an infringement action brought against a Florida web site operator whose 
allegedly infringing site was accessible in Arizona, the state where the plaintiff had its 
principal place of business. In declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction, the 
Cybersell court found there must be “‘something more’ [beyond the mere posting of a 
passive web site] to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed 
his activity in a substantial way to the forum state.” Decisions from other circuits have 
articulated similar standards. See, e.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 
883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the purposeful availment requirement is satisfied “if 
the web site is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with 
residents of the state”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
2. Non-Internet Contacts 
 
In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from a defendant’s 
operation of a web site, a court may consider the defendant’s related non-Internet activities 
as part of the “purposeful availment” calculus. One case that relies on non-Internet contacts 
for the exercise of jurisdiction—a case Toys repeatedly cites—is Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. 
Crate and Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000). In Euromarket, the court 
exercised jurisdiction over an Irish manufacturer based on its commercially interactive web 
site, even though the products purchased through the web site could not be shipped to 
Illinois. The court identified a number of non-Internet contacts between the defendant and 
Illinois, including the fact that the defendant’s vendors included Illinois suppliers, its 
attendance at trade shows in Illinois, and its advertisement in publications that circulate in 
the United States (albeit originating outside). The Euromarket court also relied on the fact 
that the defendant billed Illinois customers, collected revenues from Illinois customers, and 
recorded sales from goods ordered from Illinois, and that the web site was designed to 
accommodate addresses in the United States. 
 
Thus far, Toys has not shown that Step Two maintained the type of contacts that supported 
jurisdiction in Euromarket—i.e., that the defendant intentionally and knowingly transacted 
business with residents of the forum state, and had significant other contacts with the 
forum besides those generated by its web site. This limited record does not provide an 
occasion for us to spell out the exact mix of Internet and non-Internet contacts required to 
support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. That determination should be made on a case-
by-case basis by assessing the “nature and quality” of the contacts. However, non-internet 
contacts such as serial business trips to the forum state, telephone and fax communications 
directed to the forum state, purchase contracts with forum state residents, contracts that 
apply the law of the forum state, and advertisements in local newspapers, may form part of 
the “something more” needed to establish personal jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the 
Supreme Court in Burger King Corp., when expounding on the “minimum contacts” 
requirement, referred generally to a defendant’s “activities” in the forum state—a term that 
includes the aforementioned non-Internet contacts.  
 
3. Personal Jurisdiction over Step Two 
 
As Zippo and the Courts of Appeals decisions indicate, the mere operation of a 
commercially interactive web site should not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere 
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in the world. Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant “purposefully availed” 
itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, 
knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through 
sufficient other related contacts. 
 
Based on the facts established in this case thus far, Toys has failed to satisfy the purposeful 
availment requirement. Step Two’s web sites, while commercial and interactive, do not 
appear to have been designed or intended to reach customers in New Jersey. Step Two’s 
web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or Euros, and 
merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain. Most important, none of the 
portions of Step Two’s web sites are designed to accommodate addresses within the United 
States. While it is possible to join Club Imaginarium and receive newsletters with only an 
email address, Step Two asks registrants to indicate their residence using fields that are 
not designed for addresses in the United States. 
 
Moreover, the record may not now support a finding that Step Two knowingly conducted 
business with residents of New Jersey. The only documented sales to persons in the United 
States are the two contacts orchestrated by Toys, and it appears that Step Two scarcely 
recognized that sales with U.S. residents had been consummated.5 
 
At best, Toys has presented only inconclusive circumstantial evidence to suggest that Step 
Two targeted its web site to New Jersey residents, or that it purposefully availed itself of 
any effort to conduct activity in New Jersey. Many of the grounds for jurisdiction that Toys 
advanced below have been deemed insufficient by the courts. First, the two documented 
sales appear to be the kind of “fortuitous,” “random,” and “attenuated” contacts that the 
Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. As for the 
electronic newsletters and other email correspondence, “telephone communication or mail 
sent by a defendant [do] not trigger personal jurisdiction if they ‘do not show purposeful 
availment.’” The court in Barrett found that the exchange of three emails between the 
plaintiff and defendant regarding the contents of the defendant’s web site, without more, 
did not “amount to the level of purposeful targeting required under the minimum contacts 
analysis.” Non-Internet contacts, such as Mr. Tena’s visits to New York and the 
relationships with U.S. vendors, have not been explored sufficiently to determine whether 
they are related to Toys’ cause of action, or whether they reflect “purposeful availment.” 
 
Absent further evidence showing purposeful availment, Toys cannot establish specific 
jurisdiction over Step Two.6 However, any information regarding Step Two’s intent vis-a-vis 
                                                 
5 Toys argues that Step Two was aware that it was conducting business with New Jersey residents. In 
particular, Toys points to the email correspondence between Mr. Luis M. Lopez and a representative of Step 
Two regarding Mr. Lopez’s overpayment. Mr. Lopez requested that the difference be mailed to his home address 
in “South Orange, NJ 07079,” but did not spell out “New Jersey” or specify that he resided in the United States. 
The Step Two representative, apparently uncertain about the address, sent a reply stating “I have received your 
address and as far as I can see, it is pretty far from here (we are in Zaragoza). I would appreciate your giving me 
more information on the address so that I can be sure that it will arrive.” Mr. Lopez’s response to this 
message—if he sent one—is not included in the record. Although Step Two ultimately learned that Mr. Lopez is 
a United States resident, a trier of fact could reasonably find from the correspondence that the company did not 
contemplate that sales would occur with U.S.-based purchasers. 
6 As an alternative to the “minimum contacts” analysis for specific jurisdiction, Toys argues that jurisdiction 
over Step Two may be based on the “effects” test. Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984), the Third Circuit has held that personal jurisdiction may, under certain 
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its Internet business and regarding other related contacts is known by Step Two, and can 
be learned by Toys only through discovery. The District Court’s denial of jurisdictional 
discovery is thus a critical issue, insofar as it may have prevented Toys from obtaining the 
information needed to establish personal jurisdiction. We next turn to whether the District 
Court properly denied Toys’ request for jurisdictional discovery. 
 
B. Jurisdictional Discovery… 
 
Toys requested jurisdictional discovery for the purpose of establishing either specific 
personal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction under the federal long-arm statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(k)(2).7 The District Court denied Toys’ request, explaining that “the clear focus of the 
Court is directed, as it should be, to the web site[,] [a]nd to the activity of the defendants 
related to that web site, which is making sales here, ...” The court added that “the apparent 
contradictions, if such there will be in the Tena affidavit, [and] what else Mr. Tena might 
have been doing here, just have no relationship to where the eye is directed and should stay 
and that is, the web site activities of this defendant.” 
 
We are persuaded that the District Court erred when it denied Toys’ request for 
jurisdictional discovery. The court’s unwavering focus on the web site precluded 
consideration of other Internet and non-Internet contacts—indicated in various parts of the 
record—which, if explored, might provide the “something more” needed to bring Step Two 
within our jurisdiction. Although the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that 
support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional 
discovery unless the plaintiff’s claim is “clearly frivolous.” If a plaintiff presents factual 
allegations that suggest “with reasonable particularity” the possible existence of the 
requisite “contacts between [the party] and the forum state,” the plaintiff’s right to conduct 
jurisdictional discovery should be sustained. 
 
Where the plaintiff has made this required threshold showing, courts within this Circuit 
have sustained the right to conduct discovery before the district court dismisses for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Here, instead of adopting a deferential approach to Toys’ request for 
discovery, the District Court appears to have focused entirely on the web site, thereby 
preventing further inquiry into non-Internet contacts. 
  
The record before the District Court contained sufficient non-frivolous allegations (and 
admissions) to support the request for jurisdictional discovery. First, Toys’ complaint 
alleges that Step Two has “completely copied the IMAGINARIUM concept” from Toys. For 
example, Toys alleges that “the mix of toys sold by Step Two is identical to the mix of toys 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances, be based on the effects in the forum state of a defendant’s tortious actions elsewhere. One of the 
Third Circuit’s requirements is that the “defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum....”  
Even assuming that Step Two’s registration of the Imaginarium domain names and its operation of web 
sites under that name bring about an injury to Toys in New Jersey (its corporate headquarters), Toys has failed 
to establish that Step Two engaged in intentionally tortious conduct expressly aimed at New Jersey. In the 
present case, this intentionality requirement is the key missing component for jurisdiction under either the 
“minimum contacts” analysis or the “effects” test. 
7 The federal long-arm statute sanctions personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants for claims arising under 
federal law when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole to justify the imposition of 
U.S. law, but without sufficient contacts to satisfy the due process concerns of the long-arm statute of any 
particular state. 
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sold by Toys under the IMAGINARIUM mark,” and that “Step Two continues to copy Toys’ 
marketing developments and Intellectual property.” Underlying Toys’ complaint is its 
concern that Step Two is “attempt[ing] to expand [its] business throughout the world 
including the United States by operating international web sites that offer goods similar to 
the goods offered in Toy’s [sic] IMAGINARIUM stores.” Step Two’s intent, according to 
Toys, is to “capitalize for [its] own pecuniary gain on the goodwill and excellent reputation 
of Toys....” 
 
It is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is 
required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in 
favor of the plaintiff. Given the allegations as to Step Two’s mimicry of Toys’ ventures on 
the Internet and its copy-cat marketing efforts, it would be reasonable to allow more 
detailed discovery into Step Two’s business plans for purchases, sales, and marketing. 
Limited discovery relating to these matters would shed light on the extent, if any, Step 
Two’s business activity—including, but not limited to, its web site—were aimed towards the 
United States. This information, known only to Step Two, would speak to an essential 
element of the personal jurisdiction calculus. 
 
Other aspects of the record should have also alerted the District Court to the possible 
existence of the “something else” needed to exercise personal jurisdiction. For example, Step 
Two concedes that a portion of the merchandise sold through its Imaginarium stores and 
web sites are purchased from U.S. vendors, and that Mr. Tena attends the New York Toy 
Fair each year. Further discovery into the vendor relationships and Mr. Tena’s activities 
here, if any, may shed light on Step Two’s intentions with respect to the U.S. market, or the 
extent of its business contacts in the United States. Discovery might also reveal whether 
these non-Internet contacts directly facilitate Step Two’s alleged exploitation of Toys’ 
marketing techniques by providing it with a supply of items identical to Toys’ inventory to 
sell on its web sites. 
 
The two documented sales to residents of New Jersey—and the subsequent emails sent 
from Step Two to the two purchasers—also speak “with reasonable particularity” to the 
possible existence of contacts needed to support jurisdiction. Although affiliates of Toys 
orchestrated the two sales, Mr. Tena’s conflicting affidavits raise the possibility that 
additional sales to U.S. residents may have been conducted via the web sites. The need for 
additional discovery regarding sales is further underscored by the parties’ uncertainty as to 
whether the residence of purchasers can be determined from their credit card number or 
through some other electronic means.8 
 
Counsel for Toys mentioned some of these contacts when it explained to the District Court 
why it should be allowed jurisdictional discovery: 
 
                                                 
8 In its brief on appeal, Step Two contends that Toys should not be allowed discovery because there is simply no 
basis for believing that there are any other contacts to find and, moreover, seeking discovery about other web 
site-generated contacts would be futile as Step Two does not keep track of billing addresses or the physical 
location of its email correspondents. At oral argument, however, counsel for Toys suggested there are means by 
which an individual’s residence can be determined from a credit card number. Toys also suggests, in its brief on 
appeal, that the residence of on-line purchasers may be determined from the phone number that purchasers are 
required to input. These possibilities can be explored through discovery. 
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Mr. Tena states in his affidavit that he has substantial regular and 
systematic contacts with the United States, [and] he attends trade shows. He 
purchases from vendors in the United States. I think at the very least, Your 
Honor, we should be able to inquire into what these substantial and 
continuing contacts are. Because apparently he buys a lot of the toys that he 
resells from U.S. vendors, because the ones that we have got were in English 
that we would be permitted to take discovery on that aspect. To determine 
whether or not ... he has made more sales within the State of New Jersey and 
in the United States as a whole, as far as accepting orders from United States 
residents. And/or whether there’s a basis for general jurisdiction under Rule 
4(k)(2), because of his regular and systematic contacts with the United 
States. Apparently a lot of his toys are obtained through United States 
vendors. 
 
Toys’ request for jurisdictional discovery was specific, non-frivolous, and a logical follow-up 
based on the information known to Toys.  The District Court erred by denying this 
reasonable request.  Toys should be allowed jurisdictional discovery, on the limited issue of 
Step Two’s business activities in the United States, including business plans, marketing 
strategies, sales, and other commercial interactions.  Although Step Two does not appear to 
have widespread contacts with the United States, this limited discovery will also help 
determine whether jurisdiction exists under the federal long-arm statute.  Accordingly, on 
remand, the District Court should consider whether any newly discovered facts will support 
jurisdiction under traditional jurisdictional analysis, or under Rule 4(k)(2). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the reasons set forth above, we reverse the District Court’s denial of Toys’ request 
for jurisdictional discovery, vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Toys’ complaint, and 
remand the case for limited jurisdictional discovery guided by the foregoing analysis, and 
for reconsideration of jurisdiction with the benefit of the product of that discovery. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Enforceability.  Let’s assume Toys ‘R’ Us wins the lawsuit and the court awards Toys ‘R’ Us 
every remedy it requests.  How will it enforce the judgment? 
 
Denouement.  After this ruling, the case settled without a further substantive ruling.  
Shortly thereafter, Toys ‘R’ Us shut down its standalone Imaginarium stores, integrated the 
brand into Toys ‘R’ Us stores, and progressively wound down the brand.
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Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2010) 
Kanne, Circuit Judge. 
 
The state of Illinois sued Hemi Group LLC for selling cigarettes to Illinois residents in 
violation of state laws and for failing to report those sales in violation of federal law.  The 
district court denied Hemi’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that 
the Internet transactions sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois.  
We affirm…. 
 
1. Minimum Contacts 
 
We find that Hemi’s contacts with Illinois were sufficient to satisfy due process.  Hemi 
maintained commercial websites through which customers could purchase cigarettes, 
calculate their shipping charges using their zip codes, and create accounts.  Hemi stated 
that it would ship to any state in the country except New York.  This statement is 
important for two reasons.  First, Hemi expressly elected to do business with the residents 
of forty-nine states.  Although listing all forty-nine states by name would have made a 
stronger case for jurisdiction in this case, inasmuch as it would have expressly stated that 
Hemi wanted to do business with Illinois residents, the net result is the same—Hemi stood 
ready and willing to do business with Illinois residents.  And Hemi, in fact, knowingly did 
do business with Illinois residents.  In light of this, Hemi’s argument that it did not 
purposefully avail itself of doing business in Illinois rings particularly hollow. 
 
Second, the fact that Hemi excluded New York residents from its customer pool shows both 
that Hemi knew that conducting business with residents of a particular state could subject 
it to jurisdiction there and also that it knew how to protect itself from being haled into court 
in any particular state…. 
 
Hemi argues that its sales to customers, specifically the sales to the special agent of the 
Illinois Department of Revenue, cannot constitute the required minimum contacts because 
the purchases were unilateral actions by the customers.  Characterizing the sales as 
unilateral is misleading, however, because it ignores several of Hemi’s own actions that led 
up to and followed the sales.  Hemi created several commercial, interactive websites 
through which customers could purchase cigarettes from Hemi.  Hemi held itself out as 
open to do business with every state (including Illinois) except New York.  After the 
customers made their purchases online, Hemi shipped the cigarettes to their various 
destinations.  It is Hemi reaching out to residents of Illinois, and not the residents reaching 
back, that creates the sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois that justify exercising 
personal jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois. 
 
We wish to point out that we have done the entire minimum contacts analysis without 
resorting to the sliding scale approach first developed in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  This was not by mistake.  Although several 
other circuits have explicitly adopted the sliding scale approach, our court has expressly 
declined to do so.… Long before the Internet became a medium for defamation, the 
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), had decided the relevant 
jurisdictional standard for intentional torts that cross state lines.  We concluded that “the 
principles articulated [in Calder] can be applied to cases involving tortious conduct 
committed over the Internet.” 
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We reach the same conclusion here.  Zippo’s sliding scale was always just short-hand for 
determining whether a defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with a 
forum to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over him in the forum state.  But we think 
that the traditional due process inquiry described earlier is not so difficult to apply to cases 
involving Internet contacts that courts need some sort of easier-to-apply categorical test…. 
 
3. Fairness… 
 
We conclude that exercising jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois is fair.  Hemi set up an 
expansive, sophisticated commercial venture online.  It held itself out to conduct business 
nationwide and was apparently successful in reaching customers across the country.  It was 
savvy enough to at least try to limit its exposure to lawsuits in states in which it felt that 
the upside of doing business was outweighed by the risk of litigation.  Hemi wants to have 
its cake and eat it, too: it wants the benefit of a nationwide business model with none of the 
exposure.  There is nothing constitutionally unfair about allowing Illinois, a state with 
which Hemi has had sufficient minimum contacts, to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
Hemi. 
 
To be sure, defending against a lawsuit in Illinois may prove to be a burden on Hemi, whose 
physical business operations are located entirely in New Mexico.  However, Illinois courts 
have a strong interest in providing a forum to resolve a dispute involving the state itself, 
and it would be most convenient to the state of Illinois (and likely New Mexico) to 
adjudicate a dispute based on Illinois law in Illinois courts.  None of the other relevant 
factors weighs conclusively in Hemi’s favor…. 
 
We note the legitimate concern that “[p]remising personal jurisdiction on the maintenance 
of a website, without requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant and 
consumers in the forum state, would create almost universal personal jurisdiction because 
of the virtually unlimited accessibility of websites across the country.”  Courts should be 
careful in resolving questions about personal jurisdiction involving online contacts to 
ensure that a defendant is not haled into court simply because the defendant owns or 
operates a website that is accessible in the forum state, even if that site is “interactive.”  
Here, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Hemi is subject to personal jurisdiction 
in Illinois, not merely because it operated several “interactive” websites, but because Hemi 
had sufficient voluntary contacts with the state of Illinois.  We make no comment on 
whether Hemi may be subject to personal jurisdiction in any other state…. 
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III. Contracts 
 
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Sotomayor, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Southern District of New York denying a motion 
by defendants-appellants Netscape Communications Corporation and its corporate parent, 
America Online, Inc. (collectively, “defendants” or “Netscape”), to compel arbitration and to 
stay court proceedings. In order to resolve the central question of arbitrability presented 
here, we must address issues of contract formation in cyberspace. Principally, we are asked 
to determine whether plaintiffs-appellees (“plaintiffs”), by acting upon defendants’ 
invitation to download free software made available on defendants’ webpage, agreed to be 
bound by the software’s license terms (which included the arbitration clause at issue), even 
though plaintiffs could not have learned of the existence of those terms unless, prior to 
executing the download, they had scrolled down the webpage to a screen located below the 
download button. We agree with the district court that a reasonably prudent Internet user 
in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the existence of the 
license terms before responding to defendants’ invitation to download the free software, and 
that defendants therefore did not provide reasonable notice of the license terms. In 
consequence, plaintiffs’ bare act of downloading the software did not unambiguously 
manifest assent to the arbitration provision contained in the license terms. 
 
We also agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ claims relating to the software at 
issue—a “plug-in” program entitled SmartDownload (“SmartDownload” or “the plug-in 
program”), offered by Netscape to enhance the functioning of the separate browser program 
called Netscape Communicator (“Communicator” or “the browser program”)—are not 
subject to an arbitration agreement contained in the license terms governing the use of 
Communicator. Finally, we conclude that the district court properly rejected defendants’ 
argument that plaintiff website owner Christopher Specht, though not a party to any 
Netscape license agreement, is nevertheless required to arbitrate his claims concerning 
SmartDownload because he allegedly benefited directly under SmartDownload’s license 
agreement. Defendants’ theory that Specht benefited whenever visitors employing 
SmartDownload downloaded certain files made available on his website is simply too 
tenuous and speculative to justify application of the legal doctrine that requires a nonparty 
to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate if he or she has received a direct benefit under a 
contract containing the arbitration agreement. 
 
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration 
and to stay court proceedings. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. Facts 
 
In three related putative class actions, plaintiffs alleged that, unknown to them, their use 
of SmartDownload transmitted to defendants private information about plaintiffs’ 
downloading of files from the Internet, thereby effecting an electronic surveillance of their 
online activities in violation of two federal statutes, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
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Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that when they first used Netscape’s Communicator—a 
software program that permits Internet browsing—the program created and stored on each 
of their computer hard drives a small text file known as a “cookie” that functioned “as a 
kind of electronic identification tag for future communications” between their computers 
and Netscape. Plaintiffs further alleged that when they installed SmartDownload—a 
separate software “plug-in”2 that served to enhance Communicator’s browsing 
capabilities—SmartDownload created and stored on their computer hard drives another 
string of characters, known as a “Key,” which similarly functioned as an identification tag 
in future communications with Netscape. According to the complaints in this case, each 
time a computer user employed Communicator to download a file from the Internet, 
SmartDownload “assume[d] from Communicator the task of downloading” the file and 
transmitted to Netscape the address of the file being downloaded together with the cookie 
created by Communicator and the Key created by SmartDownload. These processes, 
plaintiffs claim, constituted unlawful “eavesdropping” on users of Netscape’s software 
products as well as on Internet websites from which users employing SmartDownload 
downloaded files. 
 
In the time period relevant to this litigation, Netscape offered on its website various 
software programs, including Communicator and SmartDownload, which visitors to the site 
were invited to obtain free of charge. It is undisputed that five of the six named plaintiffs—
Michael Fagan, John Gibson, Mark Gruber, Sean Kelly, and Sherry Weindorf—downloaded 
Communicator from the Netscape website. These plaintiffs acknowledge that when they 
proceeded to initiate installation3 of Communicator, they were automatically shown a 
scrollable text of that program’s license agreement and were not permitted to complete the 
installation until they had clicked on a “Yes” button to indicate that they accepted all the 
license terms.4 If a user attempted to install Communicator without clicking “Yes,” the 
installation would be aborted. All five named user plaintiffs5 expressly agreed to 
Communicator’s license terms by clicking “Yes.” The Communicator license agreement that 
                                                 
2 Netscape’s website defines “plug-ins” as “software programs that extend the capabilities of the Netscape 
Browser in a specific way—giving you, for example, the ability to play audio samples or view video movies from 
within your browser.” SmartDownload purportedly made it easier for users of browser programs like 
Communicator to download files from the Internet without losing their progress when they paused to engage in 
some other task, or if their Internet connection was severed. 
3 There is a difference between downloading and installing a software program. When a user downloads a 
program from the Internet to his or her computer, the program file is stored on the user’s hard drive but 
typically is not operable until the user installs or executes it, usually by double-clicking on the file and causing 
the program to run. 
4 This kind of online software license agreement has come to be known as “clickwrap” (by analogy to 
“shrinkwrap,” used in the licensing of tangible forms of software sold in packages) because it “presents the user 
with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of 
the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The product cannot be obtained or used unless and until the icon is 
clicked.” Just as breaking the shrinkwrap seal and using the enclosed computer program after encountering 
notice of the existence of governing license terms has been deemed by some courts to constitute assent to those 
terms in the context of tangible software, see, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996), 
so clicking on a webpage’s clickwrap button after receiving notice of the existence of license terms has been held 
by some courts to manifest an Internet user’s assent to terms governing the use of downloadable intangible 
software. 
5 The term “user plaintiffs” here and elsewhere in this opinion denotes those plaintiffs who are suing for harm 
they allegedly incurred as computer users, in contrast to plaintiff Specht, who alleges that he was harmed in his 
capacity as a website owner. 
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these plaintiffs saw made no mention of SmartDownload or other plug-in programs, and 
stated that “[t]hese terms apply to Netscape Communicator and Netscape Navigator”6 and 
that “all disputes relating to this Agreement (excepting any dispute relating to intellectual 
property rights)” are subject to “binding arbitration in Santa Clara County, California.” 
 
Although Communicator could be obtained independently of SmartDownload, all the named 
user plaintiffs, except Fagan, downloaded and installed Communicator in connection with 
downloading SmartDownload.7 Each of these plaintiffs allegedly arrived at a Netscape 
webpage captioned “SmartDownload Communicator” that urged them to “Download With 
Confidence Using SmartDownload!” At or near the bottom of the screen facing plaintiffs 
was the prompt “Start Download” and a tinted button labeled “Download.” By clicking on 
the button, plaintiffs initiated the download of SmartDownload. Once that process was 
complete, SmartDownload, as its first plug-in task, permitted plaintiffs to proceed with 
downloading and installing Communicator, an operation that was accompanied by the 
clickwrap display of Communicator’s license terms described above. 
 
The signal difference between downloading Communicator and downloading 
SmartDownload was that no clickwrap presentation accompanied the latter operation. 
Instead, once plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf had clicked on the “Download” 
button located at or near the bottom of their screen, and the downloading of 
SmartDownload was complete, these plaintiffs encountered no further information about 
the plug-in program or the existence of license terms governing its use.9 The sole reference 
to SmartDownload’s license terms on the “SmartDownload Communicator” webpage was 
located in text that would have become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to 
the next screen. 
 
Had plaintiffs scrolled down instead of acting on defendants’ invitation to click on the 
“Download” button, they would have encountered the following invitation: “Please review 
and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload software license agreement before 
downloading and using the software.” Plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf 
averred in their affidavits that they never saw this reference to the SmartDownload license 
agreement when they clicked on the “Download” button. They also testified during 
depositions that they saw no reference to license terms when they clicked to download 
SmartDownload, although under questioning by defendants’ counsel, some plaintiffs added 
that they could not “remember” or be “sure” whether the screen shots of the 
                                                 
6 While Navigator was Netscape’s “stand-alone” Internet browser program during the period in question, 
Communicator was a “software suite” that comprised Navigator and other software products. All five named 
user plaintiffs stated in affidavits that they had obtained upgraded versions of Communicator. Fagan, who, as 
noted below, allegedly did not obtain the browser program in connection with downloading SmartDownload, 
expressed some uncertainty during his deposition as to whether he had acquired Communicator or Navigator. 
The identity of Fagan’s browser program is immaterial to this appeal, however, as Communicator and 
Navigator shared the same license agreement. 
7 Unlike the four other user plaintiffs, Fagan chose the option of obtaining Netscape’s browser program without 
first downloading SmartDownload. As discussed below, Fagan allegedly obtained SmartDownload from a 
separate “shareware” website unrelated to Netscape. 
9 Plaintiff Kelly, a relatively sophisticated Internet user, testified that when he clicked to download 
SmartDownload, he did not think that he was downloading a software program at all, but rather that 
SmartDownload “was merely a piece of download technology.” He later became aware that SmartDownload was 
residing as software on his hard drive when he attempted to download electronic files from the Internet. 
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SmartDownload page attached to their affidavits reflected precisely what they had seen on 
their computer screens when they downloaded SmartDownload. 
  
In sum, plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf allege that the process of obtaining 
SmartDownload contrasted sharply with that of obtaining Communicator. Having selected 
SmartDownload, they were required neither to express unambiguous assent to that 
program’s license agreement nor even to view the license terms or become aware of their 
existence before proceeding with the invited download of the free plug-in program. 
Moreover, once these plaintiffs had initiated the download, the existence of 
SmartDownload’s license terms was not mentioned while the software was running or at 
any later point in plaintiffs’ experience of the product. 
 
Even for a user who, unlike plaintiffs, did happen to scroll down past the download button, 
SmartDownload’s license terms would not have been immediately displayed in the manner 
of Communicator’s clickwrapped terms. Instead, if such a user had seen the notice of 
SmartDownload’s terms and then clicked on the underlined invitation to review and agree 
to the terms, a hypertext link would have taken the user to a separate webpage entitled 
“License & Support Agreements.” The first paragraph on this page read, in pertinent part: 
 
The use of each Netscape software product is governed by a license 
agreement. You must read and agree to the license agreement terms 
BEFORE acquiring a product. Please click on the appropriate link below to 
review the current license agreement for the product of interest to you before 
acquisition. For products available for download, you must read and agree to 
the license agreement terms BEFORE you install the software. If you do not 
agree to the license terms, do not download, install or use the software. 
 
Below this paragraph appeared a list of license agreements, the first of which was “License 
Agreement for Netscape Navigator and Netscape Communicator Product Family (Netscape 
Navigator, Netscape Communicator and Netscape SmartDownload).” If the user clicked on 
that link, he or she would be taken to yet another webpage that contained the full text of a 
license agreement that was identical in every respect to the Communicator license 
agreement except that it stated that its “terms apply to Netscape Communicator, Netscape 
Navigator, and Netscape SmartDownload.” The license agreement granted the user a 
nonexclusive license to use and reproduce the software, subject to certain terms: 
 
BY CLICKING THE ACCEPTANCE BUTTON OR INSTALLING OR USING 
NETSCAPE COMMUNICATOR, NETSCAPE NAVIGATOR, OR NETSCAPE 
SMARTDOWNLOAD SOFTWARE (THE “PRODUCT”), THE INDIVIDUAL 
OR ENTITY LICENSING THE PRODUCT (“LICENSEE”) IS CONSENTING 
TO BE BOUND BY AND IS BECOMING A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT. 
IF LICENSEE DOES NOT AGREE TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS 
AGREEMENT, THE BUTTON INDICATING NON-ACCEPTANCE MUST 
BE SELECTED, AND LICENSEE MUST NOT INSTALL OR USE THE 
SOFTWARE. 
 
Among the license terms was a provision requiring virtually all disputes relating to the 
agreement to be submitted to arbitration: 
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Unless otherwise agreed in writing, all disputes relating to this Agreement 
(excepting any dispute relating to intellectual property rights) shall be 
subject to final and binding arbitration in Santa Clara County, California, 
under the auspices of JAMS/EndDispute, with the losing party paying all 
costs of arbitration. 
 
[Editor’s note: these four screenshots were not included in the opinion but may be helpful]  
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Unlike the four named user plaintiffs who downloaded SmartDownload from the Netscape 
website, the fifth named plaintiff, Michael Fagan, claims to have downloaded the plug-in 
program from a “shareware” website operated by ZDNet, an entity unrelated to Netscape. 
Shareware sites are websites, maintained by companies or individuals, that contain 
libraries of free, publicly available software. The pages that a user would have seen while 
downloading SmartDownload from ZDNet differed from those that he or she would have 
encountered while downloading SmartDownload from the Netscape website. Notably, 
instead of any kind of notice of the SmartDownload license agreement, the ZDNet pages 
offered only a hypertext link to “more information” about SmartDownload, which, if clicked 
on, took the user to a Netscape webpage that, in turn, contained a link to the license 
agreement. Thus, a visitor to the ZDNet website could have obtained SmartDownload, as 
Fagan avers he did, without ever seeing a reference to that program’s license terms, even if 
he or she had scrolled through all of ZDNet’s webpages. 
 
The sixth named plaintiff, Christopher Specht, never obtained or used SmartDownload, but 
instead operated a website from which visitors could download certain electronic files that 
permitted them to create an account with an internet service provider called WhyWeb. 
Specht alleges that every time a user who had previously installed SmartDownload visited 
his website and downloaded WhyWeb-related files, defendants intercepted this information. 
Defendants allege that Specht would receive a representative’s commission from WhyWeb 
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every time a user who obtained a WhyWeb file from his website subsequently subscribed to 
the WhyWeb service. Thus, argue defendants, because the “Netscape license agreement ... 
conferred on each user the right to download and use both Communicator and 
SmartDownload software,” Specht received a benefit under that license agreement in that 
SmartDownload “assisted in obtaining the WhyWeb file and increased the likelihood of 
success in the download process.” This benefit, defendants claim, was direct enough to 
require Specht to arbitrate his claims pursuant to Netscape’s license terms. Specht, 
however, maintains that he never received any commissions based on the WhyWeb files 
available on his website…. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law… 
 
If a court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate, it should then consider whether the 
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. A district court’s determination 
of the scope of an arbitration agreement is reviewed de novo. In addition, whether a party 
may be compelled to arbitrate as a result of direct benefits that he or she allegedly received 
under a contract entered into by others is an issue of arbitrability that is reviewed de novo. 
 
The FAA provides that a “written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” It is well settled that 
a court may not compel arbitration until it has resolved “the question of the very existence” 
of the contract embodying the arbitration clause. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a 
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit.” Unless the parties clearly provide otherwise, “the question of arbitrability—
whether a[n] ... agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular 
grievance—is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.”  
 
The district court properly concluded that in deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a 
certain matter, a court should generally apply state-law principles to the issue of contract 
formation. Therefore, state law governs the question of whether the parties in the present 
case entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to the SmartDownload license 
agreement. The district court further held that California law governs the question of 
contract formation here; the parties do not appeal that determination…. 
 
III. Whether the User Plaintiffs Had Reasonable Notice of and Manifested Assent to the 
SmartDownload License Agreement 
 
Whether governed by the common law or by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement 
between the parties. See…Cal. Com. Code § 2204(1) (“A contract for sale of goods may be 
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which 
recognizes the existence of such a contract.”).13 Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by 
                                                 
13 The district court concluded that the SmartDownload transactions here should be governed by “California law 
as it relates to the sale of goods, including the Uniform Commercial Code in effect in California.” It is not 
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written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract…cf. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1981) (“The conduct of a party is not effective as a 
manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has 
reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”). Although 
an onlooker observing the disputed transactions in this case would have seen each of the 
user plaintiffs click on the SmartDownload “Download” button, see Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. 
v. Mid-West Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“In California, 
a party’s intent to contract is judged objectively, by the party’s outward manifestation of 
consent.”), a consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to 
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the 
download button would signify assent to those terms, see Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 
992 (“[W]hen the offeree does not know that a proposal has been made to him this objective 
standard does not apply.”). California’s common law is clear that “an offeree, regardless of 
apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions 
of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.” 
 
Arbitration agreements are no exception to the requirement of manifestation of assent. 
“This principle of knowing consent applies with particular force to provisions for 
arbitration.” Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing 
informed assent. “If a party wishes to bind in writing another to an agreement to arbitrate 
future disputes, such purpose should be accomplished in a way that each party to the 
arrangement will fully and clearly comprehend that the agreement to arbitrate exists and 
binds the parties thereto.” Thus, California contract law measures assent by an objective 
standard that takes into account both what the offeree said, wrote, or did and the 
transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or acted. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
obvious, however, that UCC Article 2 (“sales of goods”) applies to the licensing of software that is downloadable 
from the Internet. There is no doubt that a sale of tangible goods over the Internet is governed by Article 2 of 
the UCC. Some courts have also applied Article 2, occasionally with misgivings, to sales of off-the-shelf software 
in tangible, packaged formats. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (“[W]e treat the [database] licenses as ordinary 
contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed by the common law of contracts and the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Whether there are legal differences between ‘contracts’ and ‘licenses’ (which may 
matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject for another day.”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Nextpoint 
Networks, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating, in the context of a dispute between business 
parties, that “Article 2 technically does not, and certainly will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for 
the time being, the Court will assume that it does”). 
Downloadable software, however, is scarcely a “tangible” good, and, in part because software may be 
obtained, copied, or transferred effortlessly at the stroke of a computer key, licensing of such Internet products 
has assumed a vast importance in recent years. Recognizing that “a body of law based on images of the sale of 
manufactured goods ill fits licenses and other transactions in computer information,” the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(“UCITA”), a code resembling UCC Article 2 in many respects but drafted to reflect emergent practices in the 
sale and licensing of computer information. UCITA—originally intended as a new Article 2B to supplement 
Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC but later proposed as an independent code—has been adopted by two states, 
Maryland and Virginia. 
We need not decide today whether UCC Article 2 applies to Internet transactions in downloadable 
products. The district court’s analysis and the parties’ arguments on appeal show that, for present purposes, 
there is no essential difference between UCC Article 2 and the common law of contracts. We therefore apply the 
common law, with exceptions as noted. 
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A. The Reasonably Prudent Offeree of Downloadable Software 
 
Defendants argue that plaintiffs must be held to a standard of reasonable prudence and 
that, because notice of the existence of SmartDownload license terms was on the next 
scrollable screen, plaintiffs were on “inquiry notice” of those terms.14 We disagree with the 
proposition that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would necessarily have 
known or learned of the existence of the SmartDownload license agreement prior to acting, 
so that plaintiffs may be held to have assented to that agreement with constructive notice 
of its terms. It is true that “[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground 
that he or she failed to read it before signing.” But courts are quick to add: “An exception to 
this general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the terms are 
not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case, no contract is formed with respect 
to the undisclosed term.”  
 
Most of the cases cited by defendants in support of their inquiry-notice argument are drawn 
from the world of paper contracting. See, e.g., Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260, 66 
P. 259 (1901) (where party had opportunity to read leakage disclaimer printed on 
warehouse receipt, he had duty to do so); In re First Capital Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th 
1283, 1288 (1995) (purchase of insurance policy after opportunity to read and understand 
policy terms creates binding agreement); King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 349, 
356 (1981) (where realtors’ board manual specifying that party was required to arbitrate 
was “readily available,” party was “on notice” that he was agreeing to mandatory 
arbitration); Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal. 
App. 2d 71, 76 (1967) (recipient of airport parking claim check was bound by terms printed 
on claim check, because a “ordinarily prudent” person would have been alerted to the 
terms); Larrus v. First Nat’l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888 (1954) (“clearly printed” 
statement on bank card stating that depositor agreed to bank’s regulations provided 
sufficient notice to create agreement, where party had opportunity to view statement and to 
ask for full text of regulations, but did not do so)…. 
 
As the foregoing cases suggest, receipt of a physical document containing contract terms or 
notice thereof is frequently deemed, in the world of paper transactions, a sufficient 
circumstance to place the offeree on inquiry notice of those terms. “Every person who has 
actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a 
particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting 
such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” Cal. Civ. Code § 19. These principles apply 
equally to the emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked 
pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to “Download 
Now!”. What plaintiffs saw when they were being invited by defendants to download this 
fast, free plug-in called SmartDownload was a screen containing praise for the product and, 
at the very bottom of the screen, a “Download” button. Defendants argue that under the 
principles set forth in the cases cited above, a “fair and prudent person using ordinary care” 
would have been on inquiry notice of SmartDownload’s license terms. 
 
We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have 
known of the existence of license terms. Plaintiffs were responding to an offer that did not 
carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require 
                                                 
14 “Inquiry notice” is “actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry.” 
58. 
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms. Thus, plaintiffs’ “apparent 
manifestation of ... consent” was to terms “contained in a document whose contractual 
nature [was] not obvious.” Moreover, the fact that, given the position of the scroll bar on 
their computer screens, plaintiffs may have been aware that an unexplored portion of the 
Netscape webpage remained below the download button does not mean that they 
reasonably should have concluded that this portion contained a notice of license terms. In 
their deposition testimony, plaintiffs variously stated that they used the scroll bar “[o]nly if 
there is something that I feel I need to see that is on—that is off the page,” or that the 
elevated position of the scroll bar suggested the presence of “mere[ ] formalities, standard 
lower banner links” or “that the page is bigger than what I can see.” Plaintiffs testified, and 
defendants did not refute, that plaintiffs were in fact unaware that defendants intended to 
attach license terms to the use of SmartDownload. 
 
We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download 
free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms 
on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice 
of those terms.15 The SmartDownload webpage screen was “printed in such a manner that 
it tended to conceal the fact that it was an express acceptance of [Netscape’s] rules and 
regulations.” Internet users may have, as defendants put it, “as much time as they need[ ]” 
to scroll through multiple screens on a webpage, but there is no reason to assume that 
viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because screens are there. When 
products are “free” and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably 
conspicuous notice that they are about to bind themselves to contract terms, the 
transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those in the paper world of arm’s-
length bargaining. In the next two sections, we discuss case law and other legal authorities 
that have addressed the circumstances of computer sales, software licensing, and online 
transacting. Those authorities tend strongly to support our conclusion that plaintiffs did 
not manifest assent to SmartDownload’s license terms. 
 
B. Shrinkwrap Licensing and Related Practices 
 
Defendants cite certain well-known cases involving shrinkwrap licensing and related 
commercial practices in support of their contention that plaintiffs became bound by the 
SmartDownload license terms by virtue of inquiry notice. For example, in Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit held that where a purchaser 
had ordered a computer over the telephone, received the order in a shipped box containing 
the computer along with printed contract terms, and did not return the computer within 
the thirty days required by the terms, the purchaser was bound by the contract. In ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the same court held that where an individual purchased software in a 
box containing license terms which were displayed on the computer screen every time the 
user executed the software program, the user had sufficient opportunity to review the terms 
and to return the software, and so was contractually bound after retaining the product. 
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; cf. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587, 587 (2d Dep’t 2002) 
(software user was bound by license agreement where terms were prominently displayed on 
computer screen before software could be installed and where user was required to indicate 
                                                 
15 We do not address the district court’s alternative holding that notice was further vitiated by the fact that the 
reference to SmartDownload’s license terms, even if scrolled to, was couched in precatory terms (“a mild 
request”) rather than mandatory ones. 
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assent by clicking “I agree”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251 (1st Dep’t 
1998) (buyer assented to arbitration clause shipped inside box with computer and software 
by retaining items beyond date specified by license terms); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. 
Timberline Software Corp., 93 Wash.App. 819 (1999) (buyer manifested assent to software 
license terms by installing and using software), aff’d, 140 Wash.2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 
(2000); see also I.Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (business entity “explicitly accepted the 
clickwrap license agreement [contained in purchased software] when it clicked on the box 
stating ‘I agree’”). 
 
These cases do not help defendants. To the extent that they hold that the purchaser of a 
computer or tangible software is contractually bound after failing to object to printed 
license terms provided with the product, Hill and Brower do not differ markedly from the 
cases involving traditional paper contracting discussed in the previous section. Insofar as 
the purchaser in ProCD was confronted with conspicuous, mandatory license terms every 
time he ran the software on his computer, that case actually undermines defendants’ 
contention that downloading in the absence of conspicuous terms is an act that binds 
plaintiffs to those terms. In Mortenson, the full text of license terms was printed on each 
sealed diskette envelope inside the software box, printed again on the inside cover of the 
user manual, and notice of the terms appeared on the computer screen every time the 
purchaser executed the program. In sum, the foregoing cases are clearly distinguishable 
from the facts of the present action. 
 
C. Online Transactions 
 
Cases in which courts have found contracts arising from Internet use do not assist 
defendants, because in those circumstances there was much clearer notice than in the 
present case that a user’s act would manifest assent to contract terms.16 See, e.g., Hotmail 
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting 
preliminary injunction based in part on breach of “Terms of Service” agreement, to which 
defendants had assented); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (upholding forum selection clause in “freely negotiated agreement” contained in 
online terms of service); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause where subscribers to online 
software were required to review license terms in scrollable window and to click “I Agree” 
or “I Don’t Agree”); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (Tex. App. 
2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for registering Internet domain 
names that required users to scroll through terms before accepting or rejecting them); cf. 
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (expressing concern 
that notice of license terms had appeared in small, gray text on a gray background on a 
linked webpage, but concluding that it was too early in the case to order dismissal).17 
                                                 
16 Defendants place great importance on Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
which held that a user of the Internet domain-name database, Register.com, had “manifested its assent to be 
bound” by the database’s terms of use when it electronically submitted queries to the database. But Verio is not 
helpful to defendants. There, the plaintiff’s terms of use of its information were well known to the defendant, 
which took the information daily with full awareness that it was using the information in a manner prohibited 
by the terms of the plaintiff’s offer. The case is not closely analogous to ours. 
17 Although the parties here do not refer to it, California’s consumer fraud statute, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 
17538, is one of the few state statutes to regulate online transactions in goods or services. The statute provides 
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After reviewing the California common law and other relevant legal authority, we conclude 
that under the circumstances here, plaintiffs’ downloading of SmartDownload did not 
constitute acceptance of defendants’ license terms. Reasonably conspicuous notice of the 
existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by 
consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility. We hold 
that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would not have known or learned, 
prior to acting on the invitation to download, of the reference to SmartDownload’s license 
terms hidden below the “Download” button on the next screen. We affirm the district court’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
that in disclosing information regarding return and refund policies and other vital consumer information, online 
vendors must legibly display the information either: 
(i) [on] the first screen displayed when the vendor’s electronic site is accessed, (ii) on the screen 
on which goods or services are first offered, (iii) on the screen on which a buyer may place the 
order for goods or services, (iv) on the screen on which the buyer may enter payment 
information, such as a credit card account number, or (v) for nonbrowser-based technologies, in 
a manner that gives the user a reasonable opportunity to review that information. 
The statute’s clear purpose is to ensure that consumers engaging in online transactions have relevant 
information before they can be bound. Although consumer fraud as such is not alleged in the present action, and 
§ 17538 protects only California residents, we note that the statute is consistent with the principle of 
conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms that is also found in California’s common law of contracts. 
In addition, the model code, UCITA, discussed above, generally recognizes the importance of 
conspicuous notice and unambiguous manifestation of assent in online sales and licensing of computer 
information. For example, § 112, which addresses manifestation of assent, provides that a user’s opportunity to 
review online contract terms exists if a “record” (or electronic writing) of the contract terms is “made available 
in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review.” Section 112 also 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with 
knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it ... intentionally engages 
in conduct or makes statements with reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from 
the conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term.” In the case of a “mass-market license,” 
a party adopts the terms of the license only by manifesting assent “before or during the party’s initial 
performance or use of or access to the information.”  
UCITA § 211 sets forth a number of guidelines for “internet-type” transactions involving the supply of 
information or software. For example, a licensor should make standard terms “available for review” prior to 
delivery or obligation to pay (1) by “displaying prominently and in close proximity to a description of the 
computer information, or to instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard terms or a reference to an 
electronic location from which they can be readily obtained,” or (2) by “disclosing the availability of the standard 
terms in a prominent place on the site from which the computer information is offered and promptly furnishing 
a copy of the standard terms on request before the transfer of the computer information.” The commentary to § 
211 adds: “The intent of the close proximity standard is that the terms or the reference to them would be called 
to the attention of an ordinary reasonable person.” The commentary also approves of prominent hypertext links 
that draw attention to the existence of a standard agreement and allow users to view the terms of the license.  
We hasten to point out that UCITA, which has been enacted into law only in Maryland and Virginia, 
does not govern the parties’ transactions in the present case, but we nevertheless find that UCITA’s provisions 
offer insight into the evolving online “circumstances” that defendants argue placed plaintiffs on inquiry notice of 
the existence of the SmartDownload license terms. UCITA has been controversial as a result of the perceived 
breadth of some of its provisions. Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Humans Computers, and Binding 
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1141 (2000) (arguing that “UCITA’s definition of manifestation of assent 
stretches the ordinary concept of consent”), with Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1145, 1187 (2000) (“There are no new legal developments [in UCITA’s assent provisions]. The revolution—if 
any—occurred with [Karl] Llewellyn’s old Article 2, which abandoned most formalisms of contract formation, 
and sought a contract wherever it could be found.”). Nonetheless, UCITA’s notice and assent provisions seem to 
be consistent with well-established principles governing contract formation and enforcement. See Robert A. 
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491 
(2002) (“[W]e contend that UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be 
found in the paper world.”). 
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conclusion that the user plaintiffs, including Fagan, are not bound by the arbitration clause 
contained in those terms.18  
 
IV. Whether Plaintiffs’ Assent to Communicator’s License Agreement Requires Them To 
Arbitrate Their Claims Regarding SmartDownload 
 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they assented to the license terms governing Netscape’s 
Communicator. The parties disagree, however, over the scope of that license’s arbitration 
clause. Defendants contend that the scope is broad enough to encompass plaintiffs’ claims 
regarding SmartDownload, even if plaintiffs did not separately assent to SmartDownload’s 
license terms and even though Communicator’s license terms did not expressly mention 
SmartDownload. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs must arbitrate. 
 
The scope of an arbitration agreement is a legal issue that we review de novo. “[A]ny doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” 
Although “the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do 
so,” arbitration is indicated unless it can be said “with positive assurance” that an 
arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 
 
The Communicator license agreement, which required arbitration of “all disputes relating 
to this Agreement (excepting any dispute relating to intellectual property rights),” must be 
classified as “broad.” Where the scope of an arbitration agreement is broad, 
 
there arises a presumption of arbitrability; if, however, the dispute is in 
respect of a matter that, on its face, is clearly collateral to the contract, then a 
court should test the presumption by reviewing the allegations underlying 
the dispute and by asking whether the claim alleged implicates issues of 
contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it.... 
[C]laims that present no question involving construction of the contract, and 
no questions in respect of the parties’ rights and obligations under it, are 
beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
 
In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement, this Court “focus[es] on the factual allegations in the complaint rather than the 
legal causes of action asserted.” If those allegations “touch matters” covered by the 
Netscape license agreement, plaintiffs’ claims must be arbitrated.  
 
To begin with, we find that the underlying dispute in this case—whether defendants 
violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—involves matters that are clearly collateral to the 
Communicator license agreement. While the SmartDownload license agreement expressly 
applied “to Netscape Communicator, Netscape Navigator, and Netscape SmartDownload,” 
the Communicator license agreement expressly applied only “to Netscape Communicator 
                                                 
18 Because we conclude that the Netscape webpage did not provide reasonable notice of the existence of 
SmartDownload’s license terms, it is irrelevant to our decision whether plaintiff Fagan obtained 
SmartDownload from that webpage, as defendants contend, or from a shareware website that provided less or 
no notice of that program’s license terms, as Fagan maintains. In either case, Fagan could not be bound by the 
SmartDownload license agreement…. 
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and Netscape Navigator.” Thus, on its face, the Communicator license agreement governed 
disputes concerning Netscape’s browser programs only, not disputes concerning a plug-in 
program like SmartDownload. Moreover, Communicator’s license terms included a merger 
or integration clause stating that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof.” SmartDownload’s license terms 
contained the same clause. Such provisions are recognized by California courts as a means 
of excluding prior or contemporaneous parol evidence from the scope of a contract. Although 
the presence of merger clauses is not dispositive here, we note that defendants’ express 
desire to limit the reach of the respective license agreements, combined with the absence of 
reference to SmartDownload in the Communicator license agreement, suggests that a 
dispute regarding defendants’ allegedly unlawful use of SmartDownload is clearly collateral 
to the Communicator license agreement. 
 
This conclusion is reinforced by the other terms of the Communicator license agreement, 
which include a provision describing the non-exclusive nature of the grant and permission 
to reproduce the software for personal and internal business purposes; restrictions on 
modification, decompilation, redistribution or other sale or transfer, and removal or 
alteration of trademarks or other intellectual property; provisions for the licensor’s right to 
terminate and its proprietary rights; a complete disclaimer of warranties (“as is”) and an 
entire-risk clause; a limitation of liability clause for consequential and other damages, 
together with a liquidated damages term; clauses regarding encryption and export; a 
disclaimer of warranties for high risk activities; and a miscellaneous paragraph that 
contains merger, choice-of-law, arbitration, and severability clauses, non-waiver and non-
assignment provisions, a force majeure term, and a clause providing for reimbursement of 
the prevailing party in any dispute. Apart from the potential generic applicability of the 
warranty and liability disclaimers, a dispute concerning alleged electronic eavesdropping 
via transmissions from a separate plug-in program would not appear to fall within 
Communicator’s license terms. We conclude, therefore, that this dispute concerns matters 
that, on their face, are clearly collateral to the Communicator license agreement. 
 
Having determined this much, we next must test the presumption of arbitrability by asking 
whether plaintiffs’ allegations implicate or touch on issues of contract construction or the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract. That is, even though the parties’ dispute 
concerns matters clearly collateral to the Communicator license terms, we must determine 
whether plaintiffs by their particular allegations have brought the dispute within the 
license terms. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ complaints “literally bristled with 
allegations that Communicator and SmartDownload operated in conjunction with one 
another to eavesdrop on Plaintiffs’ Internet communications.” We disagree. Plaintiffs’ 
allegations nowhere collapse or blur the distinction between Communicator and 
SmartDownload, but instead consistently separate the two software programs and assert 
that SmartDownload alone is responsible for unlawful eavesdropping. Plaintiffs begin by 
alleging that “SmartDownload facilitates the transfer of large files over the Internet by 
permitting a transfer to be resumed if it is interrupted.” Plaintiffs then explain that “[o]nce 
SmartDownload is downloaded and running on a Web user’s computer, it automatically 
connects to Netscape’s file servers and downloads the installation program for 
Communicator.” Plaintiffs add that defendants also encourage visitors to Netscape’s 
website “to download and install SmartDownload even if they are not installing or 
upgrading Communicator.” 
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Plaintiffs go on to point out that installing Communicator “automatically creates and stores 
on the Web user’s computer a small text file known as a ‘cookie.’” There follow two 
paragraphs essentially alleging that cookies were originally intended to perform such 
innocuous tasks as providing “temporary identification for purposes such as electronic 
commerce,” and that the Netscape cookie performs this original identifying, and entirely 
lawful, function. Separate paragraphs then describe the “Key” or “UserID” that 
SmartDownload allegedly independently places on user’s computers, and point out that 
“SmartDownload assumes from Communicator the task of downloading various files. 
Communicator itself could and would perform these downloading tasks if SmartDownload 
were not installed.” “Thereafter,” the complaints continue, 
 
each time a Web user downloads any file from any site on the Internet using 
SmartDownload, SmartDownload automatically transmits to defendants the 
name and Internet address of the file and the Web site from which it is being 
sent. Within the same transmission, SmartDownload also includes the 
contents of the Netscape cookie previously created by Communicator and the 
“Key” previously created by SmartDownload. 
 
In the course of their description of the installation and downloading process, plaintiffs 
keep SmartDownload separate from Communicator and clearly indicate that it is 
SmartDownload that performed the allegedly unlawful eavesdropping and made use of the 
otherwise innocuous Communicator cookie as well as its own “Key” and “UserID” to 
transmit plaintiffs’ information to Netscape. The complaints refer to “SmartDownload’s 
spying” and explain that “Defendants are using SmartDownload to eavesdrop.” Plaintiffs’ 
allegations consistently distinguish and isolate the functions of SmartDownload in such a 
way as to make it clear that it is through SmartDownload, not Communicator, that 
defendants committed the abuses that are the subject of the complaints. 
 
After careful review of these allegations, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims “present no 
question involving construction of the [Communicator license agreement], and no questions 
in respect of the parties’ rights and obligations under it.” It follows that the claims of the 
five user plaintiffs are beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the 
Communicator license agreement. Because those claims are not arbitrable under that 
agreement or under the SmartDownload license agreement, to which plaintiffs never 
assented, we affirm the district court’s holding that the five user plaintiffs may not be 
compelled to arbitrate their claims…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
How Did This Happen?  Netscape had a large in-house legal department with many skillful 
attorneys.  How did this problem occur? 
 
Paper vs. Electronic Contract Presentation.  Should the law treat contracts presented 
electronically different from contracts presented on paper, even if their content is identical?  
Some social science suggests that readers may better retain information they read on paper 
than if they read the same content electronically.  See Maia Szalavitz, Do E-Books Make It 
Harder to Remember What You Just Read?, TIME, Mar. 14, 2012. 
 
64. 
Denouement.  The New York Attorney General also pursued AOL for the operation of 
SmartDownload.  AOL settled both cases.  It paid $100,000 to the NY Attorney General but 
didn’t pay any money to consumers.  AOL ended up not having to pay attorneys’ fees to 
Specht’s counsel due to a litigation error on their part.  AOL also had to delete the data 
collected via SmartDownload, had to provide a new version of the software, and made some 
other minor promises, such as agreeing to third party audits.   
 
Netscape also modified its download screen.  Does this satisfy the requirements of the 
Specht case? 
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Does Epinions’ contract formation procedure satisfy the requirements of the Specht case? 
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Does eBay’s (as depicted in this screenshot)? 
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Do you agree with this comic? (used with permission of the Doghouse Diaries, 
http://www.thedoghousediaries.com/) 
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Leval, Circuit Judge.* 
 
Defendant, Verio, Inc. (“Verio”) appeals from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York (Barbara S. Jones, J.) granting the motion of plaintiff 
Register.com, Inc. (“Register”) for a preliminary injunction. The court’s order enjoined Verio 
from (1) using Register’s trademarks; (2) representing or otherwise suggesting to third 
parties that Verio’s services have the sponsorship, endorsement, or approval of Register; (3) 
accessing Register’s computers by use of automated software programs performing multiple 
successive queries; and (4) using data obtained from Register’s database of contact 
information of registrants of Internet domain names to solicit the registrants for the sale of 
web site development services by electronic mail, telephone calls, or direct mail. We 
affirm.1… 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
This plaintiff Register is one of over fifty companies serving as registrars for the issuance of 
domain names on the world wide web. As a registrar, Register issues domain names to 
persons and entities preparing to establish web sites on the Internet. Web sites are 
identified and accessed by reference to their domain names. 
 
Register was appointed a registrar of domain names by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers, known by the acronym “ICANN.” ICANN is a private, non-
profit public benefit corporation which was established by agencies of the U.S. government 
to administer the Internet domain name system. To become a registrar of domain names, 
Register was required to enter into a standard form agreement with ICANN, designated as 
the ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement, November 1999 version (referred to herein 
as the “ICANN Agreement”). 
 
Applicants to register a domain name submit to the registrar contact information, including 
at a minimum, the applicant’s name, postal address, telephone number, and electronic mail 
address. The ICANN Agreement, referring to this registrant contact information under the 
rubric “WHOIS information,” requires the registrar, under terms discussed in greater detail 
below, to preserve it, update it daily, and provide for free public access to it through the 
Internet as well as through an independent access port, called port 43.  
 
Section II.F.5 of the ICANN Agreement (which furnishes a major basis for the appellant 
Verio’s contentions on this appeal) requires that the registrar “not impose terms and 
                                                 
* The Honorable Fred I. Parker was a member of the panel but died on August 12, 2003. Judge Parker would 
have voted to reverse the district court’s order. This appeal is being decided by the two remaining members of 
the panel, who are in agreement. 
1 Judge Parker was not in agreement with this disposition. Deliberations have followed an unusual course. 
Judge Parker initially was assigned to prepare a draft opinion affirming the district court. In the course of 
preparing the draft, Judge Parker changed his mind and proposed to rule in favor of the defendant, overturning 
the injunction in most respects. Judge Parker’s draft opinion, however, failed to convince the other members of 
the panel, who adhered to the view that the injunction should be affirmed. Judge Parker died shortly thereafter, 
prior to the circulation of a draft opinion affirming the injunction, from which Judge Parker presumably would 
have dissented.  [Editor’s note: The court attached Judge Parker’s draft opinion as an Appendix.  It’s a scholarly 
and thoughtful opinion that will reward interested readers.] 
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conditions” on the use made by others of its WHOIS data “except as permitted by ICANN-
adopted policy.” In specifying what restrictions may be imposed, the ICANN Agreement 
requires the registrar to permit use of its WHOIS data “for any lawful purposes except to: ... 
support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via 
email (spam); [and other listed purposes not relevant to this appeal].” (emphasis added). 
 
Another section of the ICANN Agreement (upon which appellee Register relies) provides as 
follows, 
 
No Third-Party Beneficiaries: This Agreement shall not be construed to 
create any obligation by either ICANN or Registrar to any non-party to this 
Agreement .... 
 
Third parties could nonetheless seek enforcement of a registrar’s obligations set forth in the 
ICANN Agreement by resort to a grievance process under ICANN’s auspices. 
 
In compliance with § II.F.1 of the ICANN Agreement, Register updated the WHOIS 
information on a daily basis and established Internet and port 43 service, which allowed 
free public query of its WHOIS information. An entity making a WHOIS query through 
Register’s Internet site or port 43 would receive a reply furnishing the requested WHOIS 
information, captioned by a legend devised by Register, which stated, 
 
By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this data only for 
lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this data to ... 
support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or 
solicitation via email. 
 
The terms of that legend tracked § II.F.5 of the ICANN Agreement in specifying the 
restrictions Register imposed on the use of its WHOIS data. Subsequently, as explained 
below, Register amended the terms of this legend to impose more stringent restrictions on 
the use of the information gathered through such queries. 
 
In addition to performing the function of a registrar of domain names, Register also 
engages in the business of selling web-related services to entities that maintain web sites. 
These services cover various aspects of web site development. In order to solicit business for 
the services it offers, Register sends out marketing communications. Among the entities it 
solicits for the sale of such services are entities whose domain names it registered. 
However, during the registration process, Register offers registrants the opportunity to 
elect whether or not they will receive marketing communications from it. 
 
The defendant Verio, against whom the preliminary injunction was issued, is engaged in 
the business of selling a variety of web site design, development and operation services. In 
the sale of such services, Verio competes with Register’s web site development business. To 
facilitate its pursuit of customers, Verio undertook to obtain daily updates of the WHOIS 
information relating to newly registered domain names. To achieve this, Verio devised an 
automated software program, or robot, which each day would submit multiple successive 
WHOIS queries through the port 43 accesses of various registrars. Upon acquiring the 
WHOIS information of new registrants, Verio would send them marketing solicitations by 
email, telemarketing and direct mail. To the extent that Verio’s solicitations were sent by 
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email, the practice was inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive legend Register 
attached to its responses to Verio’s queries. 
 
At first, Verio’s solicitations addressed to Register’s registrants made explicit reference to 
their recent registration through Register. This led some of the recipients of Verio’s 
solicitations to believe the solicitation was initiated by Register (or an affiliate), and was 
sent in violation of the registrant’s election not to receive solicitations from Register. 
Register began to receive complaints from registrants. Register in turn complained to Verio 
and demanded that Verio cease and desist from this form of marketing. Register asserted 
that Verio was harming Register’s goodwill, and that by soliciting via email, was violating 
the terms to which it had agreed on submitting its queries for WHOIS information. Verio 
responded to the effect that it had stopped mentioning Register in its solicitation message. 
 
In the meantime, Register changed the restrictive legend it attached to its responses to 
WHOIS queries. While previously the legend conformed to the terms of § II F.5, which 
authorized Register to prohibit use of the WHOIS information for mass solicitations “via 
email,” its new legend undertook to bar mass solicitation “via direct mail, electronic mail, or 
by telephone.”2 Section II.F.5 of Register’s ICANN Agreement, as noted above, required 
Register to permit use of the WHOIS data “for any lawful purpose except to ... support the 
transmission of mass unsolicited solicitations via email (spam).” Thus, by undertaking to 
prohibit Verio from using the WHOIS information for solicitations “via direct mail ... or by 
telephone,” Register was acting in apparent violation of this term of its ICANN Agreement. 
 
Register wrote to Verio demanding that it cease using WHOIS information derived from 
Register not only for email marketing, but also for marketing by direct mail and telephone. 
Verio ceased using the information in email marketing, but refused to stop marketing by 
direct mail and telephone.  [Register then sued Verio in August 2000]…. 
 
                                                 
2 The new legend stated: 
By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that ... under no circumstances will you use this 
data to ... support the transmission of mass unsolicited ... advertising or solicitations via direct 
mail, electronic mail, or by telephone. 
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[Editor’s note: the following diagram may help you understand the relationships visually] 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Standard of review and preliminary injunction standard… 
 
(a) Verio’s enforcement of the restrictions placed on Register by the ICANN Agreement 
 
Verio conceded that it knew of the restrictions Register placed on the use of the WHOIS 
data and knew that, by using Register’s WHOIS data for direct mail and telemarketing 
solicitations, it was violating Register’s restrictions. Verio’s principal argument is that 
Register was not authorized to forbid Verio from using the data for direct mail and 
telemarketing solicitation because the ICANN Agreement prohibited Register from 
imposing any “terms and conditions” on use of WHOIS data, “except as permitted by 
ICANN-adopted policy,” which specified that Register was required to permit “any lawful 
purpose, except ... mass solicitation[ ] via email.” 
 
Register does not deny that the restrictions it imposed contravened this requirement of the 
ICANN Agreement. Register contends, however, that the question whether it violated § 
II.F.5 of its Agreement with ICANN is a matter between itself and ICANN, and that Verio 
cannot enforce the obligations placed on Register by the ICANN Agreement. Register points 
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to § II.S.2 of the ICANN Agreement, captioned “No Third-Party Beneficiaries,” which, as 
noted, states that the agreement is not to be construed “to create any obligation by either 
ICANN or Registrar to any non-party.” Register asserts that Verio, a non-party, is asking 
the court to construe § II.F.5 as creating an obligation owed by Register to Verio, and that 
the Agreement expressly forbids such a construction. 
 
ICANN intervened in the district court as an amicus curiae and strongly supports 
Register’s position, opposing Verio’s right to invoke Register’s contractual promises to 
ICANN. ICANN explained that ICANN has established a remedial process for the 
resolution of such disputes through which Verio might have sought satisfaction. “If Verio 
had concerns regarding Register.com’s conditions for access to WHOIS data, it should have 
raised them within the ICANN process rather [than] simply taking Register.com’s data, 
violating the conditions [imposed by Register], and then seeking to justify its violation in 
this Court .... [Verio’s claim was] intended to be addressed only within the ICANN process.” 
 
ICANN asserted that the No Third-Party Beneficiary provision, barring third parties from 
seeking to enforce promises made by a registrar to ICANN through court proceedings, was 
“vital to the overall scheme of [its] various agreements.” 
 
This is because proper expression of the letter and spirit of ICANN policies is most 
appropriately achieved through the ICANN process itself, and not through forums that lack 
the every day familiarity with the intricate technical and policy issues that the ICANN 
process was designed to address. 
 
ICANN’s brief went on to state: 
 
[E]nforcement of agreements with ICANN [was to] be informed by the 
judgment of the various segments of the internet community as expressed 
through ICANN. In the fast-paced environment of the Internet, new issues 
and situations arise quickly, and sometimes the language of contractual 
provisions does not perfectly match the underlying policies. For this and 
other reasons, hard-and-fast enforcement [by courts] of the letter of every 
term of every agreement is not always appropriate. An integral part of the 
agreements that the registrars ... entered with ICANN is the understanding 
that these situations would be handled through consultation and 
consideration within the ICANN process .... Allowing issues under the 
agreements registrars make with ICANN to be diverted from [ICANN’s] 
carefully crafted remedial scheme to the courts, at the behest of third parties 
..., would seriously threaten the Internet community’s ability, under the 
auspices of ICANN, to achieve a proper balance of the competing policy 
values that are so frequently involved. 
 
We are persuaded by the arguments Register and ICANN advance. It is true Register 
incurred a contractual obligation to ICANN not to prevent the use of its WHOIS data for 
direct mail and telemarketing solicitation. But ICANN deliberately included in the same 
contract that persons aggrieved by Register’s violation of such a term should seek 
satisfaction within the framework of ICANN’s grievance policy, and should not be heard in 
courts of law to plead entitlement to enforce Register’s promise to ICANN. As experience 
develops in the fast changing world of the Internet, ICANN, informed by the various 
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constituencies in the Internet community, might well no longer consider it salutary to 
enforce a policy which it earlier expressed in the ICANN Agreement. For courts to 
undertake to enforce promises made by registrars to ICANN at the instance of third parties 
might therefore be harmful to ICANN’s efforts to develop well-informed and sound Internet 
policy. 
 
Verio’s invocation of the ICANN Agreement necessarily depends on its entitlement to 
enforce Register’s promises to ICANN in the role of third party beneficiary. The ICANN 
Agreement specified that it should be deemed to have been made in California, where 
ICANN is located. Under § 1559 of the California Civil Code, a “contract, made expressly 
for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him.” For Verio to seek to enforce 
Register’s promises it made to ICANN in the ICANN Agreement, Verio must show that the 
Agreement was made for its benefit. Verio did not meet this burden. To the contrary, the 
Agreement expressly and intentionally excluded non-parties from claiming rights under it 
in court proceedings. 
 
We are not persuaded by the arguments Judge Parker advanced in his draft. Although 
acknowledging that Verio could not claim third party beneficiary rights to enforce 
Register’s promises to ICANN, Judge Parker nonetheless found three reasons for enforcing 
Verio’s claim: (i) “public policy interests at stake,” (ii) Register’s “indisputable obligations to 
ICANN as a registrar,” and (iii) the equities, involving Register’s “unclean hands” in 
imposing a restriction it was contractually bound not to impose. We respectfully disagree. 
As for the first argument, that Register’s restriction violated public policy, it is far from 
clear that this is so. It is true that the ICANN Agreement at the time ICANN presented it 
to Register permitted mass solicitation by means other than email. But it is not clear that 
at the time of this dispute, ICANN intended to adhere to that policy. As ICANN’s amicus 
brief suggested, the world of the Internet changes rapidly, and public policy as to how that 
world should be governed may change rapidly as well. ICANN in fact has since changed the 
terms of its standard agreement for the accreditation of registrars to broaden the uses of 
WHOIS information that registrars may prohibit to include not only mass email 
solicitations but also mass telephone and fax solicitations. It is far from clear that ICANN 
continues to view public policy the way it did at the time it crafted Register’s agreement. In 
any event, if Verio wished to have the dispute resolved in accordance with public policy, it 
was free to bring its grievance to ICANN. Verio declined to do so. ICANN included the “No 
Third-Party Beneficiary” provision precisely so that it would retain control of enforcement 
of policy, rather than yielding it to courts. 
 
As for Judge Parker’s second argument, Register’s “indisputable obligation to ICANN as a 
registrar” to permit Verio to use the WHOIS information for mass solicitation by mail and 
telephone, we do not see how this argument differs from Verio’s claim of entitlement as a 
third party beneficiary, which § II.S.2 explicitly negates. The fact that Register owed a 
contractual obligation to ICANN not to impose certain restrictions on use of WHOIS 
information does not mean that it owed an obligation to Verio not to impose such 
restrictions. As ICANN’s brief in the district court indicates, ICANN was well aware of 
Register’s deviation from the restrictions imposed by the ICANN Agreement, but ICANN 
chose not to take steps to compel Register to adhere to its contract. 
 
Nor are we convinced by Judge Parker’s third argument of Register’s “unclean hands.” 
Judge Parker characterizes Register’s failure to honor its contractual obligation to ICANN 
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as unethical conduct, making Register ineligible for equitable relief. But Register owed no 
duty in that regard to anyone but ICANN, and ICANN has expressed no dissatisfaction 
with Register’s failure to adhere to that term of the contract. Verio was free to seek 
ICANN’s intervention on its behalf, but declined to do so, perhaps because it knew or 
suspected that ICANN would decline to compel Register to adhere to the contract term. 
Under the circumstances, we see no reason to assume on appeal that Register’s conduct 
should be considered unethical, especially where the district court made no such finding. 
 
(b) Verio’s assent to Register’s contract terms 
 
Verio’s next contention assumes that Register was legally authorized to demand that takers 
of WHOIS data from its systems refrain from using it for mass solicitation by mail and 
telephone, as well as by email. Verio contends that it nonetheless never became 
contractually bound to the conditions imposed by Register’s restrictive legend because, in 
the case of each query Verio made, the legend did not appear until after Verio had 
submitted the query and received the WHOIS data. Accordingly, Verio contends that in no 
instance did it receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register intended to 
impose. Verio therefore argues it should not be deemed to have taken WHOIS data from 
Register’s systems subject to Register’s conditions. 
 
Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries addressed to Register’s computers 
had been sporadic and infrequent. If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if it had 
submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give considerable force to its contention 
that it obtained the WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended to impose 
conditions, and without being deemed to have accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was 
daily submitting numerous queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the 
terms Register exacted. Furthermore, Verio admits that it knew perfectly well what terms 
Register demanded. Verio’s argument fails. 
 
The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P maintains a roadside fruit 
stand displaying bins of apples. A visitor, defendant D, takes an apple and bites into it. As 
D turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to exit, which says “Apples—50 
cents apiece.” D does not pay for the apple. D believes he has no obligation to pay because 
he had no notice when he bit into the apple that 50 cents was expected in return. D’s view is 
that he never agreed to pay for the apple. Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D 
revisits the stand, takes an apple, and eats it. D never leaves money. 
 
P sues D in contract for the price of the apples taken. D defends on the ground that on no 
occasion did he see P’s price notice until after he had bitten into the apples. D may well 
prevail as to the first apple taken. D had no reason to understand upon taking it that P was 
demanding the payment. In our view, however, D cannot continue on a daily basis to take 
apples for free, knowing full well that P is offering them only in exchange for 50 cents in 
compensation, merely because the sign demanding payment is so placed that on each 
occasion D does not see it until he has bitten into the apple. 
 
Verio’s circumstance is effectively the same. Each day Verio repeatedly enters Register’s 
computers and takes that day’s new WHOIS data. Each day upon receiving the requested 
data, Verio receives Register’s notice of the terms on which it makes the data available—
that the data not be used for mass solicitation via direct mail, email, or telephone. Verio 
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acknowledges that it continued drawing the data from Register’s computers with full 
knowledge that Register offered access subject to these restrictions. Verio is no more free to 
take Register’s data without being bound by the terms on which Register offers it, than D 
was free, in the example, once he became aware of the terms of P’s offer, to take P’s apples 
without obligation to pay the 50 cent price at which P offered them. 
 
Verio seeks support for its position from cases that have dealt with the formation of 
contracts on the Internet. An excellent example, although decided subsequent to the 
submission of this case, is Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
2002). The dispute was whether users of Netscape’s software, who downloaded it from 
Netscape’s web site, were bound by an agreement to arbitrate disputes with Netscape, 
where Netscape had posted the terms of its offer of the software (including the obligation to 
arbitrate disputes) on the web site from which they downloaded the software. We ruled 
against Netscape and in favor of the users of its software because the users would not have 
seen the terms Netscape exacted without scrolling down their computer screens, and there 
was no reason for them to do so. The evidence did not demonstrate that one who had 
downloaded Netscape’s software had necessarily seen the terms of its offer. 
 
Verio, however, cannot avail itself of the reasoning of Specht. In Specht, the users in whose 
favor we decided visited Netscape’s web site one time to download its software. Netscape’s 
posting of its terms did not compel the conclusion that its downloaders took the software 
subject to those terms because there was no way to determine that any downloader had 
seen the terms of the offer. There was no basis for imputing to the downloaders of 
Netscape’s software knowledge of the terms on which the software was offered. This case is 
crucially different. Verio visited Register’s computers daily to access WHOIS data and each 
day saw the terms of Register’s offer; Verio admitted that, in entering Register’s computers 
to get the data, it was fully aware of the terms on which Register offered the access. 
 
Verio’s next argument is that it was not bound by Register’s terms because it rejected them. 
Even assuming Register is entitled to demand compliance with its terms in exchange for 
Verio’s entry into its systems to take WHOIS data, and even acknowledging that Verio was 
fully aware of Register’s terms, Verio contends that it still is not bound by Register’s terms 
because it did not agree to be bound. In support of its claim, Verio cites a district court case 
from the Central District of California, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 
1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug.10, 2000), in which the court rejected Ticketmaster’s application for 
a preliminary injunction to enforce posted terms of use of data available on its website 
against a regular user. Noting that the user of Ticketmaster’s web site is not required to 
check an “I agree” box before proceeding, the court concluded that there was insufficient 
proof of agreement to support a preliminary injunction.  
 
We acknowledge that the Ticketmaster decision gives Verio some support, but not enough. 
In the first place, the Ticketmaster court was not making a definitive ruling rejecting 
Ticketmaster’s contract claim. It was rather exercising a district court’s discretion to deny a 
preliminary injunction because of a doubt whether the movant had adequately shown 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
 
But more importantly, we are not inclined to agree with the Ticketmaster court’s analysis. 
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht, where we declined to 
enforce Netscape’s specified terms against a user of its software because of inadequate 
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evidence that the user had seen the terms when downloading the software, and those of 
Ticketmaster, where the taker of information from Ticketmaster’s site knew full well the 
terms on which the information was offered but was not offered an icon marked, “I agree,” 
on which to click. Under the circumstances of Ticketmaster, we see no reason why the 
enforceability of the offeror’s terms should depend on whether the taker states (or clicks), “I 
agree.” 
 
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the offeree to click on an “I 
agree” icon. And no doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the 
offeree is essential to the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances. While new 
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not 
fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is standard contract doctrine that 
when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to 
take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an 
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the offeree. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1)(a) (1981) (“[S]ilence and inaction operate as an 
acceptance ... [w]here an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable 
opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation 
of compensation.”); 2 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 6:9 (4th ed. 1991) (“[T]he 
acceptance of the benefit of services may well be held to imply a promise to pay for them if 
at the time of acceptance the offeree has a reasonable opportunity to reject the service and 
knows or has reason to know that compensation is expected.”); Arthur Linton Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts § 71 (West 1 vol. ed. 1952) (“The acceptance of the benefit of the 
services is a promise to pay for them, if at the time of accepting the benefit the offeree has a 
reasonable opportunity to reject it and knows that compensation is expected.”); Jones v. 
Brisbin, 41 Wash.2d 167, 172 (1952) (“Where a person, with reasonable opportunity to 
reject offered services, takes the benefit of them under circumstances which would indicate, 
to a reasonable man, that they were offered with the expectation of compensation, a 
contract, complete with mutual assent, results.”); Markstein Bros. Millinery Co. v. J.A. 
White & Co., 151 Ark. 1 (1921) (buyer of hats was bound to pay for hats when buyer failed 
to return them to seller within five days of inspection as seller requested in clear and 
obvious notice statement). 
 
Returning to the apple stand, the visitor, who sees apples offered for 50 cents apiece and 
takes an apple, owes 50 cents, regardless whether he did or did not say, “I agree.” The 
choice offered in such circumstances is to take the apple on the known terms of the offer or 
not to take the apple. As we see it, the defendant in Ticketmaster and Verio in this case had 
a similar choice. Each was offered access to information subject to terms of which they were 
well aware. Their choice was either to accept the offer of contract, taking the information 
subject to the terms of the offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the 
benefits. 
 
We find that the district court was within its discretion in concluding that Register showed 
likelihood of success on the merits of its contract claim…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Did Verio act ethically?  Did Register.com? 
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Seeing how the case turned out, if you represented Verio, what would you do differently?  
Even though it won in court, should Register.com have done anything differently? 
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Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
Lynn, District Judge. 
 
Background 
 
This case arises out of alleged violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act by Defendant 
Blockbuster Inc. (“Blockbuster”). Blockbuster operates a service called Blockbuster Online, 
which allows customers to rent movies through the internet. Blockbuster entered into an 
agreement with Facebook (“the Blockbuster contract”) which caused Blockbuster’s 
customers’ movie rental choices to be disseminated on the customers’ Facebook accounts 
through Facebook’s “Beacon” program. In short, when a customer rented a video from 
Blockbuster Online, the Beacon program would transmit the customer’s choice to Facebook, 
which would then broadcast the choice to the customer’s Facebook friends. 
 
Plaintiff claims that this arrangement violated the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710, which prohibits a videotape service provider from disclosing personally identifiable 
information about a customer unless given informed, written consent at the time the 
disclosure is sought. The Act provides for liquidated damages of $2,500 for each violation. 
 
Blockbuster attempted to invoke an arbitration provision in its “Terms and Conditions,” 
which includes a paragraph governing “Dispute Resolution” that states, in pertinent part: 
“[a]ll claims, disputes or controversies ... will be referred to and determined by binding 
arbitration.” It further purportedly waives the right of its users to commence any class 
action. As a precondition to joining Blockbuster Online, customers were required to click on 
a box certifying that they had read and agreed to the Terms and Conditions. 
 
On August 30, 2008, before the case was transferred to this Court, the Defendant moved to 
enforce the arbitration provision. The Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration provision is 
unenforceable, principally for two reasons: (1) it is illusory; and (2) it is unconscionable. 
Because the Court concludes that the arbitration provision is illusory, the Court does not 
reach the unconscionability issue. 
 
Legal Standard 
 
In Texas, a contract must be supported by consideration, and if it is not, it is illusory and 
cannot be enforced. In Morrison v. Amway Corp., the Fifth Circuit analyzed a very similar 
arbitration provision to that in the subject Terms and Conditions and held it to be illusory. 
In Morrison, defendant, a seller of household products marketed through a chain of 
distributors, was sued by its distributors for a variety of torts, including racketeering and 
defamation. The defendant sought to enforce an arbitration provision in which each 
distributor agreed: 
 
“[T]o conduct [his or her] business according to the Amway Code of Ethics 
and Rules of Conduct, as they are amended and published from time to time 
in official Amway literature .... I agree I will give notice in writing of any 
claim or dispute arising out of or relating to my Amway distributorship, or 
the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan or Rules of Conduct to the other party 
or parties .... I agree to submit any remaining claim or dispute arising out of 
or relating to any Amway distributorship, the Amway Sales and Marketing 
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Plan, or the Amway Rules of Conduct ... to binding arbitration in accordance 
with the Amway Arbitration rules, which are set forth in the Amway 
Business Compendium.”  
 
The Morrison court held that the provision was illusory because “[t]here is no express 
exemption of the arbitration provisions from Amway’s ability to unilaterally modify all 
rules, and the only express limitation on that unilateral right is published notice. While it 
is inferable that an amendment thus unilaterally made by Amway to the arbitration 
provision would not become effective until published, there is nothing to suggest that once 
published the amendment would be inapplicable to disputes arising, or arising out of events 
occurring, before such publication.” 
 
The Morrison court distinguished In re Halliburton Co., in which the Texas Supreme Court 
rejected an argument that an arbitration clause was illusory. The provision in Halliburton 
specifically limited the defendant’s ability to apply changes to the agreement as follows: 
 
[N]o amendment shall apply to a Dispute of which the Sponsor [Halliburton] 
had actual notice on the date of amendment .... termination [of the 
arbitration agreement] shall not be effective until 10 days after reasonable 
notice of termination is given to Employees or as to Disputes which arose 
prior to the date of termination. 
 
In Morrison, the Fifth Circuit held that the limitation on the ability to unilaterally modify 
or terminate the agreement in Halliburton is what caused the Texas Supreme Court to rule 
that it was enforceable. Because the Morrison agreement contained no “Halliburton type 
savings clauses,” which would “preclude application of such amendments to disputes which 
arose (or of which Amway had notice) before the amendment,” the agreement in Morrison 
was illusory. 
 
Analysis 
 
The basis for the Plaintiffs’ claim that the arbitration provision is illusory is that 
Blockbuster reserves the right to modify the Terms and Conditions, including the section 
that contains the arbitration provision, “at its sole discretion” and “at any time,” and such 
modifications will be effective immediately upon being posted on the site. Under the 
heading “Changes to Terms and Conditions,” the contract states: 
 
Blockbuster may at any time, and at its sole discretion, modify these Terms 
and Conditions of Use, including without limitation the Privacy Policy, with 
or without notice. Such modifications will be effective immediately upon 
posting. You agree to review these Terms and Conditions of Use periodically 
and your continued use of this Site following such modifications will indicate 
your acceptance of these modified Terms and Conditions of Use. If you do not 
agree to any modification of these Terms and Conditions of Use, you must 
immediately stop using this Site. 
 
The Court concludes that the Blockbuster arbitration provision is illusory for the same 
reasons as that in Morrison. Here, as in Morrison, there is nothing in the Terms and 
80. 
Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from unilaterally changing any part of the contract 
other than providing that such changes will not take effect until posted on the website. 
There are likewise no “Halliburton type savings clauses,” as there is “nothing to suggest 
that once published the amendment would be inapplicable to disputes arising, or arising 
out of events occurring, before such publication.” The Fifth Circuit in Morrison noted the 
lack of an “express exemption” of the ability to unilaterally modify all rules, which the 
Blockbuster agreement also does not contain. The Blockbuster contract only states that 
modifications “will be effective immediately upon posting,” and the natural reading of that 
clause does not limit application of the modifications to earlier disputes. 
 
The Court addresses two differences between the Blockbuster contract and that in 
Morrison. Under Texas law, where, as here, an arbitration provision is incorporated within 
a larger contract, the benefits of the underlying contract can serve as consideration. The 
Morrison contract was a stand-alone agreement, and as such required independent 
consideration. Second, in Morrison, the defendant was actually attempting to retroactively 
apply the arbitration agreement to events that had happened before it was in effect, and 
there is no such suggestion here. 
 
Neither distinction affects this Court’s determination that the Blockbuster contract is 
illusory. First, the Supreme Court has broadly held that challenges to a contract as a whole, 
and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator. Defendant argues 
that because Plaintiffs challenge a provision that applies to the contract as a whole, the 
challenge must be heard by the arbitrator. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ challenge is to 
the arbitration provision, and therefore the challenge is properly before the Court. 
  
Second, the rule in Morrison applies to cases where there was no attempt to apply a 
contract modification to prior events. In Simmons v. Quixtar, Inc., the court stated that “a 
close reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion [in Morrison] is not predicated on that sole 
ground [of applying modification to earlier actions]. The Court’s reasoning applies to the 
Rules of Conduct and Amway’s (Quixtar’s) ability to unilaterally change the rules of the 
game.” The court continued: “[t]he language of the Circuit’s [Morrison] opinion ... decided 
the issue on the basis that the ability to change the rules at any time made the contract 
merely illusory.” The Court agrees with that analysis and finds that the Morrison rule 
applies even when no retroactive modification has been attempted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision of the Blockbuster 
contract is illusory and unenforceable, and accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel 
Individual Arbitration is denied. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
In light of this ruling, how should Blockbuster amend its user agreement over time?
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IV. Trespass/Computer Fraud & Abuse Act 
 
 
Comparison of Trespass to Chattels Legal Doctrines 
 
 
intentionally impair integrity/availability of data, program, system 
or information without authorization which causes 
• loss of $5k/yr (includes remediation costs and costs/lost 
revenues from service interruption)
• [medical harm] or physical injury
• threat to public health/safety
• damage to government computer
• damage to 10+ computers/yr
knowingly transmit 
program/info/code/command
18 USC 1030
(a)(5)(A)
any damage or loss (including verification expenses)Knowingly without permission
(2) access and take/copy/use data 
from computer system/network
(3) use computer services
(7) access computer 
system/network
CA Penal 502(c)
impair integrity/availability of data, program, system or 
information which causes 
• loss of $5k/yr (includes remediation costs and costs/lost 
revenues from service interruption)
• [medical harm] or physical injury
• threat to public health/safety
• damage to government computer
• damage to 10+ computers/yr
Note: (B) requires reckless impairment; (C) requires “loss”
intentional access without 
authorization
18 USC 1030 
(a)(5)(B) & (C)
• dispossess
• impair condition/quality/value
• lost use for substantial time period
• bodily harm or harm to legally protected interest
intentional use or physical contactRestatements 
(Common law)
DamageChattel Interference
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Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342 (Cal. 2003). 
Werdegar, Justice. 
 
Intel Corporation (Intel) maintains an electronic mail system, connected to the Internet, 
through which messages between employees and those outside the company can be sent 
and received, and permits its employees to make reasonable nonbusiness use of this system. 
On six occasions over almost two years, Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel employee, 
sent e-mails criticizing Intel’s employment practices to numerous current employees on 
Intel’s electronic mail system. Hamidi breached no computer security barriers in order to 
communicate with Intel employees. He offered to, and did, remove from his mailing list any 
recipient who so wished. Hamidi’s communications to individual Intel employees caused 
neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the company’s computers, nor did they 
at any time deprive Intel of the use of its computers. The contents of the messages, 
however, caused discussion among employees and managers. 
 
On these facts, Intel brought suit, claiming that by communicating with its employees over 
the company’s e-mail system Hamidi committed the tort of trespass to chattels. The trial 
court granted Intel’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Hamidi from any further 
mailings. A divided Court of Appeal affirmed. 
 
After reviewing the decisions analyzing unauthorized electronic contact with computer 
systems as potential trespasses to chattels, we conclude that under California law the tort 
does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an electronic 
communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its 
functioning. Such an electronic communication does not constitute an actionable trespass to 
personal property, i.e., the computer system, because it does not interfere with the 
possessor’s use or possession of, or any other legally protected interest in, the personal 
property itself. The consequential economic damage Intel claims to have suffered, i.e., loss 
of productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to Hamidi’s messages and 
company efforts to block the messages, is not an injury to the company’s interest in its 
computers—which worked as intended and were unharmed by the communications—any 
more than the personal distress caused by reading an unpleasant letter would be an injury 
to the recipient’s mailbox, or the loss of privacy caused by an intrusive telephone call would 
be an injury to the recipient’s telephone equipment. 
 
Our conclusion does not rest on any special immunity for communications by electronic 
mail; we do not hold that messages transmitted through the Internet are exempt from the 
ordinary rules of tort liability. To the contrary, e-mail, like other forms of communication, 
may in some circumstances cause legally cognizable injury to the recipient or to third 
parties and may be actionable under various common law or statutory theories. Indeed, on 
facts somewhat similar to those here, a company or its employees might be able to plead 
causes of action for interference with prospective economic relations, interference with 
contract or intentional infliction of emotional distress. And, of course, as with any other 
means of publication, third party subjects of e-mail communications may under appropriate 
facts make claims for defamation, publication of private facts, or other speech-based torts. 
Intel’s claim fails not because e-mail transmitted through the Internet enjoys unique 
immunity, but because the trespass to chattels tort—unlike the causes of action just 
mentioned—may not, in California, be proved without evidence of an injury to the plaintiff’s 
personal property or legal interest therein. 
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Nor does our holding affect the legal remedies of Internet service providers (ISP’s) against 
senders of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail (UCE), also known as “spam.” A series of 
federal district court decisions, beginning with CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. 
(S.D. Ohio 1997) 962 F. Supp. 1015, has approved the use of trespass to chattels as a theory 
of spammers’ liability to ISP’s, based upon evidence that the vast quantities of mail sent by 
spammers both overburdened the ISP’s own computers and made the entire computer 
system harder to use for recipients, the ISP’s customers. In those cases, discussed in 
greater detail below, the underlying complaint was that the extraordinary quantity of UCE 
impaired the computer system’s functioning. In the present case, the claimed injury is 
located in the disruption or distraction caused to recipients by the contents of the e-mail 
messages, an injury entirely separate from, and not directly affecting, the possession or 
value of personal property. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND… 
 
Hamidi, a former Intel engineer, together with others, formed an organization named 
Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-Intel) to disseminate information and views 
critical of Intel’s employment and personnel policies and practices. FACE-Intel maintained 
a Web site (which identified Hamidi as Webmaster and as the organization’s spokesperson) 
containing such material. In addition, over a 21-month period Hamidi, on behalf of FACE-
Intel, sent six mass e-mails to employee addresses on Intel’s electronic mail system. The 
messages criticized Intel’s employment practices, warned employees of the dangers those 
practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider moving to other companies, 
solicited employees’ participation in FACE-Intel, and urged employees to inform themselves 
further by visiting FACE-Intel’s Web site. The messages stated that recipients could, by 
notifying the sender of their wishes, be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list; Hamidi did 
not subsequently send messages to anyone who requested removal. 
 
Each message was sent to thousands of addresses (as many as 35,000 according to FACE-
Intel’s Web site), though some messages were blocked by Intel before reaching employees. 
Intel’s attempt to block internal transmission of the messages succeeded only in part; 
Hamidi later admitted he evaded blocking efforts by using different sending computers. 
When Intel, in March 1998, demanded in writing that Hamidi and FACE-Intel stop sending 
e-mails to Intel’s computer system, Hamidi asserted the organization had a right to 
communicate with willing Intel employees; he sent a new mass mailing in September 1998. 
 
The summary judgment record contains no evidence Hamidi breached Intel’s computer 
security in order to obtain the recipient addresses for his messages; indeed, internal Intel 
memoranda show the company’s management concluded no security breach had occurred.1 
Hamidi stated he created the recipient address list using an Intel directory on a floppy disk 
anonymously sent to him. Nor is there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution 
of Hamidi’s electronic messages damaged Intel’s computer system or slowed or impaired its 
                                                 
1 To the extent, therefore, that Justice Mosk suggests Hamidi breached the security of Intel’s internal computer 
network by “circumvent [ing]” Intel’s “security measures” and entering the company’s “intranet”, the evidence 
does not support such an implication. An “intranet” is “a network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet) 
belonging to an organization, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization’s members, employees, 
or others with authorization.” Hamidi used only a part of Intel’s computer network accessible to outsiders. 
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functioning. Intel did present uncontradicted evidence, however, that many employee 
recipients asked a company official to stop the messages and that staff time was consumed 
in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel. According to the FACE-Intel Web 
site, moreover, the messages had prompted discussions between “[e]xcited and nervous 
managers” and the company’s human resources department. 
 
[Editor’s note: here is a screenshot of the FACE-Intel website from 1999, after Hamidi had 
already been sued by Intel] 
 
 
 
 
Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel, pleading causes of action for trespass to chattels and 
nuisance, and seeking both actual damages and an injunction against further e-mail 
messages. Intel later voluntarily dismissed its nuisance claim and waived its demand for 
damages. The trial court entered default against FACE-Intel upon that organization’s 
failure to answer. The court then granted Intel’s motion for summary judgment, 
permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents “from sending unsolicited e-
mail to addresses on Intel’s computer systems.” Hamidi appealed; FACE-Intel did not. 
  
The Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the grant of injunctive relief. The 
majority took the view that the use of or intermeddling with another’s personal property is 
actionable as a trespass to chattels without proof of any actual injury to the personal 
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property; even if Intel could not show any damages resulting from Hamidi’s sending of 
messages, “it showed he was disrupting its business by using its property and therefore is 
entitled to injunctive relief based on a theory of trespass to chattels.” The dissenting justice 
warned that the majority’s application of the trespass to chattels tort to “unsolicited 
electronic mail that causes no harm to the private computer system that receives it” would 
“expand the tort of trespass to chattel in untold ways and to unanticipated 
circumstances.”… 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. Current California Tort Law 
 
Dubbed by Prosser the “little brother of conversion,” the tort of trespass to chattels allows 
recovery for interferences with possession of personal property “not sufficiently important 
to be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing 
with which he has interfered.” 
 
Though not amounting to conversion, the defendant’s interference must, to be actionable, 
have caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it. Under California law, 
trespass to chattels “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal 
property has proximately caused injury.” (Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal. App. 
4th 1559, 1566, italics added.) In cases of interference with possession of personal property 
not amounting to conversion, “the owner has a cause of action for trespass or case, and may 
recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the 
loss of its use.” In modern American law generally, “[t]respass remains as an occasional 
remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some damage, but not sufficiently serious or 
sufficiently important to amount to the greater tort” of conversion. (Prosser & Keeton, 
Torts, supra, § 15, p. 90, italics added.) 
 
The Restatement, too, makes clear that some actual injury must have occurred in order for 
a trespass to chattels to be actionable. Under section 218 of the Restatement Second of 
Torts, dispossession alone, without further damages, is actionable, but other forms of 
interference require some additional harm to the personal property or the possessor’s 
interests in it. “The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar 
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal 
damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an actor who 
interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other and 
more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one who intentionally intermeddles 
with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is harmful to the 
possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the 
chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some 
other legally protected interest of the possessor is affected as stated in Clause (c). Sufficient 
legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded 
by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless 
interference.” 
 
The Court of Appeal (quoting 7 Speiser et al., American Law of Torts (1990) Trespass, § 
23:23, p. 667) referred to “‘a number of very early cases [showing that] any unlawful 
interference, however slight, with the enjoyment by another of his personal property, is a 
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trespass.’” But while a harmless use or touching of personal property may be a technical 
trespass, an interference (not amounting to dispossession) is not actionable, under modern 
California and broader American law, without a showing of harm. As already discussed, 
this is the rule embodied in the Restatement (Rest.2d Torts, § 218) and adopted by 
California law (Zaslow v. Kroenert, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 551; Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 
supra, 46 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1566). 
 
In this respect, as Prosser explains, modern day trespass to chattels differs both from the 
original English writ and from the action for trespass to land: “Another departure from the 
original rule of the old writ of trespass concerns the necessity of some actual damage to the 
chattel before the action can be maintained. Where the defendant merely interferes without 
doing any harm—as where, for example, he merely lays hands upon the plaintiff’s horse, or 
sits in his car—there has been a division of opinion among the writers, and a surprising 
dearth of authority. By analogy to trespass to land there might be a technical tort in such a 
case .... Such scanty authority as there is, however, has considered that the dignitary interest 
in the inviolability of chattels, unlike that as to land, is not sufficiently important to require 
any greater defense than the privilege of using reasonable force when necessary to protect 
them. Accordingly it has been held that nominal damages will not be awarded, and that in 
the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie.” 
 
Intel suggests that the requirement of actual harm does not apply here because it sought 
only injunctive relief, as protection from future injuries. But as Justice Kolkey, dissenting 
below, observed, “[t]he fact the relief sought is injunctive does not excuse a showing of 
injury, whether actual or threatened.” Indeed, in order to obtain injunctive relief the 
plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to cause 
irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages. Even in an 
action for trespass to real property, in which damage to the property is not an element of 
the cause of action, “the extraordinary remedy of injunction” cannot be invoked without 
showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. A fortiori, to issue an injunction without a 
showing of likely irreparable injury in an action for trespass to chattels, in which injury to 
the personal property or the possessor’s interest in it is an element of the action, would 
make little legal sense. 
 
The dispositive issue in this case, therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate 
Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or 
injury to its rights in that personal property, such as to entitle Intel to judgment as a 
matter of law. To review, the undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage 
to Intel’s computer hardware or software and no interference with its ordinary and 
intended operation. Intel was not dispossessed of its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages 
prevent Intel from using its computers for any measurable length of time. Intel presented 
no evidence its system was slowed or otherwise impaired by the burden of delivering 
Hamidi’s electronic messages. Nor was there any evidence transmission of the messages 
imposed any marginal cost on the operation of Intel’s computers. In sum, no evidence 
suggested that in sending messages through Intel’s Internet connections and internal 
computer system Hamidi used the system in any manner in which it was not intended to 
function or impaired the system in any way. Nor does the evidence show the request of any 
employee to be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list was not honored. The evidence did 
show, however, that some employees who found the messages unwelcome asked 
management to stop them and that Intel technical staff spent time and effort attempting to 
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block the messages. A statement on the FACE-Intel Web site, moreover, could be taken as 
an admission that the messages had caused “[e]xcited and nervous managers” to discuss 
the matter with Intel’s human resources department. 
 
Relying on a line of decisions, most from federal district courts, applying the tort of trespass 
to chattels to various types of unwanted electronic contact between computers, Intel 
contends that, while its computers were not damaged by receiving Hamidi’s messages, its 
interest in the “physical condition, quality or value” of the computers was harmed. We 
disagree. The cited line of decisions does not persuade us that the mere sending of 
electronic communications that assertedly cause injury only because of their contents 
constitutes an actionable trespass to a computer system through which the messages are 
transmitted. Rather, the decisions finding electronic contact to be a trespass to computer 
systems have generally involved some actual or threatened interference with the 
computers’ functioning. 
 
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra, 46 Cal. App. 4th at pages 1566-1567 (Thrifty-Tel), the 
California Court of Appeal held that evidence of automated searching of a telephone 
carrier’s system for authorization codes supported a cause of action for trespass to chattels. 
The defendant’s automated dialing program “overburdened the [plaintiff’s] system, denying 
some subscribers access to phone lines”, showing the requisite injury. 
 
Following Thrifty-Tel, a series of federal district court decisions held that sending UCE 
through an ISP’s equipment may constitute trespass to the ISP’s computer system. The 
lead case, CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., supra, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-1023 
(CompuServe), was followed by Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Apr. 16, 
1998) 1998 WL 388389, page *7, America Online, Inc. v. IMS (E.D. Va. 1998) 24 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 550-551, and America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc. (E.D. Va. 1998) 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 
451-452. 
 
In each of these spamming cases, the plaintiff showed, or was prepared to show, some 
interference with the efficient functioning of its computer system. In CompuServe, the 
plaintiff ISP’s mail equipment monitor stated that mass UCE mailings, especially from 
nonexistent addresses such as those used by the defendant, placed “a tremendous burden” 
on the ISP’s equipment, using “disk space and drain[ing] the processing power,” making 
those resources unavailable to serve subscribers. (CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at p. 1022.) 
Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 at page *7, the court 
found the evidence supported a finding that the defendant’s mailings “fill[ed] up Hotmail’s 
computer storage space and threaten [ed] to damage Hotmail’s ability to service its 
legitimate customers.” America Online, Inc. v. IMS, decided on summary judgment, was 
deemed factually indistinguishable from CompuServe; the court observed that in both cases 
the plaintiffs “alleged that processing the bulk e-mail cost them time and money and 
burdened their equipment.” The same court, in America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., supra, 
46 F. Supp. 2d at page 452, simply followed CompuServe and its earlier America Online 
decision, quoting the former’s explanation that UCE burdened the computer’s processing 
power and memory. 
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Building on the spamming cases, in particular CompuServe, three even more recent district 
court decisions addressed whether unauthorized robotic data collection4 from a company’s 
publicly accessible Web site is a trespass on the company’s computer system. (eBay, Inc. v. 
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., supra, 100 F. Supp. 2d at pp. 1069-1072 (eBay); Register.com, Inc. v. 
Verio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248-251; Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com, Inc., supra, 2000 WL 1887522 at p. *4.) The two district courts that found such 
automated data collection to constitute a trespass relied, in part, on the deleterious impact 
this activity could have, especially if replicated by other searchers, on the functioning of a 
Web site’s computer equipment. 
 
In the leading case, eBay, the defendant Bidder’s Edge (BE), operating an auction 
aggregation site, accessed the eBay Web site about 100,000 times per day, accounting for 
between 1 and 2 percent of the information requests received by eBay and a slightly smaller 
percentage of the data transferred by eBay. The district court rejected eBay’s claim that it 
was entitled to injunctive relief because of the defendant’s unauthorized presence alone, or 
because of the incremental cost the defendant had imposed on operation of the eBay site, 
but found sufficient proof of threatened harm in the potential for others to imitate the 
defendant’s activity: “If BE’s activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage 
other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay system such 
that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system 
unavailability, or data losses.” Again, in addressing the likelihood of eBay’s success on its 
trespass to chattels cause of action, the court held the evidence of injury to eBay’s computer 
system sufficient to support a preliminary injunction: “If the court were to hold otherwise, it 
would likely encourage other auction aggregators to crawl the eBay site, potentially to the 
point of denying effective access to eBay’s customers. If preliminary injunctive relief were 
denied, and other aggregators began to crawl the eBay site, there appears to be little doubt 
that the load on eBay’s computer system would qualify as a substantial impairment of 
condition or value.” 
 
Another district court followed eBay on similar facts—a domain name registrar’s claim 
against a Web hosting and development site that robotically searched the registrar’s 
database of newly registered domain names in search of business leads—in Register.com, 
Inc. v. Verio, Inc. Although the plaintiff was unable to measure the burden the defendant’s 
searching had placed on its system, the district court, quoting the declaration of one of the 
plaintiff’s officers, found sufficient evidence of threatened harm to the system in the 
possibility the defendant’s activities would be copied by others: “‘I believe that if Verio’s 
searching of Register.com’s WHOIS database were determined to be lawful, then every 
purveyor of Internet-based services would engage in similar conduct.’” Like eBay, the court 
observed, Register.com had a legitimate fear “that its servers will be flooded by search 
robots.” 
 
In the third decision discussing robotic data collection as a trespass, Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com, Inc. (Ticketmaster), the court, distinguishing eBay, found insufficient evidence 
of harm to the chattel to constitute an actionable trespass: “A basic element of trespass to 
chattels must be physical harm to the chattel (not present here) or some obstruction of its 
                                                 
4 Data search and collection robots, also known as “Web bots” or “spiders,” are programs designed to rapidly 
search numerous Web pages or sites, collecting, retrieving, and indexing information from these pages. Their 
uses include creation of searchable databases, Web catalogues and comparison shopping services. 
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basic function (in the court’s opinion not sufficiently shown here).... The comparative use 
[by the defendant of the plaintiff’s computer system] appears very small and there is no 
showing that the use interferes to any extent with the regular business of [the plaintiff].... 
Nor here is the specter of dozens or more parasites joining the fray, the cumulative total of 
which could affect the operation of [the plaintiff’s] business.” 
 
In the decisions so far reviewed, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s computer system was 
held sufficient to support an action for trespass when it actually did, or threatened to, 
interfere with the intended functioning of the system, as by significantly reducing its 
available memory and processing power. In Ticketmaster, the one case where no such effect, 
actual or threatened, had been demonstrated, the court found insufficient evidence of harm 
to support a trespass action. These decisions do not persuade us to Intel’s position here, for 
Intel has demonstrated neither any appreciable effect on the operation of its computer 
system from Hamidi’s messages, nor any likelihood that Hamidi’s actions will be replicated 
by others if found not to constitute a trespass. 
 
That Intel does not claim the type of functional impact that spammers and robots have been 
alleged to cause is not surprising in light of the differences between Hamidi’s activities and 
those of a commercial enterprise that uses sheer quantity of messages as its 
communications strategy. Though Hamidi sent thousands of copies of the same message on 
six occasions over 21 months, that number is minuscule compared to the amounts of mail 
sent by commercial operations. The individual advertisers sued in America Online, Inc. v. 
IMS, and America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., were alleged to have sent more than 60 
million messages over 10 months and more than 92 million messages over seven months, 
respectively. Collectively, UCE has reportedly come to constitute about 45 percent of all e-
mail. The functional burden on Intel’s computers, or the cost in time to individual 
recipients, of receiving Hamidi’s occasional advocacy messages cannot be compared to the 
burdens and costs caused ISP’s and their customers by the ever-rising deluge of commercial 
e-mail. 
 
Intel relies on language in the eBay decision suggesting that unauthorized use of another’s 
chattel is actionable even without any showing of injury: “Even if, as [defendant] BE 
argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, BE has 
nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its 
own purposes. The law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” But as 
the eBay court went on immediately to find that the defendant’s conduct, if widely 
replicated, would likely impair the functioning of the plaintiff’s system, we do not read the 
quoted remarks as expressing the court’s complete view of the issue. In isolation, moreover, 
they would not be a correct statement of California or general American law on this point. 
While one may have no right temporarily to use another’s personal property, such use is 
actionable as a trespass only if it “has proximately caused injury.” (Thrifty-Tel, supra, 46 
Cal. App. 4th at p. 1566.) “[I]n the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie.” 
(Prosser & Keeton, Torts, supra, § 14, p. 87.) Short of dispossession, personal injury, or 
physical damage (not present here), intermeddling is actionable only if “the chattel is 
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or [¶] ... the possessor is deprived of the use of 
the chattel for a substantial time.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, pars. (b), (c).) In particular, an 
actionable deprivation of use “must be for a time so substantial that it is possible to 
estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not 
sufficient unless there is a dispossession....” That Hamidi’s messages temporarily used some 
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portion of the Intel computers’ processors or storage is, therefore, not enough; Intel must, 
but does not, demonstrate some measurable loss from the use of its computer system.5 
 
In addition to impairment of system functionality, CompuServe and its progeny also refer to 
the ISP’s loss of business reputation and customer goodwill, resulting from the 
inconvenience and cost that spam causes to its members, as harm to the ISP’s legally 
protected interests in its personal property. Intel argues that its own interest in employee 
productivity, assertedly disrupted by Hamidi’s messages, is a comparable protected interest 
in its computer system. We disagree. 
 
Whether the economic injuries identified in CompuServe were properly considered injuries 
to the ISP’s possessory interest in its personal property, the type of property interest the 
tort is primarily intended to protect, has been questioned.6 “[T]he court broke the chain 
between the trespass and the harm, allowing indirect harms to CompuServe’s business 
interests—reputation, customer goodwill, and employee time—to count as harms to the 
chattel (the server).” (Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to 
Chattels, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. at pp. 429-430.) “[T]his move cuts trespass to chattels free 
from its moorings of dispossession or the equivalent, allowing the court free reign [sic] to 
hunt for ‘impairment.’” (Burk, The Trouble with Trespass (2000) 4 J. Small & Emerging 
Bus. L. 27, 35.) But even if the loss of goodwill identified in CompuServe were the type of 
injury that would give rise to a trespass to chattels claim under California law, Intel’s 
position would not follow, for Intel’s claimed injury has even less connection to its personal 
property than did CompuServe’s. 
 
CompuServe’s customers were annoyed because the system was inundated with unsolicited 
commercial messages, making its use for personal communication more difficult and costly. 
Their complaint, which allegedly led some to cancel their CompuServe service, was about 
the functioning of CompuServe’s electronic mail service. Intel’s workers, in contrast, were 
allegedly distracted from their work not because of the frequency or quantity of Hamidi’s 
messages, but because of assertions and opinions the messages conveyed. Intel’s complaint 
is thus about the contents of the messages rather than the functioning of the company’s e-
mail system. Even accepting CompuServe’s economic injury rationale, therefore, Intel’s 
position represents a further extension of the trespass to chattels tort, fictionally 
                                                 
5 In the most recent decision relied upon by Intel, Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. (N.D. Cal., 
Dec. 6, 2001) 2001 WL 1736382, pages *12-*13, a federal magistrate judge incorrectly read eBay as establishing, 
under California law, that mere unauthorized use of another’s computer system constitutes an actionable 
trespass. The plaintiff accused the defendant, a business competitor, of copying the metatags (code describing 
the contents of a Web site to a search engine) from the plaintiff’s Web site, resulting in diversion of potential 
customers for the plaintiff’s services. With regard to the plaintiff’s trespass claim (the plaintiff also pleaded 
causes of action for, inter alia, misappropriation, copyright and trademark infringement), the magistrate judge 
concluded that eBay imposed no requirement of actual damage and that the defendant’s conduct was sufficient 
to establish a trespass “simply because [it] amounted to ‘use’ of Plaintiff’s computer.” But as just explained, we 
do not read eBay as holding that the actual injury requirement may be dispensed with, and such a suggestion 
would, in any event, be erroneous as a statement of California law. 
6 In support of its reasoning, the CompuServe court cited paragraph (d) of section 218 of the Restatement Second 
of Torts, which refers to harm “to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.” 
As the comment to this paragraph explains, however, it is intended to cover personal injury to the possessor or 
another person in whom the possessor has a legal interest, or injury to “other chattel or land” in which the 
possessor of the chattel subject to the trespass has a legal interest. No personal injury was claimed either in 
CompuServe or in the case at bar, and neither the lost goodwill in CompuServe nor the loss of employee 
efficiency claimed in the present case is chattel or land. 
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recharacterizing the allegedly injurious effect of a communication’s contents on recipients 
as an impairment to the device which transmitted the message. 
 
This theory of “impairment by content” (Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. Small & 
Emerging Bus. L. at p. 37) threatens to stretch trespass law to cover injuries far afield from 
the harms to possession the tort evolved to protect. Intel’s theory would expand the tort of 
trespass to chattels to cover virtually any unconsented-to communication that, solely 
because of its content, is unwelcome to the recipient or intermediate transmitter. As the 
dissenting justice below explained, “‘Damage’ of this nature—the distraction of reading or 
listening to an unsolicited communication—is not within the scope of the injury against 
which the trespass-to-chattel tort protects, and indeed trivializes it. After all, ‘[t]he property 
interest protected by the old action of trespass was that of possession; and this has 
continued to affect the character of the action.’ Reading an e-mail transmitted to equipment 
designed to receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory interest in the 
equipment. [¶] Indeed, if a chattel’s receipt of an electronic communication constitutes a 
trespass to that chattel, then not only are unsolicited telephone calls and faxes trespasses 
to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and television signals also constitute a trespass to 
chattel every time the viewer inadvertently sees or hears the unwanted program.” We 
agree. While unwelcome communications, electronic or otherwise, can cause a variety of 
injuries to economic relations, reputation and emotions, those interests are protected by 
other branches of tort law; in order to address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to 
the communication system. 
 
Nor may Intel appropriately assert a property interest in its employees’ time. “The 
Restatement test clearly speaks in the first instance to the impairment of the chattel.... But 
employees are not chattels (at least not in the legal sense of the term).” (Burk, The Trouble 
with Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. at p. 36.) Whatever interest Intel may have 
in preventing its employees from receiving disruptive communications, it is not an interest 
in personal property, and trespass to chattels is therefore not an action that will lie to 
protect it. Nor, finally, can the fact Intel staff spent time attempting to block Hamidi’s 
messages be bootstrapped into an injury to Intel’s possessory interest in its computers. To 
quote, again, from the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal: “[I]t is circular to premise 
the damage element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to prevent the damage. Injury can 
only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, not by the cost of the steps taken 
to avoid the injury and prevent the tort; otherwise, we can create injury for every supposed 
tort.” 
 
Intel connected its e-mail system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use 
of this connection both for business and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes. In 
doing so, the company necessarily contemplated the employees’ receipt of unsolicited as 
well as solicited communications from other companies and individuals. That some 
communications would, because of their contents, be unwelcome to Intel management was 
virtually inevitable. Hamidi did nothing but use the e-mail system for its intended 
purpose—to communicate with employees. The system worked as designed, delivering the 
messages without any physical or functional harm or disruption. These occasional 
transmissions cannot reasonably be viewed as impairing the quality or value of Intel’s 
computer system. We conclude, therefore, that Intel has not presented undisputed facts 
demonstrating an injury to its personal property, or to its legal interest in that property, 
that support, under California tort law, an action for trespass to chattels. 
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II. Proposed Extension of California Tort Law 
 
We next consider whether California common law should be extended to cover, as a 
trespass to chattels, an otherwise harmless electronic communication whose contents are 
objectionable. We decline to so expand California law. Intel, of course, was not the recipient 
of Hamidi’s messages, but rather the owner and possessor of computer servers used to relay 
the messages, and it bases this tort action on that ownership and possession. The property 
rule proposed is a rigid one, under which the sender of an electronic message would be 
strictly liable to the owner of equipment through which the communication passes—here, 
Intel—for any consequential injury flowing from the contents of the communication…. 
 
…Creating an absolute property right to exclude undesired communications from one’s e-
mail and Web servers might help force spammers to internalize the costs they impose on 
ISP’s and their customers. But such a property rule might also create substantial new costs, 
to e-mail and e-commerce users and to society generally, in lost ease and openness of 
communication and in lost network benefits. In light of the unresolved controversy, we 
would be acting rashly to adopt a rule treating computer servers as real property for 
purposes of trespass law. 
 
The Legislature has already adopted detailed regulations governing UCE. (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, §§ 17538.4, 17538.45) It may see fit in the future also to regulate noncommercial e-
mail, such as that sent by Hamidi, or other kinds of unwanted contact between computers 
on the Internet, such as that alleged in eBay. But we are not persuaded that these 
perceived problems call at present for judicial creation of a rigid property rule of computer 
server inviolability. We therefore decline to create an exception, covering Hamidi’s 
unwanted electronic messages to Intel employees, to the general rule that a trespass to 
chattels is not actionable if it does not involve actual or threatened injury to the personal 
property or to the possessor’s legally protected interest in the personal property. No such 
injury having been shown on the undisputed facts, Intel was not entitled to summary 
judgment in its favor. 
 
III. Constitutional Considerations 
 
Because we conclude no trespass to chattels was shown on the summary judgment record, 
making the injunction improper on common law grounds, we need not address at length the 
dissenters’ constitutional arguments. A few clarifications are nonetheless in order. 
 
Justice Mosk asserts that this case involves only “a private entity seeking to enforce private 
trespass rights.” But the injunction here was issued by a state court. While a private 
refusal to transmit another’s electronic speech generally does not implicate the First 
Amendment, because no governmental action is involved (see Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. 
American Online, Inc. (E.D. Penn. 1996) 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-445 [spammer could not 
force private ISP to carry its messages]), the use of government power, whether in 
enforcement of a statute or ordinance or by an award of damages or an injunction in a 
private lawsuit, is state action that must comply with First Amendment limits. Nor does 
the nonexistence of a “constitutional right to trespass” make an injunction in this case per 
se valid. Unlike, for example, the trespasser-to-land defendant in Church of Christ in 
Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 1244, Hamidi himself had no tangible 
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presence on Intel property, instead speaking from his own home through his computer. He 
no more invaded Intel’s property than does a protester holding a sign or shouting through a 
bullhorn outside corporate headquarters, posting a letter through the mail, or telephoning 
to complain of a corporate practice. 
 
Justice Brown relies upon a constitutional “right not to listen,” rooted in the listener’s 
“personal autonomy”, as compelling a remedy against Hamidi’s messages, which she asserts 
were sent to “unwilling” listeners. Even assuming a corporate entity could under some 
circumstances claim such a personal right, here the intended and actual recipients of 
Hamidi’s messages were individual Intel employees, rather than Intel itself. The record 
contains no evidence Hamidi sent messages to any employee who notified him such 
messages were unwelcome. In any event, such evidence would, under the dissent’s rationale 
of a right not to listen, support only a narrow injunction aimed at protecting individual 
recipients who gave notice of their rejection. (See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 
(1983) 463 U.S. 60, 72 [government may not act on behalf of all addressees by generally 
prohibiting mailing of materials related to contraception, where those recipients who may 
be offended can simply ignore and discard the materials]; Martin v. City of Struthers (1943) 
319 U.S. 141, 144 [anti-canvassing ordinance improperly “substitutes the judgment of the 
community for the judgment of the individual householder”]; cf. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office 
Dept. (1970) 397 U.S. 728, 736 [“householder” may exercise “individual autonomy” by 
refusing delivery of offensive mail].) The principle of a right not to listen, founded in 
personal autonomy, cannot justify the sweeping injunction issued here against all 
communication to Intel addresses, for such a right, logically, can be exercised only by, or at 
the behest of, the recipient himself or herself. 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
WE CONCUR: KENNARD, MORENO and PERREN*, JJ. 
 
[Concurring opinion by Justice Kennard and dissenting opinion by Justice Brown are 
omitted.] 
 
Dissenting Opinion by MOSK, J.** 
 
The majority hold that the California tort of trespass to chattels does not encompass the 
use of expressly unwanted electronic mail that causes no physical damage or impairment to 
the recipient’s computer system. They also conclude that because a computer system is not 
like real property, the rules of trespass to real property are also inapplicable to the 
circumstances in this case. Finally, they suggest that an injunction to preclude mass, 
noncommercial, unwelcome e-mails may offend the interests of free communication. 
 
                                                 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
** Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution 
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I respectfully disagree and would affirm the trial court’s decision. In my view, the repeated 
transmission of bulk e-mails by appellant Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi (Hamidi) to the 
employees of Intel Corporation (Intel) on its proprietary confidential e-mail lists, despite 
Intel’s demand that he cease such activities, constituted an actionable trespass to chattels. 
The majority fail to distinguish open communication in the public “commons” of the 
Internet from unauthorized intermeddling on a private, proprietary intranet. Hamidi is not 
communicating in the equivalent of a town square or of an unsolicited “junk” mailing 
through the United States Postal Service. His action, in crossing from the public Internet 
into a private intranet, is more like intruding into a private office mailroom, 
commandeering the mail cart, and dropping off unwanted broadsides on 30,000 desks. 
Because Intel’s security measures have been circumvented by Hamidi, the majority leave 
Intel, which has exercised all reasonable self-help efforts, with no recourse unless he causes 
a malfunction or systems “crash.” Hamidi’s repeated intrusions did more than merely 
“prompt[ ] discussions between ‘[e]xcited and nervous managers’ and the company’s human 
resource department”; they also constituted a misappropriation of Intel’s private computer 
system contrary to its intended use and against Intel’s wishes. 
 
The law of trespass to chattels has not universally been limited to physical damage. I 
believe it is entirely consistent to apply that legal theory to these circumstances—that is, 
when a proprietary computer system is being used contrary to its owner’s purposes and 
expressed desires, and self-help has been ineffective. Intel correctly expects protection from 
an intruder who misuses its proprietary system, its nonpublic directories, and its 
supposedly controlled connection to the Internet to achieve his bulk mailing objectives—
incidentally, without even having to pay postage. 
 
I 
 
Intel maintains an intranet—a proprietary computer network—as a tool for transacting 
and managing its business, both internally and for external business communications.1 The 
network and its servers constitute a tangible entity that has value in terms of the costs of 
its components and its function in enabling and enhancing the productivity and efficiency of 
Intel’s business operations. Intel has established costly security measures to protect the 
integrity of its system, including policies about use, proprietary internal e-mail addresses 
that it does not release to the public for use outside of company business, and a gateway for 
blocking unwanted electronic mail—a so-called firewall. 
 
The Intel computer usage guidelines, which are promulgated for its employees, state that 
the computer system is to be “used as a resource in conducting business. Reasonable 
personal use is permitted, but employees are reminded that these resources are the 
property of Intel and all information on these resources is also the property of Intel.” 
                                                 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines an intranet as “A local or restricted computer network; spec. a private 
or corporate network that uses Internet protocols. An intranet may (but need not) be connected to the Internet 
and be accessible externally to authorized users.” (OED Online, new ed., draft entry, Mar. 2003, 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/> [as of June 30, 2003]; see also Kokka, Property Rights on an Intranet, 3 Spring 
1998 J. Tech.L. & Policy 3, WL 3 UFLJTLP 3 at *3, *6 [defining an intranet as “an internal network of 
computers, servers, routers and browser software designed to organize, secure, distribute and collect 
information within an organization,” which in large organizations generally includes a wide range of services, 
including e-mail].) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is nothing incorrect about characterizing Hamidi’s 
unauthorized bulk e-mails as intrusions onto Intel’s intranet. 
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Examples of personal use that would not be considered reasonable expressly include “use 
that adversely affects productivity.” Employee e-mail communications are neither private 
nor confidential. 
 
Hamidi, a former Intel employee who had sued Intel and created an organization to 
disseminate negative information about its employment practices, sent bulk electronic mail 
on six occasions to as many as 35,000 Intel employees on its proprietary computer system, 
using Intel’s confidential employee e-mail lists and adopting a series of different origination 
addresses and encoding strategies to elude Intel’s blocking efforts. He refused to stop when 
requested by Intel to do so, asserting that he would ignore its demands: “I don’t care. I have 
grown deaf.” Intel sought injunctive relief, alleging that the disruptive effect of the bulk 
electronic mail, including expenses from administrative and management personnel, 
damaged its interest in the proprietary nature of its network. 
 
The trial court, in its order granting summary judgment and a permanent injunction, made 
the following pertinent findings regarding Hamidi’s transmission of bulk electronic mail: 
“Intel has requested that Hamidi stop sending the messages, but Hamidi has refused, and 
has employed surreptitious means to circumvent Intel’s efforts to block entry of his 
messages into Intel’s system.... [¶] ... The e-mail system is dedicated for use in conducting 
business, including communications between Intel employees and its customers and 
vendors. Employee e-mail addresses are not published for use outside company business.... 
[¶] The intrusion by Hamidi into the Intel e-mail system has resulted in the expenditure of 
company resources to seek to block his mailings and to address employee concerns about 
the mailings. Given Hamidi’s evasive techniques to avoid blocking, the self help remedy 
available to Intel is ineffective.” The trial court concluded that “the evidence establishes 
(without dispute) that Intel has been injured by diminished employee productivity and in 
devoting company resources to blocking efforts and to addressing employees about Hamidi’s 
e-mails.” The trial court further found that the “massive” intrusions “impaired the value to 
Intel of its e-mail system.” 
 
The majority agree that an impairment of Intel’s system would result in an action for 
trespass to chattels, but find that Intel suffered no injury. As did the trial court, I conclude 
that the undisputed evidence establishes that Intel was substantially harmed by the costs 
of efforts to block the messages and diminished employee productivity. Additionally, the 
injunction did not affect Hamidi’s ability to communicate with Intel employees by other 
means; he apparently continues to maintain a Web site to publicize his messages 
concerning the company. Furthermore, I believe that the trial court and the Court of Appeal 
correctly determined that the tort of trespass to chattels applies in these circumstances. 
 
The Restatement Second of Torts explains that a trespass to a chattel occurs if “the chattel 
is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value” or if “harm is caused to some ... thing in 
which the possessor has a legally protected interest.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, subds. (b) & (d), 
p. 420, italics added.) As to this tort, a current prominent treatise on the law of torts 
explains that “[t]he defendant may interfere with the chattel by interfering with the 
plaintiff’s access or use” and observes that the tort has been applied so as “to protect 
computer systems from electronic invasions by way of unsolicited email or the like.” (1 
Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) § 60, pp. 122-123.) Moreover, “[t]he harm necessary to 
trigger liability for trespass to chattels can be ... harm to something other than the chattel 
itself.” (Id., pp. 124-125; see also 1 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (3d ed. 1996 & 2003 
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supp.) § 2.3, pp. 2:14-2:18.) The Restatement points out that, unlike a possessor of land, a 
possessor of a chattel is not given legal protection from harmless invasion, but “the actor” 
may be liable if the conduct affects “some other and more important interest of the 
possessor.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. (e), p. 421, italics added.) 
 
The Restatement explains that the rationale for requiring harm for trespass to a chattel but 
not for trespass to land is the availability and effectiveness of self-help in the case of 
trespass to a chattel. “Sufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere 
inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his 
possession against even harmless interference.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. (e), p. 422.) 
Obviously, “force” is not available to prevent electronic trespasses. As shown by Intel’s 
inability to prevent Hamidi’s intrusions, self-help is not an adequate alternative to 
injunctive relief. 
 
The common law tort of trespass to chattels does not require physical disruption to the 
chattel. It also may apply when there is impairment to the “quality” or “value” of the 
chattel. (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, subd. (b), p. 420; see also id., com. (e), pp. 421-422 [liability if 
“intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical 
condition, quality, or value of the chattel”].) Moreover, as we held in Zaslow v. Kroenert 
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 551, it also applies “[w]here the conduct complained of does not 
amount to a substantial interference with possession or the right thereto, but consists of 
intermeddling with or use of or damages to the personal property.”2  
 
Here, Hamidi’s deliberate and continued intermeddling, and threatened intermeddling, 
with Intel’s proprietary computer system for his own purposes that were hostile to Intel, 
certainly impaired the quality and value of the system as an internal business device for 
Intel and forced Intel to incur costs to try to maintain the security and integrity of its 
server—efforts that proved ineffective. These included costs incurred to mitigate injuries 
that had already occurred. It is not a matter of “bootstrapp[ing]” to consider those costs a 
damage to Intel. Indeed, part of the value of the proprietary computer system is the ability 
to exclude intermeddlers from entering it for significant uses that are disruptive to its 
owner’s business operations. 
 
If Intel, a large business with thousands of former employees, is unable to prevent Hamidi 
from continued intermeddling, it is not unlikely that other outsiders who obtain access to 
its proprietary electronic mail addresses would engage in similar conduct, further reducing 
the value of, and perhaps debilitating, the computer system as a business productivity 
mechanism. Employees understand that a firewall is in place and expect that the messages 
they receive are from senders permitted by the corporation. Violation of this expectation 
increases the internal disruption caused by messages that circumvent the company’s 
attempt to exclude them. The time that each employee must spend to evaluate, delete or 
respond to the message, when added up, constitutes an amount of compensated time that 
translates to quantifiable financial damage.3 
                                                 
2 In Zaslow, we observed that when the trespass involves “intermeddling with or use of” another’s property, the 
owner “may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of 
its use.” (Zaslow v. Kroenert, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 551) We did not state that such damages were a 
requirement for a cause of action; nor did we address the availability of injunctive relief. 
3 As the recent spate of articles on “spam”—unsolicited bulk e-mail—suggests, the effects on business of such 
unwanted intrusions are not trivial. “Spam is not just a nuisance. It absorbs bandwidth and overwhelms 
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All of these costs to protect the integrity of the computer system and to deal with the 
disruptive effects of the transmissions and the expenditures attributable to employee time, 
constitute damages sufficient to establish the existence of a trespass to chattels, even if the 
computer system was not overburdened to the point of a “crash” by the bulk electronic mail. 
 
The several courts that have applied the tort of trespass to chattels to deliberate 
intermeddling with proprietary computer systems have, for the most part, used a similar 
analysis. Thus, the court in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022, applied the Restatement to conclude that mass mailings and 
evasion of the server’s filters diminished the value of the mail processing computer 
equipment to CompuServe “even though it is not physically damaged by defendant’s 
conduct.” The inconvenience to users of the system as a result of the mass messages 
“decrease[d] the utility of CompuServe’s e-mail service” and was actionable as a trespass to 
chattels. (Id. at p. 1023.) 
 
The court in America Online, Inc. v. IMS (E.D. Va. 1998) 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, on facts 
similar to those in the present case, also applied the Restatement in a trespass to chattels 
claim. There, defendant sent unauthorized e-mails to America Online’s computer system, 
persisting after receiving notice to desist and causing the company “to spend technical 
resources and staff time to ‘defend’ its computer system and its membership” against the 
unwanted messages. The company was not required to show that its computer system was 
overwhelmed or suffered a diminution in performance; mere use of the system by the 
defendant was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to prevail on the trespass to chattels claim. 
 
Similarly, the court in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2000) 100 F. Supp. 2d 
1058 determined that there was a trespass to chattels when the quality or value of a 
computer system was diminished by unauthorized “web crawlers,”4 despite the fact that 
eBay had not alleged any “particular service disruption” or “specific incremental damages” 
to the computer system. Intermeddling with eBay’s private property was sufficient to 
establish a cause of action: “A trespasser is liable when the trespass diminishes the 
condition, quality or value of personal property”; “[e]ven if [defendant’s intrusions] use only 
a small amount of eBay’s computer ... capacity, [defendant] has nonetheless deprived eBay 
of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The law 
recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” ([S]ee also, e.g., Oyster 
                                                                                                                                                             
Internet service providers. Corporate tech staffs labor to deploy filtering technology to protect their networks. 
The cost is now widely estimated (though all such estimates are largely guesswork) at billions of dollars a year. 
The social costs are immeasurable.... [¶] ‘Spam has become the organized crime of the Internet.’ ... ‘[M]ore and 
more it’s becoming a systems and engineering and networking problem.’” (Gleick, Tangled Up in Spam, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 9, 2003) magazine p. 1 [as of June 30, 2003]; see also Cooper & Shogren, U.S., States Turn Focus to 
Curbing Spam, L.A. Times (May 1, 2003) p. A21, col. 2 [“Businesses are losing money with every moment that 
employees spend deleting”]; Turley, Congress Must Send Spammers a Message, L.A. Times (Apr. 21, 2003) p. 
B13, col. 5 [“Spam now costs American businesses about $9 billion a year in lost productivity and screening”]; 
Taylor, Spam’s Big Bang! (June 16, 2003) Time, p. 51 [“The time we spend deleting or defeating spam costs an 
estimated $8.9 billion a year in lost productivity”].) But the occasional spam addressed to particular employees 
does not pose nearly the same threat of impaired value as the concerted bulk mailings into one e-mail system at 
issue here, which mailings were sent to thousands of employees with the express purpose of disrupting business 
as usual. 
4 A “web crawler” is a computer program that operates across the Internet to obtain information from the 
websites of others. 
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Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 200) 2001 WL 1736382 at *12-
*13 [trespass to chattels claim did not require company to demonstrate physical damage]; 
accord, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250; cf. 
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-1567 [unconsented 
electronic access to a computer system constituted a trespass to chattels].) 
 
These cases stand for the simple proposition that owners of computer systems, like owners 
of other private property, have a right to prevent others from using their property against 
their interests. That principle applies equally in this case. By his repeated intermeddling, 
Hamidi converted Intel’s private employee e-mail system into a tool for harming 
productivity and disrupting Intel’s workplace. Intel attempted to put a stop to Hamidi’s 
intrusions by increasing its electronic screening measures and by requesting that he desist. 
Only when self-help proved futile, devolving into a potentially endless joust between 
attempted prevention and circumvention, did Intel request and obtain equitable relief in 
the form of an injunction to prevent further threatened injury. 
 
The majority suggest that Intel is not entitled to injunctive relief because it chose to allow 
its employees access to e-mail through the Internet and because Hamidi has apparently 
told employees that he will remove them from his mailing list if they so request. They 
overlook the proprietary nature of Intel’s intranet system; Intel’s system is not merely a 
conduit for messages to its employees. As the owner of the computer system, it is Intel’s 
request that Hamidi stop that must be respected. The fact that, like most large businesses, 
Intel’s intranet includes external e-mail access for essential business purposes does not 
logically mean, as the majority suggest, that Intel has forfeited the right to determine who 
has access to its system. Its intranet is not the equivalent of a common carrier or public 
communications licensee that would be subject to requirements to provide service and 
access. Just as Intel can, and does, regulate the use of its computer system by its 
employees, it should be entitled to control its use by outsiders and to seek injunctive relief 
when self-help fails. 
 
The majority also propose that Intel has sufficient avenues for legal relief outside of 
trespass to chattels, such as interference with prospective economic relations, interference 
with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation; Hamidi urges 
that an action for nuisance is more appropriate. Although other causes of action may under 
certain circumstances also apply to Hamidi’s conduct, the remedy based on trespass to 
chattels is the most efficient and appropriate. It simply requires Hamidi to stop the 
unauthorized use of property without regard to the content of the transmissions. Unlike 
trespass to chattels, the other potential causes of action suggested by the majority and 
Hamidi would require an evaluation of the transmissions’ content and, in the case of a 
nuisance action, for example, would involve questions of degree and value judgments based 
on competing interests. 
 
II 
 
As discussed above, I believe that existing legal principles are adequate to support Intel’s 
request for injunctive relief. But even if the injunction in this case amounts to an extension 
of the traditional tort of trespass to chattels, this is one of those cases in which, as Justice 
Cardozo suggested, “[t]he creative element in the judicial process finds its opportunity and 
power” in the development of the law.  
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The law has evolved to meet economic, social, and scientific changes in society. The 
industrial revolution, mass production, and new transportation and communication 
systems all required the adaptation and evolution of legal doctrines. 
 
The age of computer technology and cyberspace poses new challenges to legal principles. As 
this court has said, “the so-called Internet revolution has spawned a host of new legal 
issues as courts have struggled to apply traditional legal frameworks to this new 
communication medium.” The court must now grapple with proprietary interests, privacy, 
and expression arising out of computer-related disputes. Thus, in this case the court is 
faced with “that balancing of judgment, that testing and sorting of considerations of 
analogy and logic and utility and fairness” that Justice Cardozo said he had “been trying to 
describe.” Additionally, this is a case in which equitable relief is sought. As Bernard Witkin 
has written, “equitable relief is flexible and expanding, and the theory that ‘for every wrong 
there is a remedy’ [Civ.Code, § 3523] may be invoked by equity courts to justify the 
invention of new methods of relief for new types of wrongs.” That the Legislature has dealt 
with some aspects of commercial unsolicited bulk e-mail (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17538.4, 
17538.45) should not inhibit the application of common law tort principles to deal with e-
mail transgressions not covered by the legislation. 
 
Before the computer, a person could not easily cause significant disruption to another’s 
business or personal affairs through methods of communication without significant cost. 
With the computer, by a mass mailing, one person can at no cost disrupt, damage, and 
interfere with another’s property, business, and personal interests. Here, the law should 
allow Intel to protect its computer-related property from the unauthorized, harmful, free 
use by intruders. 
 
III 
 
As the Court of Appeal observed, connecting one’s driveway to the general system of roads 
does not invite demonstrators to use the property as a public forum. Not mindful of this 
precept, the majority blur the distinction between public and private computer networks in 
the interest of “ease and openness of communication.” By upholding Intel’s right to exercise 
self-help to restrict Hamidi’s bulk e-mails, they concede that he did not have a right to send 
them through Intel’s proprietary system. Yet they conclude that injunctive relief is 
unavailable to Intel because it connected its e-mail system to the Internet and thus, 
“necessarily contemplated” unsolicited communications to its employees. Their exposition 
promotes unpredictability in a manner that could be as harmful to open communication as 
it is to property rights. It permits Intel to block Hamidi’s e-mails entirely, but offers no 
recourse if he succeeds in breaking through its security barriers, unless he physically or 
functionally degrades the system. 
 
By making more concrete damages a requirement for a remedy, the majority has rendered 
speech interests dependent on the impact of the e-mails. The sender will never know when 
or if the mass e-mails sent by him (and perhaps others) will use up too much space or cause 
a crash in the recipient system, so as to fulfill the majority’s requirement of damages. Thus, 
the sender is exposed to the risk of liability because of the possibility of damages. If, as the 
majority suggest, such a risk will deter “ease and openness of communication”, the 
majority’s formulation does not eliminate such deterrence. Under the majority’s position, 
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the lost freedom of communication still exists. In addition, a business could never reliably 
invest in a private network that can only be kept private by constant vigilance and 
inventiveness, or by simply shutting off the Internet, thus limiting rather than expanding 
the flow of information.6 Moreover, Intel would have less incentive to allow employees 
reasonable use of its equipment to send and receive personal e-mails if such allowance is 
justification for preventing restrictions on unwanted intrusions into its computer system. I 
believe the best approach is to clearly delineate private from public networks and identify 
as a trespass to chattels the kind of intermeddling involved here. 
 
The views of the amici curiae group of intellectual property professors that a ruling in favor 
of Intel will interfere with communication are similarly misplaced because here, Intel, 
contrary to most users, expressly informed Hamidi that it did not want him sending 
messages through its system. Moreover, as noted above, all of the problems referred to will 
exist under the apparently accepted law that there is a cause of action if there is some 
actionable damage. 
 
Hamidi and other amici curiae raise, for the first time on appeal, certain labor law issues, 
including the matter of protected labor-related communications. Even assuming that these 
issues are properly before this court, to the extent the laws allow what would otherwise be 
trespasses for some labor-related communications, my position does not exclude that here 
too. But there has been no showing that the communications are labor-law protected.7  
 
Finally, with regard to alleged constitutional free speech concerns raised by Hamidi and 
others, this case involves a private entity seeking to enforce private rights against trespass. 
Unlike the majority, I have concluded that Hamidi did invade Intel’s property. His actions 
constituted a trespass—in this case a trespass to chattels. There is no federal or state 
constitutional right to trespass. (Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 47 [“Nothing in the 
Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its 
general trespass statute....”]; Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 
Cal. App. 4th 1244, 1253-1254 [affirming a restraining order preventing former church 
member from entering church property: “[the United States Supreme Court] has never held 
that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on 
property privately owned”]; see also CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp. at p. 1026 [“the mere judicial enforcement of neutral trespass laws by the private 
owner of property does not alone render it a state actor”]; Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. 
American Online, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1996) 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 [“a private company such as 
Cyber simply does not have the unfettered right under the First Amendment to invade 
AOL’s private property....”].) Accordingly, the cases cited by the majority regarding 
restrictions on speech, not trespass, are not applicable. Nor does the connection of Intel’s e-
mail system to the Internet transform it into a public forum any more than any connection 
between private and public properties. Moreover, as noted above, Hamidi had adequate 
alternative means for communicating with Intel employees so that an injunction would not, 
under any theory, constitute a free speech violation. 
                                                 
6 Thus, the majority’s approach creates the perverse incentive for companies to invest less in computer capacity 
in order to protect its property. In the view of the majority, Hamidi’s massive e-mails would be actionable only if 
Intel had insufficient server or storage capacity to manage them. 
7 The bulk e-mail messages from Hamidi, a nonemployee, did not purport to spur employees into any collective 
action; he has conceded that “[t]his is not a drive to unionize.” Nor was his disruptive conduct part of any bona 
fide labor dispute. 
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IV 
 
The trial court granted an injunction to prevent threatened injury to Intel. That is the 
purpose of an injunction. Intel should not be helpless in the face of repeated and threatened 
abuse and contamination of its private computer system. The undisputed facts, in my view, 
rendered Hamidi’s conduct legally actionable. Thus, the trial court’s decision to grant a 
permanent injunction was not “a clear abuse of discretion” that may be “disturbed on 
appeal.” 
 
The injunction issued by the trial court simply required Hamidi to refrain from further 
trespassory conduct, drawing no distinction based on the content of his e-mails. Hamidi 
remains free to communicate with Intel employees and others outside the walls—both 
physical and electronic—of the company. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Who did you feel more sympathetic towards: Hamidi or Intel? 
 
As recounted by the dissent, “[t]he trial court further found that the ‘massive’ intrusions 
‘impaired the value to Intel of its e-mail system.’”  Why didn’t that lower court finding of 
fact satisfy the majority’s legal standard? 
 
Intel brought, and subsequently dropped, a nuisance claim against Hamidi.  How was 
Hamidi’s activity like a “nuisance”? 
 
If Hamidi continues to send unwanted email to Intel employees, what can Intel do, and 
what can’t it do? 
 
The dissent says “the majority’s approach creates the perverse incentive for companies to 
invest less in computer capacity in order to protect its property.”  How likely is it that 
companies will underinvest in their email capacity due to this ruling? 
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Leval, Circuit Judge. 
 
…Verio also attacks the grant of the preliminary injunction against its accessing Register’s 
computers by automated software programs performing multiple successive queries. This 
prong of the injunction was premised on Register’s claim of trespass to chattels. Verio 
contends the ruling was in error because Register failed to establish that Verio’s conduct 
resulted in harm to Register’s servers and because Verio’s robot access to the WHOIS 
database through Register was “not unauthorized.” We believe the district court’s findings 
were within the range of its permissible discretion. 
 
“A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally ... using or intermeddling with a 
chattel in the possession of another,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217(b) (1965), where 
“the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value.” 
 
The district court found that Verio’s use of search robots, consisting of software programs 
performing multiple automated successive queries, consumed a significant portion of the 
capacity of Register’s computer systems. While Verio’s robots alone would not incapacitate 
Register’s systems, the court found that if Verio were permitted to continue to access 
Register’s computers through such robots, it was “highly probable” that other Internet 
service providers would devise similar programs to access Register’s data, and that the 
system would be overtaxed and would crash. We cannot say these findings were 
unreasonable. 
 
Nor is there merit to Verio’s contention that it cannot be engaged in trespass when Register 
had never instructed it not to use its robot programs. As the district court noted, Register’s 
complaint sufficiently advised Verio that its use of robots was not authorized and, according 
to Register’s contentions, would cause harm to Register’s systems…. 
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WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 2012 WL 3039213 (4th Cir. 2012) 
Floyd, Circuit Judge. 
 
…I. 
A. 
 
In 1984, Congress initiated a campaign against computer crime by passing the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984. Shortly thereafter, in 1986, it 
expanded the Act with a revised version, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. 
Today, the CFAA remains primarily a criminal statute designed to combat hacking. 
Nevertheless, it permits a private party “who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation 
of [the statute]” to bring a civil action “to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive 
relief or other equitable relief.” Notably, although proof of at least one of five additional 
factors is necessary to maintain a civil action, a violation of any of the statute’s provisions 
exposes the offender to both civil and criminal liability…. 
 
B. 
 
WEC and Arc are competitors, providing specialized welding and related services to the 
power generation industry. Both companies are incorporated in South Carolina and 
maintain their principal places of business in York County, South Carolina. Prior to April 
30, 2010, WEC employed Mike Miller as a Project Director and Emily Kelley as his 
assistant. Both individuals now work for Arc. 
 
When Miller worked for WEC, the company provided him with a laptop computer and cell 
phone, and authorized his access to the company’s intranet and computer servers. 
According to WEC’s complaint, “Miller had access to numerous confidential and trade secret 
documents stored on ... computer servers, including pricing terms, pending projects[,] and 
the technical capabilities of WEC.” To protect its confidential information and trade secrets, 
WEC instituted policies that prohibited using the information without authorization or 
downloading it to a personal computer. These policies did not restrict Miller’s authorization 
to access the information, however. 
 
On April 30, 2010, Miller resigned from WEC. WEC alleges that prior to resigning, Miller, 
at Arc’s direction, “either by himself or by his assistant, Kelley, downloaded a substantial 
number of WEC’s confidential documents” and emailed them to his personal e-mail address. 
WEC also alleges that Miller and Kelley downloaded confidential information to a personal 
computer. Twenty days after leaving WEC, Miller reportedly used the downloaded 
information to make a presentation on behalf of Arc to a potential WEC customer. 
 
The customer ultimately awarded two projects to Arc. WEC contends that as a result of 
Miller’s and Kelley’s actions, it “has suffered and will continue to suffer impairment to the 
integrity of its data, programs, systems or information, including economic damages, and 
loss aggregating substantially more than $5,000 during a one-year period.”… 
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II…. 
A. 
 
WEC alleges that Appellees violated §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(B), and (a)(5)(C), each of 
which require that a party either access a computer “without authorization” or “exceed[ ] 
authorized access.” The district court held that Appellees’ alleged conduct—the violation of 
policies regarding the use and downloading of confidential information—did not contravene 
any of these provisions. Accordingly, the crux of the issue presented here is the scope of 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.” We particularly examine whether 
these terms extend to violations of policies regarding the use of a computer or information 
on a computer to which a defendant otherwise has access. Before delving into statutory 
analysis, however, we briefly review the perspectives of our sister circuits. 
 
In short, two schools of thought exist. The first, promulgated by the Seventh Circuit and 
advanced by WEC here, holds that when an employee accesses a computer or information 
on a computer to further interests that are adverse to his employer, he violates his duty of 
loyalty, thereby terminating his agency relationship and losing any authority he has to 
access the computer or any information on it. Thus, for example, the Seventh Circuit held 
that an employee who erased crucial data on his company laptop prior to turning it in at 
the end of his employment violated the CFAA. It reasoned that his “breach of his duty of 
loyalty terminated his agency relationship ... and with it his authority to access the laptop, 
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.” 
 
The second, articulated by the Ninth Circuit and followed by the district court here, 
interprets “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” literally and narrowly, 
limiting the terms’ application to situations where an individual accesses a computer or 
information on a computer without permission. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 
863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th 
Cir. 2009). Thus, in Nosal, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the defendant’s co-
conspirators, a group of employees at an executive search firm, did not violate the CFAA 
when they retrieved confidential information via their company user accounts and 
transferred it to the defendant, a competitor and former employee. It reasoned that the 
CFAA fails to provide a remedy for misappropriation of trade secrets or violation of a use 
policy where authorization has not been rescinded. As we explain below, we agree with this 
latter view. 
 
B…. 
 
Where, as here, our analysis involves a statute whose provisions have both civil and 
criminal application, our task merits special attention because our interpretation applies 
uniformly in both contexts. Thus, we follow “the canon of strict construction of criminal 
statutes, or rule of lenity.” In other words, in the interest of providing fair warning “of what 
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,” we will construe this criminal statute 
strictly and avoid interpretations not “clearly warranted by the text.”  
 
1.  
The CFAA is concerned with the unauthorized access of protected computers. Thus, we note 
at the outset that “access” means “[t]o obtain, acquire,” or “[t]o gain admission to.” 
Moreover, per the CFAA, a “computer” is a high-speed processing device “and includes any 
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data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in 
conjunction with such device.” A computer becomes a “protected computer” when it “is used 
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 
 
With respect to the phrase, “without authorization,” the CFAA does not define 
“authorization.” Nevertheless, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “authorization” as 
“formal warrant, or sanction.” Regarding the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” the CFAA 
defines it as follows: “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to 
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”  
 
Recognizing that the distinction between these terms is arguably minute, we nevertheless 
conclude based on the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of “authorization,” that 
an employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves or sanctions 
his admission to that computer. Thus, he accesses a computer “without authorization” when 
he gains admission to a computer without approval. Similarly, we conclude that an 
employee “exceeds authorized access” when he has approval to access a computer, but uses 
his access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his approved 
access. Notably, neither of these definitions extends to the improper use of information 
validly accessed. 
 
2. 
WEC presses instead an ostensibly plain-language interpretation articulated in the Nosal 
panel decision, which was subsequently reversed en banc. In that decision, the panel 
fixated on the word “so” in the definition of “exceeds authorized access.” The panel declared 
that, in context, this conjunction means “in a manner or way that is indicated or 
suggested.” Thus, it found that an employee “exceed[s][his] authorized access” if he uses 
such access “to obtain or alter information [on] the computer that [he] is not entitled [in 
that manner] to obtain or alter.” Armed with this interpretation, the court held that the 
defendant’s co-conspirators “exceed[ed] their authorized access” because although they had 
permission to access the proprietary information that they transferred to the defendant, 
they violated the company’s policy regarding the use and disclosure of that information. 
The court reasoned that the co-conspirators’ violation of the use and disclosure policy 
constituted access “in a manner” to which they were not entitled. Thus, they violated the 
CFAA. 
 
As an initial manner, we believe the Nosal panel’s conclusion is a non sequitur. To us, 
defining “so” as “in that manner” only elucidates our earlier conclusion that “exceeds 
authorized access” refers to obtaining or altering information beyond the limits of the 
employee’s authorized access. It does not address the use of information after access. 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit indicated as much in its en banc reversal, when it declined to 
hold that the interpretation of “so” as “in that manner” necessarily means employees can be 
liable for use-policy violations. Instead, the court offered hypotheticals illustrating how the 
panel’s interpretation of “so” referred to the means of obtaining information, not the use of 
information. For example, if an employee who has access to view information, but not to 
download it, disregards company policy by “cop[ying] the information to a thumb drive and 
walk[ing] out of the building with it,” he obtains information “in a manner” that lacks 
authorization. Similarly, if an employee has complete access to information with his own 
username and password, but accesses information using another employee’s username and 
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password, he also obtains information “in a manner” that is not authorized. In contrast, 
however, where such an employee uses his own username and password to access the 
information and then puts it to an impermissible use, his “manner” of access remains valid. 
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, and ours, interpreting “so” as “in that manner” fails to 
mandate CFAA liability for the improper use of information that is accessed with 
authorization. 
 
Nevertheless, because WEC alleges that Miller and Kelley obtained information by 
downloading it to a personal computer in violation of company policy, we go a step further. 
Although we believe that interpreting “so” as “in that manner” fails to subject an employee 
to liability for violating a use policy, we nonetheless decline to adopt the Nosal panel’s 
interpretation of the conjunction. The interpretation is certainly plausible, but it is not 
“clearly warranted by the text.” Indeed, Congress may have intended “so” to mean “in that 
manner,” but it “could just as well have included ‘so’ as a connector or for emphasis.” Thus, 
faced with the option of two interpretations, we yield to the rule of lenity and choose the 
more obliging route. “[W]hen [a] choice has to be made between two readings of what 
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher 
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and 
definite.” Here, Congress has not clearly criminalized obtaining or altering information “in 
a manner” that is not authorized. Rather, it has simply criminalized obtaining or altering 
information that an individual lacked authorization to obtain or alter. 
 
And lest we appear to be needlessly splitting hairs, we maintain that the Nosal panel’s 
interpretation would indeed be a harsher approach. For example, such an interpretation 
would impute liability to an employee who with commendable intentions disregards his 
employer’s policy against downloading information to a personal computer so that he can 
work at home and make headway in meeting his employer’s goals. Such an employee has 
authorization to obtain and alter the information that he downloaded. Moreover, he has no 
intent to defraud his employer. But under the Nosal panel’s approach, because he obtained 
information “in a manner” that was not authorized (i.e., by downloading it to a personal 
computer), he nevertheless would be liable under the CFAA. Believing that Congress did 
not clearly intend to criminalize such behavior, we decline to interpret “so” as “in that 
manner.” 
 
In so doing, we adopt a narrow reading of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access” and hold that they apply only when an individual accesses a computer 
without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that which he is 
authorized to access. 
 
3. 
In adopting these definitions, we reject any interpretation that grounds CFAA liability on a 
cessation-of-agency theory. The deficiency of a rule that revokes authorization when an 
employee uses his access for a purpose contrary to the employer’s interests is apparent: 
Such a rule would mean that any employee who checked the latest Facebook posting or 
sporting event scores in contravention of his employer’s use policy would be subject to the 
instantaneous cessation of his agency and, as a result, would be left without any 
authorization to access his employer’s computer systems. We recognize that the Seventh 
Circuit applied its reasoning to egregious behavior that clearly violated the duty of loyalty. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the theory has far-reaching effects unintended by Congress. 
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Although an employer might choose to rescind an employee’s authorization for violating a 
use policy, we do not think Congress intended an immediate end to the agency relationship 
and, moreover, the imposition of criminal penalties for such a frolic. 
 
III. 
 
WEC founds its CFAA claim on Miller’s and Kelley’s violations of its policies “prohibiting 
the use of any confidential information and trade secrets unless authorized” and prohibiting 
the “download[ing][of] confidential and proprietary information to a personal computer.” 
Notably, however, WEC fails to allege that Miller and Kelley accessed a computer or 
information on a computer without authorization. Indeed, WEC’s complaint belies such a 
conclusion because it states that Miller “had access to WEC’s intranet and computer 
servers” and “to numerous confidential and trade secret documents stored on these 
computer servers, including pricing, terms, pending projects[,] and the technical 
capabilities of WEC.” Thus, we agree with the district court that although Miller and Kelley 
may have misappropriated information, they did not access a computer without 
authorization or exceed their authorized access. Moreover, because Miller’s and Kelley’s 
conduct failed to violate the CFAA, Arc cannot be liable under the statute for any role that 
it played in encouraging such conduct. Accordingly, we hold that WEC failed to state a 
claim for which the CFAA can grant relief, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
the claim. 
 
IV. 
 
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means to rein in rogue 
employees. But we are unwilling to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming a statute 
meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access 
computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy. Providing such 
recourse not only is unnecessary, given that other legal remedies exist for these 
grievances,4 but also is violative of the Supreme Court’s counsel to construe criminal 
statutes strictly. Thus, we reject an interpretation of the CFAA that imposes liability on 
employees who violate a use policy, choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals 
who access computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information beyond the 
bounds of their authorized access. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Can employers avoid this result by saying in their computer use policies that employees are 
authorized to access company computers only if they don’t misuse the information on those 
computers?
                                                 
4 As evidenced by WEC’s complaint, nine other state-law causes of action potentially provide relief, including 
conversion, tortious interference with contractual relations, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade 
secrets. 
108. 
V. Copyright 
 
Copyright Basics, Copyright Office Circular 1 (from 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1.pdf) (accessed July 6, 2010) 
 
What Is Copyright? 
 
Copyright is a form of protection provided by the laws of the United States (title 17, U. S. 
Code) to the authors of “original works of authorship,” including literary, dramatic, musical, 
artistic, and certain other intellectual works. This protection is available to both published 
and unpublished works. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act generally gives the owner of 
copyright the exclusive right to do and to authorize others to do the following: 
 
• To reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords; 
• To prepare derivative works based upon the work; 
• To distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
• To perform the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
• To display the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; and 
• In the case of sound recordings,* to perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission. 
 
In addition, certain authors of works of visual art have the rights of attribution and 
integrity as described in section 106A of the 1976 Copyright Act…. 
 
It is illegal for anyone to violate any of the rights provided by the copyright law to the 
owner of copyright. These rights, however, are not unlimited in scope. Sections 107 through 
121 of the 1976 Copyright Act establish limitations on these rights. In some cases, these 
limitations are specified exemptions from copyright liability. One major limitation is the 
doctrine of “fair use,” which is given a statutory basis in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. In other instances, the limitation takes the form of a “compulsory license” under which 
certain limited uses of copyrighted works are permitted upon payment of specified royalties 
and compliance with statutory conditions…. 
 
Who Can Claim Copyright? 
 
Copyright protection subsists from the time the work is created in fixed form. The copyright 
in the work of authorship immediately becomes the property of the author who created the 
work. Only the author or those deriving their rights through the author can rightfully claim 
copyright. In the case of works made for hire, the employer and not the employee is 
                                                 
* Sound recordings are defined in the law as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, 
or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” 
Common examples include recordings of music, drama, or lectures. A sound recording is not the same as a 
phonorecord. A phonorecord is the physical object in which works of authorship are embodied. The word 
“phonorecord” includes cassette tapes, CDs, and vinyl disks as well as other formats. 
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considered to be the author. Section 101 of the copyright law defines a “work made for hire” 
as: 
1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or 
2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as: 
• a contribution to a collective work 
• a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work 
• a translation 
• a supplementary work 
• a compilation 
• an instructional text 
• a test 
• answer material for a test 
• an atlas 
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire. 
 
The authors of a joint work are co-owners of the copyright in the work, unless there is an 
agreement to the contrary. 
 
Copyright in each separate contribution to a periodical or other collective work is distinct 
from copyright in the collective work as a whole and vests initially with the author of the 
contribution. 
 
Two General Principles 
 
• Mere ownership of a book, manuscript, painting, or any other copy or phonorecord does 
not give the possessor the copyright. The law provides that transfer of ownership of any 
material object that embodies a protected work does not of itself convey any rights in the 
copyright. 
 
• Minors may claim copyright, but state laws may regulate the business dealings involving 
copyrights owned by minors…. 
 
What Works Are Protected? 
 
Copyright protects “original works of authorship” that are fixed in a tangible form of 
expression. The fixation need not be directly perceptible so long as it may be communicated 
with the aid of a machine or device. Copyrightable works include the following categories: 
 
1) literary works 
2) musical works, including any accompanying words 
3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music 
4) pantomimes and choreographic works 
5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works 
6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works 
7) sound recordings 
8) architectural works 
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These categories should be viewed broadly. For example, computer programs and most 
“compilations” may be registered as “literary works”; maps and architectural plans may be 
registered as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 
 
What Is Not Protected by Copyright? 
 
Several categories of material are generally not eligible for federal copyright protection. 
These include among others: 
 
• Works that have not been fixed in a tangible form of expression (for example, 
choreographic works that have not been notated or recorded, or improvisational speeches or 
performances that have not been written or recorded) 
 
• Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of 
typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents 
 
• Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, discoveries, or 
devices, as distinguished from a description, explanation, or illustration 
 
• Works consisting entirely of information that is common property and containing no 
original authorship (for example: standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape 
measures and rulers, and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common 
sources) 
 
How to Secure a Copyright 
 
Copyright Secured Automatically upon Creation 
 
The way in which copyright protection is secured is frequently misunderstood. No 
publication or registration or other action in the Copyright Office is required to secure 
copyright. There are, however, certain definite advantages to registration.  
 
Copyright is secured automatically when the work is created, and a work is “created” when 
it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. “Copies” are material objects from 
which a work can be read or visually perceived either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device, such as books, manuscripts, sheet music, film, videotape, or microfilm. 
“Phonorecords” are material objects embodying fixations of sounds (excluding, by statutory 
definition, motion picture soundtracks), such as cassette tapes, CDs, or vinyl disks. Thus, 
for example, a song (the “work”) can be fixed in sheet music (“copies”) or in phonograph 
disks (“phonorecords”), or both. If a work is prepared over a period of time, the part of the 
work that is fixed on a particular date constitutes the created work as of that date. 
 
Publication 
 
Publication is no longer the key to obtaining federal copyright as it was under the 
Copyright Act of 1909. However, publication remains important to copyright owners. 
 
The 1976 Copyright Act defines publication as follows: 
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“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. 
The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for 
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display 
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of 
itself constitute publication. 
 
Note: Before 1978, federal copyright was generally secured by the act of 
publication with notice of copyright, assuming compliance with all other 
relevant statutory conditions. U. S. works in the public domain on January 1, 
1978, (for example, works published without satisfying all conditions for 
securing federal copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909) remain in the 
public domain under the 1976 Copyright Act…. 
 
Federal copyright could also be secured before 1978 by the act of registration 
in the case of certain unpublished works and works eligible for ad interim 
copyright. The 1976 Copyright Act automatically extends to full term (section 
304 sets the term) copyright for all works, including those subject to ad 
interim copyright if ad interim registration has been made on or before June 
30, 1978. 
 
A further discussion of the definition of “publication” can be found in the legislative history 
of the 1976 Copyright Act. The legislative reports define “to the public” as distribution to 
persons under no explicit or implicit restrictions with respect to disclosure of the contents. 
The reports state that the definition makes it clear that the sale of phonorecords constitutes 
publication of the underlying work, for example, the musical, dramatic, or literary work 
embodied in a phonorecord. The reports also state that it is clear that any form of 
dissemination in which the material object does not change hands, for example, 
performances or displays on television, is not a publication no matter how many people are 
exposed to the work. However, when copies or phonorecords are offered for sale or lease to a 
group of wholesalers, broadcasters, or motion picture theaters, publication does take place 
if the purpose is further distribution, public performance, or public display. 
 
Publication is an important concept in the copyright law for several reasons: 
 
• Works that are published in the United States are subject to mandatory deposit with the 
Library of Congress…. 
• Publication of a work can affect the limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner that are set forth in sections 107 through 121 of the law. 
• The year of publication may determine the duration of copyright protection for 
anonymous and pseudonymous works (when the author’s identity is not revealed in the 
records of the Copyright Office) and for works made for hire. 
• Deposit requirements for registration of published works differ from those for registration 
of unpublished works…. 
• When a work is published, it may bear a notice of copyright to identify the year of 
publication and the name of the copyright owner and to inform the public that the work is 
protected by copyright. Copies of works published before March 1, 1989, must bear the 
notice or risk loss of copyright protection…. 
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Notice of Copyright 
 
The use of a copyright notice is no longer required under U. S. law, although it is often 
beneficial. Because prior law did contain such a requirement, however, the use of notice is 
still relevant to the copyright status of older works. 
 
Notice was required under the 1976 Copyright Act. This requirement was eliminated when 
the United States adhered to the Berne Convention, effective March 1, 1989…. 
 
The Copyright Office does not take a position on whether copies of works first published 
with notice before March 1, 1989, which are distributed on or after March 1, 1989, must 
bear the copyright notice. 
 
Use of the notice may be important because it informs the public that the work is protected 
by copyright, identifies the copyright owner, and shows the year of first publication. 
Furthermore, in the event that a work is infringed, if a proper notice of copyright appears 
on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had 
access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based 
on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided 
in section 504(c)(2) of the copyright law. Innocent infringement occurs when the infringer 
did not realize that the work was protected. 
 
The use of the copyright notice is the responsibility of the copyright owner and does not 
require advance permission from, or registration with, the Copyright Office. 
 
Form of Notice for Visually Perceptible Copies 
 
The notice for visually perceptible copies should contain all the following three elements: 
 
1) The symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright,” or the abbreviation 
“Copr.”; and 
2) The year of first publication of the work. In the case of compilations or derivative works 
incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the 
compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying textual matter, if any, is reproduced in or 
on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful article; and 
3) The name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name 
can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner. 
 
Example: © 2008 John Doe…. 
 
How Long Copyright Protection Endures 
 
Works Originally Created on or after January 1, 1978 
 
A work that was created (fixed in tangible form for the first time) on or after January 1, 
1978, is automatically protected from the moment of its creation and is ordinarily given a 
term enduring for the author’s life plus an additional 70 years after the author’s death. In 
the case of “a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire,” the 
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term lasts for 70 years after the last surviving author’s death. For works made for hire, and 
for anonymous and pseudonymous works (unless the author’s identity is revealed in 
Copyright Office records), the duration of copyright will be 95 years from publication or 120 
years from creation, whichever is shorter…. 
 
Transfer of Copyright 
 
Any or all of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights or any subdivision of those rights may 
be transferred, but the transfer of exclusive rights is not valid unless that transfer is in 
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized 
agent. Transfer of a right on a nonexclusive basis does not require a written agreement. A 
copyright may also be conveyed by operation of law and may be bequeathed by will or pass 
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. 
 
Copyright is a personal property right, and it is subject to the various state laws and 
regulations that govern the ownership, inheritance, or transfer of personal property as well 
as terms of contracts or conduct of business…. 
 
The law does provide for the recordation in the Copyright Office of transfers of copyright 
ownership. Although recordation is not required to make a valid transfer between the 
parties, it does provide certain legal advantages and may be required to validate the 
transfer as against third parties…. 
 
Termination of Transfers 
 
Under the previous law, the copyright in a work reverted to the author, if living, or if the 
author was not living, to other specified beneficiaries, provided a renewal claim was 
registered in the 28th year of the original term. The present law drops the renewal feature 
except for works already in the first term of statutory protection when the present law took 
effect. Instead, the present law permits termination of a grant of rights after 35 years under 
certain conditions by serving written notice on the transferee within specified time limits…. 
 
International Copyright Protection 
 
There is no such thing as an “international copyright” that will automatically protect an 
author’s writings throughout the entire world. Protection against unauthorized use in a 
particular country depends, basically, on the national laws of that country. However, most 
countries do offer protection to foreign works under certain conditions, and these conditions 
have been greatly simplified by international copyright treaties and conventions…. 
 
Copyright Registration 
 
In general, copyright registration is a legal formality intended to make a public record of 
the basic facts of a particular copyright. However, registration is not a condition of 
copyright protection. Even though registration is not a requirement for protection, the 
copyright law provides several inducements or advantages to encourage copyright owners to 
make registration. 
 
Among these advantages are the following: 
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• Registration establishes a public record of the copyright claim. 
• Before an infringement suit may be filed in court, registration is necessary for works of 
U.S. origin. 
• If made before or within five years of publication, registration will establish prima facie 
evidence in court of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. 
• If registration is made within three months after publication of the work or prior to an 
infringement of the work, statutory damages and attorney’s fees will be available to the 
copyright owner in court actions. Otherwise, only an award of actual damages and profits is 
available to the copyright owner. 
• Registration allows the owner of the copyright to record the registration with the U. S. 
Customs Service for protection against the importation of infringing copies…. 
 
Registration may be made at any time within the life of the copyright. Unlike the law 
before 1978, when a work has been registered in unpublished form, it is not necessary to 
make another registration when the work becomes published, although the copyright owner 
may register the published edition, if desired…. 
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Fair Use Summary 
 
First Factor (Nature of Use) 
 
Spectrum of commercial to educational uses, where commercial uses are less fair and 
educational uses are more fair.  Some courts treat commercial uses as presumptively unfair 
(Sony), but Campbell rejected this presumption.   
 
Courts will also consider if the use is transformative or just redistributive.  Transformative 
uses “add something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning or message” (Campbell).  Rarely, courts do not require 
adding something new if the use has a different purpose (Kelly v. Arriba, but compare 
Texaco).  Transformative uses are more likely to be fair use, and the other three factors are 
less important (Campbell).   
 
Second Factor (Nature of Work).   
 
Spectrum of fact to fiction, where taking factual works is more fair and taking fiction is less 
fair.  
 
Some courts deem taking unpublished works presumptively unfair (Harper & Row), but 
§107 was amended to supersede this presumption. 
 
Some courts treat fact/fiction and published/unpublished as two separate sub-factors. 
 
Third Factor (Amount/Substantiality of Portion Taken).   
 
Some courts say that taking the entire work is presumptively unfair.  Taking the “heart of 
the work,” even if a small amount, usually isn’t fair. 
 
Fourth Factor (Market Effect).   
 
The fourth factor is routinely characterized as the most important factor (Harper & Row).  
The factor evaluates (1) whether unrestricted and widespread conduct like the defendant’s 
would substantively and adversely impact the market, and (2) the harm to the market for 
derivative works when these derivative markets are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed markets” (Texaco), but some courts give the copyright owner the option not to 
pursue a market (Castle Rock).  Increasing demand for the underlying work doesn’t 
mitigate harm to a derivative market (Harper & Row; Napster). 
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Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendant-Appellant Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablevision”) wants to market a 
new “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder system (“RS-DVR”), using a technology akin 
to both traditional, set-top digital video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-on-
demand (“VOD”) services provided by many cable companies. Plaintiffs-Appellees produce 
copyrighted movies and television programs that they provide to Cablevision pursuant to 
numerous licensing agreements. They contend that Cablevision, through the operation of 
its RS-DVR system as proposed, would directly infringe their copyrights both by making 
unauthorized reproductions, and by engaging in public performances, of their copyrighted 
works. The material facts are not in dispute. Because we conclude that Cablevision would 
not directly infringe plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act by offering its RS-DVR 
system to consumers, we reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to 
plaintiffs, and we vacate its injunction against Cablevision. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Today’s television viewers increasingly use digital video recorders (“DVRs”) instead of video 
cassette recorders (“VCRs”) to record television programs and play them back later at their 
convenience. DVRs generally store recorded programming on an internal hard drive rather 
than a cassette. But, as this case demonstrates, the generic term “DVR” actually refers to a 
growing number of different devices and systems. Companies like TiVo sell a stand-alone 
DVR device that is typically connected to a user’s cable box and television much like a VCR. 
Many cable companies also lease to their subscribers “set-top storage DVRs,” which 
combine many of the functions of a standard cable box and a stand-alone DVR in a single 
device. 
 
In March 2006, Cablevision, an operator of cable television systems, announced the advent 
of its new “Remote Storage DVR System.” As designed, the RS-DVR allows Cablevision 
customers who do not have a stand-alone DVR to record cable programming on central hard 
drives housed and maintained by Cablevision at a “remote” location. RS-DVR customers 
may then receive playback of those programs through their home television sets, using only 
a remote control and a standard cable box equipped with the RS-DVR software. Cablevision 
notified its content providers, including plaintiffs, of its plans to offer RS-DVR, but it did 
not seek any license from them to operate or sell the RS-DVR. 
 
Plaintiffs, which hold the copyrights to numerous movies and television programs, sued 
Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that Cablevision’s proposed 
operation of the RS-DVR would directly infringe their exclusive rights to both reproduce 
and publicly perform their copyrighted works. Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs 
alleged theories only of direct infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendants 
waived any defense based on fair use. 
 
Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny 
Chin, Judge), awarded summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined Cablevision from 
operating the RS-DVR system without licenses from its content providers. At the outset, we 
think it helpful to an understanding of our decision to describe, in greater detail, both the 
RS-DVR and the district court’s opinion. 
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I. Operation of the RS-DVR System 
 
Cable companies like Cablevision aggregate television programming from a wide variety of 
“content providers”—the various broadcast and cable channels that produce or provide 
individual programs—and transmit those programs into the homes of their subscribers via 
coaxial cable. At the outset of the transmission process, Cablevision gathers the content of 
the various television channels into a single stream of data. Generally, this stream is 
processed and transmitted to Cablevision’s customers in real time. Thus, if a Cartoon 
Network program is scheduled to air Monday night at 8pm, Cartoon Network transmits 
that program’s data to Cablevision and other cable companies nationwide at that time, and 
the cable companies immediately re-transmit the data to customers who subscribe to that 
channel. 
 
Under the new RS-DVR, this single stream of data is split into two streams. The first is 
routed immediately to customers as before. The second stream flows into a device called the 
Broadband Media Router (“BMR”), which buffers the data stream, reformats it, and sends it 
to the “Arroyo Server,” which consists, in relevant part, of two data buffers and a number of 
high-capacity hard disks. The entire stream of data moves to the first buffer (the “primary 
ingest buffer”), at which point the server automatically inquires as to whether any 
customers want to record any of that programming. If a customer has requested a 
particular program, the data for that program move from the primary buffer into a 
secondary buffer, and then onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that 
customer. As new data flow into the primary buffer, they overwrite a corresponding 
quantity of data already on the buffer. The primary ingest buffer holds no more than 0.1 
seconds of each channel’s programming at any moment. Thus, every tenth of a second, the 
data residing on this buffer are automatically erased and replaced. The data buffer in the 
BMR holds no more than 1.2 seconds of programming at any time. While buffering occurs at 
other points in the operation of the RS-DVR, only the BMR buffer and the primary ingest 
buffer are utilized absent any request from an individual subscriber. 
 
As the district court observed, “the RS-DVR is not a single piece of equipment,” but rather 
“a complex system requiring numerous computers, processes, networks of cables, and 
facilities staffed by personnel twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week.” To the 
customer, however, the processes of recording and playback on the RS-DVR are similar to 
that of a standard set-top DVR. Using a remote control, the customer can record 
programming by selecting a program in advance from an on-screen guide, or by pressing 
the record button while viewing a given program. A customer cannot, however, record the 
earlier portion of a program once it has begun. To begin playback, the customer selects the 
show from an on-screen list of previously recorded programs. The principal difference in 
operation is that, instead of sending signals from the remote to an on-set box, the viewer 
sends signals from the remote, through the cable, to the Arroyo Server at Cablevision’s 
central facility. In this respect, RS-DVR more closely resembles a VOD service, whereby a 
cable subscriber uses his remote and cable box to request transmission of content, such as a 
movie, stored on computers at the cable company’s facility. But unlike a VOD service, RS-
DVR users can only play content that they previously requested to be recorded. 
 
Cablevision has some control over the content available for recording: a customer can only 
record programs on the channels offered by Cablevision (assuming he subscribes to them). 
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Cablevision can also modify the system to limit the number of channels available and 
considered doing so during development of the RS-DVR…. 
 
[Editor’s note: the following diagram may help you visualize Cablevision’s network] 
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DISCUSSION… 
 
“Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders a bundle of exclusive rights....” 
This case implicates two of those rights: the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies,” and the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4). As 
discussed above, the district court found that Cablevision infringed the first right by 1) 
buffering the data from its programming stream and 2) copying content onto the Arroyo 
Server hard disks to enable playback of a program requested by an RS-DVR customer. In 
addition, the district court found that Cablevision would infringe the public performance 
right by transmitting a program to an RS-DVR customer in response to that customer’s 
playback request. We address each of these three allegedly infringing acts in turn. 
 
I. The Buffer Data 
 
It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any customer or other entity, takes the content from 
one stream of programming, after the split, and stores it, one small piece at a time, in the 
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BMR buffer and the primary ingest buffer. As a result, the information is buffered before 
any customer requests a recording, and would be buffered even if no such request were 
made. The question is whether, by buffering the data that make up a given work, 
Cablevision “reproduce[s]” that work “in copies,” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and thereby infringes 
the copyright holder’s reproduction right. 
 
“Copies,” as defined in the Copyright Act, “are material objects ... in which a work is fixed 
by any method ... and from which the work can be ... reproduced.” The Act also provides 
that a work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment ... is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be ... reproduced ... for a period of more than 
transitory duration.” We believe that this language plainly imposes two distinct but related 
requirements: the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that 
it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment requirement”), 
and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more than transitory duration” (the 
“duration requirement”). Unless both requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the 
buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work whose data is 
buffered. 
 
The district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the embodiment requirement. 
As a result of this error, once it determined that the buffer data was “[c]learly ... capable of 
being reproduced,” i.e., that the work was embodied in the buffer, the district court 
concluded that the work was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been 
made. In doing so, it relied on a line of cases beginning with MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). It also relied on the United States Copyright 
Office’s 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which states, in essence, that 
an embodiment is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot 
be copied.” (emphasis added). 
 
The district court’s reliance on cases like MAI Systems is misplaced. In general, those cases 
conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without addressing the duration requirement; it does 
not follow, however, that those cases assume, much less establish, that such a requirement 
does not exist. Indeed, the duration requirement, by itself, was not at issue in MAI Systems 
and its progeny. As a result, they do not speak to the issues squarely before us here: If a 
work is only “embodied” in a medium for a period of transitory duration, can it be “fixed” in 
that medium, and thus a copy? And what constitutes a period “of more than transitory 
duration”? 
 
In MAI Systems, defendant Peak Computer, Inc., performed maintenance and repairs on 
computers made and sold by MAI Systems. In order to service a customer’s computer, a 
Peak employee had to operate the computer and run the computer’s copyrighted operating 
system software. The issue in MAI Systems was whether, by loading the software into the 
computer’s RAM,1 the repairman created a “copy” as defined in § 101. The resolution of this 
issue turned on whether the software’s embodiment in the computer’s RAM was “fixed,” 
within the meaning of the same section. The Ninth Circuit concluded that  
 
                                                 
1 To run a computer program, the data representing that program must be transferred from a data storage 
medium (such as a floppy disk or a hard drive) to a form of Random Access Memory (“RAM”) where the data can 
be processed. The data buffers at issue here are also a form of RAM. 
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by showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then able to 
view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI 
has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 
 
The MAI Systems court referenced the “transitory duration” language but did not discuss or 
analyze it. The opinion notes that the defendants “vigorously” argued that the program’s 
embodiment in the RAM was not a copy, but it does not specify the arguments defendants 
made. This omission suggests that the parties did not litigate the significance of the 
“transitory duration” language, and the court therefore had no occasion to address it. This 
is unsurprising, because it seems fair to assume that in these cases the program was 
embodied in the RAM for at least several minutes. 
 
Accordingly, we construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that loading a program 
into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program. We do not read MAI Systems as 
holding that, as a matter of law, loading a program into a form of RAM always results in 
copying. Such a holding would read the “transitory duration” language out of the definition, 
and we do not believe our sister circuit would dismiss this statutory language without even 
discussing it. It appears the parties in MAI Systems simply did not dispute that the 
duration requirement was satisfied; this line of cases simply concludes that when a 
program is loaded into RAM, the embodiment requirement is satisfied—an important 
holding in itself, and one we see no reason to quibble with here. 
 
At least one court, relying on MAI Systems in a highly similar factual setting, has made this 
point explicitly. In Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 
the district court expressly noted that the unlicensed user in that case ran copyrighted 
diagnostic software “for minutes or longer,” but that the program’s embodiment in the 
computer’s RAM might be too ephemeral to be fixed if the computer had been shut down 
“within seconds or fractions of a second” after loading the copyrighted program. We have no 
quarrel with this reasoning; it merely makes explicit the reasoning that is implicit in the 
other MAI Systems cases. Accordingly, those cases provide no support for the conclusion 
that the definition of “fixed” does not include a duration requirement. 
 
Nor does the Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report, also relied on by the district court in 
this case, explicitly suggest that the definition of “fixed” does not contain a duration 
requirement. However, as noted above, it does suggest that an embodiment is fixed 
“[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or 
communicated.” As we have stated, to determine whether a work is “fixed” in a given 
medium, the statutory language directs us to ask not only 1) whether a work is “embodied” 
in that medium, but also 2) whether it is embodied in the medium “for a period of more 
than transitory duration.” According to the Copyright Office, if the work is capable of being 
copied from that medium for any amount of time, the answer to both questions is “yes.” The 
problem with this interpretation is that it reads the “transitory duration” language out of 
the statute. 
 
We assume, as the parties do, that the Copyright Office’s pronouncement deserves only 
Skidmore deference, deference based on its “power to persuade.” And because the Office’s 
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interpretation does not explain why Congress would include language in a definition if it 
intended courts to ignore that language, we are not persuaded. 
 
In sum, no case law or other authority dissuades us from concluding that the definition of 
“fixed” imposes both an embodiment requirement and a duration requirement. Accord 
CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (while temporary 
reproductions “may be made in this transmission process, they would appear not to be 
‘fixed’ in the sense that they are ‘of more than transitory duration’”). We now turn to 
whether, in this case, those requirements are met by the buffer data. 
 
Cablevision does not seriously dispute that copyrighted works are “embodied” in the buffer. 
Data in the BMR buffer can be reformatted and transmitted to the other components of the 
RS-DVR system. Data in the primary ingest buffer can be copied onto the Arroyo hard disks 
if a user has requested a recording of that data. Thus, a work’s “embodiment” in either 
buffer “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,” (as in 
the case of the ingest buffer) “or otherwise communicated” (as in the BMR buffer). The 
result might be different if only a single second of a much longer work was placed in the 
buffer in isolation. In such a situation, it might be reasonable to conclude that only a 
minuscule portion of a work, rather than “a work” was embodied in the buffer. Here, 
however, where every second of an entire work is placed, one second at a time, in the buffer, 
we conclude that the work is embodied in the buffer. 
 
Does any such embodiment last “for a period of more than transitory duration”? No bit of 
data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds. And unlike the data in 
cases like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in the computer’s RAM memory until 
the user turned the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and automatically 
overwritten as soon as it is processed. While our inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, and 
other factors not present here may alter the duration analysis significantly, these facts 
strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a 
“transitory” period, thus failing the duration requirement. 
 
Against this evidence, plaintiffs argue only that the duration is not transitory because the 
data persist “long enough for Cablevision to make reproductions from them.” As we have 
explained above, however, this reasoning impermissibly reads the duration language out of 
the statute, and we reject it. Given that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2 
seconds before being automatically overwritten, and in the absence of compelling 
arguments to the contrary, we believe that the copyrighted works here are not “embodied” 
in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration, and are therefore not “fixed” in 
the buffers. Accordingly, the acts of buffering in the operation of the RS-DVR do not create 
copies, as the Copyright Act defines that term. Our resolution of this issue renders it 
unnecessary for us to determine whether any copies produced by buffering data would be de 
minimis, and we express no opinion on that question. 
 
II. Direct Liability for Creating the Playback Copies 
 
In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the identity of the infringer are 
never in doubt. These cases turn on whether the conduct in question does, in fact, infringe 
the plaintiff’s copyright. In this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the authorship 
of the infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that 
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program airs, a copy of the program—a copyrighted work—resides on the hard disks of 
Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The 
question is who made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement 
succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, 
at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs. 
 
Few cases examine the line between direct and contributory liability. Both parties cite a 
line of cases beginning with Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Netcom, a third-party 
customer of the defendant Internet service provider (“ISP”) posted a copyrighted work that 
was automatically reproduced by the defendant’s computer. The district court refused to 
impose direct liability on the ISP, reasoning that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability 
statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.” Recently, the Fourth 
Circuit endorsed the Netcom decision, noting that 
 
to establish direct liability under ... the Act, something more must be shown 
than mere ownership of a machine used by others to make illegal copies. 
There must be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and 
causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner 
himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.” 
 
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 
Here, the district court pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in Netcom and its progeny as 
“premised on the unique attributes of the Internet.” While the Netcom court was plainly 
concerned with a theory of direct liability that would effectively “hold the entire Internet 
liable” for the conduct of a single user, its reasoning and conclusions, consistent with 
precedents of this court and the Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act, 
transcend the Internet. Like the Fourth Circuit, we reject the contention that “the Netcom 
decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is inconsistent with the established 
law of copyright,” and we find it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106,” rather 
than a special-purpose rule applicable only to ISPs. 
 
When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, 
Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to 
be made. There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s 
conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, 
and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In 
the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of no case holding otherwise—that the 
operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, 
supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, 
if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR 
customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct 
infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s 
command. 
 
The district court emphasized the fact that copying is “instrumental” rather than 
“incidental” to the function of the RS-DVR system. While that may distinguish the RS-DVR 
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from the ISPs in Netcom and CoStar, it does not distinguish the RS-DVR from a VCR, a 
photocopier, or even a typical copy shop. And the parties do not seem to contest that a 
company that merely makes photocopiers available to the public on its premises, without 
more, is not subject to liability for direct infringement for reproductions made by customers 
using those copiers. They only dispute whether Cablevision is similarly situated to such a 
proprietor. 
 
The district court found Cablevision analogous to a copy shop that makes course packs for 
college professors. In the leading case involving such a shop, for example, “[t]he professor 
[gave] the copyshop the materials of which the coursepack [was] to be made up, and the 
copyshop [did] the rest.” Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1384 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). There did not appear to be any serious dispute in that case 
that the shop itself was directly liable for reproducing copyrighted works. The district court 
here found that Cablevision, like this copy shop, would be “doing” the copying, albeit “at the 
customer’s behest.” 
 
But because volitional conduct is an important element of direct liability, the district court’s 
analogy is flawed. In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference 
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the 
copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which 
automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. In cases like Princeton 
University Press, the defendants operated a copying device and sold the product they made 
using that device. See 99 F.3d at 1383 (“The corporate defendant ... is a commercial 
copyshop that reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, bound 
the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to students....”). Here, by selling 
access to a system that automatically produces copies on command, Cablevision more 
closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers to use a photocopier on his 
premises, and it seems incorrect to say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any 
copies when his machines are actually operated by his customers. Some courts have held to 
the contrary, but they do not explicitly explain why, and we find them unpersuasive. See, 
e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(concluding that, “regardless” of whether customers or defendants’ employees operated the 
tape-copying machines at defendants’ stores, defendant had actively infringed copyrights). 
 
The district court also emphasized Cablevision’s “unfettered discretion in selecting the 
programming that it would make available for recording.” This conduct is indeed more 
proximate to the creation of illegal copying than, say, operating an ISP or opening a copy 
shop, where all copied content was supplied by the customers themselves or other third 
parties. Nonetheless, we do not think it sufficiently proximate to the copying to displace the 
customer as the person who “makes” the copies when determining liability under the 
Copyright Act. Cablevision, we note, also has subscribers who use home VCRs or DVRs 
(like TiVo), and has significant control over the content recorded by these customers. But 
this control is limited to the channels of programming available to a customer and not to 
the programs themselves. Cablevision has no control over what programs are made 
available on individual channels or when those programs will air, if at all. In this respect, 
Cablevision possesses far less control over recordable content than it does in the VOD 
context, where it actively selects and makes available beforehand the individual programs 
available for viewing. For these reasons, we are not inclined to say that Cablevision, rather 
than the user, “does” the copying produced by the RS-DVR system. As a result, we find that 
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the district court erred in concluding that Cablevision, rather than its RS-DVR customers, 
makes the copies carried out by the RS-DVR system. 
 
Our refusal to find Cablevision directly liable on these facts is buttressed by the existence 
and contours of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of contributory liability in the copyright 
context. After all, the purpose of any causation-based liability doctrine is to identify the 
actor (or actors) whose “conduct has been so significant and important a cause that [he or 
she] should be legally responsible.” But here, to the extent that we may construe the 
boundaries of direct liability more narrowly, the doctrine of contributory liability stands 
ready to provide adequate protection to copyrighted works. 
 
Most of the facts found dispositive by the district court—e.g., Cablevision’s “continuing 
relationship” with its RS-DVR customers, its control over recordable content, and the 
“instrumental[ity]” of copying to the RS-DVR system—seem to us more relevant to the 
question of contributory liability. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
the lack of an “ongoing relationship” between Sony and its VCR customers supported the 
Court’s conclusion that it should not impose contributory liability on Sony for any infringing 
copying done by Sony VCR owners. The Sony Court did deem it “just” to impose liability on 
a party in a “position to control” the infringing uses of another, but as a contributory, not 
direct, infringer. And asking whether copying copyrighted material is only “incidental” to a 
given technology is akin to asking whether that technology has “commercially significant 
noninfringing uses,” another inquiry the Sony Court found relevant to whether imposing 
contributory liability was just. 
 
The Supreme Court’s desire to maintain a meaningful distinction between direct and 
contributory copyright infringement is consistent with congressional intent. The Patent 
Act, unlike the Copyright Act, expressly provides that someone who “actively induces 
infringement of a patent” is “liable as an infringer,” just like someone who commits the 
underlying infringing act by “us[ing]” a patented invention without authorization. In 
contrast, someone who merely “sells ... a material or apparatus for use in practicing a 
patented process” faces only liability as a “contributory infringer.” If Congress had meant to 
assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act 
and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew 
how to draft a statute that would have this effect. Because Congress did not do so, the Sony 
Court concluded that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another.” Furthermore, in cases like Sony, the Supreme Court 
has strongly signaled its intent to use the doctrine of contributory infringement, not direct 
infringement, to “identify[ ] the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another.” Thus, although Sony warns us that “the lines 
between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not 
clearly drawn,” that decision does not absolve us of our duty to discern where that line falls 
in cases, like this one, that require us to decide the question. 
 
The district court apparently concluded that Cablevision’s operation of the RS-DVR system 
would contribute in such a major way to the copying done by another that it made sense to 
say that Cablevision was a direct infringer, and thus, in effect, was “doing” the relevant 
copying. There are certainly other cases, not binding on us, that follow this approach. See, 
e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997) 
(noting that defendant ISP’s encouragement of its users to copy protected files was “crucial” 
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to finding that it was a direct infringer). We need not decide today whether one’s 
contribution to the creation of an infringing copy may be so great that it warrants holding 
that party directly liable for the infringement, even though another party has actually 
made the copy. We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the RS-
DVR system are “made” by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this 
reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability. 
Therefore, Cablevision is entitled to summary judgment on this point, and the district court 
erred in awarding summary judgment to plaintiffs…. 
 
[In the third section, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision’s playback of the recording 
did not constitute an infringing public performance: 
 
Because each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single subscriber 
using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that 
such transmissions are not performances “to the public,” and therefore do not 
infringe any exclusive right of public performance.] 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Is web browsing an infringement; and if so, by whom?  Does your answer change if 
the browsed file is uploaded without permission?
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
Souter, Justice. 
 
The question is under what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both 
lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using 
the product. We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use 
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. 
 
I 
A 
 
Respondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, Inc., defendants in the trial court, 
distribute free software products that allow computer users to share electronic files through 
peer-to-peer networks, so called because users’ computers communicate directly with each 
other, not through central servers. The advantage of peer-to-peer networks over 
information networks of other types shows up in their substantial and growing popularity. 
Because they need no central computer server to mediate the exchange of information or 
files among users, the high-bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be 
dispensed with, and the need for costly server storage space is eliminated. Since copies of a 
file (particularly a popular one) are available on many users’ computers, file requests and 
retrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, and since file exchanges do not 
travel through a server, communications can take place between any computers that 
remain connected to the network without risk that a glitch in the server will disable the 
network in its entirety. Given these benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, peer-to-peer 
networks are employed to store and distribute electronic files by universities, government 
agencies, corporations, and libraries, among others.1  
 
Other users of peer-to-peer networks include individual recipients of Grokster’s and 
StreamCast’s software, and although the networks that they enjoy through using the 
software can be used to share any type of digital file, they have prominently employed those 
networks in sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization. A group of 
copyright holders (MGM for short, but including motion picture studios, recording 
companies, songwriters, and music publishers) sued Grokster and StreamCast for their 
users’ copyright infringements, alleging that they knowingly and intentionally distributed 
their software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in 
violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. MGM sought damages and an 
injunction. 
 
Discovery during the litigation revealed the way the software worked, the business aims of 
each defendant company, and the predilections of the users. Grokster’s eponymous software 
employs what is known as FastTrack technology, a protocol developed by others and 
licensed to Grokster. StreamCast distributes a very similar product except that its 
                                                 
1 Peer-to-peer networks have disadvantages as well. Searches on peer-to-peer networks may not reach and 
uncover all available files because search requests may not be transmitted to every computer on the network. 
There may be redundant copies of popular files. The creator of the software has no incentive to minimize storage 
or bandwidth consumption, the costs of which are borne by every user of the network. Most relevant here, it is 
more difficult to control the content of files available for retrieval and the behavior of users. 
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software, called Morpheus, relies on what is known as Gnutella technology. A user who 
downloads and installs either software possesses the protocol to send requests for files 
directly to the computers of others using software compatible with FastTrack or Gnutella. 
On the FastTrack network opened by the Grokster software, the user’s request goes to a 
computer given an indexing capacity by the software and designated a supernode, or to 
some other computer with comparable power and capacity to collect temporary indexes of 
the files available on the computers of users connected to it. The supernode (or indexing 
computer) searches its own index and may communicate the search request to other 
supernodes. If the file is found, the supernode discloses its location to the computer 
requesting it, and the requesting user can download the file directly from the computer 
located. The copied file is placed in a designated sharing folder on the requesting user’s 
computer, where it is available for other users to download in turn, along with any other 
file in that folder. 
 
In the Gnutella network made available by Morpheus, the process is mostly the same, 
except that in some versions of the Gnutella protocol there are no supernodes. In these 
versions, peer computers using the protocol communicate directly with each other. When a 
user enters a search request into the Morpheus software, it sends the request to computers 
connected with it, which in turn pass the request along to other connected peers. The 
search results are communicated to the requesting computer, and the user can download 
desired files directly from peers’ computers. As this description indicates, Grokster and 
StreamCast use no servers to intercept the content of the search requests or to mediate the 
file transfers conducted by users of the software, there being no central point through which 
the substance of the communications passes in either direction.4 
 
Although Grokster and StreamCast do not therefore know when particular files are copied, 
a few searches using their software would show what is available on the networks the 
software reaches. MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his 
study showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on the FastTrack system 
were copyrighted works.5 Grokster and StreamCast dispute this figure, raising 
methodological problems and arguing that free copying even of copyrighted works may be 
authorized by the rightholders. They also argue that potential noninfringing uses of their 
software are significant in kind, even if infrequent in practice. Some musical performers, 
for example, have gained new audiences by distributing their copyrighted works for free 
across peer-to-peer networks, and some distributors of unprotected content have used peer-
to-peer networks to disseminate files, Shakespeare being an example. Indeed, StreamCast 
has given Morpheus users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though 
their popularity has not been quantified. 
 
As for quantification, the parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence entered thus far to 
show the content available on the FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much 
about which files are actually downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the 
software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material. But MGM’s evidence gives reason 
                                                 
4 There is some evidence that both Grokster and StreamCast previously operated supernodes, which compiled 
indexes of files available on all of the nodes connected to them. This evidence, pertaining to previous versions of 
the defendants’ software, is not before us and would not affect our conclusions in any event. 
5 By comparison, evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 
(C.A.9 2001), showed that 87% of files available on the Napster file-sharing network were copyrighted. 
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to think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement, and because 
well over 100 million copies of the software in question are known to have been 
downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks 
each month, the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering. 
 
Grokster and StreamCast concede the infringement in most downloads, and it is 
uncontested that they are aware that users employ their software primarily to download 
copyrighted files, even if the decentralized FastTrack and Gnutella networks fail to reveal 
which files are being copied, and when. From time to time, moreover, the companies have 
learned about their users’ infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each 
company with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom 
the companies have responded with guidance. And MGM notified the companies of 8 million 
copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software. 
 
Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients of information about 
infringing use. The record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and 
StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective 
that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to 
encourage infringement. 
 
After the notorious file-sharing service, Napster, was sued by copyright holders for 
facilitation of copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 
896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (C.A.9 2001), StreamCast 
gave away a software program of a kind known as OpenNap, designed as compatible with 
the Napster program and open to Napster users for downloading files from other Napster 
and OpenNap users’ computers. Evidence indicates that “[i]t was always [StreamCast’s] 
intent to use [its OpenNap network] to be able to capture email addresses of [its] initial 
target market so that [it] could promote [its] StreamCast Morpheus interface to them”; 
indeed, the OpenNap program was engineered “‘to leverage Napster’s 50 million user base.’”  
 
StreamCast monitored both the number of users downloading its OpenNap program and 
the number of music files they downloaded. It also used the resulting OpenNap network to 
distribute copies of the Morpheus software and to encourage users to adopt it. Internal 
company documents indicate that StreamCast hoped to attract large numbers of former 
Napster users if that company was shut down by court order or otherwise, and that 
StreamCast planned to be the next Napster. A kit developed by StreamCast to be delivered 
to advertisers, for example, contained press articles about StreamCast’s potential to 
capture former Napster users, and it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a 
company “which is similar to what Napster was.” It broadcast banner advertisements to 
users of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its OpenNap. An internal 
e-mail from a company executive stated: “‘We have put this network in place so that when 
Napster pulls the plug on their free service ... or if the Court orders them shut down prior to 
that ... we will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that will be 
actively looking for an alternative.’” 
 
Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to market its service as the best 
Napster alternative. One proposed advertisement read: “Napster Inc. has announced that it 
will soon begin charging you a fee. That’s if the courts don’t order it shut down first. What 
will you do to get around it?” Another proposed ad touted StreamCast’s software as the “# 1 
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alternative to Napster” and asked “[w]hen the lights went off at Napster ... where did the 
users go?” (ellipsis in original).7 StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal uses of its 
software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of the 
company averred that “[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued. It’s the best 
way to get in the new[s].”  
 
The evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market of former Napster users is sparser 
but revealing, for Grokster launched its own OpenNap system called Swaptor and inserted 
digital codes into its Web site so that computer users using Web search engines to look for 
“Napster” or “[f]ree file sharing” would be directed to the Grokster Web site, where they 
could download the Grokster software. And Grokster’s name is an apparent derivative of 
Napster. 
 
StreamCast’s executives monitored the number of songs by certain commercial artists 
available on their networks, and an internal communication indicates they aimed to have a 
larger number of copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing 
networks. The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just as it 
would be with their promotional materials developed showing copyrighted songs as 
examples of the kinds of files available through Morpheus. Morpheus in fact allowed users 
to search specifically for “Top 40” songs, which were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly, 
Grokster sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular 
copyrighted materials. 
 
In addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote further, 
the business models employed by Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal 
object was use of their software to download copyrighted works. Grokster and StreamCast 
receive no revenue from users, who obtain the software itself for nothing. Instead, both 
companies generate income by selling advertising space, and they stream the advertising to 
Grokster and Morpheus users while they are employing the programs. As the number of 
users of each program increases, advertising opportunities become worth more. While there 
is doubtless some demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence shows that substantive 
volume is a function of free access to copyrighted work. Users seeking Top 40 songs, for 
example, or the latest release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than 
those seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and StreamCast translated that demand into 
dollars. 
 
Finally, there is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted 
material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files. 
Although Grokster appears to have sent e-mails warning users about infringing content 
when it received threatening notice from the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone 
from continuing to use its software to share copyrighted files. StreamCast not only rejected 
another company’s offer of help to monitor infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol 
addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks…. 
 
                                                 
7 The record makes clear that StreamCast developed these promotional materials but not whether it released 
them to the public. Even if these advertisements were not released to the public and do not show 
encouragement to infringe, they illuminate StreamCast’s purposes. 
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II 
A 
 
MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeals’s holding for upsetting a sound 
balance between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright 
protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the 
incidence of liability for copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the 
more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is 
an exercise in managing the tradeoff. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra, at 
442. 
 
The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim that digital 
distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before, because 
every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, and many people (especially the 
young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted works. This very breadth of the 
software’s use may well draw the public directly into the debate over copyright policy, and 
the indications are that the ease of copying songs or movies using software like Grokster’s 
and Napster’s is fostering disdain for copyright protection. As the case has been presented 
to us, these fears are said to be offset by the different concern that imposing liability, not 
only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful use, 
could limit further development of beneficial technologies.8  
 
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful one, given 
the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast’s and 
Grokster’s software. When a widely shared service or product is used to commit 
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively 
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the 
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement. 
 
One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, 
see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (C.A.2 
1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to 
exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 
307 (C.A.2 1963).9 Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S., at 
                                                 
8 The mutual exclusivity of these values should not be overstated, however. On the one hand technological 
innovators, including those writing file-sharing computer programs, may wish for effective copyright protections 
for their work. On the other hand the widespread distribution of creative works through improved technologies 
may enable the synthesis of new works or generate audiences for emerging artists. 
9 We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), that “‘the lines 
between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn’ 
....[R]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim] necessarily entails consideration 
of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed the parties ... rely 
upon such arguments and authority in support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory 
infringement.” In the present case MGM has argued a vicarious liability theory, which allows imposition of 
liability when the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the 
direct infringer, even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement. Because we resolve the case 
based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM’s vicarious liability theory. 
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434, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are 
well established in the law. 
 
B 
 
Despite the currency of these principles of secondary liability, this Court has dealt with 
secondary copyright infringement in only one recent case, and because MGM has tailored 
its principal claim to our opinion there, a look at our earlier holding is in order. In Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, this Court addressed a claim that secondary liability for 
infringement can arise from the very distribution of a commercial product. There, the 
product, novel at the time, was what we know today as the videocassette recorder or VCR. 
Copyright holders sued Sony as the manufacturer, claiming it was contributorily liable for 
infringement that occurred when VCR owners taped copyrighted programs because it 
supplied the means used to infringe, and it had constructive knowledge that infringement 
would occur. At the trial on the merits, the evidence showed that the principal use of the 
VCR was for “‘time-shifting,’” or taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient 
time, which the Court found to be a fair, not an infringing, use. There was no evidence that 
Sony had expressed an object of bringing about taping in violation of copyright or had taken 
active steps to increase its profits from unlawful taping. Although Sony’s advertisements 
urged consumers to buy the VCR to “‘record favorite shows’” or “‘build a library’” of recorded 
programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing. 
 
On those facts, with no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote infringing uses, the 
only conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement 
arising from its sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use them to 
infringe. But because the VCR was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses,” we held the manufacturer could not be faulted solely on the basis of its distribution.  
 
This analysis reflected patent law’s traditional staple article of commerce doctrine, now 
codified, that distribution of a component of a patented device will not violate the patent if 
it is suitable for use in other ways. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The doctrine was devised to identify 
instances in which it may be presumed from distribution of an article in commerce that the 
distributor intended the article to be used to infringe another’s patent, and so may justly be 
held liable for that infringement. “One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted 
to be used in a patented combination will be presumed to intend the natural consequences 
of his acts; he will be presumed to intend that they shall be used in the combination of the 
patent.” 
 
In sum, where an article is “good for nothing else” but infringement, there is no legitimate 
public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or 
imputing an intent to infringe. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of 
selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to 
instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will 
be misused. It leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce. 
 
The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to resolving it is the Sony rule 
and, in particular, what it means for a product to be “capable of commercially significant 
noninfringing uses.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra, at 442. MGM advances 
the argument that granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast as to their 
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current activities gave too much weight to the value of innovative technology, and too little 
to the copyrights infringed by users of their software, given that 90% of works available on 
one of the networks was shown to be copyrighted. Assuming the remaining 10% to be its 
noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify as “substantial,” and the Court should 
quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used “principally” for infringement 
does not qualify. As mentioned before, Grokster and StreamCast reply by citing evidence 
that their software can be used to reproduce public domain works, and they point to 
copyright holders who actually encourage copying. Even if infringement is the principal 
practice with their software today, they argue, the noninfringing uses are significant and 
will grow. 
 
We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which it read as limiting 
secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied. Sony barred 
secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely 
from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the 
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. The Ninth Circuit has read Sony’s 
limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the 
producer can never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it; it read 
the rule as being this broad, even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown 
by evidence independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the distributors 
had “specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contributed to the 
infringement, and failed to act upon that information.” Because the Circuit found the 
StreamCast and Grokster software capable of substantial lawful use, it concluded on the 
basis of its reading of Sony that neither company could be held liable, since there was no 
showing that their software, being without any central server, afforded them knowledge of 
specific unlawful uses. 
 
This view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case from one about liability resting 
on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory. Because Sony did not displace other 
theories of secondary liability, and because we find below that it was error to grant 
summary judgment to the companies on MGM’s inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony 
further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance 
between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge 
that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested 
on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule 
for a day when that may be required. 
 
C 
 
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or 
uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of 
intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-
based liability derived from the common law.10 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra, 
at 439 (“If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact 
that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge” of the potential for infringement). 
Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may 
                                                 
10 Nor does the Patent Act’s exemption from liability for those who distribute a staple article of commerce, 35 
U.S.C. § 271(c), extend to those who induce patent infringement, § 271(b). 
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be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability. 
 
The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission 
of infringement by another, or “entic[es] or persuad[es] another” to infringe, as by 
advertising. Thus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who “not only expected 
but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement” was liable for infringement “on principles 
recognized in every part of the law.” 
 
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different 
today. Evidence of “active steps ... taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as 
advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an 
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement 
was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely 
sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use. 
 
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for 
its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We 
adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use 
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We are, of 
course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the 
development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony 
did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that 
its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual 
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would 
ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support 
or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises 
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. 
 
III 
A 
 
The only apparent question about treating MGM’s evidence as sufficient to withstand 
summary judgment under the theory of inducement goes to the need on MGM’s part to 
adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster communicated an inducing message to 
their software users. The classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation 
that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations. MGM claims 
that such a message is shown here. It is undisputed that StreamCast beamed onto the 
computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads urging the adoption of its 
OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the custom of 
patrons of Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement. 
Those who accepted StreamCast’s OpenNap program were offered software to perform the 
same services, which a factfinder could conclude would readily have been understood in the 
Napster market as the ability to download copyrighted music files. Grokster distributed an 
electronic newsletter containing links to articles promoting its software’s ability to access 
popular copyrighted music. And anyone whose Napster or free file-sharing searches turned 
up a link to Grokster would have understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing 
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ability as Napster, and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing 
downloads; that would also have been the understanding of anyone offered Grokster’s 
suggestively named Swaptor software, its version of OpenNap. And both companies 
communicated a clear message by responding affirmatively to requests for help in locating 
and playing copyrighted materials. 
 
In StreamCast’s case, of course, the evidence just described was supplemented by other 
unequivocal indications of unlawful purpose in the internal communications and 
advertising designs aimed at Napster users (“When the lights went off at Napster ... where 
did the users go?”). Whether the messages were communicated is not to the point on this 
record. The function of the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant’s 
own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection (and 
incidentally to point to actual violators likely to be found among those who hear or read the 
message). Proving that a message was sent out, then, is the preeminent but not exclusive 
way of showing that active steps were taken with the purpose of bringing about infringing 
acts, and of showing that infringing acts took place by using the device distributed. Here, 
the summary judgment record is replete with other evidence that Grokster and 
StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and distributor in Sony, acted with a purpose to 
cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for illegal use.  
 
Three features of this evidence of intent are particularly notable. First, each company 
showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, 
the market comprising former Napster users. StreamCast’s internal documents made 
constant reference to Napster, it initially distributed its Morpheus software through an 
OpenNap program compatible with Napster, it advertised its OpenNap program to Napster 
users, and its Morpheus software functions as Napster did except that it could be used to 
distribute more kinds of files, including copyrighted movies and software programs. 
Grokster’s name is apparently derived from Napster, it too initially offered an OpenNap 
program, its software’s function is likewise comparable to Napster’s, and it attempted to 
divert queries for Napster onto its own Web site. Grokster and StreamCast’s efforts to 
supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute 
what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on 
the part of each to bring about infringement. 
 
Second, this evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM’s showing 
that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish 
the infringing activity using their software. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants’ 
failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to 
monitor their users’ activity, we think this evidence underscores Grokster’s and 
StreamCast’s intentional facilitation of their users’ infringement.12  
 
Third, there is a further complement to the direct evidence of unlawful objective. It is useful 
to recall that StreamCast and Grokster make money by selling advertising space, by 
directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software. As the record shows, the 
                                                 
12 Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory 
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device 
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe 
harbor. 
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more the software is used, the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising 
revenue becomes. Since the extent of the software’s use determines the gain to the 
distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, which the 
record shows is infringing.13 This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful 
intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear. 
 
The unlawful objective is unmistakable. 
 
B 
 
In addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a device suitable for 
infringing use, the inducement theory of course requires evidence of actual infringement by 
recipients of the device, the software in this case. As the account of the facts indicates, there 
is evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale, and there is no serious issue of the adequacy 
of MGM’s showing on this point in order to survive the companies’ summary judgment 
requests. Although an exact calculation of infringing use, as a basis for a claim of damages, 
is subject to dispute, there is no question that the summary judgment evidence is at least 
adequate to entitle MGM to go forward with claims for damages and equitable relief. 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, this case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on that case to rule in 
favor of StreamCast and Grokster was error. Sony dealt with a claim of liability based 
solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge 
that some users would follow the unlawful course. The case struck a balance between the 
interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial 
lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability 
for the unlawful acts of others. 
 
MGM’s evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis of liability for 
distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the distributors’ words 
and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose to cause and profit from 
third-party acts of copyright infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is 
ultimately found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from 
inferring a patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that 
objective was. 
 
There is substantial evidence in MGM’s favor on all elements of inducement, and summary 
judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast was error. On remand, reconsideration of 
MGM’s motion for summary judgment will be in order…. 
                                                 
13 Grokster and StreamCast contend that any theory of liability based on their conduct is not properly before 
this Court because the rulings in the trial and appellate courts dealt only with the present versions of their 
software, not “past acts ... that allegedly encouraged infringement or assisted ... known acts of infringement.” 
This contention misapprehends the basis for their potential liability. It is not only that encouraging a particular 
consumer to infringe a copyright can give rise to secondary liability for the infringement that results. 
Inducement liability goes beyond that, and the distribution of a product can itself give rise to liability where 
evidence shows that the distributor intended and encouraged the product to be used to infringe. In such a case, 
the culpable act is not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the distribution of the tool intended 
for infringing use.  
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[Ginsburg and Breyer concurrences omitted]. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Who were the direct infringers in this case?  Why didn’t the plaintiffs sue them? 
 
Does this holding mean that Grokster and Streamcast could be liable even if no one ever 
actually directly infringed?   
 
“Fixing” Inducement.  Assume for a moment that Grokster deliberately induced copyright 
infringement at its outset.  However, before any copyright owners sued, it voluntarily 
decided to mend its ways and stop inducing.  How would it do so?  Is there any way a 
company can “cure” historical inducement?  Or would Grokster’s only hope be to wait out 
the statute of limitations? 
 
This is a central issue in the Viacom v. YouTube case, discussed below.  Assume that 
YouTube historically induced infringement and subsequently YouTube’s service became 
extremely socially valuable.  Is it possible that tools with long-term social value might 
initially look threatening to copyright owners?  Note that for decades, copyright owners 
have contested virtually every major technological development that enables third parties 
to do something new with their copyrighted work.  See Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling 
on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125 (2011).  Could Grokster 
and Streamcast have evolved into a legitimate and important social resource if this ruling 
hadn’t effectively shut them down?  If your answer is yes, consider this when judging the 
practices of start-up companies whose future remains unwritten. 
  
Denouement.  On remand, Grokster lost in court, and subsequently it shut down operations.  
Its website displayed the following announcement/warning (the IP address is redacted; 
screen shot taken August 3, 2011): 
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UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 
2011) 
Fisher, Circuit Judge.  
 
…BACKGROUND 
 
Veoh allows people to share video content over the Internet. Users can view videos 
uploaded by other users as well as authorized “partner content” made available by major 
copyright holders such as SonyBMG, ABC and ESPN. There are two ways to use Veoh’s 
service: through a standalone software client application launched in late 2005, or through 
the veoh.com website launched in early 2006 that users access via a standard web browser. 
Both services are provided free of charge. Veoh generates revenue from advertising 
displayed along with the videos. “As of April 2009, Veoh had well over a million videos 
available for viewing, and users had uploaded more than four million videos to Veoh.” 
 
Before a user may share a video through Veoh, he must register at veoh.com by providing 
an email address, user name and password. He must then state that he has read and 
agreed to Veoh’s “Publisher Terms and Conditions” (PTC). The PTC instructs users that 
they “may not submit [material] ... that contains any ... infringing ... or illegal content” and 
directs that they “may only upload and publish[material] on the Veoh Service to which 
[they] have sufficient rights and licenses to permit the distribution of [their] [material] via 
the Veoh Services.” The PTC agreement also gives Veoh a license to “publicly display, 
publicly perform, transmit, distribute, copy, store, reproduce and/or provide” the uploaded 
video “through the Veoh Service, either in its original form, copy or in the form of an 
encoded work.” 
 
A user who wants to share a video must also agree to Veoh’s “Terms of Use,” which give 
Veoh a license “to use, reproduce, modify, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, 
publish, perform and transmit” the video. The Terms of Use provide that “you expressly 
represent and warrant that you own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and 
permissions to use and authorize Veoh to use all ... copyright or other proprietary rights in 
and to any and all[material shared on Veoh].” Users must agree “not to (a) take any action 
or (b) upload, download, post, submit or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of any 
[material] ... through the Veoh Service, that ... infringes any ... copyright.” Once a user 
agrees to the PTC and Terms of Use, he may upload a video. Each time a user begins to 
upload a video to Veoh’s website, a message appears stating, “Do not upload videos that 
infringe copyright, are pornographic, obscene, violent, or any other videos that violate 
Veoh’s Terms of Use.” 
 
When a video is uploaded, various automated processes take place. Veoh’s software 
automatically breaks down the video file into smaller 256–kilobyte “chunks,” which 
facilitate making the video accessible to others. Veoh’s software also automatically 
converts, or “transcodes,” the video file into Flash 7 format. This is done because “the vast 
majority of internet users have software that can play videos” in this format. Veoh presets 
the requisite settings for the Flash conversion. If the user is a “Pro” user, Veoh’s software 
also converts the uploaded video into Flash 8 and MPEG–4 formats, which are playable on 
some portable devices. Accordingly, when a Pro user uploads a video, Veoh automatically 
creates and retains four copies: the chunked file, the Flash 7 file, the Flash 8 file and the 
MPEG–4 file. None of these automated conversions affects the content of the video. 
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Veoh’s computers also automatically extract metadata from information users provide to 
help others locate the video for viewing. Users can provide a title, as well as tags or 
keywords that describe the video, and can also select pre-set categories describing the 
video, such as “music,” “faith” or “politics.” The Veoh system then automatically assigns 
every uploaded video a “permalink,” or web address, that uniquely identifies the video and 
makes it available to users. Veoh employees do not review the user-submitted video, title or 
tags before the video is made available.2 
 
Veoh’s system allows users to access shared videos in two ways. First, the video may be 
“streamed” from a server, whereby the user’s web browser begins displaying the video 
almost immediately, before the entire file has been transmitted to the user’s computer. 
Depending on whether the user stops his web browser from streaming the full video, a 
partial or full copy of the video is stored temporarily on the user’s computer. Second, the 
user can download a copy of the video through Veoh’s website or client software application. 
Veoh transfers a “chunked” copy of the file to the user’s computer, and the software 
reassembles the chunks into a viewable copy. The downloaded file is stored on the user’s 
computer in a Veoh directory, which gives Veoh the ability to terminate access to the files. 
 
Veoh employs various technologies to automatically prevent copyright infringement on its 
system. In 2006, Veoh adopted “hash filtering” software. Whenever Veoh disables access to 
an infringing video, the hash filter also automatically disables access to any identical videos 
and blocks any subsequently submitted duplicates. Veoh also began developing an 
additional filtering method of its own, but in 2007 opted instead to adopt a third-party 
filtering solution produced by a company called Audible Magic. Audible Magic’s technology 
takes audio “fingerprints” from video files and compares them to a database of copyrighted 
content provided by copyright holders. If a user attempts to upload a video that matches a 
fingerprint from Audible Magic’s database of forbidden material, the video never becomes 
available for viewing. Approximately nine months after beginning to apply the Audible 
Magic filter to all newly uploaded videos, Veoh applied the filter to its backlog of previously 
uploaded videos. This resulted in the removal of more than 60,000 videos, including some 
incorporating UMG’s works. Veoh has also implemented a policy for terminating users who 
repeatedly upload infringing material, and has terminated thousands of user accounts. 
 
Despite Veoh’s efforts to prevent copyright infringement on its system, both Veoh and UMG 
agree that some of Veoh’s users were able to download unauthorized videos containing 
songs for which UMG owns the copyright. The parties also agree that before UMG filed its 
complaint, the only notices Veoh received regarding alleged infringements of UMG’s works 
were sent by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). The RIAA notices 
listed specific videos that were allegedly infringing, and included links to those videos. The 
notices did not assert rights to all works by the identified artists, and did not mention 
UMG. UMG does not dispute that Veoh removed the material located at the links identified 
in the RIAA notices…. 
 
                                                 
2 Veoh employees do monitor already accessible videos for pornography, which is removed, using a “porn tool” to 
review thumbnail images of uploaded videos tagged as “sexy.” 
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DISCUSSION… 
 
II. 
 
“Difficult and controversial questions of copyright liability in the online world prompted 
Congress to enact Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA).” Congress recognized that “[i]n the ordinary course of their 
operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to potential 
copyright infringement liability.” S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 8 (1998). Although Congress was 
aware that the services provided by companies like Veoh are capable of being misused to 
facilitate copyright infringement, it was loath to permit the specter of liability to chill 
innovation that could also serve substantial socially beneficial functions. Congress decided 
that “by limiting [service providers’] liability,” it would “ensure[ ] that the efficiency of the 
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the 
Internet will continue to expand.” To that end, OCILLA created four safe harbors that 
preclude imposing monetary liability on service providers for copyright infringement that 
occurs as a result of specified activities. The district court concluded that Veoh qualified for 
one such safe harbor, under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). UMG challenges that determination and the 
consequent entry of summary judgment in Veoh’s favor…. 
 
A. 
 
We must first decide whether the functions automatically performed by Veoh’s software 
when a user uploads a video fall within the meaning of “by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user.” Although UMG concedes that “[s]torage on computers involves making 
a copy of the underlying data,” it argues that “nothing in the ordinary definition of ‘storage’ 
encompasses” the automatic processes undertaken to facilitate public access to user-
uploaded videos. Facilitation of access, UMG argues, goes beyond “storage.” Therefore the 
creation of chunked and Flash files and the streaming and downloading of videos fall 
outside § 512(c). UMG also contends that these automatic processes are not undertaken “at 
the direction of the user.” 
 
The district court concluded that UMG’s reading of § 512(c) was too narrow, wrongly 
requiring “that the infringing conduct be storage,” rather than be “‘by reason of the 
storage,’” as its terms provide. We agree that the phrase “by reason of the storage at the 
direction of the user” is broader causal language than UMG contends, “clearly meant to 
cover more than mere electronic storage lockers.” We hold that the language and structure 
of the statute, as well as the legislative intent that motivated its enactment, clarify that § 
512(c) encompasses the access-facilitating processes that automatically occur when a user 
uploads a video to Veoh….  
 
B. 
 
Under § 512(c)(1)(A), a service provider can receive safe harbor protection only if it “(i) does 
not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system 
or network is infringing;” “(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or” “(iii) upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 
UMG has never disputed that when Veoh became aware of allegedly infringing material as 
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a result of the RIAA’s DMCA notices, it removed the files. Rather, it argues that Veoh had 
knowledge or awareness of other infringing videos that it did not remove. The district court 
found that UMG failed to rebut Veoh’s showing “that when it did acquire knowledge of 
allegedly infringing material—whether from DMCA notices, informal notices, or other 
means—it expeditiously removed such material.” UMG argues on appeal that the district 
court erred by improperly construing the knowledge requirement to unduly restrict the 
circumstances in which a service provider has “actual knowledge” under subsection (i) and 
setting too stringent a standard for what we have termed “red flag” awareness based on 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent under subsection (ii). We 
hold that the district court properly construed these requirements. 
 
1. 
 
It is undisputed that, until the filing of this lawsuit, UMG “had not identified to Veoh any 
specific infringing video available on Veoh’s system.” UMG’s decision to forgo the DMCA 
notice protocol “stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s 
knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the copyright holder.” Nevertheless, UMG 
contends that Veoh hosted a category of copyrightable content—music—for which it had no 
license from any major music company. UMG argues Veoh thus must have known this 
content was unauthorized, given its general knowledge that its services could be used to 
post infringing material. UMG urges us to hold that this sufficiently demonstrates 
knowledge of infringement. We cannot, for several reasons. 
 
As an initial matter, contrary to UMG’s contentions, there are many music videos that 
could in fact legally appear on Veoh. “Among the types of videos subject to copyright 
protection but lawfully available on Veoh’s system were videos with music created by users 
and videos that Veoh provided pursuant to arrangements it reached with major copyright 
holders, such as SonyBMG.” Further, Congress’ express intention that the DMCA “facilitate 
making available quickly and conveniently via the Internet ... movies, music, software, and 
literary works”—precisely the service Veoh provides—makes us skeptical that UMG’s 
narrow interpretation of § 512(c) is plausible. S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 8. Finally, if merely 
hosting material that falls within a category of content capable of copyright protection, with 
the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted material, was sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c) 
safe harbor would be rendered a dead letter: § 512(c) applies only to claims of copyright 
infringement, yet the fact that a service provider’s website contained copyrightable material 
would remove the service provider from § 512(c) eligibility. 
 
Cases analyzing knowledge in the secondary copyright infringement context also counsel 
against UMG’s general knowledge approach. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court held that there was “no precedent in 
the law of copyright for the imposition of” liability based on the theory that the defendant 
had “sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use 
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.” So long as the 
product was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” the Court refused to impute 
knowledge of infringement. Applying Sony to the Internet context, we held in A & M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), that “if a computer system 
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge 
such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct 
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infringement.” But “absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a 
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because 
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.” 
 
Requiring specific knowledge of particular infringing activity makes good sense in the 
context of the DMCA, which Congress enacted to foster cooperation among copyright 
holders and service providers in dealing with infringement on the Internet. See S. Rep. No. 
105–190, at 20 (noting OCILLA was intended to provide “strong incentives for service 
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright 
infringements”). Copyright holders know precisely what materials they own, and are thus 
better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service providers like Veoh, who 
cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not. See S. Rep. No. 105–
190, at 48; (“[A] [service] provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief 
cataloguing visit, to determine whether [a] photograph was still protected by copyright or 
was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by copyright, whether the 
use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair 
use doctrine.”). 
 
These considerations are reflected in Congress’ decision to enact a notice and takedown 
protocol encouraging copyright holders to identify specific infringing material to service 
providers. They are also evidenced in the “exclusionary rule” that prohibits consideration of 
substantially deficient § 512(c)(3)(A) notices for purposes of “determining whether a service 
provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts and circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent.” Congress’ intention is further reflected in the DMCA’s direct 
statement that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of 
subsections (a) through (d) on ... a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively 
seeking facts indicating infringing activity.” Congress made a considered policy 
determination that the “DMCA notification procedures [would] place the burden of policing 
copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately 
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.” In parsing § 
512(c)(3), we have “decline[d] to shift [that] substantial burden from the copyright owner to 
the provider.” 
 
UMG asks us to change course with regard to § 512(c)(1)(A) by adopting a broad conception 
of the knowledge requirement. We see no principled basis for doing so. We therefore hold 
that merely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the 
general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is 
insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) inquiry into whether a 
service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.” The district court’s conception of this “red flag test” properly followed our 
analysis in CCBill, which reiterated that the burden remains with the copyright holder 
rather than the service provider. The plaintiffs in CCBill argued that there were a number 
of red flags that made it apparent infringing activity was afoot, noting that the defendant 
hosted sites with names such as “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” as well as 
password hacking websites, which obviously infringe. See id. We disagreed that these were 
sufficient red flags because “[w]e do not place the burden of determining whether 
[materials] are actually illegal on a service provider,” and “[w]e impose no such 
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investigative duties on service providers.” For the same reasons, we hold that Veoh’s 
general knowledge that it hosted copyrightable material and that its services could be used 
for infringement is insufficient to constitute a red flag. 
 
2. 
 
We are not persuaded that UMG’s other purported evidence of Veoh’s actual or apparent 
knowledge of infringement warrants trial. First, UMG points to the tagging of videos on 
Veoh’s service as “music videos.” Relying on the theory rejected above, UMG contends that 
this demonstrates Veoh’s knowledge that it hosted a category of infringing content. 
Relatedly, UMG argues that Veoh’s purchase of certain search terms through the Google 
AdWords program demonstrates knowledge of infringing activity because some of the terms 
purchased, such as “50 Cent,” “Avril Lavigne” and “Britney Spears,” are the names of UMG 
artists. However, artists are not always in exclusive relationships with recording 
companies, so just because UMG owns the copyrights for some Britney Spears songs does 
not mean it owns the copyright for all Britney Spears songs. Indeed, 50 Cent, Avril Lavigne 
and Britney Spears are also affiliated with Sony–BMG, which gave Veoh permission to 
stream its videos by these artists. Furthermore, even if Veoh had not had such permission, 
we recognize that companies sometimes purchase search terms they believe will lead 
potential customers to their websites even if the terms do not describe goods or services the 
company actually provides. For example, a sunglass company might buy the search terms 
“sunscreen” or “vacation” because it believed that people interested in such searches would 
often also be interested in sunglasses. Accordingly, Veoh’s search term purchases do little to 
demonstrate that it knew it hosted infringing material. 
 
UMG also argues that Veoh’s removal of unauthorized content identified in RIAA notices 
demonstrates knowledge, even if Veoh complied with § 512(c)’s notice and takedown 
procedures. According to UMG, Veoh should have taken the initiative to use search and 
indexing tools to locate and remove from its website any other content by the artists 
identified in the notices. Relatedly, UMG argues that some of the videos on Veoh that had 
been pulled from MTV or other broadcast television stations bore information about the 
artist, song title and record label. UMG contends that Veoh should have used this 
information to find and remove unauthorized videos. As we have explained, however, to so 
require would conflict with § 512(m), § 512(c)(1)(C) and CCBill’s refusal to “impose ... 
investigative duties on service providers.” It could also result in removal of noninfringing 
content. 
 
UMG also points to news articles discussing the availability of copyrighted materials on 
Veoh. One article reported that “several major media companies ... say that Veoh.com has 
been among the least aggressive video sharing sites in fighting copyrighted content,” and 
has thus “become a haven for pirated content.” Another article reported that, 
 
Veoh Networks CEO Dmitry Shapiro acknowledges that only a week after 
the company’s official debut, Veoh.com is host to a wide range of 
unauthorized and full-length copies of popular programs. But Shapiro says 
it’s not his upstart company’s fault: ... “We have a policy that specifically 
states that when we see copyright material posted, we take it down,” Shapiro 
said. “This problem is the democratization of publishing. Anyone can now 
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post a video to the Internet. Sometimes the material belongs to someone else. 
We take this very seriously.” 
 
UMG elicited deposition testimony from Shapiro that he had heard of these articles, and 
was aware that, “from time to time,” “material belonging to someone else end[ed] up on” 
Veoh. UMG argues that this evidence of knowledge that, as a general matter, unauthorized 
materials had been previously posted on Veoh is sufficient to meet the § 512(c)(1)(A) 
requirements. 
 
At base, this argument relies on UMG’s primary theory, which we rejected above. Here, as 
well, more specific information than UMG has adduced is required. The DMCA’s detailed 
notice and takedown procedure assumes that, “from time to time,” “material belonging to 
someone else ends up” on service providers’ websites, and establishes a process for ensuring 
the prompt removal of such unauthorized material. If Veoh’s CEO’s acknowledgment of this 
general problem and awareness of news reports discussing it was enough to remove a 
service provider from DMCA safe harbor eligibility, the notice and takedown procedures 
would make little sense and the safe harbors would be effectively nullified. We cannot 
conclude that Congress intended such a result, and we therefore hold that this evidence is 
insufficient to warrant a trial. 
 
UMG comes closer to meeting the § 512(c)(1)(A) requirements with its evidence of emails 
sent to Veoh executives and investors by copyright holders and users identifying infringing 
content. One email, sent by the CEO of Disney, a major copyright holder, to Michael Eisner, 
a Veoh investor, stated that the movie Cinderella III and various episodes from the 
television show Lost were available on Veoh without Disney’s authorization. If this 
notification had come from a third party, such as a Veoh user, rather than from a copyright 
holder, it might meet the red flag test because it specified particular infringing material.13 
As a copyright holder, however, Disney is subject to the notification requirements in § 
512(c)(3), which this informal email failed to meet. Accordingly, this deficient notice “shall 
not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has 
actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.” Further, even if this email could have created actual knowledge or qualified as a 
red flag, Eisner’s email in response assured Disney that he would instruct Veoh to “take it 
down,” and Eisner copied Veoh’s founder to ensure this happened “right away.” UMG 
nowhere alleges that the offending material was not immediately removed, and accordingly 
Veoh would be saved by § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), which preserves the safe harbor for service 
providers with such knowledge so long as they “act[ ] expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material.” 
 
UMG also points to an email from a Veoh user whose video was rejected for containing 
infringing content. Upset that Veoh would not post his unauthorized material, he stated 
that he had seen “plenty of [other] copyright infringement material” on the site, and 
identified another user who he said posted infringing content. It is possible that this email 
would be sufficient to constitute a red flag under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), even though it would not 
qualify as sufficient notice from a copyright holder under § 512(c)(3). But even assuming 
                                                 
13 Of course, even then it would not be obvious how Veoh’s awareness of apparent infringement of Disney’s 
copyrights over movies and television shows would advance UMG’s claims that Veoh hosted unauthorized UMG 
music videos. 
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that is so, UMG has not specifically alleged that Veoh failed to expeditiously remove the 
infringing content identified by the user’s email, or that the content at issue was owned by 
UMG. Accordingly, this too fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Veoh’s 
knowledge of infringement.14 
 
A service provider is eligible for the § 512(c) safe harbor only if it “does not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the 
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.” UMG appeals the district 
court’s determination that Veoh did not have the necessary right and ability to control 
infringing activity and thus remained eligible for safe harbor protection. We conclude the 
district court was correct, and therefore affirm…. 
 
Whether Veoh had the requisite “ability to control” the infringing activity at issue depends 
on what the statute means by that phrase, which the statute does not define. Looking first 
to the dictionary, “ability” is defined as “the quality or state of being able: physical, mental, 
or legal power to perform: competence in doing”; and “able” is in turn defined as “possessed 
of needed powers (as intelligence or strength) or of needed resources (as means or influence) 
to accomplish an objective ...: constituted or situated so as to be susceptible or readily 
subjected to some action or treatment.” “Control” is defined as having the “power or 
authority to guide or manage: directing or restraining domination.” Where, as here, it is a 
practical impossibility for Veoh to ensure that no infringing material is ever uploaded to its 
site, or to remove unauthorized material that has not yet been identified to Veoh as 
infringing, we do not believe that Veoh can properly be said to possess the “needed powers 
... or needed resources” to be “competen[t] in” exercising the sort of “restraining domination” 
that § 512(c)(1)(B) requires for denying safe harbor eligibility. 
 
As discussed, in the knowledge context it is not enough for a service provider to know as a 
general matter that users are capable of posting unauthorized content; more specific 
knowledge is required. Similarly, a service provider may, as a general matter, have the 
legal right and necessary technology to remove infringing content, but until it becomes 
aware of specific unauthorized material, it cannot exercise its “power or authority” over the 
specific infringing item. In practical terms, it does not have the kind of ability to control 
infringing activity the statute contemplates. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 
F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ( “[T]he provider must know of the particular case 
before he can control it.” (emphasis added)); cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google’s supervisory power is limited because Google’s 
software lacks the ability to analyze every image on the [I]nternet, compare each image to 
all the other copyrighted images that exist in the world ... and determine whether a certain 
image on the web infringes someone’s copyright.” (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Our reading of § 512(c)(1)(B) is informed and reinforced by our concern that the statute 
would be internally inconsistent were we to interpret the “right and ability to control” 
                                                 
14 We do not credit UMG’s contention that the district court conflated the actual knowledge and red flag 
awareness tests. A user email informing Veoh of infringing material and specifying its location provides a good 
example of the distinction. Although the user’s allegations would not give Veoh actual knowledge under § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i), because Veoh would have no assurance that a third party who does not hold the copyright in 
question could know whether the material was infringing, the email could act as a red flag under § 
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) provided its information was sufficiently specific. 
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language as UMG urges. First, § 512(m) cuts against holding that Veoh’s general 
knowledge that infringing material could be uploaded to its site triggered an obligation to 
“police” its services to the “fullest extent” possible. As we have explained, § 512(m) provides 
that § 512(c)’s safe harbor protection may not be conditioned on “a service provider 
monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.” UMG’s 
reading of the “right and ability to control” language would similarly run afoul of CCBill, 
which likewise clarified that § 512(c) “impose[s] no such investigative duties on service 
providers,” and “place[s] the burden of policing copyright infringement ... squarely on the 
owners of the copyright.” We are not persuaded by UMG’s suggestion that Congress meant 
this limitation on the duty to monitor to apply only to service providers who do not receive a 
direct financial benefit under subsection (B). Rather, we conclude that a service provider 
must be aware of specific infringing material to have the ability to control that infringing 
activity within the meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B). Only then would its failure to exercise its 
ability to control deny it a safe harbor. 
 
Second, § 512(c) actually presumes that service providers have the sort of control that UMG 
argues satisfies the § 512(c)(1)(B) “right and ability to control” requirement: they must 
“remove[ ] or disable access to” infringing material when they become aware of it. Quoting 
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024, UMG argues that service providers have “the right and ability to 
control” infringing activity, § 512(c)(1)(B), as long as they have “the ability to locate 
infringing material” and “terminate users’ access.” Under that reading, service providers 
would have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity regardless of their becoming 
“aware of” the material. Under that interpretation, the prerequisite to § 512(c) protection 
under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (C), would at the same time be a disqualifier under § 
512(c)(1)(B). We agree with Judge Matz that “Congress could not have intended for courts 
to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA 
because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the DMCA.”  
 
Accordingly, we hold that the “right and ability to control” under § 512(c) requires control 
over specific infringing activity the provider knows about. A service provider’s general right 
and ability to remove materials from its services is, alone, insufficient. Of course, a service 
provider cannot willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid obtaining such specific 
knowledge. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to UMG, as we must here, we 
agree with the district court there is no evidence that Veoh acted in such a manner. Rather, 
the evidence demonstrates that Veoh promptly removed infringing material when it became 
aware of specific instances of infringement. Although the parties agree, in retrospect, that 
at times there was infringing material available on Veoh’s services, the DMCA recognizes 
that service providers who are not able to locate and remove infringing materials they do 
not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor protection. 
 
UMG seeks to avoid our reading of the statute’s plain language and structure by arguing 
that we should instead interpret § 512(c) as we read similar language in the common law 
vicarious liability context in Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024. We are unpersuaded for several 
reasons, and conclude instead, as previously discussed, that whereas the vicarious liability 
standard applied in Napster can be met by merely having the general ability to locate 
infringing material and terminate users’ access, § 512(c) requires “something more.” 
 
First, § 512(c) nowhere mentions the term “vicarious liability.” Although it uses a set of 
words that has sometimes been used to describe common law vicarious liability, the 
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language used in the common law standard is loose and has varied. For example, Metro–
Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n. 9 (2005), refers to 
“supervis[ing] the direct infringer” rather than “control[ing] such [infringing] activity,” § 
512(c)(1)(B), and “supervise” and “control” are different in potentially significant ways. 
“Control,” which we have noted means having the “power or authority to guide or manage: 
directing or restraining domination,” involves more command than “supervise,” which 
means “to look over, inspect, oversee.” 
 
Second, Napster was decided after the DMCA was enacted, so Congress could not have 
intended to codify Napster’s precise application upon which UMG relies. Third, although 
not definitive, the legislative history informs our conclusion that Congress did not intend to 
exclude from § 512(c)’s safe harbor all service providers who would be vicariously liable for 
their users’ infringing activity under the common law. The legislative history did, at one 
point, suggest an intention to codify the “right and ability to control” element of vicarious 
infringement, and § 512(c)(1)(B) was not modified following that report. That report, 
however, referred to a version of the bill different from the one ultimately passed, and the 
discussion of vicarious liability is omitted from all later reports and, notably, from the 
statutory language. 
 
Subsequent legislative statements help clarify Congress’ intent. First, Congress explicitly 
stated in three different reports that the DMCA was intended to “protect qualifying service 
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory 
infringement.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105–796, at 64, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649 (emphasis 
added); S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 18, 36; H.R. Rep. No. 105–551, pt. 2, at 50. Under UMG’s 
interpretation, however, every service provider subject to vicarious liability would be 
automatically excluded from safe harbor protection. Second, Congress made clear that it 
intended to provide safe harbor protection not by altering the common law vicarious 
liability standards, but rather by carving out permanent safe harbors to that liability for 
Internet service providers even while the common law standards continue to evolve. See 
S.Rep. No. 105–190, at 17 (“There have been several cases relevant to service provider 
liability for copyright infringement. Most have approached the issue from the standpoint of 
contributory and vicarious liability. Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification 
of these doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, 
instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service 
providers. A service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit of 
limited liability.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
Given Congress’ explicit intention to protect qualifying service providers who would 
otherwise be subject to vicarious liability, it would be puzzling for Congress to make § 
512(c) entirely coextensive with the vicarious liability requirements, which would 
effectively exclude all vicarious liability claims from the § 512(c) safe harbor. In addition, it 
is difficult to envision, from a policy perspective, why Congress would have chosen to 
exclude vicarious infringement from the safe harbors, but retain protection for contributory 
infringement. It is not apparent why the former might be seen as somehow worse than the 
latter. 
 
Furthermore, if Congress had intended that the § 512(c)(1)(B) “right and ability to control” 
requirement be coextensive with vicarious liability law, the statute could have 
accomplished that result in a more direct manner. 
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It is conceivable that Congress [would have] intended that [service providers] 
which receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity would not, under any circumstances, be able to qualify for the 
subsection (c) safe harbor. But if that was indeed their intention, it would 
have been far simpler and much more straightforward to simply say as much. 
The Court does not accept that Congress would express its desire to do so by 
creating a confusing, self-contradictory catch–22 situation that pits 
512(c)(1)(B) and 512(c)(1)(C) directly at odds with one another, particularly 
when there is a much simpler explanation: the DMCA requires more than the 
mere ability to delete and block access to infringing material after that 
material has been posted in order for the [service provider] to be said to have 
“the right and ability to control such activity.” 
 
Indeed, in the anti-circumvention provision in Title I of the DMCA, which was enacted at 
the same time as the § 512 safe harbors, Congress explicitly stated, “Nothing in this section 
shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in 
connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.” “If 
Congress had intended to exclude vicarious liability from the DMCA [Title II] safe harbors, 
it would have done so expressly as it did in Title I of the DMCA.” 
 
In light of the DMCA’s language, structure, purpose and legislative history, we are 
compelled to reject UMG’s argument that the district court should have employed Napster’s 
vicarious liability standard to evaluate whether Veoh had sufficient “right and ability to 
control” infringing activity under § 512(c). Although in some cases service providers subject 
to vicarious liability will be excluded from the § 512(c) safe harbor, in others they will not. 
Because we conclude that Veoh met all the § 512(c) requirements, we affirm the entry of 
summary judgment in its favor. 
 
III. 
 
UMG also appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its complaint against the 
Investor Defendants for vicarious infringement, contributory infringement and inducement 
of infringement. It is well-established that “[s]econdary liability for copyright infringement 
does not exist in the absence of direct infringement....” UMG argues, however, that even if 
summary judgment was properly granted to Veoh on the basis of the DMCA safe harbor, as 
we have held it was, “the [Investor] Defendants remain potentially liable for their related 
indirect infringement” because the district court did not “make a finding regarding Veoh’s 
direct infringement,” and the Investor Defendants do not qualify as “service providers” who 
can receive DMCA safe harbor protection. The Investor Defendants argue that it would be 
illogical to impose greater liability on them than on Veoh itself. Although we agree that this 
would create an anomalous result, we assume without deciding that the suit against the 
Investor Defendants can properly proceed even though Veoh is protected from monetary 
liability by the DMCA.18 Reaching the merits of UMG’s secondary liability arguments, we 
hold that the district court properly dismissed the complaint. 
                                                 
18 …We remain concerned about the possibility of imposing secondary liability on tangentially involved parties, 
like Visa and the Investor Defendants, while those accused of direct infringement receive safe harbor protection. 
“[B]y limiting the liability of service providers,” the DMCA sought to assuage any “hesitat[ion] to make the 
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UMG first alleges that the Investor Defendants are liable for contributory infringement. 
“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ 
infringer.” In Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264, we established the “site and facilities” test: 
“providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish 
contributory liability” where the defendant “actively strives to provide the environment and 
the market for counterfeit ... sales to thrive.” The district court concluded this test was not 
met, dismissing the complaint because UMG did “not allege sufficiently that [the Investor 
Defendants] gave material assistance in helping Veoh or its users accomplish 
infringement.” We agree. 
 
UMG acknowledges that funding alone cannot satisfy the material assistance requirement. 
It thus argues that the Investor Defendants “provided Veoh’s necessary funding and 
directed its spending” on “basic operations including ... hardware, software, and 
employees”—”elements” UMG argues “form ‘the site and facilities’ for Veoh’s direct 
infringement.” UMG thus attempts to liken its case to UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Bertelsmann AG et al., 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004), where the district court denied an 
investor’s motion to dismiss claims of contributory infringement. In Bertelsmann, however, 
the investor was Napster’s “only available source of funding,” and thus “held significant 
power and control over Napster’s operations.” Here, by contrast, there were multiple 
investors, and none of the Investor Defendants could individually control Veoh. 
Accordingly, UMG hinges its novel theory of secondary liability on the contention that the 
three Investor Defendants together took control of Veoh’s operations by “obtain[ing] three of 
the five seats on Veoh’s Board of Directors,” and effectively provided the “site and facilities” 
for direct infringement by wielding their majority power to direct spending. 
 
Even assuming that such joint control, not typically an element of contributory 
infringement, could satisfy Fonovisa’s site and facilities requirement, UMG’s argument fails 
on its own terms, because the complaint nowhere alleged that the Investor Defendants 
agreed to work in concert to this end. UMG suggests that it “did allege that the [Investor] 
Defendants agreed to ‘operate’ Veoh jointly—UMG alleged that the [Investor] Defendants 
operated Veoh by ‘s[eeking] and obtain[ing] seats on Veoh’s Board of Directors as a 
condition of their investments.’ “ But three investors individually acquiring one seat apiece 
is not the same as agreeing to operate as a unified entity to obtain and leverage majority 
control. Unless the three independent investors were on some level working in concert, then 
none of them actually had sufficient control over the Board to direct Veoh in the way UMG 
contends. This missing allegation is critical because finding secondary liability without it 
would allow plaintiffs to sue any collection of directors making up 51 percent of the board 
on the theory that they constitute a majority, and therefore together they control the 
company. Without this lynchpin allegation, UMG’s claim that the Investor Defendants had 
sufficient control over Veoh to direct its spending and operations in a manner that might 
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet.” S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 7. 
Congress was no doubt well aware that service providers can make the desired investment only if they receive 
funding from investors like the Investor Defendants. Although we do not decide the matter today, were we to 
hold that Veoh was protected, but its investors were not, investors might hesitate to provide the necessary 
funding to companies like Veoh, and Congress’ purpose in passing the DMCA would be undermined. 
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theoretically satisfy the “site and facilities” test falls apart. We therefore affirm the 
dismissal of UMG’s contributory infringement claim. 
 
This missing allegation likewise requires us to affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
UMG’s vicarious liability and inducement of infringement claims. Inducement liability is 
proper where “one [ ] distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. Vicarious liability is warranted if “the 
defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the 
direct infringer.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n. 9. UMG’s arguments that the Investor 
Defendants “distribute[d]” Veoh’s services and had the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing users are premised on the unalleged contention that the Investor Defendants 
agreed to act in concert, and thus together they held a majority of seats on the Board and 
“maintained operational control over the company.” We therefore affirm the dismissal of the 
complaint against the Investor Defendants…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Viacom v. YouTube.  After this ruling, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Viacom v. 
YouTube, dealing with similar facts.  Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d 
Cir. 2012).  The opinion is mostly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s UMG opinion, but it 
expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the safe harbor’s meaning of “right 
and ability to control”—saying the concept “involve[s] a service provider exerting 
substantial influence on the activities of users, without necessarily—or even frequently—
acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.”  This standard is vague and opaque, 
leaving lots of room for future arguments.  The Second Circuit also more expressly 
acknowledged that a service provider’s willful blindness could defeat the safe harbor; but as 
with the “right and ability to control” phrase, the opinion didn’t define what behavior 
constitutes willful blindness. 
 
In light of the Viacom v. YouTube ruling, the Ninth Circuit asked the litigants in UMG v. 
Shelter Capital to submit briefs on whether it should modify the opinion you just read.  As 
of August 2, 2012, the Ninth Circuit had not amended its opinion, but that remains a 
possibility as of press time. 
 
The Viacom v. YouTube litigation is especially puzzling because the litigants have so much 
incentive to work together rather than fight each other.  Indeed, Viacom has acknowledged 
that it has no objections to YouTube’s practices since May 2008, when YouTube deployed 
more aggressive technology filters.  Indeed, Viacom currently heavily uses YouTube to 
promote its offerings.  So what’s the problem that needs to be resolved in court? 
 
Takedown Notices.  Why didn’t UMG just send Veoh proper takedown notices instead of 
suing it in court?  If UMG had sent proper takedown notices, what do you think Veoh would 
have done with them? 
 
Red Flags of Infringement.  What, exactly, constitutes a “red flag” of infringement?  If a 
website provides a tool letting users report problems with content, and one user flags 
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another user’s content item as infringing, does the website have a “red flag” of 
infringement—and if so, of what? 
 
The Challenges of Determining Infringement.  Viacom’s marketing team and affiliates 
uploaded videos to YouTube for their marketing benefit.  In some cases, Viacom 
deliberately altered clips to look like an unauthorized upload to make it look more 
interesting to viewers.   The Viacom legal team would complain about clips posted by 
Viacom’s marketing team because they wouldn’t realize the uploads were authorized.  If 
Viacom’s legal team doesn’t know that some clips were authorized by its own marketing 
department, how is YouTube supposed to know?   
 
Also, Viacom routinely acquiesced to leaving up user-posted video clips, but it constantly 
changed its acquiescence policy—and never disclosed the policy to YouTube.  If Viacom is 
constantly changing its mind about which user postings it objects to, how is YouTube 
supposed to know? 
 
Also, Viacom TWICE withdrew clips from its complaint which it subsequently determined 
weren’t infringing.  If Viacom’s litigators can’t figure out which clips are infringing well 
enough to file an accurate complaint—when they have full access to Viacom’s information 
and its lawyers are under Rule 11’s investigatory duty—how is YouTube supposed to figure 
it out? 
 
Willful Blindness.  The UMG court hints that a service provider’s willful blindness would 
disqualify it from the statute.  What types of actions on a service provider’s part might 
satisfy the Ninth Circuit that the service provider engaged in willful blindness?  Note the 
statute and caselaw already cover other scienter standards, including “actual knowledge,” 
“red flags” and “inducement.”  What’s left for “willful blindness” to address? 
 
Copyright Owner Over-Claiming.  Does it strike you as odd that UMG took the position that 
Veoh couldn’t advertise the availability of material from 50 Cent, Avril Lavigne and Britney 
Spears, even though UMG did not completely control those artists’ catalogs? 
 
Wordsmithing.  Does it strike you as odd that the court effectively concludes that the 
phrase “right and ability to control” means something different depending on whether it’s 
being used in the common law test for vicarious copyright infringement or in the safe 
harbor statute? 
 
Investor Liability.  Why weren’t the investors automatically protected by the corporate veil?  
If you were a potential investor in a new user-generated content website, would this ruling 
deter you from making the investment?  See Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: 
The Untold Story, 2012 WISC. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2099876. 
  
Discovery Implications.  Imagine that you are a copyright owner’s counsel.  In light of this 
opinion, what kinds of onerous discovery requests might you legitimately make of a service 
provider defendant?  What kinds of onerous discovery requests might you legitimately 
make of the service provider’s investors? 
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Denouement.  In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit declares that Veoh properly complied with 
the legal expectations of Congress.  This is great news for Veoh, right?  Yes, except that 
Voeh’s litigation costs for this and other cases (such as Io v. Veoh) drained its bank account, 
forcing Veoh to shut down—meaning its investors lost their investment, its employees lost 
their jobs, and users who uploaded videos to Veoh had those videos taken offline.  So the 
case produces an anomaly: the courts gave Veoh a clean bill of health, but getting that clean 
bill of health killed Veoh.   
 
Indeed, Google has disclosed that it spent $100 million on litigation costs in Viacom v. 
YouTube up to the point it filed its summary judgment motions.  Obviously, it has spent 
more—much more—on legal fees since making those filings.  Google can afford to spend 
over $100M defending YouTube, but smaller market players—like Veoh—can’t.   
 
What implications might these facts (i.e., Veoh is legal but dead) have for the proper design 
of immunities and safe harbors?  Compare the litigation costs associated with the 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 immunity discussed later in the casebook. 
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Celebrating (?) the Six-Month Anniversary of SOPA’s Demise 
By Eric Goldman 
Posted July 18, 2012 to http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/07/18/celebrating-
the-six-month-anniversary-of-sopas-demise/.  
 
Six months ago today–January 18, 2012–was a major day in the Internet’s history.  Some of 
the most heavily trafficked websites went dark or rallied their users against proposed 
legislation called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its sister bill the Protect IP Act 
(PIPA).  The resulting outcry effectively killed the legislation that day.  But with 6 months 
of perspective, plus plenty of new developments, it’s clear there may not be much to 
celebrate about the developments of January 18. 
 
What Happened on January 18 
 
January 18 witnessed some unprecedented political developments.  In response to massive 
voter feedback to Congress, a remarkable 19 United States Senators (nearly 20% of all 
senators) either changed their position on PIPA (from supporting to opposing) or newly 
announced a position on PIPA by coming out opposed to it.  I’m not aware of any other 
single day in American history when so many senators publicly changed their opinion on a 
pending bill in response to voter advocacy. 
 
Even more remarkably, this meant consumers had squarely defeated a determined 
copyright owner lobby led by the MPAA, although they were hardly alone.  (Trademark 
owners also supported the proposals, but they were less visible in the process).  For 
decades, individual consumers have had virtually no voice in American copyright policy.  
Generally the process has been: 
 
1) Copyright owners give lots of money to members of Congress. 
 
2) Copyright owners then redeem this patronage by getting broad Congressional support for 
their legislative wish-lists. 
 
3) The technology community, and other repeat-player groups that depend on third party 
copyrighted materials (like libraries), fight vigorously to make minor changes to the 
copyright owners’ wish-list. 
 
4) Congress passes the lightly modified proposal and then, feel self-satisfied, pats itself on 
the back for having engaged all of the relevant constituencies in a vigorous multi-
stakeholder legislative process. 
 
This cycle has played itself out a few dozen times over the decades, and SOPA/PIPA were 
well on their way to following this pattern–until January 18. 
 
And then, an upset outcome.  David defeated Goliath.  The amateur boxer knocked out the 
undefeated heavyweight boxing champion.  Copyright owners had never outright lost a 
legislative battle they choose to fight.  Yet, on January 18, they did.  And they lost that 
battle to consumers–the constituency who isn’t even at the bargaining table.  In the words 
of Vizzini from the Princess Bride: “Inconceivable!” 
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How January 18 Was a Turning Point 
 
The defeat of SOPA/PIPA immediately shook the corridors of power and continues to ripple 
through policy circles.  Two examples: 
 
ACTA’s Demise.  The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a trade agreement 
putatively designed to encourage trans-border cooperation to fight counterfeiting.  
Unfortunately, ACTA did more than that, potentially upsetting existing delicate balances 
between IP owners and consumers.  Worse, ACTA was negotiated virtually entirely out of 
the public eye.  While industry insiders (such as the copyright lobby) had prominent seats 
at the table, consumers got very limited disclosures of the drafts and no meaningful 
opportunity to comment on the proposals.  Thus, for consumers, ACTA had potentially 
unacceptable substantive terms and was developed via an unquestionably unacceptable 
process. 
 
President Obama signed the agreement without getting Congressional approval, despite 
significant protests.  Other countries started signing ACTA.  ACTA looked like a fait 
accompli. 
 
Then, partially inspired by the SOPA/PIPA protests in the United States, European 
consumers started protesting ACTA.  Their voices were heard.  The European Parliament 
overwhelmingly rejected ACTA, which most likely takes all of Europe out of ACTA–which, 
in turn, largely moots ACTA.  There are still wranglings and shenanigans involving ACTA, 
so it’s too early to declare it dead.  Still, the most likely outcome is that European 
consumers’ protests scuttled an otherwise unstoppable international trade agreement on IP 
issues–just like US consumers derailed SOPA/PIPA.  Could SOPA have been the first spark 
to ignite effective consumer input into future IP policy-making worldwide? 
 
No Legislator Wants to Be “SOPAed.”  Back in the United States, politicians are walking on 
eggshells.  Multiple Washington DC insiders have told me that no legislator wants to be 
“SOPAed,” presumably a verb for having massive consumer protests melting the legislator’s 
phones.  To avoid the risk of being SOPAed, I’m hearing that some legislators are changing 
their proposals–presumably to tone them down–before they even are introduced.  So even 
without lifting another finger, consumers may be beneficially influencing the legislative 
process. 
 
How January 18 Didn’t Make a Difference at All 
 
For all of that good news, I believe the better analysis is that the events of January 18 
made no real difference.  Some examples supporting my conclusion: 
 
SOPA’s Death = Status Quo.  I can imagine some backroom Hollywood strategist shaking 
his head, thinking to himself, “Those [insert pejorative expletive] shut down the Internet 
and melted the phone lines in Washington DC, and what did they get?  NOTHING.”  For all 
of the work that went into the anti-SOPA/PIPA campaign, the reality is that its demise just 
preserved the status quo.  As the maxim goes, it’s a lot easier to kill legislation than to get 
it passed.  And it’s hardly easy to kill proposed copyright legislation; it took a favorable 
confluence of multiple things going right just to kill SOPA/PIPA.  But in the end, all of that 
enormous effort didn’t change anything. 
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Congress Is Making the Same Systematic Mistakes.  Procedurally, the advocates of 
SOPA/PIPA made several mistakes.  First, the substantive proposals massively 
overreached.  Legislators’ fear of being SOPAed reduces the chance that error will recur, at 
least in the short run. 
 
Second, SOPA/PIPA would have created some serious technical problems that the 
legislators simply did not understand.  In response to this glaring lack of knowledge, Rep. 
Chaffetz suggested that Congress should “bring in the nerds” to advise Congress on the 
technical implications of its proposals.  Despite that suggestion, Congress continues to 
regulate the Internet without adequate guidance from “the nerds.”  For example, despite 
protests from many expert technologists, the House passed a cyber-security bill (CISPA). 
 
Third, SOPA/PIPA were drafted largely in secret by a few legislators and a coterie of 
industry lobbyists who have bought access to the legislative process; once this cabal was 
satisfied, the bills were introduced and then fast-tracked for passage.  Yet, amazingly, Rep. 
Lamar Smith–a key figure in the SOPA battles–announced he was introducing a bill (the IP 
Attaché Act) resurrecting a small part of SOPA after preparing the bill behind closed doors, 
and then intended to fast-track the bill.  (The amount of overlap between SOPA and the IP 
Attaché Act is complicated; this BNA report tries to unpack the issue).  As Techdirt’s Mike 
Masnick asked rhetorically, “Dear Lamar Smith & House Judiciary: Have You Learned 
Nothing from SOPA?”  So for all of the whispertalk that legislators are running scared of 
being SOPAed, at least some legislators still think it’s OK to procedurally navigate 
controversial bills in a way that (deliberately?) suppresses the public’s ability to participate 
in the process. 
 
Plaintiffs Are Getting SOPA’s Remedies (or Better) in Court. As I indicated, SOPA/PIPA’s 
demise preserved the status quo–but the status quo isn’t so great for consumers.  Without 
any new legislation, IP owners are already getting extraordinary remedies in court that 
compare favorably to the remedies contemplated by SOPA/PIPA.  My co-blogger Venkat 
Balasubramani and I have cataloged some of these cases.  Typically these cases involve 
foreign defendants who don’t show up, meaning that the court only hears one side of the 
story (the plaintiff’s) and basically gives the plaintiffs whatever they ask for.  In many 
cases, this includes court orders that purport to bind third party service providers (who also 
aren’t in court to defend their interests), even though Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
65 doesn’t allow judges to tell non-litigants what to do. 
 
In my “favorite” example, involving a Chinese website allegedly selling counterfeit 
cigarettes, the court ordered Western Union (who wasn’t in court and wasn’t a defendant) 
to interdict all money buyers were sending to the website and put it into a special account 
for an unspecified period of time.  In other words, buyers–who may not have realized they 
were buying counterfeit goods–weren’t getting  their ordered cigarettes but also weren’t 
getting their money back.  Compare an alternative approach, where the court could have 
told Western Union to reject the payments and simply return the money to the buyers.  
Without buyers or Western Union appearing in court to defend their interests, the court 
overly catered to the plaintiffs’ interests.  So much for due process. 
 
Until judges start pushing back on plaintiff demands in these cases where defendants no-
show, and until judges become more circumspect about their ability to reach non-litigants 
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under Rule 65, who needs SOPA/PIPA?  IP owners can synthetically achieve the same or 
better results without a new statute. 
 
The Obama Administration is Implementing SOPA Even Though Congress Didn’t Approve 
It. Even though Congress did not approve SOPA/PIPA, the Obama administration 
repeatedly has been tone-deaf to consumer concerns about SOPA and its underlying 
policies.  Three examples of the Obama administration’s efforts to create SOPA-like 
outcomes through its executive branch powers: 
 
* Megaupload prosecution.  On January 19, the day after SOPA/PIPA melted down and the 
copyright lobby was publicly grumbling that their years of campaign contributions weren’t 
buying the patronage they expected, the Obama administration’s Department of Justice 
loudly announced the criminal prosecution of a foreign cyberlocker–one of the types of 
websites that SOPA/PIPA nominally targeted.  In effect, copyright owners convinced the US 
government (at taxpayer expense!) to enforce SOPA-like remedies even without SOPA on 
the books.  Worse, as we’ve seen in the past 6 months, the Megaupload prosecution is 
deeply troubled, and the DOJ has not looked good at any step in the prosecution.  
Personally, I believe that the prosecution was lawless from inception, a point I explained 
more fully on my blog. 
 
* Domain name seizures.  For a couple of years, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division has been seizing (without any 
judicial oversight) hundreds and hundreds of domain names it thinks are used for 
infringing conduct.  The bad news: ICE’s legal authority for such domain name grabs is 
dubious at best.  (PIPA and SOPA would have codified the government authority for these 
ex parte domain name seizures).  Worse news: ICE has been acting on unverified claims 
from self-interested copyright owners.  We learned, for example, that ICE seized Dajaz1′s 
domain name based on an unverified report from the RIAA; and when ICE asked for 
supporting verification (after it had already seized the domain name), the RIAA didn’t 
produce anything for an entire year–at which point ICE simply gave Dajaz1 its domain 
name back, without an apology or an explanation.  The worst news: ICE’s Dajaz1-related 
court proceedings were conducted in secret, meaning Dajaz1 could not see the court file or 
respond to it because, as near as we can, the file sat in a clerk’s desk drawer rather than in 
the normal place where files are stored.  Secret judicial proceedings where the defendant 
has no ability to see the charges or respond to them?  That sounds more like a Kafka book 
than the country I know and love. 
 
* “Voluntary” industry initiatives.  Obama’s “IP Czar,” Victoria Espinel, has been actively 
negotiating “voluntary” industry agreements that replicate some of SOPA’s key features. 
 
First, Espinel helped broker a “voluntary” agreement where Internet access providers 
agreed to implement a “graduated response” program.  Effectively, the access providers will 
build a system to process copyright owners’ claims (which usually will be automatically 
generated) of copyright infringement via peer-to-peer file sharing.  Each notice against a 
user will count as a “strike.”  When users get too many strikes, the Internet access provider 
will progressively subject the user to more stringent discipline, including potentially 
terminating the user’s Internet access account completely.  Users can protest the strikes, 
but only via a kangaroo court which is not designed to let users win.  Corynne McSherry 
and I previously explained the anti-consumer aspects of the graduated response deal. 
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The fact that Internet access providers agreed to this deal is fascinating.  They were 
already legally immunized from copyright infringement liability for users’ conduct in 17 
U.S.C. Sec. 512(a); they agreed to implement a technical system at a not-inconsiderable 
expense to them; and the ultimate remedy of firing their customers will cost them money 
too.  One has to wonder just how hard the Obama administration leaned on Internet access 
providers to do something so clearly contrary to their interests; and one further has to 
wonder why the Obama administration would favor something designed to stack the deck 
against consumers.  Perhaps not including adequate consumer representation at the table 
had something to do with that. 
 
Second, Espinel brokered a deal where advertiser and ad agency industry groups 
“voluntarily” encouraged their members to adopt policies against displaying ads on websites 
that facilitate infringement–another key component of SOPA.  This was a little easier sale 
than the graduated response deal.  One of the recommended policy terms is that advertisers 
shouldn’t pay publishers who run their ads alongside infringing content.  Well, naturally, 
the advertisers weren’t opposed to anything that would let them get advertising they don’t 
have to pay for. More troubling is the apparent intent to develop a blacklist of allegedly 
infringing websites that advertisers should cut off. It remains to be seen if the private 
blacklist will offer an appropriate level of public accountability, transparency and due 
process. 
 
In a related development, Espinel is also pressuring Yahoo, Google, AOL, and Microsoft to 
cut off allegedly infringing websites from their ad networks. 
 
The graduated response system hasn’t come online yet, and it remains to be seen just how 
vigorously advertisers will undertake their implied promise to police publishers who are 
engaged in infringing activity.  So it’s not clear if these government-brokered voluntary 
agreements will amount to much.  But the fact that the Obama administration is going 
around to industry groups asking them to do what SOPA would have required or coerced 
them to do is a good sign that the Obama administration plans to implement SOPA if 
Congress won’t. 
 
One more data point showing that the Obama administration hasn’t internalized the 
messages of January 18.  Its trade reps, especially US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, have 
mishandled the latest trade agreement negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), committing the same sins that poisoned ACTA.  Just like ACTA, all of the 
negotiations have taken place in backrooms, with no consumer representation but plenty of 
industry lobbyists around the table.  Furthermore, the process has been not transparent at 
all (despite Kirk’s twisted insistence otherwise, using a “day is night” definition of 
transparency).  Drafts have not been made available to the public, so outsiders can only 
speculate what’s even being discussed.   As the EFF asked, “Is the TPP–Framed as a ‘21st 
Century Agreement’–the Best Way to Build a 21st Century Society?”  More than anything, 
January 18 was about consumers rejecting backroom policy-making designed to bypass 
democratic governance.  Yet, that’s exactly what the Obama administration keeps doing, 
over and over again. 
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Conclusion 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt once said: 
 
[L]et us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power 
over us. The ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and 
Senators and Congressmen and Government officials but the voters of this 
country. 
 
For one day, on January 18, we reminded our government of this fact.  But the burden is on 
us–the voters–to make our voices heard again and again. One day isn’t enough.  If you don’t 
like what you see from the system we have, you do have the power–and, I would argue, the 
responsibility–to remind your elected officials of your displeasure.  In response to my 
unhappiness with some of my elected representatives’ stances on SOPA and copyright 
issues, I’ve changed my votes in June–and my vote for President is up-for-grabs in 
November based in part on the candidates’ stances on IP (an especially salient issue given 
how many times the Obama administration has sold out consumers on IP issues).  If you 
believe the system needs fixing, I hope you’ll send that message to the folks who are 
supposed to be working for you. 
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Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 
2007). 
Collins, District Judge. 
 
…I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In this action, Plaintiff Ticketmaster (“Plaintiff” or “Ticketmaster”) alleges that Defendant 
RMG has developed and marketed automated devices to access and navigate through 
Ticketmaster’s website, thereby infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights and violating the website’s 
Terms of Use and a number of federal and state statutes. 
 
Plaintiff Ticketmaster sells tickets for entertainment and sports events on behalf of its 
clients to the general public through a variety of means, including its copyrighted website 
ticketmaster.com (“website”). Recognizing that competition to purchase tickets can be 
intense, Plaintiff contends that it attempts to ensure a fair and equitable ticket buying 
process on the website by contract and through technological means. First, visitors to 
ticketmaster.com are required to accept contractual provisions set forth in the website’s 
“Terms of Use.” These terms permit viewers to use ticketmaster.com for personal use only, 
prohibit commercial use, prohibit the use of automatic devices, prohibit users from 
accessing ticketing pages more than once during any three second interval, and prohibit 
consumers from purchasing more than a specific number of tickets in a single transaction. 
 
Second, Plaintiff contends that it employs a number of technological means to ensure that 
ticket buying over the website is fair and equitable. One of these measures is a computer 
security program known as CAPTCHA that is designed to distinguish between human 
users and computer programs, and thereby prevent purchasers from using automated 
devices to purchase tickets.  
 
Plaintiff contends that Defendant RMG has marketed and sold applications that enable 
Defendant’s customers to use automated devices to enter and navigate through its website 
in violation of the Terms of Use governing the website, thereby causing injury to Plaintiff. 
For example, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s applications are prohibited “automatic 
devices,” that the applications circumvent Plaintiff’s access control and copy protection 
systems, including CAPTCHA, inundate Plaintiff’s computers with thousands of automatic 
requests thereby preventing ordinary consumers from accessing the website, and enable 
Defendant’s clients to purchase large quantities of tickets. Based on these allegations, 
Plaintiff’s FAC, filed on June 25, 2007, states eleven causes of action against Defendant. 
 
Plaintiff now moves for a preliminary injunction based on five of its claims. Plaintiff’s 
evidence in support of its motion includes declarations from its Senior Director of 
Applications Support, Kevin McLain, wherein Mr. McLain testifies how he was able to trace 
ticket requests and purchases made on ticketmaster.com back to individual users and, 
ultimately, to Defendant. Based on his methodology, McLain discovered, for example, that 
Chris Kovach, a ticket broker and one of Defendant’s clients, purchased over 9,500 ticket 
orders—or 24,000 tickets—over the last several years. McLain also explains that he 
identified Gary Charles Bonner and Thomas J. Prior as Defendant’s clients. Using IP 
addresses registered to Defendant, Bonner made almost 13,000 ticket purchases over 
several years, and made more than 425,000 ticket requests in a single day. Using IP 
addresses registered to Defendant, Prior made almost 22,000 ticket orders over several 
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years, and made more than 600,000 ticket requests in a single day. Plaintiff also submitted 
declarations from Kovach; Adam Lieb, a computer and internet consultant; Steven Obara, 
Plaintiff’s Director of Customer Service Operations; Mark Lee, an attorney representing 
Plaintiff in this matter; and a number of exhibits.  
 
Defendant challenges the Motion on both legal and factual grounds. Defendant states that 
the computer application Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant from using and selling is its 
Ticket Broker Acquisition Tool (“TBAT”), and that this application is not an “automated 
device” but, rather, is simply a type of internet browser, akin to Internet Explorer, 
requiring human interaction. Defendant also urges that it should not be bound by the 
Terms of Use and that, in any case, Plaintiff has presented no evidence upon which it—as 
opposed to the persons using TBAT—can be enjoined. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s 
legal theories are flawed in various ways…. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The five claims on which Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction are its claims for violation 
of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 17 U.S.C. § 1201, California Penal Code § 502, and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), and on its breach of contract claim. 
 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits. 
 
1. Plaintiff’s Copyright Claim 
To prevail on its claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiff must (1) “show ownership of the 
allegedly infringed material and (2) [it] must demonstrate that the alleged infringers 
violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” 
Ticketmaster alleges that RMG is violating its copyright in the ticketmaster.com website. 
 
Ticketmaster has submitted evidence that it owns registered copyrights in the website 
ticketmaster.com, and, separately, in portions of the website. “A website may constitute a 
work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression ... Copyright protection for a 
website may extend to both the screen displays and the computer code for the website.” 
Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s claim that its website is copyrighted. Ticketmaster 
has thus satisfied the first element of its copyright claim. 
 
Ticketmaster alleges that RMG infringes its copyrights in ticketmaster.com both directly 
and indirectly. First, Ticketmaster states that each time Defendant views a page from 
ticketmaster.com, a copy of that page is necessarily downloaded or “cached” from Plaintiff’s 
computers onto the Defendant’s computer’s random access memory (“RAM”), thus 
rendering Defendant directly liable for such copying. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant 
directly participates in its customers’ unauthorized access of the website because its 
customers do not acquire physical possession of the software. Rather, Defendant’s devices 
are kept on Defendant’s own computer systems; in order to gain access to Defendant’s 
devices, its customers must log onto Defendant’s website ticketbrokertools.com, and use the 
devices hosted on ticketbrokertools.com to improperly access ticketmaster.com. Thus, 
Defendant allows and, indeed, requires its customers to go through its own infrastructure 
in order to employ the devices that access ticketmaster.com. Defendant denies this factual 
allegation and states that “TBAT [has never been] operated from RMG’s computer system 
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on behalf of any client, as it is not, nor has it ever, been centrally run on behalf of any 
client.” 
 
Second, Plaintiff states that Defendant is indirectly liable for contributory infringement, 
vicarious infringement, and inducing copyright infringement because it provides its clients 
with bots and other automated devices to infringe Plaintiff’s copyright in its website. Both 
direct and indirect infringement occur insofar as the person viewing the website does so in 
excess of the authorization Plaintiff grants through the website’s Terms of Use. 
 
a. Defendant’s Direct Liability for Copyright Infringement 
Defendant’s direct liability for copyright infringement is based on the automatically-created 
copies of ticketmaster.com webpages that are stored on Defendant’s computer each time 
Defendant accesses ticketmaster.com. Defendant does not contest that, as a technological 
question, whenever a webpage is viewed on a computer, copies of the viewed pages are 
made and stored on the viewer’s computer. However, Defendant contends that such 
“cached” copies are not “copies” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, that such copies 
could not give rise to copyright liability because their creation constitutes fair use, and that 
Plaintiff has not shown that any pages from ticketmaster.com were ever downloaded or 
stored on Defendant’s computer. 
 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” The Copyright Act also provides that “[a] 
work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.” 
 
The copies of webpages stored automatically in a computer’s cache or random access 
memory (“RAM”) upon a viewing of the webpage fall within the Copyright Act’s definition of 
“copy.” See, e.g., MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“We recognize that these authorities are somewhat troubling since they do not 
specify that a copy is created regardless of whether the software is loaded into the RAM, 
the hard disk or the read only memory (‘ROM’). However, since we find that the copy 
created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,’ we hold 
that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.”) See 
also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
621 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (agreeing with the “numerous courts [that] have held that the 
transmission of information through a computer’s random access memory or RAM ... 
creates a ‘copy’ for purposes of the Copyright Act,” and citing cases.) Thus, copies of 
ticketmaster.com webpages automatically stored on a viewer’s computer are “copies” within 
the meaning of the Copyright Act. 
 
The Court must next determine whether Plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Defendant did in fact view the website, thereby copying its webpages. 
Although Plaintiff does not present direct evidence of such viewing, the logic from which 
such an inference may be drawn is compelling. Plaintiff presents expert testimony that 
Defendant necessarily had to view ticketmaster.com in order to create the applications that 
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enable Defendant’s customers to enter and navigate through the website. Indeed, in order 
to test the applications to determine whether they worked as intended, Defendant would 
have had to actually use the applications to purchase tickets from the website. By 
Defendant’s own description, TBAT is “a browser geared for the purchase of tickets from a 
variety of websites including ... ticketmaster.com.” It also follows that Defendant’s clients 
would have had to visit the website, and thus copy pages, in order to make ticket purchases. 
The Court thus finds that Plaintiff is indeed likely to prove that Defendant visited (and 
used) ticketmaster.com and necessarily made copies of pages from the copyrighted website. 
 
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is directly liable for infringement because its clients 
must work through Defendant’s website and computer system in order to use Defendant’s 
ticket purchasing software and thereby gain unauthorized access to ticketmaster.com. 
Defendant disputes this allegation. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to decide 
whether Plaintiff will prevail in its claim for direct infringement by showing that 
Defendant directly participates in its clients’ conduct by acting as an intermediary for their 
unauthorized use of ticketmaster.com. As discussed above, Plaintiff will likely succeed in its 
claim for direct liability by showing that Defendant itself viewed and/or used the website.4 
 
Next, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff is likely to demonstrate that such copying 
constitutes copyright infringement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant infringed its 
copyrights by accessing and using the copyrighted website in excess of the authorization 
granted in the website’s Terms of Use, which Plaintiff contends creates a non-exclusive 
license to view (and thus copy) pages from the website. Defendant presents a number of 
legal and factual arguments against this theory, but none of them is meritorious. 
 
First, the Court agrees that the Terms of Use presented on ticketmaster.com create a non-
exclusive license to copy the website. “The word ‘license,’ means permission, or authority; 
and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing.” “No 
magic words must be included in a document” to create a copyright license. Furthermore, 
nonexclusive licenses can be implied from conduct. See Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 
908 F.2d 555, 558-559 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that by creating a work at defendant’s 
request and handing it over to defendant to copy and distribute, plaintiff granted defendant 
an implied nonexclusive license to the work.) Use of a work in excess of a license gives rise 
to liability for copyright infringement.  
 
Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that access to the website is governed by specific 
Terms of Use, and that any person viewing the website is put on notice of the Terms of Use. 
For example, the ticketmaster.com homepage displays the following warning: “Use of this 
website is subject to express Terms of Use which prohibit commercial use of this site. By 
continuing past this page, you agree to abide by these terms.” The underlined phrase 
“Terms of Use” is a hyperlink to the full Terms of Use; the same phrase appears on almost 
every page of ticketmaster.com. In addition, since 2003, users of ticketmaster.com have had 
to affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use as part of the procedure to set up an account, and 
since mid-2006, users have had to affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use for every ticket 
purchase. 
                                                 
4 In addition, even accepting Defendant’s version of the facts—that its clients download TBAT onto their own 
computers and operate it independent of Defendant—its conduct would still render it liable for contributory 
infringement, discussed infra. 
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Having determined that Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendants 
viewed and navigated through ticketmaster.com, the Court further concludes that Plaintiff 
is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use 
and assented to them by actually using the website. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, 
Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where website’s terms of use stated “by 
submitting this query, you agree to abide by these terms,” court held “there can be no 
question that [the user of website] manifested its assent to be bound” by the terms of use 
when it electronically submitted queries to the database); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie 
Inc., 1998 WL 388389, *2, 6 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction based in part 
on breach of “Terms of Service” agreement, to which defendants had assented.) Indeed, 
Defendant does not contest that it was on notice of the Terms of Use; rather, Defendant 
argues that the Terms of Use do not amount to an agreement or a license, and that the 
Terms are too uncertain to be enforced. The Court finds no merit in these arguments. 
 
The Terms of Use governing ticketmaster.com include the following terms: 
 
“You [the viewer] agree that you are only authorized to visit, view and to 
retain a copy of pages of this site for your own personal use, and that you 
shall not duplicate, download, [or] modify ... the material on this Site for any 
purpose other than to review event and promotions information, for personal 
use ...” 
 
“No ... areas of this Site may be used by our visitors for any commercial 
purposes ...” 
 
“You agree that you will not use any robot, spider or other automated device, 
process, or means to access the Site.... You agree that you will not use any 
device, software or routine that interferes with the proper working of the Site 
nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.” 
 
“You agree that you will not take any action that imposes an unreasonable or 
disproportionately large load on our infrastructure.” 
 
“You agree that you will not access, reload or ‘refresh’ transactional event or 
ticketing pages, or make any other request to transactional servers, more 
than once during any three second interval.” 
 
“You do not have permission to access this Site in any way that violates ... 
these terms of use.” 
 
“You understand and agree that ... Ticketmaster may terminate your access 
to this Site, cancel your ticket order or tickets acquired through your ticket 
order ... if Ticketmaster believes that your conduct or the conduct of any 
person with whom Ticketmaster believes you act in concert ... violates or is 
inconsistent with these Terms or the law, or violates the rights of 
Ticketmaster, a client of Ticketmaster or another user of the Site.” 
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Viewers are thus authorized to view—and thereby copy—pages of the website when they do 
so in accordance with the Terms of Use. In addition, Plaintiff reserves the right to 
terminate any person’s access to the website if it believes that person violated the Terms of 
Use. Thus, by the Terms of Use, Plaintiff grants a nonexclusive license to consumers to copy 
pages from the website in compliance with those Terms. Inasmuch as Defendant used the 
website, Defendant assented to the terms. 
 
Nor are the terms so vague as to be unenforceable. The above terms permit access for 
personal use only, prohibit commercial use, prohibit the use of bots and automated devices, 
limit the frequency with which users can make requests of the website, and require the 
user to agree not to interfere with the proper working of the website. Defendant argues, 
however, that the term “automated device” is confusing. Specifically, Defendant’s President, 
Cipriano Garibay, a software designer, testifies in his declaration that TBAT—which he 
appears to claim is the only product in issue in this case—is just a web browser and is not 
an “automated device” because it requires human interaction to function. Garibay further 
claims that he does not know what Plaintiff is referring to by the term “automated device” 
because “every computer in the world, as well as all computer programs and web browsers, 
have [sic] a large degree of automation built in since they are not run manually. Clearly, 
Ticketmaster is not seeking to prohibit all computers and browsers from accessing its 
website, otherwise the website would be useless. However, as Ticketmaster has not defined 
‘automated device’ in its ‘Terms of Use,’ I can only speculate as to what it means by same.” 
 
This claim is specious. First, the term appears in the provision in which website viewers 
agree to “not use any robot, spider or other automated device, process, or means to access 
the Site.” (emphasis added). Although the terms of use include no additional definition of 
“automated device,” they identify robots and spiders as examples of such devices, which 
Garibay states are “programs which by their very nature run without interfacing with 
humans.” Plaintiff has submitted credible testimony showing that Defendant’s applications 
are, in fact, automated devices. For example, Adam Lieb, a computer consultant who 
studied a directory Defendant placed on Kovach’s computer, testified that “the term 
‘automated device’ is easy to understand in the context of computer programming”—a field 
in which Garibay claims 10 years of experience—and that TBAT is an automated device. 
Lieb explains that even though TBAT may require human initialization or set up, the 
application generates automated requests thereafter. Based on his examination of the 
“super proxy” log files on Kovach’s computer, Lieb states that “several webpage requests 
per second were made to Ticketmaster, via the proxy, from the same source IP address. 
Thousands of requests were made per day. No human would be able to generate that many 
requests during manual, non-automated web browsing. These were automated request[s] 
made by an ‘automated device.’” 
 
Based on his personal experience, Kovach describes Defendant’s software as “including 
automated devices that RMG calls ‘workers’ that can automatically navigate the 
Ticketmaster website.... [M]y level of service enabled me to use multiple workers—
sometimes over one hundred of them—simultaneously to search for and request tickets.” 
Kovach further describes how he could command the workers to search for tickets according 
to parameters that he would set, and that the workers would search for tickets 
automatically and alert him when they found tickets matching his parameters. Indeed, 
Defendant’s own website advertises its products as “let[ting] you do the work of a dozen 
people at once. Just enter the event information ... and the moment the event goes on sale, 
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PurchaseMaster goes into action.” In view of all of the evidence, Plaintiff is highly likely to 
succeed on its claim that Defendant’s applications are automated devices that violate the 
Terms of Use. 
 
However, even setting aside Plaintiff’s prohibition of automated devices, the application as 
described would violate other provisions of the Terms of Use. For example, using an 
application that enables a person to make several requests per second would violate the 
provision limiting the frequency of requests to no more than one every three seconds. 
Furthermore, use of an application designed to thwart Plaintiff’s access control by, in 
Defendant’s own description, “stealth technology [that] lets you hide your IP address, so you 
never get blocked by Ticketmaster,” (original emphasis) would breach the user’s 
agreement to “not use any device, software or routine that interferes with the proper 
working of the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.” 
See also Kovach Decl. ¶ 8 (explaining his understanding that the “workers are specifically 
designed to navigate or otherwise avoid various security measures on Ticketmaster’s 
website.”) 
 
Finally, Defendant argues in summary fashion that to the extent Plaintiff’s claim is 
predicated on automatically-made cache copies of Plaintiff’s webpages, such cache copies 
constitute fair use as a matter of law under Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 
701, 716 (9th Cir. 2007). This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, “[b]ecause 
the defendant in an infringement action has the burden of proving fair use, the defendant is 
responsible for introducing evidence of fair use in responding to a motion for preliminary 
relief.” Here, Defendant has come forward with no evidence of fair use. Nor did Defendant 
attempt to explain how its use satisfies any of the four fair use factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107. Accordingly, the fair use defense fails to defeat Plaintiff’s motion on these grounds 
alone. 
 
Second, Perfect 10 does not stand for the absolute principle of law that Defendant attributes 
to it. Rather, Perfect 10 addressed, among other questions, whether users who link to 
infringing websites and thus make automatic cache copies of those infringing websites 
themselves commit copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court 
that such conduct was “fair use in this context” because the caching was “noncommercial, 
transformative ... and has a minimal impact on the potential market for the original work.” 
Significantly, the Court also noted that “a cache copies no more than necessary to assist the 
user in Internet use,” and, in the case before it, the “background copying has no more than 
a minimal effect” on the plaintiff’s rights. In this context, by contrast, Defendant is not an 
“innocent” third-party visitor to another person’s infringing site. Instead, the purpose of 
Defendant’s viewing ticketmaster.com and the copying that necessarily entails is to engage 
in conduct that violates the Terms of Use in the ways described above. In addition, 
Defendant’s use of the website is to further its own commercial objectives, that is, to create 
and sell ticket purchasing applications that can gain unauthorized access to 
ticketmaster.com. In addition, in this case, such copying has a significant, as opposed to 
minimal, effect on Plaintiff’s rights because Defendant’s conduct empowers its customers to 
also violate the Terms of Use, infringe on Plaintiff’s rights, and collectively cause Plaintiff 
the harm described below. For all of these reasons, Defendant’s fair use defense fails. 
 
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of proving that Defendant 
violated ticketmaster.com’s Terms of Use by using automated devices, making excessive 
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requests, and interfering with the proper working of the website when it used and/or 
designed applications that access ticketmaster.com, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a 
strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim for direct copyright infringement. 
 
b. Defendant’s Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement 
Plaintiff also argues that it has a strong likelihood of success on its claim for indirect 
copyright infringement. The Court agrees. 
 
“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, 
and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a 
right to stop or limit it.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
930-931 (2005). Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from 
common law principles and are well established in the law.” In Grokster, the Supreme 
Court held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Evidence to 
support an inducement theory includes, for example “advertisement[s] or solicitation[s] that 
broadcast [ ] a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations.” Here, as 
described above, there is substantial evidence that Defendant designed its application for 
the purpose of giving its clients unauthorized access to ticketmaster.com; Defendant even 
advertises its product as “stealth technology [that] lets you hide your IP address, so you 
never get blocked by Ticketmaster” (original emphasis.) Designing and marketing a 
device whose purpose is to allow unauthorized access to, and thus to infringe on, a 
copyrighted website is sufficient to trigger contributory liability for infringement committed 
by the device’s immediate users. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 
259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that providing the site and facilities for known infringing 
activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability, and quoting with approval 2 William 
F. Patry, Copyright Law & Practice 1147, “Merely providing the means for infringement 
may be sufficient” to incur contributory copyright liability.) 
 
As discussed in the Background section, Plaintiff has presented examples of Defendant’s 
clients making numerous ticket purchases and ticket requests using Defendant’s 
applications and resources, including the examples of Bonner making more than 425,000 
requests in a single day, and Prior making more than 600,000 requests in a single day, both 
through IP addresses registered to Defendant. Requests so numerous cannot be made other 
than with automated devices. Kovach testified how he used Defendant’s applications to 
make automated ticket requests, and that Defendant made representatives available to 
help him use its applications, circumvent Plaintiff’s security measures, and set up his 
hardware for optimal use. Such uses infringe on Plaintiff’s copyrights for the reasons stated 
above with regard to Defendant’s direct infringement. 
 
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff is highly likely to prove that 
Defendant induced or encouraged its clients’ direct infringement by providing them with 
devices that gain them unauthorized access to and use of ticketmaster.com. Plaintiff is 
therefore highly likely to succeed in its claim against Defendant for contributory 
infringement. 
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2. Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., by trafficking in technological products, services, 
devices, or components that are primarily designed to circumvent Plaintiff’s access control 
and copy protection systems. Plaintiff’s Motion relies on two provisions of the DMCA. 
 
First, Plaintiff claims Defendant is liable under section 1201(a)(2), which prohibits 
trafficking in devices designed to circumvent “technological measure[s] that effectively 
control[ ] access to a work protected under this title.” “A plaintiff alleging a violation of § 
1201(a)(2) must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively 
controlled by a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third parties 
can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or facilitates 
infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the 
defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available 
despite only limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for 
use in circumvention of the controlling technological measure.” 
 
The Court finds that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its section 1201(a)(2) claim. Specifically, 
as stated above, Plaintiff is likely to prove that (1) Plaintiff owns copyrights to 
ticketmaster.com and specific portions thereof; (2) Plaintiff employs “technological 
measures” such as CAPTCHA to block automated access to its copyrighted ticket purchase 
pages; (3) Defendant’s customers are third parties who can now access those copyrighted 
pages; (4) these parties access those pages without Plaintiff’s authorization; and (5) that 
this access infringes Plaintiff’s rights because it entails copying those pages in excess of the 
third parties’ license to do so; and (6)(i), (iii) these third parties have such access because of 
Defendant’s products designed primarily for circumvention, and marketed for use in 
circumvention of the controlling technological measure. 
 
The majority of Defendant’s challenges to Plaintiff’s Motion on the DMCA claim are 
repetitive of its arguments with regard to the copyright claim, and are unavailing for the 
same reasons. The only unique arguments as to the DMCA claim are that CAPTCHA is not 
a system or a program, but is simply an image, and that CAPTCHA is designed to regulate 
ticket sales, not to regulate access to a copyrighted work. 
 
First, the Court notes that the DMCA does not equate its use of the term “technological 
measure” with Defendant’s terms “system” or “program.” In any case, Plaintiff has 
submitted evidence that CAPTCHA is a technological measure that regulates access to a 
copyrighted work. Although the DMCA does not appear to include a definition of the term, 
it states that “a technological measure ‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure, 
in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process 
or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” When 
the user makes a ticket request on ticketmaster.com, CAPTCHA presents “a box with 
stylized random characters partially obscured behind hash marks.” The user is required to 
type the characters into an entry on the screen in order to proceed with the request. Most 
automated devices cannot decipher and type the random characters and thus cannot 
proceed to the copyrighted ticket purchase pages. Thus, because CAPTCHA “in the ordinary 
course of its operation, requires the application of information ... to gain access to the 
work,” it is a technological measure that regulates access to a copyrighted work. Plaintiff is 
therefore likely to prevail on its DMCA § 1201(a)(2) claim. 
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Section 1201(b)(1) similarly prohibits the trafficking of devices primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing “protection afforded by a technological measure 
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion 
thereof.” Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) differ only in that 1201(a)(2), by its terms, 
makes it wrongful to traffic in devices that circumvent technological measures that control 
access to protected works, while 1201(b)(1) makes it wrongful to traffic in devices that 
circumvent technological measures that protect rights of a copyright owner in a work. Here, 
CAPTCHA both controls access to a protected work because a user cannot proceed to 
copyright protected webpages without solving CAPTCHA, and protects rights of a copyright 
owner because, by preventing automated access to the ticket purchase webpage, CAPTCHA 
prevents users from copying those pages. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its DMCA §§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) claims. 
 
3. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is breaching the ticketmaster.com Terms of Use in 
numerous ways, and is therefore liable for breach of contract. The facts and issues that this 
claim raises are the same as those raised by Plaintiff’s contention, in connection with its 
copyright claims, that Defendant breached the Terms of Use. The Court addressed the 
merits of that claim in its discussion of Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement, and 
concluded that Plaintiff is highly likely to prove that use of ticketmaster.com is governed by 
the Terms of Use; that Defendant was on notice of, and assented to, the Terms of Use; and 
that Defendant violated the Terms of Use by using automated devices to access the website, 
using an application that makes several requests per second (in violation of the provision 
limiting the frequency of requests to no more than one every three seconds), and by using 
an application designed to thwart Plaintiff’s access controls (which breaches the user’s 
agreement to “not use any device, software or routine that interferes with the proper 
working of the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.”). 
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is therefore likely to prevail on its breach of 
contract claim. 
 
4. Plaintiff’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Claim 
Plaintiff also argues that it is likely to prevail on its claim under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Although the CFAA is a criminal statute, it permits 
“any person who suffers damage or loss” through a violation of its provisions “to maintain a 
civil action ... to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable 
relief.” To prevail on its CFAA claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant 
“intentionally accesse[d] a computer without authorization or exceed[ed] authorized access, 
and thereby obtain[ed] information from any protected computer,” or that Defendant 
“knowingly cause[d] the transmission of a program ... and ... cause [d] damage without 
authorization to a protected computer.” Plaintiff must also demonstrate that Defendant’s 
unauthorized access caused $5,000 in loss or damage during a one year period. 
 
It appears likely that Plaintiff will be able to prove that Defendant gained unauthorized 
access to, and/or exceeded authorized access to, Plaintiff’s protected computers, and caused 
damage thereby. Based on the statute and the cases Plaintiff cites, the Court also agrees 
that the required $5,000 of harm may consist of harm to a computer system, and need not 
be suffered by just one computer during one particular intrusion. However, because 
Plaintiff has not quantified its harm as required by the statute or even attempted to show 
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what portion of the harm is attributable to Defendant, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff 
has affirmatively shown that its harm caused by Defendant exceeds the $5,000 minimum. 
Thus, the CFAA claim does not provide a basis for a preliminary injunction. 
 
In light of the Court’s rulings on Plaintiff’s copyright, DMCA, and breach of contract claims, 
the Court need not address whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its claims under 
California Penal Code § 502, the fifth basis asserted for the preliminary injunction. 
 
B. Irreparable Harm 
 
Having determined that Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its 
copyright, DMCA, and breach of contract claims, the Court now addresses whether Plaintiff 
has shown “the possibility of irreparable injury.” 
 
For Plaintiff’s copyright claim, “a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm.” “A copyright holder seeking a 
preliminary injunction is therefore not required to make an independent demonstration of 
irreparable harm.” Here, because Plaintiff has shown a strong likelihood of success on the 
merits of its copyright claim, the Court presumes irreparable harm. Defendant has done 
nothing to rebut that presumption. 
 
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has otherwise shown the possibility of irreparable harm 
required to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction on its DMCA and breach of 
contract claims. Specifically, Plaintiff has submitted extensive evidence demonstrating that 
it is suffering a loss of goodwill with the buying public in that there is a growing public 
perception that Plaintiff does not provide the public with a fair opportunity to buy tickets 
due to automated purchases. Such evidence includes numerous complaints from consumers 
about the unavailability of tickets, some of which demonstrate extreme dissatisfaction with 
Plaintiff and indicate suspicions that Plaintiff is colluding with ticket brokers to deny 
consumers tickets.5 Plaintiff has also submitted copies of consumer comments posted on 
blogs expressing similar extreme dissatisfaction6 and evidence of numerous news stories 
discussing the unavailability of tickets. For example, many of the news stories concern the 
unavailability of tickets to concerts in Hannah Montana’s “Best of Both Worlds” tour. Based 
on the reports, many parents expressed disappointed and outrage at Plaintiff because 
tickets to many Hannah Montana concerts throughout the nation (Bossier City, Louisiana; 
Miami, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; and Kansas City, Missouri, for example) were snapped up 
within several hours—and sometimes within minutes—of their release for sale. It also 
appears that the public’s difficulty obtaining tickets to the Hannah Montana concerts was 
so severe and created such an outcry that the Attorneys General of Missouri and Arkansas 
initiated investigations into Plaintiff’s ticket selling practices…. 
                                                 
5 Plaintiff’s brief quotes several of the complaints compiled in Exhibit 19. One such complaint states: “I would 
like to know how within 20 seconds of a show going on sale I could not find ANY seats together at ANY price at 
this event. However, there are gobs of them for sale on many different scalper sites. How is this possible and 
why is this tolerated. The only explanation for this is that people inside TM are in cahoots with these criminals. 
I would just like to know if there are any plans whatsoever to address this situation.” 
6 For example, the following is a comment posted by someone who could not obtain tickets to a performance of 
the rock group “Rush”: “I am absolutely irate about TicketBxxxxxd and its practices. As has been mentioned on 
this site already, the whole process of getting tickets to concerts has gotten completely out of control with 
scalpers, brokers, and God-knows-who-else trying to make a buck at the expense of fans.” 
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Although the extent of Defendant’s culpability for this harm to Plaintiff’s goodwill cannot 
yet be determined, it is likely that some of Defendant’s customers were able to obtain 
tickets to such concerts by using Defendant’s applications. Given the alleged extent of 
Defendant’s participation in the hundreds of thousands of automated ticket requests 
wrongfully made of Plaintiff’s website, it is likely that Defendant’s conduct has caused, and 
will continue to cause, some portion of Plaintiff’s loss of goodwill unless Defendant’s conduct 
is enjoined. As a consequence of Plaintiff’s loss of consumer goodwill, Plaintiff also faces the 
possibility of loss of goodwill and loss of business from its clients. 
 
In this Circuit, intangible injuries, such as damage to goodwill, can constitute irreparable 
harm. Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that it has attempted to use technological 
countermeasures to prevent automated ticket requests, but that these efforts have had only 
limited success. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s 
self-help measures (such as “blacklisting” IP addresses) are enough to prevent irreparable 
harm and thus obviate the need for injunctive relief. In addition, the cost to Plaintiff of 
developing and implementing such countermeasures is not easily calculable. For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the possibility of 
irreparable harm…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
What exactly was the prima facie case of copyright infringement?  And why did the fair use 
defense fail? 
 
Why wasn’t there sufficient damage to support the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act claim? 
 
You probably aren’t sympathetic to RMG.  But are you sympathetic to Ticketmaster? 
 
Denouement.  RMG ultimately defaulted, so Ticketmaster got a default judgment of $18.2M 
in damages plus $350,000 in attorneys’ fees.  Also, several states have enacted “anti-RMG” 
laws making it illegal to use software to electronically jump a ticket-buying queue. 
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VI. Trademarks and Domain Names 
 
Trademark FAQs Excerpts (from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm) 
(accessed August 5, 2007) (omitted questions aren’t indicated) 
 
What is a trademark?  
A trademark includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination, used, or 
intended to be used, in commerce to identify and distinguish the goods of one manufacturer 
or seller from goods manufactured or sold by others, and to indicate the source of the goods. 
In short, a trademark is a brand name.  
 
What is a service mark?  
A service mark is any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination, used, or intended to 
be used, in commerce, to identify and distinguish the services of one provider from services 
provided by others, and to indicate the source of the services.  
 
What is a certification mark?  
A certification mark is any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination, used, or 
intended to be used, in commerce with the owner’s permission by someone other than its 
owner, to certify regional or other geographic origin, material, mode of manufacture, 
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of someone’s goods or services, or that the work or 
labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.  
 
What is a collective mark?  
A collective mark is a trademark or service mark used, or intended to be used, in commerce, 
by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, 
including a mark which indicates membership in a union, an association, or other 
organization.  
 
Do I have to register my trademark?  
No, but federal registration has several advantages, including notice to the public of the 
registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of ownership nationwide, 
and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods or services set 
forth in the registration.  
 
What are the benefits of federal trademark registration?  
1. Constructive notice nationwide of the trademark owner’s claim.  
2. Evidence of ownership of the trademark.  
3. Jurisdiction of federal courts may be invoked.  
4. Registration can be used as a basis for obtaining registration in foreign countries.  
5. Registration may be filed with U.S. Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing 
foreign goods.  
 
Are there federal regulations governing the use of the designations “TM” or “SM” with 
trademarks?  
No. Use of the symbols “TM” or “SM” (for trademark and service mark, respectively) may, 
however, be governed by local, state, or foreign laws and the laws of the pertinent 
jurisdiction must be consulted. These designations usually indicate that a party claims 
rights in the mark and are often used before a federal registration is issued.  
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When is it proper to use the federal registration symbol (the letter R enclosed within a circle 
— ® — with the mark.  
The federal registration symbol may be used once the mark is actually registered in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Even though an application is pending, the registration 
symbol may not be used before the mark has actually become registered. The federal 
registration symbol should only be used on goods or services that are the subject of the 
federal trademark registration. [Note: Several foreign countries use the letter R enclosed 
within a circle to indicate that a mark is registered in that country. Use of the symbol by 
the holder of a foreign registration may be proper.]  
 
What constitutes interstate commerce?  
For goods, “Interstate commerce” involves sending the goods across state lines with the 
mark displayed on the goods or the packaging for the goods. With services, “interstate 
commerce” involves offering a service to those in another state or rendering a service which 
affects interstate commerce (e.g. restaurants, gas stations, hotels, etc.).  
 
Is a federal registration valid outside the United States?  
No. However, if you are a qualified owner of a trademark application pending before the 
USPTO, or of a registration issued by the USPTO, you may seek registration in any of the 
countries that have joined the Madrid Protocol by filing a single application, called an 
“international application,” with the he International Bureau of the World Property 
Intellectual Organization, through the USPTO. For more information about the Madrid 
Protocol, click here.  
Also, certain countries recognize a United States registration as a basis for filing an 
application to register a mark in those countries under international treaties…. 
 
What are common law rights?  
Federal registration is not required to establish rights in a trademark. Common law rights 
arise from actual use of a mark. Generally, the first to either use a mark in commerce or file 
an intent to use application with the Patent and Trademark Office has the ultimate right to 
use and registration. However, there are many benefits of federal trademark registration. 
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Trademark Glossary 
 
Likelihood of Confusion 
 
Ninth Circuit “Sleekcraft” Factors (from the Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions 
18.15) 
 
1. STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S MARK. The more 
the consuming public recognizes the plaintiff’s trademark as an indication of 
origin of the plaintiff’s goods, the more likely it is that consumers would be 
confused about the source of the defendant’s goods if the defendant uses a 
similar mark. 
 
2.DEFENDANT’S USE OF THE MARK. If the defendant and plaintiff use 
their trademarks on the same, related, or complementary kinds of goods 
there may be a greater likelihood of confusion about the source of the goods 
than otherwise. 
 
3. SIMILARITY OF PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANT’S MARKS. If the 
overall impression created by the plaintiff’s trademark in the marketplace is 
similar to that created by the defendant’s trademark in [appearance] [sound] 
or [meaning], there is a greater chance [that consumers are likely to be 
confused by defendant’s use of a mark] [of likelihood of confusion]. 
[Similarities in appearance, sound or meaning weigh more heavily than 
differences in finding the marks are similar]. 
 
4. ACTUAL CONFUSION. If use by the defendant of the plaintiff’s 
trademark has led to instances of actual confusion, this strongly suggests a 
likelihood of confusion. However actual confusion is not required for a finding 
of likelihood of confusion. Even if actual confusion did not occur, the 
defendant’s use of the trademark may still be likely to cause confusion, you 
may conclude that the amount of actual confusion was not substantial. As 
you consider whether the trademark used by the defendant creates for 
consumers a likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff’s trademark, you should 
weigh any instances of actual confusion against the opportunities for such 
confusion. If the instances of actual confusion have been relatively frequent, 
you may find that there has been substantial actual confusion. If, by contrast, 
there is a very large volume of sales, but only a few isolated instances of 
actual confusion you may find that there has not been substantial actual 
confusion. 
 
5. DEFENDANT’S INTENT. Knowing use by defendant of the plaintiff’s 
trademark to identify similar goods may strongly show an intent to derive 
benefit from the reputation of the plaintiff’s mark, suggesting an intent to 
cause a likelihood of confusion. On the other hand, even in the absence of 
proof that the defendant acted knowingly, the use of plaintiff’s trademark to 
identify similar goods may indicate a likelihood of confusion. 
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6. MARKETING/ADVERTISING CHANNELS. If the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s (goods) (services) are likely to be sold in the same or similar 
stores or outlets, or advertised in similar media, this may increase the 
likelihood of confusion. 
 
7. PURCHASER’S DEGREE OF CARE. The more sophisticated the potential 
buyers of the goods or the more costly the goods, the more careful and 
discriminating the reasonably prudent purchaser exercising ordinary caution 
may be. They may be less likely to be confused by similarities in the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s trademarks 
 
8. PRODUCT LINE EXPANSION. When the parties’ products differ, you may 
consider how likely the plaintiff is to begin selling the products for which the 
defendant is using the plaintiff’s trademark. If there is a strong possibility of 
expanding into the other party’s market, there is a greater likelihood of 
confusion.  
 
Dilution 
 
(1) mark is “famous” = “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United 
States” 
- advertising/publicity duration/extent/geographic reach  
- amount/volume/geographic extent of sales 
- actual recognition  
- registration? 
(2) defendant used in commerce 
(3) defendant’s use began after the mark became famous 
(4) dilution  
- blurring = impairs distinctiveness (factors: mark similarity; level of distinctiveness; 
degree of exclusivity; level of recognition) 
- tarnishment = harms reputation 
 
Nominative Use (from New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302 
(9th Cir. 1992)) 
 
(1) “the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of 
the trademark” 
(2) “only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify 
the product or service” 
(3) “the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder” 
 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure 
 
(1) the domain name is confusing similar (or identical) to a third party’s mark 
(2) the registrant has no legitimate interests in the name 
 
But registrant can show legitimate rights by:  
- actual or planned bona fide offering of goods/services;  
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- it is commonly known by the domain name; or 
- making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use without intent for commercial gain, 
misleading diversion of traffic, or dilution.  
 
(3) the name is being used in bad faith:  
- acquired the name for profitable resale;  
- registered the name to block the legitimate TM owner if a pattern can be shown;  
- acquired name to disrupt a competitor; or 
- name is intended to attract attention to site by creating a likelihood of confusion.  
 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
 
(1) Domain name registrant registers a domain name containing a third party trademark 
(2) has a bad faith intent to profit from the domain name 
- the registrant’s IP rights in the domain name 
- if the domain name contains the registrant’s real name 
- the use of the domain name in a bona fide offering of goods/services 
- a bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the domain name 
- an intent to divert consumers in a way that harms the trademark owner’s goodwill 
- an offer to sell the domain name without having used it for a bona fide offering of 
goods/services 
- providing false contact info 
- multiple bogus registrations 
- distinctiveness/famousness of the mark 
(3) registers, traffics in or uses a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the 
mark or, in the case of a famous mark, dilutes it. 
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Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005). 
Motz, Circuit Judge. 
 
Christopher Lamparello appeals the district court’s order enjoining him from maintaining a 
gripe website critical of Reverend Jerry Falwell. For the reasons stated below, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
Reverend Falwell is “a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on 
politics and public affairs.” He holds the common law trademarks “Jerry Falwell” and 
“Falwell,” and the registered trademark “Listen America with Jerry Falwell.” Jerry Falwell 
Ministries can be found online at “www.falwell.com,” a website which receives 9,000 hits (or 
visits) per day. 
 
Lamparello registered the domain name “www.fallwell.com” on February 11, 1999, after 
hearing Reverend Falwell give an interview “in which he expressed opinions about gay 
people and homosexuality that [Lamparello] considered ... offensive.” Lamparello created a 
website at that domain name to respond to what he believed were “untruths about gay 
people.” Lamparello’s website included headlines such as “Bible verses that Dr. Falwell 
chooses to ignore” and “Jerry Falwell has been bearing false witness (Exodus 20:16) against 
his gay and lesbian neighbors for a long time.” The site also contained in-depth criticism of 
Reverend Falwell’s views. For example, the website stated: 
 
Dr. Falwell says that he is on the side of truth. He says that he will preach 
that homosexuality is a sin until the day he dies. But we believe that if the 
reverend were to take another thoughtful look at the scriptures, he would 
discover that they have been twisted around to support an anti-gay political 
agenda ... at the expense of the gospel. 
 
Although the interior pages of Lamparello’s website did not contain a disclaimer, the 
homepage prominently stated, “This website is NOT affiliated with Jerry Falwell or his 
ministry”; advised, “If you would like to visit Rev. Falwell’s website, you may click here”; 
and provided a hyperlink to Reverend Falwell’s website. 
 
At one point, Lamparello’s website included a link to the Amazon.com webpage for a book 
that offered interpretations of the Bible that Lamparello favored, but the parties agree that 
Lamparello has never sold goods or services on his website. The parties also agree that 
“Lamparello’s domain name and web site at www.fallwell.com,” which received only 200 
hits per day, “had no measurable impact on the quantity of visits to [Reverend Falwell’s] 
web site at www.falwell.com.” 
 
Nonetheless, Reverend Falwell sent Lamparello letters in October 2001 and June 2003 
demanding that he cease and desist from using www.fallwell.com or any variation of 
Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name. Ultimately, Lamparello filed this action 
against Reverend Falwell and his ministries (collectively referred to hereinafter as 
“Reverend Falwell”), seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. Reverend Falwell 
counter-claimed, alleging trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), false 
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designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1126 
and the common law of Virginia,1 and cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 
The parties stipulated to all relevant facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The district court granted summary judgment to Reverend Falwell, enjoined Lamparello 
from using Reverend Falwell’s mark at www.fallwell.com, and required Lamparello to 
transfer the domain name to Reverend Falwell. However, the court denied Reverend 
Falwell’s request for statutory damages or attorney fees, reasoning that the “primary 
motive” of Lamparello’s website was “to put forth opinions on issues that were contrary to 
those of [Reverend Falwell]” and “not to take away monies or to profit.”  
 
Lamparello appeals the district court’s order; Reverend Falwell cross-appeals the denial of 
statutory damages and attorney fees. We review de novo a district court’s ruling on cross-
motions for summary judgment. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter “PETA”]. 
 
II. 
 
We first consider Reverend Falwell’s claims of trademark infringement and false 
designation of origin. 
 
A…. 
 
Both infringement and false designation of origin have five elements. To prevail under 
either cause of action, the trademark holder must prove: 
 
(1) that it possesses a mark; (2) that the [opposing party] used the mark; (3) 
that the [opposing party’s] use of the mark occurred “in commerce”; (4) that 
the [opposing party] used the mark “in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising” of goods or services; and (5) that the 
[opposing party] used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers. 
 
Trademark law serves the important functions of protecting product identification, 
providing consumer information, and encouraging the production of quality goods and 
services. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). But protections 
“‘against unfair competition’” cannot be transformed into “‘rights to control language.’” 
“Such a transformation” would raise serious First Amendment concerns because it would 
limit the 
 
ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of companies that may 
be of widespread public concern and importance. Much useful social and 
commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under 
                                                 
1 …because “[t]he test for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act is essentially 
the same as that for common law unfair competition under Virginia law because both address the likelihood of 
confusion as to the source of the goods or services involved,” Reverend Falwell’s state-law unfair competition 
claim rises or falls with his federal claims of infringement and false designation of origin. Therefore, we will not 
analyze his state-law claim separately. 
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threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, 
company or product by using its trademark. 
 
Lamparello and his amici argue at length that application of the Lanham Act must be 
restricted to “commercial speech” to assure that trademark law does not become a tool for 
unconstitutional censorship. The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this view, see Taubman Co. v. 
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003), and the Ninth Circuit recently has done so as 
well, see Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 
In its two most significant recent amendments to the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”) and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 
(“ACPA”), Congress left little doubt that it did not intend for trademark laws to impinge the 
First Amendment rights of critics and commentators. The dilution statute applies to only a 
“commercial use in commerce of a mark,” and explicitly states that the “[n]oncommercial 
use of a mark” is not actionable. Congress explained that this language was added to 
“adequately address [ ] legitimate First Amendment concerns,” and “incorporate[d] the 
concept of ‘commercial’ speech from the ‘commercial speech’ doctrine.” Similarly, Congress 
directed that in determining whether an individual has engaged in cybersquatting, the 
courts may consider whether the person’s use of the mark is a “bona fide noncommercial or 
fair use.” The legislature believed this provision necessary to “protect[ ] the rights of 
Internet users and the interests of all Americans in free speech and protected uses of 
trademarked names for such things as parody, comment, criticism, comparative 
advertising, news reporting, etc.” 
 
In contrast, the trademark infringement and false designation of origin provisions of the 
Lanham Act (Sections 32 and 43(a), respectively) do not employ the term “noncommercial.” 
They do state, however, that they pertain only to the use of a mark “in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services,” or “in connection 
with any goods or services.” But courts have been reluctant to define those terms narrowly.2 
Rather, as the Second Circuit has explained, “[t]he term ‘services’ has been interpreted 
broadly” and so “[t]he Lanham Act has ... been applied to defendants furnishing a wide 
variety of non-commercial public and civic benefits.” Similarly, in PETA we noted that a 
website need not actually sell goods or services for the use of a mark in that site’s domain 
name to constitute a use “‘in connection with’ goods or services.” PETA, 263 F.3d at 365; see 
also Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775 (concluding that website with two links to websites of 
for-profit entities violated the Lanham Act). 
 
Thus, even if we accepted Lamparello’s contention that Sections 32 and 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act apply only to commercial speech, we would still face the difficult question of 
what constitutes such speech under those provisions. In the case at hand, we need not 
resolve that question or determine whether Sections 32 and 43(a) apply exclusively to 
commercial speech because Reverend Falwell’s claims of trademark infringement and false 
designation fail for a more obvious reason. The hallmark of such claims is a likelihood of 
confusion—and there is no likelihood of confusion here. 
 
                                                 
2 Indeed, Lamparello agreed at oral argument that the Lanham Act’s prohibitions on infringement and false 
designation apply to more than just commercial speech as defined by the Supreme Court. 
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B. 
 
1. 
“[T]he use of a competitor’s mark that does not cause confusion as to source is permissible.” 
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., Accordingly, Lamparello can only be liable for 
infringement and false designation if his use of Reverend Falwell’s mark would be likely to 
cause confusion as to the source of the website found at www.fallwell.com. This likelihood-
of-confusion test “generally strikes a comfortable balance” between the First Amendment 
and the rights of markholders. 
 
We have identified seven factors helpful in determining whether a likelihood of confusion 
exists as to the source of a work, but “not all these factors are always relevant or equally 
emphasized in each case.” The factors are: “(a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark; 
(b) the similarity of the two marks; (c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks 
identify; (d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; (e) the 
similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; (f) the defendant’s intent; (g) actual 
confusion.”  
 
Reverend Falwell’s mark is distinctive, and the domain name of Lamparello’s website, 
www.fallwell.com, closely resembles it. But, although Lamparello and Reverend Falwell 
employ similar marks online, Lamparello’s website looks nothing like Reverend Falwell’s; 
indeed, Lamparello has made no attempt to imitate Reverend Falwell’s website. Moreover, 
Reverend Falwell does not even argue that Lamparello’s website constitutes advertising or 
a facility for business, let alone a facility or advertising similar to that of Reverend Falwell. 
Furthermore, Lamparello clearly created his website intending only to provide a forum to 
criticize ideas, not to steal customers. 
 
Most importantly, Reverend Falwell and Lamparello do not offer similar goods or services. 
Rather they offer opposing ideas and commentary. Reverend Falwell’s mark identifies his 
spiritual and political views; the website at www.fallwell.com criticizes those very views. 
After even a quick glance at the content of the website at www.fallwell.com, no one seeking 
Reverend Falwell’s guidance would be misled by the domain name—www.fallwell.com—
into believing Reverend Falwell authorized the content of that website. No one would 
believe that Reverend Falwell sponsored a site criticizing himself, his positions, and his 
interpretations of the Bible.3 
 
Finally, the fact that people contacted Reverend Falwell’s ministry to report that they 
found the content at www.fallwell.com antithetical to Reverend Falwell’s views does not 
illustrate, as Reverend Falwell claims, that the website engendered actual confusion. To the 
contrary, the anecdotal evidence Reverend Falwell submitted shows that those searching 
for Reverend Falwell’s site and arriving instead at Lamparello’s site quickly realized that 
Reverend Falwell was not the source of the content therein. 
 
                                                 
3 If Lamparello had neither criticized Reverend Falwell by name nor expressly rejected Reverend Falwell’s 
teachings, but instead simply had quoted Bible passages and offered interpretations of them subtly different 
from those of Reverend Falwell, this would be a different case. For, while a gripe site, or a website dedicated to 
criticism of the markholder, will seldom create a likelihood of confusion, a website purporting to be the official 
site of the markholder and, for example, articulating positions that could plausibly have come from the 
markholder may well create a likelihood of confusion. 
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For all of these reasons, it is clear that the undisputed record evidences no likelihood of 
confusion. In fact, Reverend Falwell even conceded at oral argument that those viewing the 
content of Lamparello’s website probably were unlikely to confuse Reverend Falwell with 
the source of that material. 
 
2. 
Nevertheless, Reverend Falwell argues that he is entitled to prevail under the “initial 
interest confusion” doctrine. This relatively new and sporadically applied doctrine holds 
that “the Lanham Act forbids a competitor from luring potential customers away from a 
producer by initially passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if confusion as to 
the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” According to 
Reverend Falwell, this doctrine requires us to compare his mark with Lamparello’s website 
domain name, www.fallwell.com, without considering the content of Lamparello’s website. 
Reverend Falwell argues that some people who misspell his name may go to 
www.fallwell.com assuming it is his site, thus giving Lamparello an unearned audience—
albeit one that quickly disappears when it realizes it has not reached Reverend Falwell’s 
site. This argument fails for two reasons. 
 
First, we have never adopted the initial interest confusion theory; rather, we have followed 
a very different mode of analysis, requiring courts to determine whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists by “examin[ing] the allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is 
seen by the ordinary consumer.” 
 
Contrary to Reverend Falwell’s arguments, we did not abandon this approach in PETA. Our 
inquiry in PETA was limited to whether Doughney’s use of the domain name 
“www.peta.org” constituted a successful enough parody of People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals that no one was likely to believe www.peta.org was sponsored or endorsed by 
that organization. For a parody to be successful, it “must convey two simultaneous—and 
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is 
instead a parody.” Doughney argued that his domain name conveyed the first message (that 
it was PETA’s website) and that the content of his website conveyed the requisite second 
message (that it was not PETA’s site). Although “[t]he website’s content ma[de] it clear that 
it [wa]s not related to PETA,” we concluded that the website’s content could not convey the 
requisite second message because the site’s content “[wa]s not conveyed simultaneously 
with the first message, [i.e., the domain name itself,] as required to be considered a parody.” 
Accordingly, we found the “district court properly rejected Doughney’s parody defense.”  
 
PETA simply outlines the parameters of the parody defense; it does not adopt the initial 
interest confusion theory or otherwise diminish the necessity of examining context when 
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. Indeed, in PETA itself, rather than 
embracing a new approach, we reiterated that “[t]o determine whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists, a court should not consider how closely a fragment of a given use 
duplicates the trademark, but must instead consider whether the use in its entirety creates a 
likelihood of confusion.” (emphasis added). When dealing with domain names, this means a 
court must evaluate an allegedly infringing domain name in conjunction with the content of 
the website identified by the domain name.4 
                                                 
4 Contrary to Reverend Falwell’s suggestions, this rule does not change depending on how similar the domain 
name or title is to the mark. Hence, Reverend Falwell’s assertion that he objects only to Lamparello using the 
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Moreover, even if we did endorse the initial interest confusion theory, that theory would not 
assist Reverend Falwell here because it provides no basis for liability in circumstances such 
as these. The few appellate courts that have followed the Ninth Circuit and imposed 
liability under this theory for using marks on the Internet have done so only in cases 
involving a factor utterly absent here—one business’s use of another’s mark for its own 
financial gain. 
 
Profiting financially from initial interest confusion is thus a key element for imposition of 
liability under this theory.5 When an alleged infringer does not compete with the 
markholder for sales, “some initial confusion will not likely facilitate free riding on the 
goodwill of another mark, or otherwise harm the user claiming infringement. Where 
confusion has little or no meaningful effect in the marketplace, it is of little or no 
consequence in our analysis.” For this reason, even the Ninth Circuit has stated that a firm 
is not liable for using another’s mark in its domain name if it “could not financially 
capitalize on [a] misdirected consumer [looking for the markholder’s site] even if it so 
desired.” 
 
This critical element—use of another firm’s mark to capture the markholder’s customers 
and profits—simply does not exist when the alleged infringer establishes a gripe site that 
criticizes the markholder. See Hannibal Travis, The Battle For Mindshare: The Emerging 
Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the 
Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 85 (Winter 2005) (“The premise of the ‘initial interest’ 
confusion cases is that by using the plaintiff’s trademark to divert its customers, the 
defendant is engaging in the old ‘bait and switch.’ But because ... Internet users who find 
[gripe sites] are not sold anything, the mark may be the ‘bait,’ but there is simply no 
‘switch.’”) (citations omitted).6 Applying the initial interest confusion theory to gripe sites 
like Lamparello’s would enable the markholder to insulate himself from criticism—or at 
least to minimize access to it. We have already condemned such uses of the Lanham Act, 
stating that a markholder cannot “‘shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its 
name in commentaries critical of its conduct.’” “[J]ust because speech is critical of a 
corporation and its business practices is not a sufficient reason to enjoin the speech.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
domain name www.fallwell.com and has no objection to Lamparello posting his criticisms at 
“www.falwelliswrong.com,” or a similar domain name, does not entitle him to a different evaluation rule. Rather 
it has long been established that even when alleged infringers use the very marks at issue in titles, courts look 
to the underlying content to determine whether the titles create a likelihood of confusion as to source. 
5 Offline uses of marks found to cause actionable initial interest confusion also have involved financial gain. And 
even those courts recognizing the initial interest confusion theory of liability but finding no actionable initial 
confusion involved one business’s use of another’s mark for profit. 
6 Although the appellate courts that have adopted the initial interest confusion theory have only applied it to 
profit-seeking uses of another’s mark, the district courts have not so limited the application of the theory. 
Without expressly referring to this theory, two frequently-discussed district court cases have held that using 
another’s domain name to post content antithetical to the markholder constitutes infringement. See Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 
1998) (table) (finding use of domain name “www.plannedparenthood.com” to provide links to passages of anti-
abortion book constituted infringement); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 
F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (table) (finding use of “www.jewsforjesus.org” to criticize religious group constituted 
infringement). We think both cases were wrongly decided to the extent that in determining whether the domain 
names were confusing, the courts did not consider whether the websites’ content would dispel any confusion. In 
expanding the initial interest confusion theory of liability, these cases cut it off from its moorings to the 
detriment of the First Amendment. 
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In sum, even if we were to accept the initial interest confusion theory, that theory would 
not apply in the case at hand. Rather, to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists 
as to the source of a gripe site like that at issue in this case, a court must look not only to 
the allegedly infringing domain name, but also to the underlying content of the website. 
When we do so here, it is clear, as explained above, that no likelihood of confusion exists. 
Therefore, the district court erred in granting Reverend Falwell summary judgment on his 
infringement, false designation, and unfair competition claims. 
 
III. 
 
We evaluate Reverend Falwell’s cybersquatting claim separately because the elements of a 
cybersquatting violation differ from those of traditional Lanham Act violations. To prevail 
on a cybersquatting claim, Reverend Falwell must show that Lamparello: (1) “had a bad 
faith intent to profit from using the [www.fallwell.com] domain name,” and (2) the domain 
name www.fallwell.com “is identical or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the distinctive 
and famous [Falwell] mark.” 
 
“The paradigmatic harm that the ACPA was enacted to eradicate” is “the practice of 
cybersquatters registering several hundred domain names in an effort to sell them to the 
legitimate owners of the mark.” Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 
806, 810 (6th Cir. 2004). The Act was also intended to stop the registration of multiple 
marks with the hope of selling them to the highest bidder, “distinctive marks to defraud 
consumers” or “to engage in counterfeiting activities,” and “well-known marks to prey on 
consumer confusion by misusing the domain name to divert customers from the mark 
owner’s site to the cybersquatter’s own site, many of which are pornography sites that 
derive advertising revenue based on the number of visits, or ‘hits,’ the site receives.” S.Rep. 
No. 106-140. The Act was not intended to prevent “noncommercial uses of a mark, such as 
for comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, etc.,” and thus they “are beyond the scope” 
of the ACPA. 
 
To distinguish abusive domain name registrations from legitimate ones, the ACPA directs 
courts to consider nine nonexhaustive factors [the court then quotes the statute]…. 
 
These factors attempt “to balance the property interests of trademark owners with the 
legitimate interests of Internet users and others who seek to make lawful uses of others’ 
marks, including for purposes such as comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, 
news reporting, fair use, etc.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-412 (emphasis added). “The first four 
[factors] suggest circumstances that may tend to indicate an absence of bad-faith intent to 
profit from the goodwill of a mark, and the others suggest circumstances that may tend to 
indicate that such bad-faith intent exists.” Id. However, “[t]here is no simple formula for 
evaluating and weighing these factors. For example, courts do not simply count up which 
party has more factors in its favor after the evidence is in.” In fact, because use of these 
listed factors is permissive, “[w]e need not ... march through” them all in every case. “The 
factors are given to courts as a guide, not as a substitute for careful thinking about whether 
the conduct at issue is motivated by a bad faith intent to profit.” 
 
After close examination of the undisputed facts involved in this case, we can only conclude 
that Reverend Falwell cannot demonstrate that Lamparello “had a bad faith intent to profit 
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from using the [www.fallwell.com] domain name.” Lamparello clearly employed 
www.fallwell.com simply to criticize Reverend Falwell’s views. Factor IV of the ACPA 
counsels against finding a bad faith intent to profit in such circumstances because “use of a 
domain name for purposes of ... comment, [and] criticism,” constitutes a “bona fide 
noncommercial or fair use” under the statute.7 That Lamparello provided a link to an 
Amazon.com webpage selling a book he favored does not diminish the communicative 
function of his website. The use of a domain name to engage in criticism or commentary 
“even where done for profit” does not alone evidence a bad faith intent to profit, H.R. Rep. 
No. 106-412, and Lamparello did not even stand to gain financially from sales of the book at 
Amazon.com. Thus factor IV weighs heavily in favor of finding Lamparello lacked a bad 
faith intent to profit from the use of the domain name. 
 
Equally important, Lamparello has not engaged in the type of conduct described in the 
statutory factors as typifying the bad faith intent to profit essential to a successful 
cybersquatting claim. First, we have already held that Lamparello’s domain name does not 
create a likelihood of confusion as to source or affiliation. Accordingly, Lamparello has not 
engaged in the type of conduct—”creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site”—described as an indicator of a bad faith 
intent to profit in factor V of the statute. 
 
Factors VI and VIII also counsel against finding a bad faith intent to profit here. 
Lamparello has made no attempt—or even indicated a willingness—”to transfer, sell, or 
otherwise assign the domain name to [Reverend Falwell] or any third party for financial 
gain.” Similarly, Lamparello has not registered “multiple domain names”; rather, the record 
indicates he has registered only one. Thus, Lamparello’s conduct is not of the suspect 
variety described in factors VI and VIII of the Act. 
 
Notably, the case at hand differs markedly from those in which the courts have found a bad 
faith intent to profit from domain names used for websites engaged in political commentary 
or parody. For example, in PETA we found the registrant of www.peta.org engaged in 
cybersquatting because www.peta.org was one of fifty to sixty domain names Doughney had 
registered and because Doughney had evidenced a clear intent to sell www.peta.org to 
PETA, stating that PETA should try to “‘settle’ with him and ‘make him an offer.’” 
Similarly, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit found 
an anti-abortion activist who had registered domain names incorporating famous marks 
such as “Washington Post” liable for cybersquatting because he had registered almost 
seventy domain names, had offered to stop using the Washington Post mark if the 
newspaper published an opinion piece by him on its editorial page, and posted content that 
created a likelihood of confusion as to whether the famous markholders sponsored the anti-
abortion sites and “ha[d] taken positions on hotly contested issues.” In contrast, Lamparello 
did not register multiple domain names, he did not offer to transfer them for valuable 
consideration, and he did not create a likelihood of confusion. 
                                                 
7 We note that factor IV does not protect a faux noncommercial site, that is, a noncommercial site created by the 
registrant for the sole purpose of avoiding liability under the FTDA, which exempts noncommercial uses of 
marks, or under the ACPA. As explained by the Senate Report discussing the ACPA, an individual cannot avoid 
liability for registering and attempting to sell a hundred domain names incorporating famous marks by posting 
noncommercial content at those domain names. But Lamparello’s sole purpose for registering www.fallwell.com 
was to criticize Reverend Falwell, and this noncommercial use was not a ruse to avoid liability. Therefore, factor 
IV indicates that Lamparello did not have a bad faith intent to profit. 
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Instead, Lamparello, like the plaintiffs in two cases recently decided by the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits, created a gripe site. Both courts expressly refused to find that gripe sites located 
at domain names nearly identical to the marks at issue violated the ACPA. In TMI, Inc. v. 
Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2004), Joseph Maxwell, a customer of homebuilder 
TMI, registered the domain name “www.trendmakerhome.com,” which differed by only one 
letter from TMI’s mark, TrendMaker Homes, and its domain name, 
“www.trendmakerhomes.com.” Maxwell used the site to complain about his experience with 
TMI and to list the name of a contractor whose work pleased him. After his registration 
expired, Maxwell registered “www.trendmakerhome.info.” TMI then sued, alleging 
cybersquatting. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that Maxwell violated 
the ACPA, reasoning that his site was noncommercial and designed only “to inform 
potential customers about a negative experience with the company.” 
 
Similarly, in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, a customer of Lucas Nursery registered the 
domain name “www.lucasnursery.com” and posted her dissatisfaction with the company’s 
landscaping services. Because the registrant, Grosse, like Lamparello, registered a single 
domain name, the Sixth Circuit concluded that her conduct did not constitute that which 
Congress intended to proscribe—i.e., the registration of multiple domain names. Noting 
that Grosse’s gripe site did not create any confusion as to sponsorship and that she had 
never attempted to sell the domain name to the markholder, the court found that Grosse’s 
conduct was not actionable under the ACPA. The court explained: “One of the ACPA’s main 
objectives is the protection of consumers from slick internet peddlers who trade on the 
names and reputations of established brands. The practice of informing fellow consumers of 
one’s experience with a particular service provider is surely not inconsistent with this 
ideal.” 
 
Like Maxwell and Grosse before him, Lamparello has not evidenced a bad faith intent to 
profit under the ACPA. To the contrary, he has used www.fallwell.com to engage in the type 
of “comment[ ][and] criticism” that Congress specifically stated militates against a finding 
of bad faith intent to profit. And he has neither registered multiple domain names nor 
attempted to transfer www.fallwell.com for valuable consideration. We agree with the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits that, given these circumstances, the use of a mark in a domain name for 
a gripe site criticizing the markholder does not constitute cybersquatting. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Lamparello, rather than Reverend Falwell, is entitled to 
summary judgment on all counts. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed 
and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for Lamparello. 
 
 
185. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Website Evolution.  Lamparello’s website evolved substantially over the years.  Screen shot 
from October 1999: 
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Screen shot from October 2002: 
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Screen shot from July 2003: 
 
 
 
For a moment, put aside your legal hat.  Which (if any) of these screenshots would you find 
confusing if you visited it for the first time? 
 
Other Questions.  Why were the parties fighting over the domain name?  Why did Rev. 
Falwell want the domain name enough to fight for it to the Fourth Circuit?  Why did 
Lamparello care so much about this domain name that it was worth fighting back? 
 
How did Lamparello make a trademark “use in commerce”?
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Promatek Industries,  Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002). 
Williams, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal concerns the propriety of a preliminary injunction in which one competitor, 
Promatek, prevailed against another, Equitrac. The preliminary injunction was issued 
without a hearing and Equitrac had to place language on its web page to remedy violations 
of the Lanham Act. Equitrac now appeals that order and because the district court did not 
abuse its discretion, we affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Promatek and Equitrac are competitors in selling cost-recovery equipment. Equitrac’s 
marketing department advised its web designer that certain words and phrases should be 
used as metatags for Equitrac’s website.1 In response, the web designer placed the term 
“Copitrack” in the contents of Equitrac’s website as a metatag.* Equitrac used the term as a 
metatag because it provides maintenance and service on Copitrak equipment, a product 
used in the cost-recovery business.2 Promatek holds the trademark for Copitrak, and once it 
learned of Equitrac’s use of the term Copitrack in the metatag, it brought suit. After 
learning of Promatek’s suit, Equitrac contacted all of the search engines known to it and 
requested that they remove any link between the term Copitrack and Equitrac’s website. 
Equitrac also removed the Copitrack metatag from its 
website. 
 
Not satisfied with Equitrac’s remedial measures, Promatek sought a preliminary injunction 
preventing Equitrac from using the term Copitrack in its website. After receiving materials 
submitted by both parties, the district court granted Promatek’s motion for preliminary 
injunction. Under the terms of the injunction, Equitrac was directed to place language on 
its web page informing consumers that any link between its website and Copitrack was in 
error: 
                                                 
1 [Quoting Brookfield for this definition:] Metatags are HTML [HyperText Markup Language] code intended to 
describe the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us 
are the “description” and “keyword” metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe the web site; 
the keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site. The more 
often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will 
be “hit” in a search for that keyword and the higher on the list of “hits” the web page will appear. 
* Editor’s note: the site’s metatags from May 11, 2000: 
<head> 
<BASE HREF=“http://www.equitrac.com/”> 
<meta NAME=“description” CONTENT=“Equitrac Corporation is the global leader in 
automated cost recovery and expense management solutions. The company’s System 4, 
OfficeTrac, DebitLog, PAS and PrintLog software and Alpha hardware track, record and report 
on print, copy, fax, postage and phone usage of office equipment.”> 
<meta NAME=“keywords” CONTENT=“PrintLog, printing, tracking, copying, cost recovery, 
billback, disbursements, clients, projects, printers, copiers, networking, hardcopy, vending, 
accounting, reporting, billing, Equitrac, System 4, Copitrack, PAS, pcounter, xcounter, 
uniprint, ocs, plotting, software, transactions, DebitLog, Telemetrac, Telemate, Officetrac, 
Disbursemate, copy centers, HP, Xerox, Canon, Ricoh, Savin, Mita, Toshiba, Pitney, Metrics, 
document, copies”> 
<title>Equitrac Corporation</title> 
<meta name=“Microsoft Border” content=“none”> 
</head> 
2 The parties agree that Equitrac meant to use the term “Copitrak” as its metatag rather than “Copitrack.” 
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If you were directed to this site through the term “Copitrack,” that is in error 
as there is no affiliation between Equitrac and that term. The mark 
“Copitrak” is a registered trademark of Promatek Industries, Ltd., which can 
be found at www.promatek.com or www.copitrak.com. 
 
Equitrac appeals the issuance of the injunction, arguing that the ordered language will not 
only inform consumers of its competitor, Promatek, but will encourage people to go to 
Promatek’s website. Promatek counters that without this language, Equitrac will continue 
to benefit, to Promatek’s detriment, from consumer internet searches containing the word 
Copitrack. We conclude that the district court was correct in finding Promatek would suffer 
a greater harm than Equitrac if corrective measures were not taken, and we affirm the 
grant of the preliminary injunction. 
 
II. ANALYSIS… 
 
A. The District Court Was Correct in Granting the Injunction 
 
1. Likelihood of success on the merits 
Equitrac argues that because there was no likelihood of success on the merits of Promatek’s 
Lanham Act claim, the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction. In order 
to prevail under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Promatek must establish that 
Copitrak is a protectable trademark and that Equitrac’s use of the term is likely to cause 
confusion among consumers. Preregistration of Promatek’s Copitrak trademark is prima 
facie evidence of the mark’s validity, which Equitrac does not dispute. Therefore, we turn to 
the issue of whether consumers would be confused by Equitrac’s use of Copitrak as a 
metatag. 
 
In assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, we consider: (1) the similarity between 
the marks in appearance and suggestion, (2) the similarity of the products, (3) the area and 
manner of concurrent use of the products, (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by 
consumers, (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s marks, (6) any evidence of actual confusion, 
and (7) the defendant’s intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff’s. None of these 
factors are dispositive and the proper weight given to each will vary in each case. However, 
the similarity of the marks, the defendant’s intent, and evidence of actual confusion are of 
particular importance. 
 
Given these factors, it is clear that Promatek has a fair likelihood of succeeding on the 
merits of its Lanham Act claim. Although Promatek has not provided us with evidence 
regarding the strength of its Copitrak mark or evidence of any actual consumer confusion, 
the other factors weigh in its favor. First, not only are the marks Copitrack and Copitrak 
similar, Equitrac admits that it meant to use the correct spelling of Copitrak in its metatag. 
Second, Equitrac’s use of Copitrack refers to Promatek’s registered trademark, Copitrak. 
Additionally, Equitrac and Promatek are direct competitors in the cost-recovery and cost-
control equipment and services market. Most importantly, for purposes of this case, 
however, is the degree of care to be exercised by consumers.  
 
Although Equitrac claims that it did not intend to mislead consumers with respect to 
Copitrak, the fact remains that there is a strong likelihood of consumer confusion as a 
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result of its use of the Copitrack metatag. The degree of care exercised by consumers could 
lead to initial interest confusion. Initial interest confusion, which is actionable under the 
Lanham Act, occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity of the mark, 
even if the customer realizes the true source of the goods before the sale is consummated.  
 
The Ninth Circuit has dealt with initial interest confusion for websites and metatags and 
held that placing a competitor’s trademark in a metatag creates a likelihood of confusion. In 
Brookfield Communications, the court found that although consumers are not confused 
when they reach a competitor’s website, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion. 
This is true in this case, because by Equitrac’s placing the term Copitrack in its metatag, 
consumers are diverted to its website and Equitrac reaps the goodwill Promatek developed 
in the Copitrak mark. That consumers who are misled to Equitrac’s website are only briefly 
confused is of little or no consequence. In fact, “that confusion as to the source of a product 
or service is eventually dispelled does not eliminate the trademark infringement which has 
already occurred.” What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the 
misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill. Equitrac cannot unring the bell. As the court in 
Brookfield explained, “[u]sing another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a 
sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.” Customers believing they are 
entering the first store rather than the second are still likely to mill around before they 
leave. The same theory is true for websites. Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s 
webpage are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products before beginning a new 
search for Promatek and Copitrak. Therefore, given the likelihood of initial consumer 
confusion, the district court was correct in finding Promatek could succeed on the merits. 
 
2. No adequate remedy at law 
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must also prove that it has no adequate remedy 
at law and as a result, will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued. 
Furthermore, it is well settled that injuries arising from Lanham Act violations are 
presumed to be irreparable, even if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a business loss.  
 
As has been discussed, Promatek has suffered injury to its consumer goodwill through 
Equitrac’s use of Copitrack as a metatag and would have continued to suffer in the absence 
of an injunction. This damage would have constituted irreparable harm for which Promatek 
had no adequate remedy. Because of the difficulty in assessing the damages associated with 
a loss of goodwill, the district court was correct in finding that Promatek lacked an 
adequate remedy at law. 
 
3. Balancing of the harms 
The final factor we must consider is the balance of harms—the irreparable harm Equitrac 
will suffer if the injunction is enforced weighed against the irreparable harm Promatek will 
suffer if it is not. We must also consider the effect the injunction will have on the public. We 
review a district court’s balancing of the harms for an abuse of discretion. 
 
In finding that the harm to Promatek as a result of denying the injunction outweighed the 
harm to Equitrac in granting it, the district court found, and we agree, that without the 
injunction, Equitrac would continue to attract consumers browsing the web by using 
Promatek’s trademark, thereby acquiring goodwill that belongs to Promatek. In response, 
Equitrac points out that even though it offers products for sale on its website, it has yet to 
consummate a sale by this means. Furthermore, Equitrac claims that “consumers of 
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products and services provided by Equitrac and Promatek are sophisticated business people 
who are not likely to be confused between Equitrac and Copitrak and are not likely to buy 
based on a visit to a website.”  
 
Although Equitrac claims that the language on its website is harmful because it alerts 
consumers to Promatek’s website, it has not provided any evidence of customers it has lost 
as a result of the remedial language. Indeed the remedial language on the website is more 
informative than it is harmful. Equitrac’s speculative argument that Promatek may gain a 
competitive advantage by inclusion of the remedial language is rejected. As to the public 
interest, because the injunction prevents consumer confusion in the marketplace, the public 
interest will be served as well. Accordingly, the strong likelihood of consumer confusion 
weighs strongly in favor of issuing the injunction, and the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding this to be the case. 
 
B. No evidentiary hearing was needed…. 
Equitrac claims that the court should not have issued the preliminary injunction without a 
hearing.  Specifically, Equitrac argues that because the court failed to find, and did not 
receive evidence to contradict, Equitrac’s position that it was entitled to advertise that it 
was capable of servicing Copitrak equipment, Promatek’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction should have been denied. Equitrac’s argument misses the point.  What is 
relevant to the preliminary injunction is not that Equitrac may advertise that it is capable 
of servicing Copitrak.  Equitrac is free to do so; it is also free to place comparison claims on 
its website, or include press releases involving the litigation between Equitrac and 
Promatek.  It is Equitrac’s use of the term Copitrack in its metatag that is a prohibited 
practice because of its potential for customer confusion. [Editor’s note: regarding this 
italicized language, see below]  Because Equitrac failed to demonstrate that its evidence 
would weaken Promatek’s case, an evidentiary hearing was not necessary…. 
 
Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., October 18, 2002 Amendment 
 
The slip opinion of this Court issued on 8/13/02 is hereby amended as follows: On page 9, 
the second-to-last sentence of the first paragraph (beginning “It is Equitrac’s use of the 
term...”) should be removed and replaced with the following: “The problem here is not that 
Equitrac, which repairs Promatek products, used Promatek’s trademark in its metatag, but 
that it used that trademark in a way calculated to deceive consumers into thinking that 
Equitrac was Promatek.  Id.”  Immediately following the sentence to be inserted above, the 
following footnote should be inserted: “It is not the case that trademarks can never appear 
in metatags, but that they may only do so where a legitimate use of the trademark is being 
made.” 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Screen Shots.  The Equitrac home page from May 2002—missing a few graphical elements, 
but showing the disclaimer: 
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Google’s 2001 search results for “Copitrak”: 
 
 
 
Google’s 2001 search results for “Copitrack”: 
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Who Won This Case?  Think carefully about the parties’ stated objectives.  We know 
Promatek won the appeal, but which party do you think better fulfilled its objectives? 
 
Non-deceptive Metatag Usage?  The court says that Equitrac loses because “it used that 
trademark in a way calculated to deceive consumers into thinking that Equitrac was 
Promatek.”  How, exactly, did Equitrac’s use of the keyword metatags satisfy this standard? 
 
For many years, courts adopted a de facto rule that including a third party trademark in 
the website’s metatags was per se infringing.  In addition to the Promatek case, other cases 
supporting this proposition include Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse. 540 
F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008) and North American Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. 522 
F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2008).  Recently, some courts have shown signs of rethinking this de 
facto rule.  See, e.g., Southern Snow Mfg. Inc. v. Sno Wizards Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 
601639 (E.D. La. 2011). 
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Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 2011 WL 815806 
(9th Cir. March 8, 2011) 
Wardlaw, Circuit Judge. 
 
“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the 
Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.” 
 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
Network Automation (“Network”) and Advanced Systems Concepts (“Systems”) are both in 
the business of selling job scheduling and management software, and both advertise on the 
Internet. Network sells its software under the mark AutoMate, while Systems’ product is 
sold under the registered trademark ActiveBatch.  Network decided to advertise its product 
by purchasing certain keywords, such as “ActiveBatch,” which when keyed into various 
search engines, most prominently Google and Microsoft Bing, produce a results page 
showing “www.NetworkAutomation.com” as a sponsored link.  Systems’ objection to 
Network’s use of its trademark to interest viewers in Network’s website gave rise to this 
trademark infringement action. 
 
The district court was confronted with the question whether Network’s use of ActiveBatch 
to advertise its products was a clever and legitimate use of readily available technology, 
such as Google’s AdWords, or a likely violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114.  The 
court found a likelihood of initial interest confusion by applying the eight factors we 
established more than three decades ago in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th 
Cir. 1979), and reasoning that the three most important factors in “cases involving the 
Internet” are (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the goods; and (3) the 
marketing channel used.  The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against 
Network’s use of the mark ActiveBatch. 
 
Mindful that the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, and that 
the Sleekcraft factors are but a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining the 
likelihood of consumer confusion, we conclude that Systems’ showing of a likelihood of 
confusion was insufficient to support injunctive relief.  Therefore, we vacate the injunction 
and reverse and remand. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Systems is a software engineering and consulting firm founded in 1981.  It has used the 
ActiveBatch trademark since 2000, and it procured federal registration of the mark in 2001.  
Systems markets ActiveBatch software to businesses, which use the product to centralize 
and manage disparate tasks.  Network is a software company founded in 1997 under the 
name Unisyn.  Its signature product, AutoMate, also provides businesses with job 
scheduling, event monitoring, and related services.  Network has approximately 15,000 
total customers, and between 4,000 and 5,000 active customers, including Fortune 500 
companies and mid-sized and small firms.  The cost of a license to use AutoMate typically 
ranges from $995 to $10,995.  There is no dispute that Network and Systems are direct 
competitors, or that ActiveBatch and AutoMate are directly competing products. 
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Google AdWords is a program through which the search engine sells “keywords,” or search 
terms that trigger the display of a sponsor’s advertisement. When a user enters a keyword, 
Google displays the links generated by its own algorithm in the main part of the page, along 
with the advertisements in a separate “sponsored links” section next to or above the 
objective results.  Multiple advertisers can purchase the same keyword, and Google charges 
sponsors based on the number of times users click on an ad to travel from the search results 
page to the advertiser’s own website.  Network purchased “ActiveBatch” as a keyword from 
Google AdWords and a comparable program offered by Microsoft’s Bing search engine. 
 
As a result, consumers searching for business software who enter “ActiveBatch” as a search 
term would locate a results page where the top objective results are links to Systems’ own 
website and various articles about the product.  In the “Sponsored Links” or “Sponsored 
Sites” section of the page, above or to the right of the regular results, users see Network’s 
advertisement, either alone or alongside Systems’ own sponsored link.  The text of 
Network’s advertisements begin with phrases such as “Job Scheduler,” “Intuitive Job 
Scheduler,” or “Batch Job Scheduling,” and end with the company’s web site address, 
www.NetworkAutomation.com.  The middle line reads: “Windows Job Scheduling + Much 
More.  Easy to Deploy, Scalable. D/L Trial.” 
 
 
Screenshot from the court’s opinion 
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Screenshot taken March 17, 2011 
 
On November 16, 2009, Systems demanded that Network cease and desist from using the 
ActiveBatch mark in its search engine advertising, as it was not “authorized to use these 
marks in commerce.”  In a second letter, Systems explained that Network’s use of 
ActiveBatch in its Google AdWords keyword advertising infringed Systems’ trademark 
rights by deceiving customers into believing that Network’s software products were 
affiliated with Systems’ products.  Systems threatened litigation unless Network 
immediately ceased all use of Systems’ mark, including removing the mark from the Google 
AdWords Program.  Network responded that its use of the ActiveBatch mark was non-
infringing as a matter of law, and filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement.  Systems counterclaimed on February 22, 2010, alleging trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), and moved for a preliminary 
injunction against Network’s use of the ActiveBatch mark pending trial. 
 
The district court granted injunctive relief on April 30, 2010.  Noting that the parties did 
not dispute the validity or ownership of the ActiveBatch mark, the district court ruled that 
Systems was likely to succeed in satisfying the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” 
requirement by showing that Network “used” the mark when it purchased advertisements 
from search engines triggered by the term “ActiveBatch.” Applying the eight-factor 
Sleekcraft test for source confusion, the district court emphasized three factors it viewed as 
significant for “cases involving the Internet”: the similarity of the marks, relatedness of the 
goods or services, and simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel.  The district 
court concluded that all three factors favored Systems: Network used the identical mark to 
sell a directly competing product, and both advertised on the Internet. 
 
198. 
 
The district court also concluded that Systems’ mark was strong because, as a federally 
registered trademark, ActiveBatch is presumptively distinctive.  It concluded that the 
degree of consumer care suggested likely confusion because “there is generally a low degree 
of care exercised by Internet consumers.”  Moreover, Network intentionally used Systems’ 
mark to advertise its own product.  Finally, the district court noted that neither party 
introduced evidence of actual confusion, and that the likelihood of product expansion was 
not relevant. 
 
The district court also analyzed whether Network infringed Systems’ mark by creating 
initial interest confusion—as opposed to source confusion—which “occurs when the 
defendant uses the plaintiff’s trademark in a manner calculated to capture initial consumer 
attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion.”  
Because the district court found that Network’s advertisements did not clearly divulge their 
source, it concluded that consumers might be confused into unwittingly visiting Network’s 
website, allowing the company to “impermissibly capitalize[ ] on [Systems’] goodwill.” 
 
Based on its analysis of the Sleekcraft factors and its finding of likely initial interest 
confusion, the district court concluded that Systems had a strong likelihood of success on 
the merits of its trademark infringement claim.  It then presumed a likelihood of 
irreparable harm, and concluded that the balance of hardships and the public interest 
favored Systems.  Following entry of the preliminary injunction, Network timely 
appealed…. 
 
III. DISCUSSION… 
 
To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, a 
party “must prove: (1) that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that 
the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.”  
 
Network does not contest the ownership or its use of the mark.  We note that the district 
court correctly found the prerequisite “use in commerce” in Network’s use of the mark to 
purchase keywords to advertise its products for sale on the Internet.  Previously we have 
assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of a trademark as a search engine 
keyword that triggers the display of a competitor’s advertisement is a “use in commerce” 
under the Lanham Act.  See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 
1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053.  We now agree with the Second 
Circuit that such use is a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act.  See Rescuecom Corp. 
v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Google’s sale of trademarks as 
search engine keywords is a use in commerce); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITIon §§ 23:11.50, 25:70:25 (4th ed. 2010) (suggesting 
that cases taking a more restrictive view of “use” in this context are based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the Lanham Act). 
 
This case, therefore, turns on whether Network’s use of Systems’ trademark is likely to 
cause consumer confusion.  Network argues that its use of Systems’ mark is legitimate 
“comparative, contextual advertising” which presents sophisticated consumers with clear 
choices.  Systems characterizes Network’s behavior differently, accusing it of misleading 
consumers by hijacking their attention with intentionally unclear advertisements.  To 
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resolve this dispute we must apply the Sleekcraft test in a flexible manner, keeping in mind 
that the eight factors it recited are not exhaustive, and that only some of them are relevant 
to determining whether confusion is likely in the case at hand. 
 
A. 
 
In Sleekcraft, we…identified eight “relevant” factors for determining whether consumers 
would likely be confused by related goods: “[1] strength of the mark; [2] proximity of the 
goods; [3] similarity of the marks; [4] evidence of actual confusion; [5] marketing channels 
used; [6] type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;[7] 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and [8] likelihood of expansion of the product 
lines.”  We also noted that “the list is not exhaustive,” and that “[o]ther variables may come 
into play depending on the particular facts presented.” 
 
The Sleekcraft factors are intended as an adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a 
rote checklist. See, e.g., Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 
Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This eight-factor analysis is ‘pliant,’ illustrative 
rather than exhaustive, and best understood as simply providing helpful guideposts.”); 
Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The 
factors should not be rigidly weighed; we do not count beans.”); Eclipse Assoc. Ltd. v. Data 
Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1990) (“These tests were not meant to be 
requirements or hoops that a district court need jump through to make the 
determination.”). 
 
When we first confronted issues of trademark infringement and consumer confusion in the 
Internet context over a decade ago in Brookfield, we noted that “[w]e must be acutely aware 
of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies 
require a flexible approach.”…  There, Brookfield, a software company, marketed an 
entertainment database program under the mark MovieBuff.  It sold the software, and 
offered access to the database, on its website, moviebuffonline.com.  West Coast, a video 
retailer, had registered the mark The Movie Buff’s Movie Store.  West Coast operated a 
website using the domain name moviebuff.com, which included a film database that 
competed with Brookfield’s product.  
 
We held that Brookfield was likely to succeed in its claim to be the senior user of 
MovieBuff, and that there was a likelihood of source confusion stemming from West Coast’s 
use of the mark in its domain name.  “Heeding our repeated warnings against simply 
launching into a mechanical application of the eight-factor Sleekcraft test,” we determined 
that three of the eight factors were the most important in analyzing source confusion in the 
context of Internet domain names: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the 
goods and services offered; and (3) the simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing 
channel.  Reasoning that the two marks were virtually identical in terms of sight, sound 
and meaning, that West Coast and Brookfield both offered products and services relating to 
movies, and that they both used the Web as a marketing and advertising device, we 
concluded that consumer confusion was likely, particularly given the nature of the 
consumers at issue, who included casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that they had 
mistakenly clicked on to West Coast’s site when they had intended to reach Brookfield’s. 
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Brookfield also asserted that West Coast infringed its mark by causing initial interest 
confusion because it had included MovieBuff in its “metatags,” code not visible to web users 
embedded in a website to attract search engines seeking a corresponding keyword.3  
Although were we to apply the same analysis in the metatags context as we did in the 
domain name context, we would easily reach the same conclusion as to each of the factors 
(with the possible exception of purchaser care), we declined to do so, reasoning that the 
“question in the metatags context is quite different.”  In the metatags context, the question 
was whether West Coast could use the mark MovieBuff in the metatags of its website to 
attract search engines to locate its site when the keyword “MovieBuff” was entered, a 
question analogous to the issue presented here.  As in the domain name context, the degree 
of care and sophistication of the consumer was a key factor, although the outcome differed.  
We did not find a likelihood of source confusion because the results list from a search for 
“MovieBuff” would result in a list that included both Brookfield’s and West Coast’s 
websites, and if the consumer clicked on West Coast’s site its own name was “prominently 
display[ed].”  Thus a consumer was much less likely to be confused about which site he was 
viewing. 
 
Finding no source confusion, we nonetheless concluded that West Coast’s use of MovieBuff 
in its metatags was likely to cause initial interest confusion.  That is, by using Brookfield’s 
mark MovieBuff to direct persons searching for Brookfield’s product to the West Coast site, 
West Coast derived an improper benefit from the goodwill Brookfield developed in its mark. 
 
Five years later in Playboy, we considered the practice of “keying”—another situation 
analogous to that here.  Netscape operated a search engine that offered an early version of 
a keyword advertising program.  It sold lists of terms to sponsors, and when users searched 
for the keywords on the list, the sponsor’s advertisement would be displayed on the results 
page.  Netscape required its advertisers from the adult entertainment industry to link their 
ads to one such list that contained more than 400 terms, including trademarks held by 
Playboy.  Playboy sued, contending that this practice infringed its trademarks in violation 
of the Lanham Act.  The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Netscape. 
 
We reversed, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to whether Netscape’s keying practices constituted actionable 
infringement.  Following Brookfield, we analyzed the keying issue in terms of initial 
interest confusion, “find[ing] insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on any 
other theory.”   Playboy claimed that Netscape “misappropriated the goodwill of [its] marks 
by leading Internet users to competitors’ websites just as West Coast ... misappropriated 
the goodwill of Brookfield’s mark.”  In framing the initial interest confusion inquiry, we 
stressed that Playboy’s infringement claim relied on the fact that the linked banner 
advertisements were “unlabeled,” and were, therefore, more likely to mislead consumers 
into believing they had followed a link to Playboy’s own website.  
 
In Playboy, as in Brookfield, we applied the Sleekcraft test flexibly, determining that 
evidence of actual confusion was the most important factor.  Playboy had introduced an 
expert study showing that a “statistically significant number” of Internet users searching 
for the terms “playboy” and “playmate” would think that Playboy itself sponsored the 
                                                 
3 Modern search engines such as Google no longer use metatags.  Instead they rely on their own algorithms to 
find websites. 
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banner advertisements which appeared on the search results page.  We noted that this 
study “alone probably suffices to reverse the grant of summary judgment,” but we 
nonetheless analyzed other relevant Sleekcraft factors.  As to the strength of the mark, we 
credited Playboy’s expert reports showing it had created strong secondary meanings for 
“playboy” and “playmate.”  This suggested that consumers who entered these terms were 
likely searching for Playboy’s products in particular. Analyzing the nature of the goods and 
consumer, we “presume[d] that the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials on 
the Internet is easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if other options, 
particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.”  We concluded that there were genuine 
issues of material fact with respect to whether consumers were likely to be confused by 
Netscape’s keying practices.  
 
Concurring, Judge Berzon was struck by how analytically similar the keyed advertisements 
in Playboy were to the infringing metatags in Brookfield.  We agree, and also find similarity 
to the use of the keyword “ActiveBatch” in this case.  Judge Berzon cautioned that a broad 
reading of Brookfield’s metatags holding could result in a finding of initial interest 
confusion “when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, 
or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the 
trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.”  She 
clarified that the Playboy panel’s holding was limited to “situations in which the banner 
advertisements are not labeled or identified.” 
 
Judge Berzon analogized the experience of browsing clearly labeled keyword 
advertisements to shopping at Macy’s, explaining that if a shopper en route to the Calvin 
Klein section is diverted by a prominently displayed Charter Club (Macy’s own brand) 
collection and never reaches the Calvin Klein collection, it could not be said that Macy’s had 
infringed on Calvin Klein’s trademark by diverting the customer to it with a clearly labeled, 
but more prominent display.  Therefore, it would be wrong to expand the initial interest 
confusion theory of infringement beyond the realm of the misleading and deceptive to the 
context of legitimate comparative and contextual advertising. 
 
B. 
 
Here we consider whether the use of another’s trademark as a search engine keyword to 
trigger one’s own product advertisement violates the Lanham Act.  We begin by examining 
the Sleekcraft factors that are most relevant to the determination whether the use is likely 
to cause initial interest confusion.4  While the district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft 
factors, it identified the three most important factors as (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) 
the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a 
marketing channel, for any case addressing trademark infringement on the Internet….  
 
However, we did not intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to forever enshrine 
these three factors—now often referred to as the “Internet trinity” or “Internet troika”—as 
the test for trademark infringement on the Internet.  Brookfield was the first to present a 
claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet; we recognized at the time it would not be 
the last, and so emphasized flexibility over rigidity.  Depending on the facts of each specific 
case arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more illuminating on the question 
                                                 
4 Systems’ argument rests only on the theory of initial interest confusion.  It does not argue source confusion. 
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of consumer confusion. In Brookfield, we used the “troika” factors to analyze the risk of 
source confusion generated by similar domain names, but we did not wholesale adopt them 
in the metatag analysis.  Subsequent courts similarly have found the “troika” helpful to 
resolve disputes involving websites with similar names or appearances.  The leading 
trademark treatise correctly explains that the “troika” analysis “is appropriate for domain 
name disputes.” 
 
Given the multifaceted nature of the Internet and the ever-expanding ways in which we all 
use the technology, however, it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for every 
type of potential online commercial activity.  The “troika” is a particularly poor fit for the 
question presented here.  The potential infringement in this context arises from the risk 
that while using Systems’ mark to search for information about its product, a consumer 
might be confused by a results page that shows a competitor’s advertisement on the same 
screen, when that advertisement does not clearly identify the source or its product. 
 
In determining the proper inquiry for this particular trademark infringement claim, we 
adhere to two long stated principles: the Sleekcraft factors (1) are non-exhaustive, and (2) 
should be applied flexibly, particularly in the context of Internet commerce.  Finally, 
because the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, when we 
examine initial interest confusion, the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely 
confusion, not mere diversion. 
 
We turn to an examination of each Sleekcraft factor to analyze whether there is a likelihood 
of consumer confusion in this case, assigning each factor appropriate weight in accordance 
with its relevance to the factual circumstances presented here. 
 
1. Strength of the Mark 
 
“The stronger a mark—meaning the more likely it is to be remembered and associated in 
the public mind with the mark’s owner—the greater the protection it is accorded by the 
trademark laws.”  Two relevant measurements are conceptual strength and commercial 
strength.  Conceptual strength involves classification of a mark “along a spectrum of 
generally increasing inherent distinctiveness as generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, 
or fanciful.”  “A mark’s conceptual strength depends largely on the obviousness of its 
connection to the good or service to which it refers.”  Federal trademark “[r]egistration 
alone may be sufficient in an appropriate case to satisfy a determination of distinctiveness.”  
However, “while the registration adds something on the scales, we must come to grips with 
an assessment of the mark itself.”  Commercial strength is based on “actual marketplace 
recognition,” and thus “advertising expenditures can transform a suggestive mark into a 
strong mark.” 
 
This factor is probative of confusion here because a consumer searching for a generic term 
is more likely to be searching for a product category. See [Brookfield] at 1058 n. 19 
(“Generic terms are those used by the public to refer generally to the product rather than a 
particular brand of the product.”).  That consumer is more likely to expect to encounter 
links and advertisements from a variety of sources.  By contrast, a user searching for a 
distinctive term is more likely to be looking for a particular product, and therefore could be 
more susceptible to confusion when sponsored links appear that advertise a similar product 
from a different source.  On the other hand, if the ordinary consumers of this particular 
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product are particularly sophisticated and knowledgeable, they might also be aware that 
Systems is the source of ActiveBatch software and not be confused at all. 
 
The district court acknowledged that the parties failed to address the strength of the mark, 
but it concluded that the factor favors Systems.  It reasoned that ActiveBatch is a 
suggestive mark because it “requires a mental leap from the mark to the product,” and as a 
registered trademark it is “inherently distinctive.”  We agree.  Because the mark is both 
Systems’ product name and a suggestive federally registered trademark, consumers 
searching for the term are presumably looking for its specific product, and not a category of 
goods.  Nonetheless, that may not be the end of the inquiry about this factor, as the 
sophistication of the consumers of the product may also play a role.  The district court 
properly declined to consider commercial strength, which, as an evidence-intensive inquiry, 
is unnecessary at the preliminary injunction stage. 
 
2. Proximity of the Goods 
 
“Related goods are generally more likely than unrelated goods to confuse the public as to 
the producers of the goods.”  “[T]he danger presented is that the public will mistakenly 
assume there is an association between the producers of the related goods, though no such 
association exists.”  The proximity of goods is measured by whether the products are: (1) 
complementary; (2) sold to the same class of purchasers; and (3) similar in use and function. 
 
The proximity of the goods was relevant in Playboy, where unsophisticated consumers were 
confronted with unlabeled banner advertisements that touted adult-oriented material very 
similar to Playboy’s own products.  There, we concluded that under the circumstances, the 
relatedness of the goods bolstered the likelihood of confusion, and therefore favored 
Playboy.  However, the proximity of the goods would become less important if 
advertisements are clearly labeled or consumers exercise a high degree of care, because 
rather than being misled, the consumer would merely be confronted with choices among 
similar products.  Id. at 1035 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“[S]uch choices do not constitute 
trademark infringement off the internet, and I cannot understand why they should on the 
internet.”). 
 
Because the products at issue here are virtually interchangeable, this factor may be helpful, 
but it must be considered in conjunction with the labeling and appearance of the 
advertisements and the degree of care exercised by the consumers of the ActiveBatch 
software.  By weighing this factor in isolation and failing to consider whether the parties’ 
status as direct competitors would actually lead to a likelihood of confusion, the district 
court allowed this factor to weigh too heavily in the analysis. 
 
3. Similarity of the Marks 
 
“[T]he more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning, the greater the 
likelihood of confusion.”  “Where the two marks are entirely dissimilar, there is no 
likelihood of confusion.”  “Similarity of the marks is tested on three levels: sight, sound, and 
meaning.  Each must be considered as they are encountered in the marketplace.”  
 
In Sleekcraft, we concluded that the marks “Sleekcraft” and “Slickcraft” were similar in 
terms of sight, sound, and meaning by examining the actual situations in which consumers 
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were likely to read, hear, and consider the meaning of the terms.  Such an inquiry is 
impossible here where the consumer does not confront two distinct trademarks.  Rather, 
after entering one company’s mark as a search term, the consumer sees a competitor’s 
sponsored link that displays neither company’s trademarks.  The district court erroneously 
treated “ActiveBatch,” the keyword purchased by Network, as conceptually separate from 
ActiveBatch the trademark owned by Systems.  This is an artificial distinction that does 
not reflect what consumers “encountered in the marketplace.”  Again, however, because the 
consumer keys in Systems’ trademark, which results in Network’s sponsored link, 
depending on the labeling and appearance of the advertisement, including whether it 
identifies Network’s own mark, and the degree of care and sophistication of the consumer, 
it could be helpful in determining initial interest confusion. 
 
4. Evidence of Actual Confusion 
 
“[A] showing of actual confusion among significant numbers of consumers provides strong 
support for the likelihood of confusion.”  However, “actual confusion is not necessary to a 
finding of likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.”  Indeed, “[p]roving actual 
confusion is difficult ... and the courts have often discounted such evidence because it was 
unclear or insubstantial.” 
 
In Playboy, the expert report showing a significant number of users were confused by the 
keying practice at issue was strong evidence that Playboy’s infringement claim should be 
allowed to proceed.  Playboy, however, was decided at the summary judgment stage, 
whereas here we examine a sparse record supporting preliminary injunctive relief.  As the 
district court noted, neither Network nor Systems provided evidence regarding actual 
confusion, which is not surprising given the procedural posture.  Therefore, while this is a 
relevant factor for determining the likelihood of confusion in keyword advertising cases, its 
importance is diminished at the preliminary injunction stage of the proceedings.  The 
district court correctly concluded that this factor should be accorded no weight. 
 
5. Marketing Channels 
 
“Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion.”  In Sleekcraft, the 
two products were sold in niche marketplaces, including boat shows, specialty retail outlets, 
and trade magazines.  However, this factor becomes less important when the marketing 
channel is less obscure.  Today, it would be the rare commercial retailer that did not 
advertise online, and the shared use of a ubiquitous marketing channel does not shed much 
light on the likelihood of consumer confusion.  See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1028 (“Given the 
broad use of the Internet today, the same could be said for countless companies. Thus, this 
factor merits little weight.”). 
 
Therefore, the district court’s determination that because both parties advertise on the 
Internet this factor weighed in favor of Systems was incorrect. 
 
6. Type of Goods and Degree of Care 
 
“Low consumer care ... increases the likelihood of confusion.”  “In assessing the likelihood of 
confusion to the public, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer exercising 
ordinary caution.... When the buyer has expertise in the field, a higher standard is proper 
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though it will not preclude a finding that confusion is likely.  Similarly, when the goods are 
expensive, the buyer can be expected to exercise greater care in his purchases; again, 
though, confusion may still be likely.” 
 
The nature of the goods and the type of consumer is highly relevant to determining the 
likelihood of confusion in the keyword advertising context.  A sophisticated consumer of 
business software exercising a high degree of care is more likely to understand the 
mechanics of Internet search engines and the nature of sponsored links, whereas an un-
savvy consumer exercising less care is more likely to be confused.  The district court 
determined that this factor weighed in Systems’ favor because “there is generally a low 
degree of care exercised by Internet consumers.”  However, the degree of care analysis 
cannot begin and end at the marketing channel.  We still must consider the nature and cost 
of the goods, and whether “the products being sold are marketed primarily to expert 
buyers.” 
 
In Brookfield, the websites were visited by both sophisticated entertainment industry 
professionals and amateur film fans, which supported the conclusion that at least some of 
the consumers were likely to exercise a low degree of care.  In Playboy, the relevant 
consumer was looking for cheap, interchangeable adult-oriented material, which similarly 
led to our court’s finding that the consumers at issue would exercise a low degree of care.  
In both cases, we looked beyond the medium itself and to the nature of the particular goods 
and the relevant consumers. 
 
We have recently acknowledged that the default degree of consumer care is becoming more 
heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and online commerce becomes 
commonplace. In Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), we vacated a 
preliminary injunction that prohibited a pair of automobile brokers from using Toyota’s 
“Lexus” mark in their domain names.  We determined that it was unlikely that a 
reasonably prudent consumer would be confused into believing that a domain name that 
included a product name would necessarily have a formal affiliation with the maker of the 
product, as “[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite 
sophisticated about such matters.”  The Tabari panel reasoned, 
 
 [I]n the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 lines, reasonable, prudent 
and experienced internet consumers are accustomed to such exploration by 
trial and error.  They skip from site to site, ready to hit the back button 
whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.  They fully expect to find 
some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain 
name or search engine summary.  Outside the special case of ... domains that 
actively claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form 
any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen 
the landing page—if then. 
 
We further explained that we expect consumers searching for expensive products online to 
be even more sophisticated.  Id. at 1176 (“Unreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced web-
shoppers are not relevant.”). 
 
Therefore the district court improperly concluded that this factor weighed in Systems’ favor 
based on a conclusion reached by our court more than a decade ago in Brookfield and 
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GoTo.com that Internet users on the whole exercise a low degree of care.  While the 
statement may have been accurate then, we suspect that there are many contexts in which 
it no longer holds true. 
 
7. Defendant’s Intent 
 
“When the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to another’s, reviewing courts 
presume that the defendant can accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be 
deceived.”  Nevertheless, we have also “recognized that liability for infringement may not 
be imposed for using a registered trademark in connection with truthful comparative 
advertising.” 
 
Therefore, much like the proximity of the goods, the defendant’s intent may be relevant 
here, but only insofar as it bolsters a finding that the use of the trademark serves to 
mislead consumers rather than truthfully inform them of their choice of products.  The 
district court incorrectly considered the intent factor in isolation, and concluded that it 
weighed in Systems’ favor without first determining that Network intended to deceive 
consumers rather than compare its product to ActiveBatch. 
 
8. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines 
 
“Inasmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater protection against competing goods, a 
‘strong possibility’ that either party may expand his business to compete with the other will 
weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing.  When goods are closely related, 
any expansion is likely to result in direct competition.”  Where two companies are direct 
competitors, this factor is unimportant.  Therefore, the district court correctly declined to 
consider the likelihood of expansion. 
 
9. Other Relevant Factors 
 
The eight Sleekcraft factors are “not exhaustive. Other variables may come into play 
depending on the particular facts presented.”  In the keyword advertising context the 
“likelihood of confusion will ultimately turn on what the consumer saw on the screen and 
reasonably believed, given the context.”  Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 
2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009).6  In Playboy, we found it important that the consumers saw 
banner advertisements that were “confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”  We noted that 
clear labeling “might eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this 
case.” 
 
The appearance of the advertisements and their surrounding context on the user’s screen 
are similarly important here.  The district court correctly examined the text of Network’s 
sponsored links, concluding that the advertisements did not clearly identify their source.  
However, the district court did not consider the surrounding context.  In Playboy, we also 
                                                 
6 The Hearts on Fire court identified a new seven-factor test to determine whether there is a likelihood of 
consumer confusion arising from a firm’s use of a competitor’s trademark as a search engine keyword triggering 
its own sponsored links.  Network urges us to adopt the Hearts on Fire factors.  While we agree that the 
decision’s reasoning is useful, we decline to add another multi-factor test to the extant eight-factor Sleekcraft 
test. 
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found it important that Netscape’s search engine did not clearly segregate the sponsored 
advertisements from the objective results.  Here, even if Network has not clearly identified 
itself in the text of its ads, Google and Bing have partitioned their search results pages so 
that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for “sponsored” links.  The 
labeling and appearance of the advertisements as they appear on the results page includes 
more than the text of the advertisement, and must be considered as a whole. 
 
C. 
 
Given the nature of the alleged infringement here, the most relevant factors to the analysis 
of the likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual 
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 
and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on 
the screen displaying the results page. 
 
The district court did not weigh the Sleekcraft factors flexibly to match the specific facts of 
this case.  It relied on the Internet “troika,” which is highly illuminating in the context of 
domain names, but which fails to discern whether there is a likelihood of confusion in a 
keywords case. Because the linchpin of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, the 
district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction…. 
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Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2010). 
Sack, Circuit Judge. 
 
eBay, Inc. (“eBay”), through its eponymous online marketplace, has revolutionized the 
online sale of goods, especially used goods. It has facilitated the buying and selling by 
hundreds of millions of people and entities, to their benefit and eBay’s profit. But that 
marketplace is sometimes employed by users as a means to perpetrate fraud by selling 
counterfeit goods. 
 
Plaintiffs Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and Company (together, “Tiffany”) have created and 
cultivated a brand of jewelry bespeaking high-end quality and style. Based on Tiffany’s 
concern that some use eBay’s website to sell counterfeit Tiffany merchandise, Tiffany has 
instituted this action against eBay, asserting various causes of action—sounding in 
trademark infringement, trademark dilution and false advertising—arising from eBay’s 
advertising and listing practices. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district 
court’s judgment with respect to Tiffany’s claims of trademark infringement and dilution 
but remand for further proceedings with respect to Tiffany’s false advertising claim. 
 
BACKGROUND… 
 
eBay 
eBay is the proprietor of www.ebay.com, an Internet-based marketplace that allows those 
who register with it to purchase goods from and sell goods to one another. It “connect[s] 
buyers and sellers and [ ] enable[s] transactions, which are carried out directly between 
eBay members.” In its auction and listing services, it “provides the venue for the sale [of 
goods] and support for the transaction[s], [but] it does not itself sell the items” listed for 
sale on the site, nor does it ever take physical possession of them. Thus, “eBay generally 
does not know whether or when an item is delivered to the buyer.” 
 
eBay has been enormously successful. More than six million new listings are posted on its 
site daily. At any given time it contains some 100 million listings. 
 
eBay generates revenue by charging sellers to use its listing services. For any listing, it 
charges an “insertion fee” based on the auction’s starting price for the goods being sold and 
ranges from $0.20 to $4.80. For any completed sale, it charges a “final value fee” that 
ranges from 5.25% to 10% of the final sale price of the item. Sellers have the option of 
purchasing, at additional cost, features “to differentiate their listings, such as a border or 
bold-faced type.” 
 
eBay also generates revenue through a company named PayPal, which it owns and which 
allows users to process their purchases. PayPal deducts, as a fee for each transaction that it 
processes, 1.9% to 2.9% of the transaction amount, plus $0.30. This gives eBay an added 
incentive to increase both the volume and the price of the goods sold on its website.  
 
Tiffany 
Tiffany is a world-famous purveyor of, among other things, branded jewelry. Since 2000, all 
new Tiffany jewelry sold in the United States has been available exclusively through 
Tiffany’s retail stores, catalogs, and website, and through its Corporate Sales Department. 
It does not use liquidators, sell overstock merchandise, or put its goods on sale at 
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discounted prices. It does not—nor can it, for that matter—control the “legitimate 
secondary market in authentic Tiffany silvery jewelry,” i.e., the market for second-hand 
Tiffany wares. The record developed at trial “offere[d] little basis from which to discern the 
actual availability of authentic Tiffany silver jewelry in the secondary market.” 
 
Sometime before 2004, Tiffany became aware that counterfeit Tiffany merchandise was 
being sold on eBay’s site. Prior to and during the course of this litigation, Tiffany conducted 
two surveys known as “Buying Programs,” one in 2004 and another in 2005, in an attempt 
to assess the extent of this practice. Under those programs, Tiffany bought various items on 
eBay and then inspected and evaluated them to determine how many were counterfeit. 
Tiffany found that 73.1% of the purported Tiffany goods purchased in the 2004 Buying 
Program and 75.5% of those purchased in the 2005 Buying Program were counterfeit. The 
district court concluded, however, that the Buying Programs were “methodologically flawed 
and of questionable value,” and “provide[d] limited evidence as to the total percentage of 
counterfeit goods available on eBay at any given time.” The court nonetheless decided that 
during the period in which the Buying Programs were in effect, a “significant portion of the 
‘Tiffany’ sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website ... was counterfeit,” and that eBay 
knew “that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.” The 
court found, however, that “a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are [also] sold 
on eBay.” 
 
Reducing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including genuine 
Tiffany pieces, through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: It would 
diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise. See id. at 510 n. 
36 (noting that “there is at least some basis in the record for eBay’s assertion that one of 
Tiffany’s goals in pursuing this litigation is to shut down the legitimate secondary market 
in authentic Tiffany goods”). The immediate effect would be loss of revenue to eBay, even 
though there might be a countervailing gain by eBay resulting from increased consumer 
confidence about the bona fides of other goods sold through its website. 
 
Anti-Counterfeiting Measures 
Because eBay facilitates many sales of Tiffany goods, genuine and otherwise, and obtains 
revenue on every transaction, it generates substantial revenues from the sale of purported 
Tiffany goods, some of which are counterfeit. “eBay’s Jewelry & Watches category manager 
estimated that, between April 2000 and June 2004, eBay earned $4.1 million in revenue 
from completed listings with ‘Tiffany’ in the listing title in the Jewelry & Watches 
category.” Although eBay was generating revenue from all sales of goods on its site, 
including counterfeit goods, the district court found eBay to have “an interest in eliminating 
counterfeit Tiffany merchandise from eBay ... to preserve the reputation of its website as a 
safe place to do business.” The buyer of fake Tiffany goods might, if and when the forgery 
was detected, fault eBay. Indeed, the district court found that “buyers ... complain[ed] to 
eBay” about the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods. “[D]uring the last six weeks of 2004, 125 
consumers complained to eBay about purchasing ‘Tiffany’ items through the eBay website 
that they believed to be counterfeit.” 
 
Because eBay “never saw or inspected the merchandise in the listings,” its ability to 
determine whether a particular listing was for counterfeit goods was limited. Even had it 
been able to inspect the goods, moreover, in many instances it likely would not have had the 
expertise to determine whether they were counterfeit. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, eBay spent “as much as $20 million each year on tools 
to promote trust and safety on its website.” For example, eBay and PayPal set up “buyer 
protection programs,” under which, in certain circumstances, the buyer would be 
reimbursed for the cost of items purchased on eBay that were discovered not to be genuine. 
eBay also established a “Trust and Safety” department, with some 4,000 employees 
“devoted to trust and safety” issues, including over 200 who “focus exclusively on combating 
infringement” and 70 who “work exclusively with law enforcement.” 
 
By May 2002, eBay had implemented a “fraud engine,” “which is principally dedicated to 
ferreting out illegal listings, including counterfeit listings.” eBay had theretofore employed 
manual searches for keywords in listings in an effort to “identify blatant instances of 
potentially infringing ... activity.” “The fraud engine uses rules and complex models that 
automatically search for activity that violates eBay policies.” In addition to identifying 
items actually advertised as counterfeit, the engine also incorporates various filters 
designed to screen out less-obvious instances of counterfeiting using “data elements 
designed to evaluate listings based on, for example, the seller’s Internet protocol address, 
any issues associated with the seller’s account on eBay, and the feedback the seller has 
received from other eBay users.” In addition to general filters, the fraud engine 
incorporates “Tiffany-specific filters,” including “approximately 90 different keywords” 
designed to help distinguish between genuine and counterfeit Tiffany goods. During the 
period in dispute, eBay also “periodically conducted [manual] reviews of listings in an effort 
to remove those that might be selling counterfeit goods, including Tiffany goods.” 
 
For nearly a decade, including the period at issue, eBay has also maintained and 
administered the “Verified Rights Owner (‘VeRO’) Program”—a “‘notice-and-takedown’ 
system” allowing owners of intellectual property rights, including Tiffany, to “report to 
eBay any listing offering potentially infringing items, so that eBay could remove such 
reported listings.” Any such rights-holder with a “good-faith belief that [a particular listed] 
item infringed on a copyright or a trademark” could report the item to eBay, using a “Notice 
Of Claimed Infringement form or NOCI form.” During the period under consideration, 
eBay’s practice was to remove reported listings within twenty-four hours of receiving a 
NOCI, but eBay in fact deleted seventy to eighty percent of them within twelve hours of 
notification. 
 
On receipt of a NOCI, if the auction or sale had not ended, eBay would, in addition to 
removing the listing, cancel the bids and inform the seller of the reason for the cancellation. 
If bidding had ended, eBay would retroactively cancel the transaction. In the event of a 
cancelled auction, eBay would refund the fees it had been paid in connection with the 
auction. 
 
In some circumstances, eBay would reimburse the buyer for the cost of a purchased item, 
provided the buyer presented evidence that the purchased item was counterfeit. During the 
relevant time period, the district court found, eBay “never refused to remove a reported 
Tiffany listing, acted in good faith in responding to Tiffany’s NOCIs, and always provided 
Tiffany with the seller’s contact information.”  
 
In addition, eBay has allowed rights owners such as Tiffany to create an “About Me” 
webpage on eBay’s website “to inform eBay users about their products, intellectual property 
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rights, and legal positions.” eBay does not exercise control over the content of those pages in 
a manner material to the issues before us. 
 
Tiffany, not eBay, maintains the Tiffany “About Me” page. With the headline “BUYER 
BEWARE,” the page begins: “Most of the purported TIFFANY & CO. silver jewelry 
and packaging available on eBay is counterfeit.” It also says, inter alia: 
 
The only way you can be certain that you are purchasing a genuine TIFFANY 
& CO. product is to purchase it from a Tiffany & Co. retail store, via our 
website (www.tiffany.com) or through a Tiffany & Co. catalogue. Tiffany & 
Co. stores do not authenticate merchandise. A good jeweler or appraiser may 
be able to do this for you. 
 
In 2003 or early 2004, eBay began to use “special warning messages when a seller 
attempted to list a Tiffany item.” These messages “instructed the seller to make sure that 
the item was authentic Tiffany merchandise and informed the seller that eBay ‘does not 
tolerate the listing of replica, counterfeit, or otherwise unauthorized items’ and that 
violation of this policy ‘could result in suspension of [the seller’s] account.’” The messages 
also provided a link to Tiffany’s “About Me” page with its “buyer beware” disclaimer. If the 
seller “continued to list an item despite the warning, the listing was flagged for review.” 
 
In addition to cancelling particular suspicious transactions, eBay has also suspended from 
its website “‘hundreds of thousands of sellers every year,’ tens of thousands of whom were 
suspected [of] having engaged in infringing conduct.” eBay primarily employed a “‘three 
strikes rule’” for suspensions, but would suspend sellers after the first violation if it was 
clear that “the seller ‘listed a number of infringing items,’ and ‘[selling counterfeit 
merchandise] appears to be the only thing they’ve come to eBay to do.’” But if “a seller 
listed a potentially infringing item but appeared overall to be a legitimate seller, the 
‘infringing items [were] taken down, and the seller [would] be sent a warning on the first 
offense and given the educational information, [and] told that ... if they do this again, they 
will be suspended from eBay.’”5  
 
By late 2006, eBay had implemented additional anti-fraud measures: delaying the ability of 
buyers to view listings of certain brand names, including Tiffany’s, for 6 to 12 hours so as to 
give rights-holders such as Tiffany more time to review those listings; developing the ability 
to assess the number of items listed in a given listing; and restricting one-day and three-
day auctions and cross-border trading for some brand-name items. 
 
The district court concluded that “eBay consistently took steps to improve its technology 
and develop anti-fraud measures as such measures became technologically feasible and 
reasonably available.” 
 
                                                 
5 According to the district court, “eBay took appropriate steps to warn and then to suspend sellers when eBay 
learned of potential trademark infringement under that seller’s account.” The district court concluded that it 
was understandable that eBay did not have a “hard-and-fast, one-strike rule” of suspending sellers because a 
NOCI “did not constitute a definitive finding that the listed item was counterfeit” and because “suspension was 
a very serious matter, particularly to those sellers who relied on eBay for their livelihoods.” The district court 
ultimately found eBay’s policy to be “appropriate and effective in preventing sellers from returning to eBay and 
re-listing potentially counterfeit merchandise.” 
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eBay’s Advertising 
At the same time that eBay was attempting to reduce the sale of counterfeit items on its 
website, it actively sought to promote sales of premium and branded jewelry, including 
Tiffany merchandise, on its site. Among other things, 
 
eBay “advised its sellers to take advantage of the demand for Tiffany 
merchandise as part of a broader effort to grow the Jewelry & Watches 
category.” And prior to 2003, eBay advertised the availability of Tiffany 
merchandise on its site. eBay’s advertisements trumpeted “Mother’s Day 
Gifts!,” a “Fall FASHION BRAND BLOWOUT,” “Jewelry Best Sellers,” 
“GREAT BRANDS, GREAT PRICES,” or “Top Valentine’s Deals,” among 
other promotions. It encouraged the viewer to “GET THE FINER THINGS.” 
These advertisements provided the reader with hyperlinks, at least one of 
each of which was related to Tiffany merchandise—”Tiffany,” “Tiffany & Co. 
under $150,” “Tiffany & Co,” “Tiffany Rings,” or “Tiffany & Co. under $50.” 
 
eBay also purchased sponsored-link advertisements on various search engines to promote 
the availability of Tiffany items on its website. In one such case, in the form of a printout of 
the results list from a search on Yahoo! for “tiffany,” the second sponsored link read 
“Tiffany on eBay. Find tiffany items at low prices. With over 5 million items for sale every 
day, you’ll find all kinds of unique [unreadable] Marketplace. www.ebay.com.” Tiffany 
complained to eBay of the practice in 2003, and eBay told Tiffany that it had ceased buying 
sponsored links. The district court found, however, that eBay continued to do so indirectly 
through a third party…. 
 
DISCUSSION… 
 
I. Direct Trademark Infringement 
 
Tiffany alleges that eBay infringed its trademark in violation of section 32 of the Lanham 
Act. The district court described this as a claim of “direct trademark infringement,” and we 
adopt that terminology. Under section 32, “the owner of a mark registered with the Patent 
and Trademark Office can bring a civil action against a person alleged to have used the 
mark without the owner’s consent.” We analyze such a claim “under a familiar two-prong 
test. The test looks first to whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection, and second 
to whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumers confusion as to the 
origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.” 
 
In the district court, Tiffany argued that eBay had directly infringed its mark by using it on 
eBay’s website and by purchasing sponsored links containing the mark on Google and 
Yahoo! Tiffany also argued that eBay and the sellers of the counterfeit goods using its site 
were jointly and severally liable. The district court rejected these arguments on the ground 
that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark was protected by the doctrine of nominative fair use. 
 
The doctrine of nominative fair use allows “[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark to 
identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the source of 
[the] defendant’s product or the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.” The doctrine 
apparently originated in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. To fall within the 
protection, according to that court: “First, the product or service in question must be one 
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not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or 
marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, 
the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.”  
 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has endorsed these principles. We have referred 
to the doctrine, albeit without adopting or rejecting it. Other circuits have done similarly.  
 
We need not address the viability of the doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s claim, however. We 
have recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is 
necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or 
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant. “While a trademark conveys an exclusive 
right to the use of a mark in commerce in the area reserved, that right generally does not 
prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by its brand name, 
so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the owner of 
the product.”  
 
We agree with the district court that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark on its website and in 
sponsored links was lawful. eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany 
goods offered for sale on its website. And none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that 
Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its products through eBay’s 
website. 
 
In addition, the “About Me” page that Tiffany has maintained on eBay’s website since 2004 
states that “[m]ost of the purported ‘TIFFANY & CO.’ silver jewelry and packaging 
available on eBay is counterfeit.” The page further explained that Tiffany itself sells its 
products only through its own stores, catalogues, and website.  
 
Tiffany argues, however, that even if eBay had the right to use its mark with respect to the 
resale of genuine Tiffany merchandise, eBay infringed the mark because it knew or had 
reason to know that there was “a substantial problem with the sale of counterfeit [Tiffany] 
silver jewelry” on the eBay website. As we discuss below, eBay’s knowledge vel non that 
counterfeit Tiffany wares were offered through its website is relevant to the issue of 
whether eBay contributed to the direct infringement of Tiffany’s mark by the counterfeiting 
vendors themselves, or whether eBay bears liability for false advertising. But it is not a 
basis for a claim of direct trademark infringement against eBay, especially inasmuch as it 
is undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as 
counterfeit and took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany goods. To 
impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all of the purported 
Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine 
Tiffany goods. 
 
We conclude that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark in the described manner did not constitute 
direct trademark infringement. 
 
II. Contributory Trademark Infringement 
 
The more difficult issue, and the one that the parties have properly focused our attention 
on, is whether eBay is liable for contributory trademark infringement—i.e., for culpably 
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facilitating the infringing conduct of the counterfeiting vendors. Acknowledging the paucity 
of case law to guide us, we conclude that the district court correctly granted judgment on 
this issue in favor of eBay. 
 
A. Principles 
 
Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that derives from the 
common law of torts. The Supreme Court most recently dealt with the subject in Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). There, the plaintiff, Ives, 
asserted that several drug manufacturers had induced pharmacists to mislabel a drug the 
defendants produced to pass it off as Ives’. According to the Court, “if a manufacturer or 
distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to 
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.” The Court ultimately decided to remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals after concluding it had improperly rejected factual findings of the district 
court favoring the defendant manufacturers. 
 
Inwood’s test for contributory trademark infringement applies on its face to manufacturers 
and distributors of goods. Courts have, however, extended the test to providers of services. 
 
The Seventh Circuit applied Inwood to a lawsuit against the owner of a swap meet, or “flea 
market,” whose vendors were alleged to have sold infringing Hard Rock Café T-shirts. The 
court “treated trademark infringement as a species of tort,” and analogized the swap meet 
owner to a landlord or licensor, on whom the common law “imposes the same duty ... [as 
Inwood] impose[s] on manufacturers and distributors.” 
 
Speaking more generally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Inwood’s test for contributory 
trademark infringement applies to a service provider if he or she exercises sufficient control 
over the infringing conduct. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 
980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999); see also id. (“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality 
used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark permits the expansion of Inwood Lab.’s 
‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory infringement.”). 
 
We have apparently addressed contributory trademark infringement in only two related 
decisions, and even then in little detail. Citing Inwood, we said that “[a] distributor who 
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or continues to supply its product to 
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, is 
contributorially liable for any injury.”  
 
The limited case law leaves the law of contributory trademark infringement ill-defined. 
Although we are not the first court to consider the application of Inwood to the Internet, we 
are apparently the first to consider its application to an online marketplace.9 
 
                                                 
9 European courts have done so. A Belgian court declined to hold eBay liable for counterfeit cosmetic products 
sold through its website. French courts, by contrast, have concluded that eBay violated applicable trademark 
laws. 
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B. Discussion 
 
1. Does Inwood Apply? 
In the district court, the parties disputed whether eBay was subject to the Inwood test. 
eBay argued that it was not because it supplies a service while Inwood governs only 
manufacturers and distributors of products. The district court rejected that distinction. It 
adopted instead the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed to conclude that Inwood 
applies to a service provider who exercises sufficient control over the means of the 
infringing conduct. Looking “to the extent of the control exercised by eBay over its sellers’ 
means of infringement,” the district court concluded that Inwood applied in light of the 
“significant control” eBay retained over the transactions and listings facilitated by and 
conducted through its website.  
 
On appeal, eBay no longer maintains that it is not subject to Inwood. We therefore assume 
without deciding that Inwood’s test for contributory trademark infringement governs. 
 
2. Is eBay Liable Under Inwood? 
The question that remains, then, is whether eBay is liable under the Inwood test on the 
basis of the services it provided to those who used its website to sell counterfeit Tiffany 
products. As noted, when applying Inwood to service providers, there are two ways in which 
a defendant may become contributorially liable for the infringing conduct of another: first, 
if the service provider “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark,” and second, 
if the service provider “continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason 
to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. Tiffany does not 
argue that eBay induced the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods on its website-the 
circumstances addressed by the first part of the Inwood test. It argues instead, under the 
second part of the Inwood test, that eBay continued to supply its services to the sellers of 
counterfeit Tiffany goods while knowing or having reason to know that such sellers were 
infringing Tiffany’s mark. 
 
The district court rejected this argument. First, it concluded that to the extent the NOCIs 
that Tiffany submitted gave eBay reason to know that particular listings were for 
counterfeit goods, eBay did not continue to carry those listings once it learned that they 
were specious. The court found that eBay’s practice was promptly to remove the challenged 
listing from its website, warn sellers and buyers, cancel fees it earned from that listing, and 
direct buyers not to consummate the sale of the disputed item. The court therefore declined 
to hold eBay contributorially liable for the infringing conduct of those sellers. On appeal, 
Tiffany does not appear to challenge this conclusion. In any event, we agree with the 
district court that no liability arises with respect to those terminated listings. 
 
Tiffany disagrees vigorously, however, with the district court’s further determination that 
eBay lacked sufficient knowledge of trademark infringement by sellers behind other, non-
terminated listings to provide a basis for Inwood liability. Tiffany argued in the district 
court that eBay knew, or at least had reason to know, that counterfeit Tiffany goods were 
being sold ubiquitously on its website. As evidence, it pointed to, inter alia, the demand 
letters it sent to eBay in 2003 and 2004, the results of its Buying Programs that it shared 
with eBay, the thousands of NOCIs it filed with eBay alleging its good faith belief that 
certain listings were counterfeit, and the various complaints eBay received from buyers 
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claiming that they had purchased one or more counterfeit Tiffany items through eBay’s 
website. Tiffany argued that taken together, this evidence established eBay’s knowledge of 
the widespread sale of counterfeit Tiffany products on its website. Tiffany urged that eBay 
be held contributorially liable on the basis that despite that knowledge, it continued to 
make its services available to infringing sellers.  
 
The district court rejected this argument. It acknowledged that “[t]he evidence produced at 
trial demonstrated that eBay had generalized notice that some portion of the Tiffany goods 
sold on its website might be counterfeit.” The court characterized the issue before it as 
“whether eBay’s generalized knowledge of trademark infringement on its website was 
sufficient to meet the ‘knowledge or reason to know’ prong of the Inwood test.” eBay had 
argued that “such generalized knowledge is insufficient, and that the law demands more 
specific knowledge of individual instances of infringement and infringing sellers before 
imposing a burden upon eBay to remedy the problem.” 
 
The district court concluded that “while eBay clearly possessed general knowledge as to 
counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge is insufficient under the Inwood 
test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem.” The court reasoned 
that Inwood’s language explicitly imposes contributory liability on a defendant who 
“continues to supply its product [—in eBay’s case, its service—] to one whom it knows or 
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” The court also noted that 
plaintiffs “bear a high burden in establishing ‘knowledge’ of contributory infringement,” and 
that courts have 
 
been reluctant to extend contributory trademark liability to defendants 
where there is some uncertainty as to the extent or the nature of the 
infringement. In Inwood, Justice White emphasized in his concurring opinion 
that a defendant is not “require[d] ... to refuse to sell to dealers who merely 
might pass off its goods.” 
 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that for Tiffany to establish eBay’s contributory 
liability, Tiffany would have to show that eBay “knew or had reason to know of specific 
instances of actual infringement” beyond those that it addressed upon learning of them. 
Tiffany failed to make such a showing. 
 
On appeal, Tiffany argues that the distinction drawn by the district court between eBay’s 
general knowledge of the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods through its website, and its 
specific knowledge as to which particular sellers were making such sales, is a “false” one 
not required by the law. Tiffany posits that the only relevant question is “whether all of the 
knowledge, when taken together, puts [eBay] on notice that there is a substantial problem 
of trademark infringement. If so and if it fails to act, [eBay] is liable for contributory 
trademark infringement.”  
 
We agree with the district court. For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a 
service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its 
service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which 
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary. 
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We are not persuaded by Tiffany’s proposed interpretation of Inwood. Tiffany understands 
the “lesson of Inwood” to be that an action for contributory trademark infringement lies 
where “the evidence [of infringing activity]—direct or circumstantial, taken as a whole—... 
provide[s] a basis for finding that the defendant knew or should have known that its 
product or service was being used to further illegal counterfeiting activity.” We think that 
Tiffany reads Inwood too broadly. Although the Inwood Court articulated a “knows or has 
reason to know” prong in setting out its contributory liability test, the Court explicitly 
declined to apply that prong to the facts then before it. The Court applied only the 
inducement prong of the test. 
 
We therefore do not think that Inwood establishes the contours of the “knows or has reason 
to know” prong. Insofar as it speaks to the issue, though, the particular phrasing that the 
Court used—that a defendant will be liable if it “continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement” (emphasis 
added)—supports the district court’s interpretation of Inwood, not Tiffany’s. 
 
We find helpful the Supreme Court’s discussion of Inwood in a subsequent copyright case, 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). There, 
defendant Sony manufactured and sold home video tape recorders. Plaintiffs Universal 
Studios and Walt Disney Productions held copyrights on various television programs that 
individual television-viewers had taped using the defendant’s recorders. The plaintiffs 
contended that this use of the recorders constituted copyright infringement for which the 
defendants should be held contributorily liable. In ruling for the defendants, the Court 
discussed Inwood and the differences between contributory liability in trademark versus 
copyright law. 
 
If Inwood’s narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement 
governed here, [the plaintiffs’] claim of contributory infringement would 
merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not ‘intentionally induce[ ]’ its 
customers to make infringing uses of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights, nor does it 
supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging in 
continuing infringement of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights. 
 
(emphases added). 
 
Thus, the Court suggested, had the Inwood standard applied in Sony, the fact that Sony 
might have known that some portion of the purchasers of its product used it to violate the 
copyrights of others would not have provided a sufficient basis for contributory liability. 
Inwood’s “narrow standard” would have required knowledge by Sony of “identified 
individuals” engaging in infringing conduct. Tiffany’s reading of Inwood is therefore 
contrary to the interpretation of that case set forth in Sony. 
 
Although the Supreme Court’s observations in Sony, a copyright case, about the “knows or 
has reason to know” prong of the contributory trademark infringement test set forth in 
Inwood were dicta, they constitute the only discussion of that prong by the Supreme Court 
of which we are aware. We think them to be persuasive authority here. 
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Applying Sony’s interpretation of Inwood, we agree with the district court that “Tiffany’s 
general allegations of counterfeiting failed to provide eBay with the knowledge required 
under Inwood.” Tiffany’s demand letters and Buying Programs did not identify particular 
sellers who Tiffany thought were then offering or would offer counterfeit goods.13 And 
although the NOCIs and buyer complaints gave eBay reason to know that certain sellers 
had been selling counterfeits, those sellers’ listings were removed and repeat offenders were 
suspended from the eBay site. Thus Tiffany failed to demonstrate that eBay was supplying 
its service to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit Tiffany 
goods. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court insofar as it holds that eBay is not 
contributorially liable for trademark infringement. 
 
3. Willful Blindness. 
Tiffany and its amici express their concern that if eBay is not held liable except when 
specific counterfeit listings are brought to its attention, eBay will have no incentive to root 
out such listings from its website. They argue that this will effectively require Tiffany and 
similarly situated retailers to police eBay’s website—and many others like it—”24 hours a 
day, and 365 days a year.” They urge that this is a burden that most mark holders cannot 
afford to bear. 
 
First, and most obviously, we are interpreting the law and applying it to the facts of this 
case. We could not, even if we thought it wise, revise the existing law in order to better 
serve one party’s interests at the expense of the other’s. 
 
But we are also disposed to think, and the record suggests, that private market forces give 
eBay and those operating similar businesses a strong incentive to minimize the counterfeit 
goods sold on their websites. eBay received many complaints from users claiming to have 
been duped into buying counterfeit Tiffany products sold on eBay. The risk of alienating 
these users gives eBay a reason to identify and remove counterfeit listings.14 Indeed, it has 
spent millions of dollars in that effort. 
 
Moreover, we agree with the district court that if eBay had reason to suspect that 
counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, and intentionally shielded 
itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them, eBay 
might very well have been charged with knowledge of those sales sufficient to satisfy 
Inwood’s “knows or has reason to know” prong. A service provider is not, we think, 
permitted willful blindness. When it has reason to suspect that users of its service are 
infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular 
infringing transactions by looking the other way.15 In the words of the Seventh Circuit, 
“willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”  
                                                 
13 The demand letters did say that eBay should presume that sellers offering five or more Tiffany goods were 
selling counterfeits, but we agree with the district court that this presumption was factually unfounded. 
14 At the same time, we appreciate the argument that insofar as eBay receives revenue from undetected 
counterfeit listings and sales through the fees it charges, it has an incentive to permit such listings and sales to 
continue. 
15 To be clear, a service provider is not contributorially liable under Inwood merely for failing to anticipate that 
others would use its service to infringe a protected mark. But contributory liability may arise where a defendant 
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eBay appears to concede that it knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products 
were listed and sold through its website. Without more, however, this knowledge is 
insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood. The district court found, after careful 
consideration, that eBay was not willfully blind to the counterfeit sales. That finding is not 
clearly erroneous.17 eBay did not ignore the information it was given about counterfeit sales 
on its website. 
 
III. Trademark Dilution… 
 
The district court rejected Tiffany’s dilution by blurring claim on the ground that “eBay 
never used the TIFFANY Marks in an effort to create an association with its own product, 
but instead, used the marks directly to advertise and identify the availability of authentic 
Tiffany merchandise on the eBay website.” The court concluded that “just as the dilution by 
blurring claim fails because eBay has never used the [Tiffany] Marks to refer to eBay’s own 
product, the dilution by tarnishment claim also fails.” 
 
We agree. There is no second mark or product at issue here to blur with or to tarnish 
“Tiffany.” 
 
Tiffany argues that counterfeiting dilutes the value of its product. Perhaps. But insofar as 
eBay did not itself sell the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution…. 
 
IV. False Advertising 
 
Finally, Tiffany claims that eBay engaged in false advertising in violation of federal law. 
 
A. Principles 
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from, “in commercial advertising or 
promotion, misrepresent[ing] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of 
his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” A claim of false 
advertising may be based on at least one of two theories: “that the challenged 
advertisement is literally false, i.e., false on its face,” or “that the advertisement, while not 
literally false, is nevertheless likely to mislead or confuse consumers.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
is (as was eBay here) made aware that there was infringement on its site but (unlike eBay here) ignored that 
fact. 
17 Tiffany’s reliance on the “flea market” cases, Hard Rock Café and Fonovisa, is unavailing. eBay’s efforts to 
combat counterfeiting far exceeded the efforts made by the defendants in those cases. See Hard Rock Café, 955 
F.2d at 1146 (defendant did not investigate any of the seizures of counterfeit products at its swap meet, even 
though it knew they had occurred); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (concluding that plaintiff stated a claim for 
contributory trademark infringement based on allegation that swap meet “disregard[ed] its vendors’ blatant 
trademark infringements with impunity”). Moreover, neither case concluded that the defendant was willfully 
blind. The court in Hard Rock Café remanded so that the district court could apply the correct definition of 
“willful blindness,” and the court in Fonovisa merely sustained the plaintiff’s complaint against a motion to 
dismiss. 
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In either case, the “injuries redressed in false advertising cases are the result of public 
deception.” And “[u]nder either theory, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the false or 
misleading representation involved an inherent or material quality of the product.”  
 
Where an advertising claim is literally false, “the court may enjoin the use of the claim 
without reference to the advertisement’s impact on the buying public.” To succeed in a 
likelihood-of-confusion case where the statement at issue is not literally false, however, a 
plaintiff “must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to 
mislead or confuse consumers,” and must “demonstrate that a statistically significant part 
of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged 
advertisement.” 
 
B. Discussion 
 
eBay advertised the sale of Tiffany goods on its website in various ways. Among other 
things, eBay provided hyperlinks to “Tiffany,” “Tiffany & Co. under $150,” “Tiffany & Co.,” 
“Tiffany Rings,” and “Tiffany & Co. under $50.” eBay also purchased advertising space on 
search engines, in some instances providing a link to eBay’s site and exhorting the reader 
to “Find tiffany items at low prices.” Yet the district court found, and eBay does not deny, 
that “eBay certainly had generalized knowledge that Tiffany products sold on eBay were 
often counterfeit.” Tiffany argues that because eBay advertised the sale of Tiffany goods on 
its website, and because many of those goods were in fact counterfeit, eBay should be liable 
for false advertising. 
 
The district court rejected this argument. The court first concluded that the advertisements 
at issue were not literally false “[b]ecause authentic Tiffany merchandise is sold on eBay’s 
website,” even if counterfeit Tiffany products are sold there, too. 
 
The court then considered whether the advertisements, though not literally false, were 
nonetheless misleading. It concluded they were not for three reasons. First, the court found 
that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark in its advertising was “protected, nominative fair use.” 
Second, the court found that “Tiffany has not proven that eBay had specific knowledge as to 
the illicit nature of individual listings,” implying that such knowledge would be necessary 
to sustain a false advertising claim. Finally, the court reasoned that “to the extent that the 
advertising was false, the falsity was the responsibility of third party sellers, not eBay.”  
 
We agree with the district court that eBay’s advertisements were not literally false 
inasmuch as genuine Tiffany merchandise was offered for sale through eBay’s website. But 
we are unable to affirm on the record before us the district court’s further conclusion that 
eBay’s advertisements were not “likely to mislead or confuse consumers.”  
 
As noted, to evaluate Tiffany’s claim that eBay’s advertisements misled consumers, a court 
must determine whether extrinsic evidence indicates that the challenged advertisements 
were misleading or confusing. The reasons the district court gave for rejecting Tiffany’s 
claim do not seem to reflect this determination, though. The court’s first rationale was that 
eBay’s advertisements were nominative fair use of Tiffany’s mark. 
 
But, even if that is so, it does not follow that eBay did not use the mark in a misleading 
advertisement. It may, after all, constitute fair use for Brand X Coffee to use the trademark 
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of its competitor, Brand Y Coffee, in an advertisement stating that “In a blind taste test, 9 
out of 10 New Yorkers said they preferred Brand X Coffee to Brand Y Coffee.” But if 9 out of 
10 New Yorkers in a statistically significant sample did not say they preferred X to Y, or if 
they were paid to say that they did, then the advertisement would nonetheless be literally 
false in the first example, or misleading in the second. 
 
There is a similar difficulty with the district court’s reliance on the fact that eBay did not 
know which particular listings on its website offered counterfeit Tiffany goods. That is 
relevant, as we have said, to whether eBay committed contributory trademark 
infringement. But it sheds little light on whether the advertisements were misleading 
insofar as they implied the genuineness of Tiffany goods on eBay’s site. 
 
Finally, the district court reasoned that if eBay’s advertisements were misleading, that was 
only because the sellers of counterfeits made them so by offering inauthentic Tiffany goods. 
Again, this consideration is relevant to Tiffany’s direct infringement claim, but less 
relevant, if relevant at all, here. It is true that eBay did not itself sell counterfeit Tiffany 
goods; only the fraudulent vendors did, and that is in part why we conclude that eBay did 
not infringe Tiffany’s mark. But eBay did affirmatively advertise the goods sold through its 
site as Tiffany merchandise. The law requires us to hold eBay accountable for the words 
that it chose insofar as they misled or confused consumers. 
 
eBay and its amici warn of the deterrent effect that will grip online advertisers who are 
unable to confirm the authenticity of all of the goods they advertise for sale. We rather 
doubt that the consequences will be so dire. An online advertiser such as eBay need not 
cease its advertisements for a kind of goods only because it knows that not all of those 
goods are authentic. A disclaimer might suffice. But the law prohibits an advertisement 
that implies that all of the goods offered on a defendant’s website are genuine when in fact, 
as here, a sizeable proportion of them are not. 
 
Rather than vacate the judgment of the district court as to Tiffany’s false advertising claim, 
we think it prudent to remand the cause so that the district court, with its greater 
familiarity with the evidence, can reconsider the claim in light of what we have said. The 
case is therefore remanded…for further proceedings for the limited purpose of the district 
court’s re-examination of the false advertising claim in accordance with this opinion…. 
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VII. Pornography 
 
 
Pornography Glossary 
 
Obscenity is: “(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”  [Miller] 
Indecency is: “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory 
activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may 
be in the audience.”  [FCC definition, quoted in Pacifica] 
Compare the CDA: “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other 
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs.” 
Harmful to minor is:  “(a) patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for minors; (b) appeals to the 
prurient interests of minors; and (c) is utterly without redeeming social importance for 
minors.”  [Ginsberg] 
Compare COPA: “any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, 
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that (A) the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking 
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in 
a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual 
act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a 
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” 
Child pornography is: “works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a 
specified age, where the category of “sexual conduct” proscribed is suitably limited and 
described.”  [Ferber]  In the New York statute’s case, “sexual conduct” was defined as 
“actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, 
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.” 
Pornography is:  ????? 
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Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
Stevens, Justice. 
 
At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications on the Internet. Notwithstanding the 
legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful 
materials, we agree with the three-judge District Court that the statute abridges “the 
freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment. 
  
I 
 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact, most of which were based on a detailed 
stipulation prepared by the parties. The findings describe the character and the dimensions 
of the Internet, the availability of sexually explicit material in that medium, and the 
problems confronting age verification for recipients of Internet communications. Because 
those findings provide the underpinnings for the legal issues, we begin with a summary of 
the undisputed facts. 
 
The Internet 
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of 
what began in 1969 as a military program called “ARPANET,” which was designed to 
enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting 
defense-related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if 
some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer 
exists, it provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks that, 
eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate 
with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The 
Internet is “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”  
 
The Internet has experienced “extraordinary growth.” The number of “host” computers—
those that store information and relay communications—increased from about 300 in 1981 
to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are 
located in the United States. About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of trial, 
a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999. 
 
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources, generally hosts 
themselves or entities with a host affiliation. Most colleges and universities provide access 
for their students and faculty; many corporations provide their employees with access 
through an office network; many communities and local libraries provide free access; and 
an increasing number of storefront “computer coffee shops” provide access for a small 
hourly fee. Several major national “online services” such as America Online, CompuServe, 
the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to their own extensive proprietary 
networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of the Internet. These commercial 
online services had almost 12 million individual subscribers at the time of trial. 
 
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication 
and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly evolving and difficult to 
categorize precisely. But, as presently constituted, those most relevant to this case are 
electronic mail (e-mail), automatic mailing list services (“mail exploders,” sometimes 
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referred to as “listservs”), “newsgroups,” “chat rooms,” and the “World Wide Web.” All of 
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving 
video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium—known to its users 
as “cyberspace”—located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, 
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet. 
 
E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message—generally akin to a note or 
letter—to another individual or to a group of addressees. The message is generally stored 
electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient to check her “mailbox” and sometimes 
making its receipt known through some type of prompt. A mail exploder is a sort of e-mail 
group. Subscribers can send messages to a common e-mail address, which then forwards 
the message to the group’s other subscribers. Newsgroups also serve groups of regular 
participants, but these postings may be read by others as well. There are thousands of such 
groups, each serving to foster an exchange of information or opinion on a particular topic 
running the gamut from, say, the music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to 
the Chicago Bulls. About 100,000 new messages are posted every day. In most newsgroups, 
postings are automatically purged at regular intervals. In addition to posting a message 
that can be read later, two or more individuals wishing to communicate more immediately 
can enter a chat room to engage in real-time dialogue—in other words, by typing messages 
to one another that appear almost immediately on the others’ computer screens. The 
District Court found that at any given time “tens of thousands of users are engaging in 
conversations on a huge range of subjects.” It is “no exaggeration to conclude that the 
content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.” 
 
The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World Wide Web, which 
allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as well as, 
in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists 
of a vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world. Some of 
these documents are simply files containing information. However, more elaborate 
documents, commonly known as Web “pages,” are also prevalent. Each has its own 
address—”rather like a telephone number.” Web pages frequently contain information and 
sometimes allow the viewer to communicate with the page’s (or “site’s”) author. They 
generally also contain “links” to other documents created by that site’s author or to other 
(generally) related sites. Typically, the links are either blue or underlined text—sometimes 
images. 
 
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either type the address of a 
known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial “search engine” in an effort to 
locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular Web page may contain the information 
sought by the “surfer,” or, through its links, it may be an avenue to other documents located 
anywhere on the Internet. Users generally explore a given Web page, or move to another, 
by clicking a computer “mouse” on one of the page’s icons or links. Access to most Web 
pages is freely available, but some allow access only to those who have purchased the right 
from a commercial provider. The Web is thus comparable, from the readers’ viewpoint, to 
both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a 
sprawling mall offering goods and services. 
 
From the publishers’ point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from which to address and 
hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. 
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Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can “publish” 
information. Publishers include government agencies, educational institutions, commercial 
entities, advocacy groups, and individuals. Publishers may either make their material 
available to the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group, such as 
those willing to pay for the privilege. “No single organization controls any membership in 
the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or 
services can be blocked from the Web.” 
 
Sexually Explicit Material 
Sexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and chat and “extends 
from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core.” These files are created, named, and 
posted in the same manner as material that is not sexually explicit, and may be accessed 
either deliberately or unintentionally during the course of an imprecise search. “Once a 
provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any 
community.” Thus, for example, 
 
“when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site 
nudes by Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new 
exhibit will travel to Baltimore and New York City, those images are 
available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but also in 
Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing—wherever Internet users live. Similarly, the 
safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web site, written in 
street language so that the teenage receiver can understand them, are 
available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague.”  
 
Some of the communications over the Internet that originate in foreign countries are also 
sexually explicit. 
  
Though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter such content 
accidentally. “A document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before 
the document itself ... and in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a 
site’s content before he or she need take the step to access the document. Almost all 
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.” For that reason, the 
“odds are slim” that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident. Unlike 
communications received by radio or television, “the receipt of information on the Internet 
requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a 
dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and 
thereby to use the Internet unattended.”  
 
Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that may be available on 
a home computer with Internet access. A system may either limit a computer’s access to an 
approved list of sources that have been identified as containing no adult material, it may 
block designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block messages containing 
identifiable objectionable features. “Although parental control software currently can 
screen for certain suggestive words or for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now 
screen for sexually explicit images.” Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that “a reasonably 
effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually 
explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children 
will soon be widely available.”  
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Age Verification 
The problem of age verification differs for different uses of the Internet. The District Court 
categorically determined that there “is no effective way to determine the identity or the age 
of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat 
rooms.” The Government offered no evidence that there was a reliable way to screen 
recipients and participants in such forums for age. Moreover, even if it were technologically 
feasible to block minors’ access to newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of art, 
politics, or other subjects that potentially elicit “indecent” or “patently offensive” 
contributions, it would not be possible to block their access to that material and “still allow 
them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content 
was not indecent.”  
 
Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may condition access on the 
verification of requested information such as a credit card number or an adult password. 
Credit card verification is only feasible, however, either in connection with a commercial 
transaction in which the card is used, or by payment to a verification agency. Using credit 
card possession as a surrogate for proof of age would impose costs on non-commercial Web 
sites that would require many of them to shut down. For that reason, at the time of the 
trial, credit card verification was “effectively unavailable to a substantial number of 
Internet content providers.” Moreover, the imposition of such a requirement “would 
completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one 
from accessing any blocked material.”  
 
Commercial pornographic sites that charge their users for access have assigned them 
passwords as a method of age verification. The record does not contain any evidence 
concerning the reliability of these technologies. Even if passwords are effective for 
commercial purveyors of indecent material, the District Court found that an adult password 
requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial sites, both because they 
would discourage users from accessing their sites and because the cost of creating and 
maintaining such screening systems would be “beyond their reach.” 
 
In sum, the District Court found: 
 
“Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were 
implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to how such 
systems could ensure that the user of the password or credit card is in fact 
over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card verification and adult password 
verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a substantial 
number of Internet content providers.” 
 
II 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was an unusually important legislative enactment. As 
stated on the first of its 103 pages, its primary purpose was to reduce regulation and 
encourage “the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” The major 
components of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet; they were designed to 
promote competition in the local telephone service market, the multichannel video market, 
and the market for over-the-air broadcasting. The Act includes seven Titles, six of which 
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are the product of extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports 
prepared by Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By contrast, Title 
V—known as the “Communications Decency Act of 1996” (CDA)—contains provisions that 
were either added in executive committee after the hearings were concluded or as 
amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation. An amendment offered in the 
Senate was the source of the two statutory provisions challenged in this case. They are 
informally described as the “indecent transmission” provision and the “patently offensive 
display” provision. 
 
The first, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), prohibits the knowing transmission of 
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. It provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
“(a) Whoever- 
“(1) in interstate or foreign communications- 
. . . . . 
“(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly- 
“(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
“(ii) initiates the transmission of, 
“any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the 
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of 
such communication placed the call or initiated the communication; 
. . . . . 
“(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to 
be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be 
used for such activity, 
“shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.” 
 
The second provision, § 223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently 
offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age. It 
provides: 
 
“(d) Whoever- 
“(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly- 
“(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or 
persons under 18 years of age, or 
“(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to 
a person under 18 years of age, 
“any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or 
initiated the communication; or 
“(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person’s 
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent 
that it be used for such activity, 
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“shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.” 
 
The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. One covers those 
who take “good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” to restrict access by 
minors to the prohibited communications. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other covers those who 
restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such 
as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code. § 223(e)(5)(B)…. 
 
IV 
 
In arguing for reversal, the Government contends that the CDA is plainly constitutional 
under three of our prior decisions: (1) Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); (2) FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, (1978); and (3) Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41 (1986). A close look at these cases, however, raises—rather than relieves—doubts 
concerning the constitutionality of the CDA. 
 
In Ginsberg, we upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited selling 
to minors under 17 years of age material that was considered obscene as to them even if not 
obscene as to adults. We rejected the defendant’s broad submission that “the scope of the 
constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned 
with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor.” In 
rejecting that contention, we relied not only on the State’s independent interest in the well-
being of its youth, but also on our consistent recognition of the principle that “the parents’ 
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in 
the structure of our society.”  
 
In four important respects, the statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA. 
First, we noted in Ginsberg that “the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar 
parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.” Under the CDA, 
by contrast, neither the parents’ consent—nor even their participation—in the 
communication would avoid the application of the statute. Second, the New York statute 
applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA contains no such limitation. 
Third, the New York statute cabined its definition of material that is harmful to minors 
with the requirement that it be “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” 
The CDA fails to provide us with any definition of the term “indecent” as used in § 223(a)(1) 
and, importantly, omits any requirement that the “patently offensive” material covered by § 
223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Fourth, the New York 
statute defined a minor as a person under the age of 17, whereas the CDA, in applying to 
all those under 18 years, includes an additional year of those nearest majority. 
 
In Pacifica, we upheld a declaratory order of the Federal Communications Commission, 
holding that the broadcast of a recording of a 12-minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words” 
that had previously been delivered to a live audience “could have been the subject of 
administrative sanctions.” The Commission had found that the repetitive use of certain 
words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs “in an afternoon broadcast when 
children are in the audience was patently offensive” and concluded that the monologue was 
indecent “as broadcast.” The respondent did not quarrel with the finding that the afternoon 
broadcast was patently offensive, but contended that it was not “indecent” within the 
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meaning of the relevant statutes because it contained no prurient appeal. After rejecting 
respondent’s statutory arguments, we confronted its two constitutional arguments: (1) that 
the Commission’s construction of its authority to ban indecent speech was so broad that its 
order had to be set aside even if the broadcast at issue was unprotected; and (2) that since 
the recording was not obscene, the First Amendment forbade any abridgment of the right to 
broadcast it on the radio. 
 
In the portion of the lead opinion not joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun, the plurality 
stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that 
depends on the content of speech. Accordingly, the availability of constitutional protection 
for a vulgar and offensive monologue that was not obscene depended on the context of the 
broadcast. Relying on the premise that “of all forms of communication” broadcasting had 
received the most limited First Amendment protection, the Court concluded that the ease 
with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, “coupled with the concerns recognized 
in Ginsberg,” justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting. 
 
As with the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg, there are significant differences 
between the order upheld in Pacifica and the CDA. First, the order in Pacifica, issued by an 
agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast 
that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to 
designate when—rather than whether—it would be permissible to air such a program in 
that particular medium. The CDA’s broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to 
particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the 
unique characteristics of the Internet. Second, unlike the CDA, the Commission’s 
declaratory order was not punitive; we expressly refused to decide whether the indecent 
broadcast “would justify a criminal prosecution.” Finally, the Commission’s order applied to 
a medium which as a matter of history had “received the most limited First Amendment 
protection,” in large part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from 
unexpected program content. The Internet, however, has no comparable history. Moreover, 
the District Court found that the risk of encountering indecent material by accident is 
remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific material. 
 
In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential 
neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in the 
theaters, but rather at the “secondary effects”—such as crime and deteriorating property 
values—that these theaters fostered: “‘It is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning 
ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of “offensive” speech.’” According to the 
Government, the CDA is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of “cyberzoning” on the 
Internet. But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the 
purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of “indecent” and 
“patently offensive” speech, rather than any “secondary” effect of such speech. Thus, the 
CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be “properly 
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.” 
 
These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent 
with the application of the most stringent review of its provisions. 
 
V 
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In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975), we observed that 
“[e]ach medium of expression ... may present its own problems.” Thus, some of our cases 
have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not 
applicable to other speakers. In these cases, the Court relied on the history of extensive 
Government regulation of the broadcast medium; the scarcity of available frequencies at its 
inception; and its “invasive” nature. 
 
Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the 
CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of 
government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry. 
Moreover, the Internet is not as “invasive” as radio or television. The District Court 
specifically found that “[c]ommunications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an individual’s 
home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content ‘by 
accident.’” It also found that “[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings 
as to the content,” and cited testimony that “‘odds are slim’ that a user would come across a 
sexually explicit sight by accident.”  
 
We distinguished Pacifica in Sable, 492 U.S., at 128, on just this basis. In Sable, a company 
engaged in the business of offering sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages 
(popularly known as “dial-a-porn”) challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the 
Communications Act of 1934 that imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as well as 
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. We held that the statute was 
constitutional insofar as it applied to obscene messages but invalid as applied to indecent 
messages. In attempting to justify the complete ban and criminalization of indecent 
commercial telephone messages, the Government relied on Pacifica, arguing that the ban 
was necessary to prevent children from gaining access to such messages. We agreed that 
“there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of 
minors” which extended to shielding them from indecent messages that are not obscene by 
adult standards, but distinguished our “emphatically narrow holding” in Pacifica because it 
did not involve a complete ban and because it involved a different medium of 
communication. We explained that “the dial-it medium requires the listener to take 
affirmative steps to receive the communication.” “Placing a telephone call,” we continued, 
“is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message.” 
 
Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of 
the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a “scarce” expressive 
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all 
kinds. The Government estimates that “[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet 
today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999.” This dynamic, 
multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print and news 
services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. 
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with 
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web 
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As 
the District Court found, “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.” We 
agree with its conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium. 
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VI 
 
Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many 
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the 
First Amendment. For instance, each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different linguistic 
form. The first uses the word “indecent,” while the second speaks of material that “in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” Given the absence of a 
definition of either term, this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among 
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean. Could 
a speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth control practices, 
homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion, 
or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA? This uncertainty 
undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional 
goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials. 
 
The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a 
content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First 
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA 
is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the 
CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of 
violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent 
rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical 
matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the “risk of discriminatory 
enforcement” of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those 
implicated by the civil regulation reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 
The Government argues that the statute is no more vague than the obscenity standard this 
Court established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But that is not so. In Miller, 
this Court reviewed a criminal conviction against a commercial vendor who mailed 
brochures containing pictures of sexually explicit activities to individuals who had not 
requested such materials. Having struggled for some time to establish a definition of 
obscenity, we set forth in Miller the test for obscenity that controls to this day: 
 
“(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.” 
 
Because the CDA’s “patently offensive” standard (and, we assume, arguendo, its 
synonymous “indecent” standard) is one part of the three-prong Miller test, the Government 
reasons, it cannot be unconstitutionally vague. 
 
The Government’s assertion is incorrect as a matter of fact. The second prong of the Miller 
test—the purportedly analogous standard—contains a critical requirement that is omitted 
from the CDA: that the proscribed material be “specifically defined by the applicable state 
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law.” This requirement reduces the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term “patently 
offensive” as used in the CDA. Moreover, the Miller definition is limited to “sexual conduct,” 
whereas the CDA extends also to include (1) “excretory activities” as well as (2) “organs” of 
both a sexual and excretory nature. 
 
The Government’s reasoning is also flawed. Just because a definition including three 
limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is 
not vague. Each of Miller’s additional two prongs—(1) that, taken as a whole, the material 
appeal to the “prurient” interest, and (2) that it “lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value”—critically limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. The 
second requirement is particularly important because, unlike the “patently offensive” and 
“prurient interest” criteria, it is not judged by contemporary community standards. This 
“societal value” requirement, absent in the CDA, allows appellate courts to impose some 
limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor 
for socially redeeming value. The Government’s contention that courts will be able to give 
such legal limitations to the CDA’s standards is belied by Miller’s own rationale for having 
juries determine whether material is “patently offensive” according to community 
standards: that such questions are essentially ones of fact.  
 
In contrast to Miller and our other previous cases, the CDA thus presents a greater threat 
of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute’s scope. Given the vague contours 
of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages 
would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for 
insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on protected speech cannot 
be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. 
 
VII 
 
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires 
when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to 
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that 
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on 
adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in 
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. 
 
In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that “[s]exual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.” Indeed, 
Pacifica itself admonished that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a 
sufficient reason for suppressing it.” 
 
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting 
children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad 
suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we have explained, the Government may not 
“reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for children.” “[R]egardless of the 
strength of the government’s interest” in protecting children, “[t]he level of discourse 
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.” 
 
The District Court was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the ban on 
“dial-a-porn” invalidated in Sable. In Sable, this Court rejected the argument that we 
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should defer to the congressional judgment that nothing less than a total ban would be 
effective in preventing enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent 
communications. Sable thus made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of 
speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to 
sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity. As we pointed out last 
Term, that inquiry embodies an “overarching commitment” to make sure that Congress has 
designed its statute to accomplish its purpose “without imposing an unnecessarily great 
restriction on speech.” 
 
In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, the Government relies 
on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a transmission whenever it is known that 
one of its recipients is a minor would not interfere with adult-to-adult communication. The 
findings of the District Court make clear that this premise is untenable. Given the size of 
the potential audience for most messages, in the absence of a viable age verification 
process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view 
it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group will be a 
minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent message—
would surely burden communication among adults. 
  
The District Court found that at the time of trial existing technology did not include any 
effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications 
on the Internet without also denying access to adults. The Court found no effective way to 
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, 
newsgroups, or chat rooms. As a practical matter, the Court also found that it would be 
prohibitively expensive for noncommercial—as well as some commercial—speakers who 
have Web sites to verify that their users are adults. These limitations must inevitably 
curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the Internet. By contrast, the 
District Court found that “[d]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software 
suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children 
from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is 
inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available.” (emphases added). 
 
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld 
in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or 
commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and 
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the 
presence of minors. The general, undefined terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” cover 
large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value. 
Moreover, the “community standards” criterion as applied to the Internet means that any 
communication available to a nation wide audience will be judged by the standards of the 
community most likely to be offended by the message. The regulated subject matter 
includes any of the seven “dirty words” used in the Pacifica monologue, the use of which the 
Government’s expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. It may also extend to 
discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude 
subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library. 
 
For the purposes of our decision, we need neither accept nor reject the Government’s 
submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a blanket prohibition on all 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” messages communicated to a 17-year-old-no matter how 
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much value the message may contain and regardless of parental approval. It is at least 
clear that the strength of the Government’s interest in protecting minors is not equally 
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute. Under the CDA, a parent allowing her 
17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in 
her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term. Similarly, a 
parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman information on birth control via e-mail 
could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home 
community found the material “indecent” or “patently offensive,” if the college town’s 
community thought otherwise. 
 
The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden 
on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as 
the CDA. It has not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible 
alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be “tagged” in a way that facilitates 
parental control of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for messages with 
artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating 
some portions of the Internet—such as commercial Web sites—differently from others, such 
as chat rooms. Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the 
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded 
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all. 
 
VIII 
 
In an attempt to curtail the CDA’s facial overbreadth, the Government advances three 
additional arguments for sustaining the Act’s affirmative prohibitions: (1) that the CDA is 
constitutional because it leaves open ample “alternative channels” of communication; (2) 
that the plain meaning of the CDA’s “knowledge” and “specific person” requirement 
significantly restricts its permissible applications; and (3) that the CDA’s prohibitions are 
“almost always” limited to material lacking redeeming social value. 
 
The Government first contends that, even though the CDA effectively censors discourse on 
many of the Internet’s modalities—such as chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders—
it is nonetheless constitutional because it provides a “reasonable opportunity” for speakers 
to engage in the restricted speech on the World Wide Web. This argument is unpersuasive 
because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content. A “time, place, and manner” 
analysis is therefore inapplicable. It is thus immaterial whether such speech would be 
feasible on the Web (which, as the Government’s own expert acknowledged, would cost up 
to $10,000 if the speaker’s interests were not accommodated by an existing Web site, not 
including costs for data base management and age verification). The Government’s position 
is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as 
individuals are free to publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned 
leafletting on the streets regardless of their content, we explained that “one is not to have 
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it 
may be exercised in some other place.” 
 
The Government also asserts that the “knowledge” requirement of both §§ 223(a) and (d), 
especially when coupled with the “specific child” element found in § 223(d), saves the CDA 
from overbreadth. Because both sections prohibit the dissemination of indecent messages 
only to persons known to be under 18, the Government argues, it does not require 
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transmitters to “refrain from communicating indecent material to adults; they need only 
refrain from disseminating such materials to persons they know to be under 18.” This 
argument ignores the fact that most Internet forums—including chat rooms, newsgroups, 
mail exploders, and the Web—are open to all comers. The Government’s assertion that the 
knowledge requirement somehow protects the communications of adults is therefore 
untenable. Even the strongest reading of the “specific person” requirement of § 223(d) 
cannot save the statute. It would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a 
“heckler’s veto,” upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform 
the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child—a “specific person ... under 18 years of 
age”—would be present. 
 
Finally, we find no textual support for the Government’s submission that material having 
scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the 
CDA’s “patently offensive” and “indecent” prohibitions. 
 
IX 
 
The Government’s three remaining arguments focus on the defenses provided in § 223(e)(5). 
First, relying on the “good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” provision, 
the Government suggests that “tagging” provides a defense that saves the constitutionality 
of the CDA. The suggestion assumes that transmitters may encode their indecent 
communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting recipients to 
block their reception with appropriate software. It is the requirement that the good-faith 
action must be “effective” that makes this defense illusory. The Government recognizes that 
its proposed screening software does not currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to 
know whether a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material. Without the 
impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening for the “tag,” the 
transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action to be “effective.” 
 
For its second and third arguments concerning defenses—which we can consider together—
the Government relies on the latter half of § 223(e)(5), which applies when the transmitter 
has restricted access by requiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification. Such 
verification is not only technologically available but actually is used by commercial 
providers of sexually explicit material. These providers, therefore, would be protected by 
the defense. Under the findings of the District Court, however, it is not economically 
feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such verification. Accordingly, this 
defense would not significantly narrow the statute’s burden on noncommercial speech. Even 
with respect to the commercial pornographers that would be protected by the defense, the 
Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques actually 
preclude minors from posing as adults. Given that the risk of criminal sanctions “hovers 
over each content provider, like the proverbial sword of Damocles,” the District Court 
correctly refused to rely on unproven future technology to save the statute. The 
Government thus failed to prove that the proffered defense would significantly reduce the 
heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays. 
 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the CDA places an unacceptably heavy 
burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the sort of “narrow 
tailoring” that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. In Sable, 
492 U.S., at 127, we remarked that the speech restriction at issue there amounted to 
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“‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’” The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free 
speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community. 
 
X 
 
At oral argument, the Government relied heavily on its ultimate fall-back position: If this 
Court should conclude that the CDA is insufficiently tailored, it urged, we should save the 
statute’s constitutionality by honoring the severability clause, and construing nonseverable 
terms narrowly. In only one respect is this argument acceptable. 
 
A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed. We will follow § 608’s 
guidance by leaving constitutional textual elements of the statute intact in the one place 
where they are, in fact, severable. The “indecency” provision, applies to “any comment, 
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent.” 
(Emphasis added.) Appellees do not challenge the application of the statute to obscene 
speech, which, they acknowledge, can be banned totally because it enjoys no First 
Amendment protection. As set forth by the statute, the restriction of “obscene” material 
enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for “indecent” material, which we have 
held unconstitutional. Therefore, we will sever the term “or indecent” from the statute, 
leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing. In no other respect, however, can § 223(a) or § 223(d) 
be saved by such a textual surgery. 
 
The Government also draws on an additional, less traditional aspect of the CDA’s 
severability clause, which asks any reviewing court that holds the statute facially 
unconstitutional not to invalidate the CDA in application to “other persons or 
circumstances” that might be constitutionally permissible. It further invokes this Court’s 
admonition that, absent “countervailing considerations,” a statute should “be declared 
invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.” There are two flaws in this 
argument. 
 
First, the statute that grants our jurisdiction for this expedited review, limits that 
jurisdictional grant to actions challenging the CDA “on its face.” Consistent with § 561, the 
plaintiffs who brought this suit and the three-judge panel that decided it treated it as a 
facial challenge. We have no authority, in this particular posture, to convert this litigation 
into an “as-applied” challenge. Nor, given the vast array of plaintiffs, the range of their 
expressive activities, and the vagueness of the statute, would it be practicable to limit our 
holding to a judicially defined set of specific applications. 
 
Second, one of the “countervailing considerations” mentioned in Brockett is present here. In 
considering a facial challenge, this Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute 
only if it is “readily susceptible” to such a construction. The open-ended character of the 
CDA provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage…. 
 
XI 
 
In this Court, though not in the District Court, the Government asserts that—in addition to 
its interest in protecting children—its “[e]qually significant” interest in fostering the 
growth of the Internet provides an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of 
the CDA. The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated availability of 
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“indecent” and “patently offensive” material on the Internet is driving countless citizens 
away from the medium because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to 
harmful material. 
 
We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of this new 
marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record 
demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As 
a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume 
that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the 
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of 
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of 
censorship. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
 
Justice O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I write separately to explain why I view the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as 
little more than an attempt by Congress to create “adult zones” on the Internet. Our 
precedent indicates that the creation of such zones can be constitutionally sound. Despite 
the soundness of its purpose, however, portions of the CDA are unconstitutional because 
they stray from the blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a “zoning law” 
that passes constitutional muster. 
 
Appellees bring a facial challenge to three provisions of the CDA. The first, which the Court 
describes as the “indecency transmission” provision, makes it a crime to knowingly 
transmit an obscene or indecent message or image to a person the sender knows is under 18 
years old. What the Court classifies as a single “‘patently offensive display’” provision is in 
reality two separate provisions. The first of these makes it a crime to knowingly send a 
patently offensive message or image to a specific person under the age of 18 (“specific 
person” provision). The second criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or 
images “in a[ny] manner available” to minors (“display” provision). None of these provisions 
purports to keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a 
First Amendment right to obtain this speech. Thus, the undeniable purpose of the CDA is 
to segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that minors cannot access. 
See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189 (1996) (CDA imposes “access restrictions ... to protect 
minors from exposure to indecent material”). 
 
The creation of “adult zones” is by no means a novel concept. States have long denied 
minors access to certain establishments frequented by adults. States have also denied 
minors access to speech deemed to be “harmful to minors.” The Court has previously 
sustained such zoning laws, but only if they respect the First Amendment rights of adults 
and minors. That is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict adult access 
to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the banned 
material. As applied to the Internet as it exists in 1997, the “display” provision and some 
applications of the “indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions fail to adhere 
to the first of these limiting principles by restricting adults’ access to protected materials in 
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certain circumstances. Unlike the Court, however, I would invalidate the provisions only in 
those circumstances. 
 
I 
 
Our cases make clear that a “zoning” law is valid only if adults are still able to obtain the 
regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more than simply keep children away from 
speech they have no right to obtain-it interferes with the rights of adults to obtain 
constitutionally protected speech and effectively “reduce[s] the adult population ... to 
reading only what is fit for children.” The First Amendment does not tolerate such 
interference. If the law does not unduly restrict adults’ access to constitutionally protected 
speech, however, it may be valid. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968), for 
example, the Court sustained a New York law that barred store owners from selling 
pornographic magazines to minors in part because adults could still buy those magazines. 
 
The Court in Ginsberg concluded that the New York law created a constitutionally 
adequate adult zone simply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors. The Court 
did not question—and therefore necessarily assumed—that an adult zone, once created, 
would succeed in preserving adults’ access while denying minors’ access to the regulated 
speech. Before today, there was no reason to question this assumption, for the Court has 
previously only considered laws that operated in the physical world, a world that with two 
characteristics that make it possible to create “adult zones”: geography and identity. A 
minor can see an adult dance show only if he enters an establishment that provides such 
entertainment. And should he attempt to do so, the minor will not be able to conceal 
completely his identity (or, consequently, his age). Thus, the twin characteristics of 
geography and identity enable the establishment’s proprietor to prevent children from 
entering the establishment, but to let adults inside. 
 
The electronic world is fundamentally different. Because it is no more than the 
interconnection of electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to mask 
their identities. Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and 
Web sites, for example, exist at fixed “locations” on the Internet. Since users can transmit 
and receive messages on the Internet without revealing anything about their identities or 
ages, however, it is not currently possible to exclude persons from accessing certain 
messages on the basis of their identity. 
 
Cyberspace differs from the physical world in another basic way: Cyberspace is malleable. 
Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, 
making cyberspace more like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to 
zoning laws. This transformation of cyberspace is already underway. Internet speakers 
(users who post material on the Internet) have begun to zone cyberspace itself through the 
use of “gateway” technology. Such technology requires Internet users to enter information 
about themselves—perhaps an adult identification number or a credit card number—before 
they can access certain areas of cyberspace, much like a bouncer checks a person’s driver’s 
license before admitting him to a nightclub. Internet users who access information have not 
attempted to zone cyberspace itself, but have tried to limit their own power to access 
information in cyberspace, much as a parent controls what her children watch on television 
by installing a lock box. This user-based zoning is accomplished through the use of 
screening software (such as Cyber Patrol or SurfWatch) or browsers with screening 
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capabilities, both of which search addresses and text for keywords that are associated with 
“adult” sites and, if the user wishes, blocks access to such sites. The Platform for Internet 
Content Selection project is designed to facilitate user-based zoning by encouraging 
Internet speakers to rate the content of their speech using codes recognized by all screening 
programs. 
 
Despite this progress, the transformation of cyberspace is not complete. Although gateway 
technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, it is not available 
to all Web speakers, and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat rooms and 
USENET newsgroups. Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace, and because 
without it “there is no means of age verification,” cyberspace still remains largely 
unzoned—and unzoneable. User-based zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective, (i) 
an agreed-upon code (or “tag”) would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers with 
screening capabilities would have to be able to recognize the “tag”; and (iii) those programs 
would have to be widely available—and widely used—by Internet users. At present, none of 
these conditions is true. Screening software “is not in wide use today” and “only a handful 
of browsers have screening capabilities.” There is, moreover, no agreed-upon “tag” for those 
programs to recognize. 
 
Although the prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising, I agree 
with the Court that we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the 
Internet as it exists today. Given the present state of cyberspace, I agree with the Court 
that the “display” provision cannot pass muster. Until gateway technology is available 
throughout cyberspace, and it is not in 1997, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that 
the speech he displays will reach only adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an 
“adult zone.” Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain 
completely from using indecent speech. But this forced silence impinges on the First 
Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this speech and, for all intents and 
purposes, “reduce[s] the adult population [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for 
children.” As a result, the “display” provision cannot withstand scrutiny. 
 
The “indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions present a closer issue, for 
they are not unconstitutional in all of their applications. As discussed above, the “indecency 
transmission” provision makes it a crime to transmit knowingly an indecent message to a 
person the sender knows is under 18 years of age. The “specific person” provision proscribes 
the same conduct, although it does not as explicitly require the sender to know that the 
intended recipient of his indecent message is a minor. The Government urges the Court to 
construe the provision to impose such a knowledge requirement, and I would do so. 
 
So construed, both provisions are constitutional as applied to a conversation involving only 
an adult and one or more minors—e.g., when an adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the 
addressee is a minor, or when an adult and minor converse by themselves or with other 
minors in a chat room. In this context, these provisions are no different from the law we 
sustained in Ginsberg. Restricting what the adult may say to the minors in no way restricts 
the adult’s ability to communicate with other adults. He is not prevented from speaking 
indecently to other adults in a chat room (because there are no other adults participating in 
the conversation) and he remains free to send indecent e-mails to other adults. The relevant 
universe contains only one adult, and the adult in that universe has the power to refrain 
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from using indecent speech and consequently to keep all such speech within the room in an 
“adult” zone. 
 
The analogy to Ginsberg breaks down, however, when more than one adult is a party to the 
conversation. If a minor enters a chat room otherwise occupied by adults, the CDA 
effectively requires the adults in the room to stop using indecent speech. If they did not, 
they could be prosecuted under the “indecency transmission” and “specific person” 
provisions for any indecent statements they make to the group, since they would be 
transmitting an indecent message to specific persons, one of whom is a minor. The CDA is 
therefore akin to a law that makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic 
magazines to anyone once a minor enters his store. Even assuming such a law might be 
constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative to excluding minors 
completely from the store, the absence of any means of excluding minors from chat rooms in 
cyberspace restricts the rights of adults to engage in indecent speech in those rooms. The 
“indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions share this defect. 
 
But these two provisions do not infringe on adults’ speech in all situations. And as 
discussed below, I do not find that the provisions are overbroad in the sense that they 
restrict minors’ access to a substantial amount of speech that minors have the right to read 
and view. Accordingly, the CDA can be applied constitutionally in some situations. 
Normally, this fact would require the Court to reject a direct facial challenge. Appellees’ 
claim arises under the First Amendment, however, and they argue that the CDA is facially 
invalid because it is “substantially overbroad”—that is, it “sweeps too broadly ... [and] 
penaliz[es] a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally protected.” I agree with 
the Court that the provisions are overbroad in that they cover any and all communications 
between adults and minors, regardless of how many adults might be part of the audience to 
the communication. 
 
This conclusion does not end the matter, however. Where, as here, “the parties challenging 
the statute are those who desire to engage in protected speech that the overbroad statute 
purports to punish, ... [t]he statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it 
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.” There is no question that Congress intended to 
prohibit certain communications between one adult and one or more minors. There is also 
no question that Congress would have enacted a narrower version of these provisions had it 
known a broader version would be declared unconstitutional. I would therefore sustain the 
“indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions to the extent they apply to the 
transmission of Internet communications where the party initiating the communication 
knows that all of the recipients are minors. 
 
II 
 
Whether the CDA substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors, and 
thereby runs afoul of the second characteristic of valid zoning laws, presents a closer 
question. In Ginsberg, the New York law we sustained prohibited the sale to minors of 
magazines that were “harmful to minors.” Under that law, a magazine was “harmful to 
minors” only if it was obscene as to minors. Noting that obscene speech is not protected by 
the First Amendment, and that New York was constitutionally free to adjust the definition 
of obscenity for minors, the Court concluded that the law did not “invad[e] the area of 
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freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.” New York therefore did not 
infringe upon the First Amendment rights of minors. 
 
The Court neither “accept[s] nor reject[s]” the argument that the CDA is facially overbroad 
because it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors. I would 
reject it. Ginsberg established that minors may constitutionally be denied access to material 
that is obscene as to minors. As Ginsberg explained, material is obscene as to minors if it (i) 
is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable ... for minors”; (ii) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and 
(iii) is “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” Because the CDA denies 
minors the right to obtain material that is “patently offensive”—even if it has some 
redeeming value for minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interests—
Congress’ rejection of the Ginsberg “harmful to minors” standard means that the CDA could 
ban some speech that is “indecent” (i.e., “patently offensive”) but that is not obscene as to 
minors. 
 
I do not deny this possibility, but to prevail in a facial challenge, it is not enough for a 
plaintiff to show “some” overbreadth. Our cases require a proof of “real” and “substantial” 
overbreadth, and appellees have not carried their burden in this case. In my view, the 
universe of speech constitutionally protected as to minors but banned by the CDA—i.e., the 
universe of material that is “patently offensive,” but which nonetheless has some redeeming 
value for minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest—is a very small one. 
Appellees cite no examples of speech falling within this universe and do not attempt to 
explain why that universe is substantial “in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.” That the CDA might deny minors the right to obtain material that has some 
“value” is largely beside the point. While discussions about prison rape or nude art may 
have some redeeming educational value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such 
value for minors, and under Ginsberg, minors only have a First Amendment right to obtain 
patently offensive material that has “redeeming social importance for minors.” There is also 
no evidence in the record to support the contention that “many e-mail transmissions from 
an adult to a minor are conversations between family members,” and no support for the 
legal proposition that such speech is absolutely immune from regulation. Accordingly, in my 
view, the CDA does not burden a substantial amount of minors’ constitutionally protected 
speech. 
 
Thus, the constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it 
substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because the rights of 
adults are infringed only by the “display” provision and by the “indecency transmission” 
and “specific person” provisions as applied to communications involving more than one 
adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to that extent. Insofar as the “indecency 
transmission” and “specific person” provisions prohibit the use of indecent speech in 
communications between an adult and one or more minors, however, they can and should 
be sustained. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding that I 
respectfully dissent. 
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Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
Kennedy, Justice. 
 
This case presents a challenge to a statute enacted by Congress to protect minors from 
exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet, the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA). We must decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm a ruling by the 
District Court that enforcement of COPA should be enjoined because the statute likely 
violates the First Amendment. 
 
In enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this subject, in 
particular the decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For 
that reason, “the Judiciary must proceed with caution and ... with care before invalidating 
the Act.” The imperative of according respect to the Congress, however, does not permit us 
to depart from well-established First Amendment principles. Instead, we must hold the 
Government to its constitutional burden of proof. 
 
Content-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant 
potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To guard against 
that threat the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be 
presumed invalid, Rand that the Government bear the burden of showing their 
constitutionality. This is true even when Congress twice has attempted to find a 
constitutional means to restrict, and punish, the speech in question…. 
 
I 
A 
 
COPA is the second attempt by Congress to make the Internet safe for minors by 
criminalizing certain Internet speech. The first attempt was the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996. The Court held the CDA unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling governmental interest and because less restrictive alternatives were 
available.  
 
In response to the Court’s decision in Reno, Congress passed COPA. COPA imposes 
criminal penalties of a $50,000 fine and six months in prison for the knowing posting, for 
“commercial purposes,” of World Wide Web content that is “harmful to minors.” Material 
that is “harmful to minors” is defined as: 
 
“any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, 
writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that- 
 
“(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would 
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed 
to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
 
“(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with 
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an 
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of 
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
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“(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors.” 
 
“Minor[s]” are defined as “any person under 17 years of age.” A person acts for “commercial 
purposes only if such person is engaged in the business of making such communications.” 
“Engaged in the business,” in turn, 
 
“means that the person who makes a communication, or offers to make a 
communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material 
that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, 
as a regular course of such person’s trade or business, with the objective of 
earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that 
the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such 
communications be the person’s sole or principal business or source of 
income).” 
 
While the statute labels all speech that falls within these definitions as criminal speech, it 
also provides an affirmative defense to those who employ specified means to prevent minors 
from gaining access to the prohibited materials on their Web site. A person may escape 
conviction under the statute by demonstrating that he 
 
“has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors- 
 
“(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or 
adult personal identification number; 
 
“(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or 
 
“(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology.” 
 
Since the passage of COPA, Congress has enacted additional laws regulating the Internet 
in an attempt to protect minors. For example, it has enacted a prohibition on misleading 
Internet domain names, 18 U.S.C. § 2252B, in order to prevent Web site owners from 
disguising pornographic Web sites in a way likely to cause uninterested persons to visit 
them. It has also passed a statute creating a “Dot Kids” second-level Internet domain, the 
content of which is restricted to that which is fit for minors under the age of 13. 
 
B 
 
Respondents, Internet content providers and others concerned with protecting the freedom 
of speech, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. They sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute. 
After considering testimony from witnesses presented by both respondents and the 
Government, the District Court issued an order granting the preliminary injunction…. 
 
The Government appealed the District Court’s decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction, 
but on a different ground. The court concluded that the “community standards” language in 
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COPA by itself rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. We granted certiorari 
and reversed, holding that the community-standards language did not, standing alone, 
make the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. We emphasized, however, that our decision 
was limited to that narrow issue. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to 
reconsider whether the District Court had been correct to grant the preliminary injunction. 
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court…. 
 
II 
A… 
 
The District Court, in deciding to grant the preliminary injunction, concentrated primarily 
on the argument that there are plausible, less restrictive alternatives to COPA. A statute 
that “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right 
to receive and to address to one another ... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives 
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was 
enacted to serve.” When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden 
is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the 
challenged statute. 
 
In considering this question, a court assumes that certain protected speech may be 
regulated, and then asks what is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to 
achieve that goal. The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the challenged 
restriction has some effect in achieving Congress’ goal, regardless of the restriction it 
imposes. The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than 
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not 
chilled or punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the status quo of existing 
regulations, then ask whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to 
achieve Congress’ legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified under 
that analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least 
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives. 
 
…As the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of COPA’s 
constitutionality, respondents must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has 
shown that respondents’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than COPA. 
Applying that analysis, the District Court concluded that respondents were likely to 
prevail. That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a 
number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute. 
 
The primary alternative considered by the District Court was blocking and filtering 
software. Blocking and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than 
COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children’s access to 
materials harmful to them. The District Court, in granting the preliminary injunction, did 
so primarily because the plaintiffs had proposed that filters are a less restrictive alternative 
to COPA and the Government had not shown it would be likely to disprove the plaintiffs’ 
contention at trial. 
 
Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the 
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults 
without children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to 
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identify themselves or provide their credit card information. Even adults with children may 
obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their 
home computers. Above all, promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any 
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much 
diminished. All of these things are true, moreover, regardless of how broadly or narrowly 
the definitions in COPA are construed. 
 
Filters also may well be more effective than COPA. First, a filter can prevent minors from 
seeing all pornography, not just pornography posted to the Web from America. The District 
Court noted in its factfindings that one witness estimated that 40% of harmful-to-minors 
content comes from overseas. COPA does not prevent minors from having access to those 
foreign harmful materials. That alone makes it possible that filtering software might be 
more effective in serving Congress’ goals. Effectiveness is likely to diminish even further if 
COPA is upheld, because the providers of the materials that would be covered by the 
statute simply can move their operations overseas. It is not an answer to say that COPA 
reaches some amount of materials that are harmful to minors; the question is whether it 
would reach more of them than less restrictive alternatives. In addition, the District Court 
found that verification systems may be subject to evasion and circumvention, for example, 
by minors who have their own credit cards. Finally, filters also may be more effective 
because they can be applied to all forms of Internet communication, including e-mail, not 
just communications available via the World Wide Web. 
 
That filtering software may well be more effective than COPA is confirmed by the findings 
of the Commission on Child Online Protection, a blue-ribbon Commission created by 
Congress in COPA itself. Congress directed the Commission to evaluate the relative merits 
of different means of restricting minors’ ability to gain access to harmful materials on the 
Internet. It unambiguously found that filters are more effective than age-verification 
requirements. See Commission on Child Online Protection (COPA), Report to Congress, 19-
21, 23-25, 27 (Oct. 20, 2000) (assigning a score for “Effectiveness” of 7.4 for server-based 
filters and 6.5 for client-based filters, as compared to 5.9 for independent adult-ID 
verification, and 5.5 for credit card verification). Thus, not only has the Government failed 
to carry its burden of showing the District Court that the proposed alternative is less 
effective, but also a Government Commission appointed to consider the question has 
concluded just the opposite. That finding supports our conclusion that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the statute. 
 
Filtering software, of course, is not a perfect solution to the problem of children gaining 
access to harmful-to-minors materials. It may block some materials that are not harmful to 
minors and fail to catch some that are. Whatever the deficiencies of filters, however, the 
Government failed to introduce specific evidence proving that existing technologies are less 
effective than the restrictions in COPA. The District Court made a specific factfinding that 
“[n]o evidence was presented to the Court as to the percentage of time that blocking and 
filtering technology is over- or underinclusive.” In the absence of a showing as to the 
relative effectiveness of COPA and the alternatives proposed by respondents, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant the preliminary injunction. The 
Government’s burden is not merely to show that a proposed less restrictive alternative has 
some flaws; its burden is to show that it is less effective. It is not enough for the 
Government to show that COPA has some effect. Nor do respondents bear a burden to 
introduce, or offer to introduce, evidence that their proposed alternatives are more effective. 
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The Government has the burden to show they are less so. The Government having failed to 
carry its burden, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant the 
preliminary injunction. 
 
One argument to the contrary is worth mentioning—the argument that filtering software is 
not an available alternative because Congress may not require it to be used. That argument 
carries little weight, because Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters. 
We have held that Congress can give strong incentives to schools and libraries to use them. 
United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). It could also take steps 
to promote their development by industry, and their use by parents. It is incorrect, for that 
reason, to say that filters are part of the current regulatory status quo. The need for 
parental cooperation does not automatically disqualify a proposed less restrictive 
alternative. In enacting COPA, Congress said its goal was to prevent the “widespread 
availability of the Internet” from providing “opportunities for minors to access materials 
through the World Wide Web in a manner that can frustrate parental supervision or 
control.” COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor what their 
children see. By enacting programs to promote use of filtering software, Congress could give 
parents that ability without subjecting protected speech to severe penalties…. 
 
B 
 
There are also important practical reasons to let the injunction stand pending a full trial on 
the merits. First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of 
leaving it in place by mistake. Where a prosecution is a likely possibility, yet only an 
affirmative defense is available, speakers may self-censor rather than risk the perils of 
trial. There is a potential for extraordinary harm and a serious chill upon protected speech. 
The harm done from letting the injunction stand pending a trial on the merits, in contrast, 
will not be extensive. No prosecutions have yet been undertaken under the law, so none will 
be disrupted if the injunction stands. Further, if the injunction is upheld, the Government 
in the interim can enforce obscenity laws already on the books. 
 
Second, there are substantial factual disputes remaining in the case. As mentioned above, 
there is a serious gap in the evidence as to the effectiveness of filtering software. For us to 
assume, without proof, that filters are less effective than COPA would usurp the District 
Court’s factfinding role. By allowing the preliminary injunction to stand and remanding for 
trial, we require the Government to shoulder its full constitutional burden of proof 
respecting the less restrictive alternative argument, rather than excuse it from doing so. 
 
Third, and on a related point, the factual record does not reflect current technological 
reality—a serious flaw in any case involving the Internet. The technology of the Internet 
evolves at a rapid pace. Yet the factfindings of the District Court were entered in February 
1999, over five years ago. Since then, certain facts about the Internet are known to have 
changed. It is reasonable to assume that other technological developments important to the 
First Amendment analysis have also occurred during that time. More and better filtering 
alternatives may exist than when the District Court entered its findings. Indeed, we know 
that after the District Court entered its factfindings, a congressionally appointed 
commission issued a report that found that filters are more effective than verification 
screens. 
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Delay between the time that a district court makes factfindings and the time that a case 
reaches this Court is inevitable, with the necessary consequence that there will be some 
discrepancy between the facts as found and the facts at the time the appellate court takes 
up the question. We do not mean, therefore, to set up an insuperable obstacle to fair review. 
Here, however, the usual gap has doubled because the case has been through the Court of 
Appeals twice. The additional two years might make a difference. By affirming the 
preliminary injunction and remanding for trial, we allow the parties to update and 
supplement the factual record to reflect current technological realities. 
 
Remand will also permit the District Court to take account of a changed legal landscape. 
Since the District Court made its factfindings, Congress has passed at least two further 
statutes that might qualify as less restrictive alternatives to COPA—a prohibition on 
misleading domain names, and a statute creating a minors-safe “Dot Kids” domain. 
Remanding for trial will allow the District Court to take into account those additional 
potential alternatives. 
 
On a final point, it is important to note that this opinion does not hold that Congress is 
incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from 
gaining access to harmful materials. The parties, because of the conclusion of the Court of 
Appeals that the statute’s definitions rendered it unconstitutional, did not devote their 
attention to the question whether further evidence might be introduced on the relative 
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute. On remand, however, the 
parties will be able to introduce further evidence on this point. This opinion does not 
foreclose the District Court from concluding, upon a proper showing by the Government 
that meets the Government’s constitutional burden as defined in this opinion, that COPA is 
the least restrictive alternative available to accomplish Congress’ goal…. 
 
[Justice Stevens’ concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent omitted]. 
 
Justice BREYER, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice O’CONNOR join, 
dissenting. 
 
The Child Online Protection Act (Act) seeks to protect children from exposure to commercial 
pornography placed on the Internet. It does so by requiring commercial providers to place 
pornographic material behind Internet “screens” readily accessible to adults who produce 
age verification. The Court recognizes that we should “‘proceed ... with care before 
invalidating the Act,’” while pointing out that the “imperative of according respect to the 
Congress ... does not permit us to depart from well-established First Amendment 
principles.” I agree with these generalities. Like the Court, I would subject the Act to “the 
most exacting scrutiny,” requiring the Government to show that any restriction of 
nonobscene expression is “narrowly drawn” to further a “compelling interest” and that the 
restriction amounts to the “least restrictive means” available to further that interest. 
 
Nonetheless, my examination of (1) the burdens the Act imposes on protected expression, 
(2) the Act’s ability to further a compelling interest, and (3) the proposed “less restrictive 
alternatives” convinces me that the Court is wrong. I cannot accept its conclusion that 
Congress could have accomplished its statutory objective—protecting children from 
commercial pornography on the Internet—in other, less restrictive ways. 
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I 
 
Although the Court rests its conclusion upon the existence of less restrictive alternatives, I 
must first examine the burdens that the Act imposes upon protected speech. That is 
because the term “less restrictive alternative” is a comparative term. An “alternative” is 
“less restrictive” only if it will work less First Amendment harm than the statute itself, 
while at the same time similarly furthering the “compelling” interest that prompted 
Congress to enact the statute. Unlike the majority, I do not see how it is possible to make 
this comparative determination without examining both the extent to which the Act 
regulates protected expression and the nature of the burdens it imposes on that expression. 
That examination suggests that the Act, properly interpreted, imposes a burden on 
protected speech that is no more than modest. 
 
A 
 
The Act’s definitions limit the material it regulates to material that does not enjoy First 
Amendment protection, namely, legally obscene material, and very little more. A 
comparison of this Court’s definition of unprotected, “legally obscene,” material with the 
Act’s definitions makes this clear. 
 
Material is legally obscene if 
 
“(a) ... ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest 
...; (b) ... the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) ... the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”  
 
The present statute defines the material that it regulates as material that meets all of the 
following criteria: 
 
“(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would 
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, [that the 
material] is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient 
interest; 
 
“(B) [the material] depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently 
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual 
contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd 
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
 
“(C) [the material] taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value for minors.” (emphasis added). 
 
Both definitions define the relevant material through use of the critical terms “prurient 
interest” and “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Insofar as 
material appeals to, or panders to, “the prurient interest,” it simply seeks a sexual 
response. Insofar as “patently offensive” material with “no serious value” simply seeks that 
response, it does not seek to educate, it does not seek to elucidate views about sex, it is not 
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artistic, and it is not literary. That is why this Court, in Miller, held that the First 
Amendment did not protect material that fit its definition. 
 
The only significant difference between the present statute and Miller’s definition consists 
of the addition of the words “with respect to minors” and “for minors.” But the addition of 
these words to a definition that would otherwise cover only obscenity expands the statute’s 
scope only slightly. That is because the material in question (while potentially harmful to 
young children) must, first, appeal to the “prurient interest” of, i.e., seek a sexual response 
from, some group of adolescents or postadolescents (since young children normally do not so 
respond). And material that appeals to the “prurient interest[s]” of some group of 
adolescents or postadolescents will almost inevitably appeal to the “prurient interest[s]” of 
some group of adults as well. 
 
The “lack of serious value” requirement narrows the statute yet further—despite the 
presence of the qualification “for minors.” That is because one cannot easily imagine 
material that has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a significant 
group of adults, but lacks such value for any significant group of minors. Thus, the statute, 
read literally, insofar as it extends beyond the legally obscene, could reach only borderline 
cases. And to take the words of the statute literally is consistent with Congress’ avowed 
objective in enacting this law; namely, putting material produced by professional 
pornographers behind screens that will verify the age of the viewer. See S.Rep. No. 105-225, 
p. 3 (1998) (hereinafter S. Rep.) (“The bill seeks to restrict access to commercial 
pornography on the Web by requiring those engaged in the business of the commercial 
distribution of material that is harmful to minors to take certain prescribed steps to restrict 
access to such material by minors ...”); H.R.Rep. No. 105-775, pp. 5, 14 (1998) (hereinafter 
H.R. Rep.) (explaining that the bill is aimed at the sale of pornographic materials and 
provides a defense for the “commercial purveyors of pornography” that the bill seeks to 
regulate). 
 
These limitations on the statute’s scope answer many of the concerns raised by those who 
attack its constitutionality. Respondents fear prosecution for the Internet posting of 
material that does not fall within the statute’s ambit as limited by the “prurient interest” 
and “no serious value” requirements; for example: an essay about a young man’s experience 
with masturbation and sexual shame; “a serious discussion about birth control practices, 
homosexuality, ... or the consequences of prison rape”; an account by a 15-year-old, written 
for therapeutic purposes, of being raped when she was 13; a guide to self-examination for 
testicular cancer; a graphic illustration of how to use a condom; or any of the other postings 
of modern literary or artistic works or discussions of sexual identity, homosexuality, 
sexually transmitted diseases, sex education, or safe sex, let alone Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World, J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, or, as the complaint would have it, “Ken 
Starr’s report on the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal.”  
 
These materials are not both (1) “designed to appeal to, or ... pander to, the prurient 
interest” of significant groups of minors and (2) lacking in “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value” for significant groups of minors. Thus, they fall outside the 
statute’s definition of the material that it restricts, a fact the Government acknowledged at 
oral argument. 
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I have found nothing elsewhere in the statute’s language that broadens its scope. Other 
qualifying phrases, such as “taking the material as a whole,” and “for commercial 
purposes,” limit the statute’s scope still more, requiring, for example, that individual 
images be considered in context. In sum, the Act’s definitions limit the statute’s scope to 
commercial pornography. It affects unprotected obscene material. Given the inevitable 
uncertainty about how to characterize close-to-obscene material, it could apply to (or chill 
the production of) a limited class of borderline material that courts might ultimately find is 
protected. But the examples I have just given fall outside that class. 
 
B 
 
The Act does not censor the material it covers. Rather, it requires providers of the “harmful 
to minors” material to restrict minors’ access to it by verifying age. They can do so by 
inserting screens that verify age using a credit card, adult personal identification number, 
or other similar technology. In this way, the Act requires creation of an Internet screen that 
minors, but not adults, will find difficult to bypass. 
 
I recognize that the screening requirement imposes some burden on adults who seek access 
to the regulated material, as well as on its providers. The cost is, in part, monetary. The 
parties agreed that a Web site could store card numbers or passwords at between 15 and 20 
cents per number. And verification services provide free verification to Web site operators, 
while charging users less than $20 per year. According to the trade association for the 
commercial pornographers who are the statute’s target, use of such verification procedures 
is “standard practice” in their online operations.  
 
In addition to the monetary cost, and despite strict requirements that identifying 
information be kept confidential, the identification requirements inherent in age screening 
may lead some users to fear embarrassment. Both monetary costs and potential 
embarrassment can deter potential viewers and, in that sense, the statute’s requirements 
may restrict access to a site. But this Court has held that in the context of congressional 
efforts to protect children, restrictions of this kind do not automatically violate the 
Constitution. And the Court has approved their use. 
 
In sum, the Act at most imposes a modest additional burden on adult access to legally 
obscene material, perhaps imposing a similar burden on access to some protected borderline 
obscene material as well. 
 
II 
 
I turn next to the question of “compelling interest,” that of protecting minors from exposure 
to commercial pornography. No one denies that such an interest is “compelling.” Rather, the 
question here is whether the Act, given its restrictions on adult access, significantly 
advances that interest. In other words, is the game worth the candle? 
 
The majority argues that it is not, because of the existence of “blocking and filtering 
software.” The majority refers to the presence of that software as a “less restrictive 
alternative.” But that is a misnomer—a misnomer that may lead the reader to believe that 
all we need do is look to see if the blocking and filtering software is less restrictive; and to 
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believe that, because in one sense it is (one can turn off the software), that is the end of the 
constitutional matter. 
 
But such reasoning has no place here. Conceptually speaking, the presence of filtering 
software is not an alternative legislative approach to the problem of protecting children 
from exposure to commercial pornography. Rather, it is part of the status quo, i.e., the 
backdrop against which Congress enacted the present statute. It is always true, by 
definition, that the status quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law. It is always less 
restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But “doing nothing” does not address the 
problem Congress sought to address—namely, that, despite the availability of filtering 
software, children were still being exposed to harmful material on the Internet. 
 
Thus, the relevant constitutional question is not the question the Court asks: Would it be 
less restrictive to do nothing? Of course it would be. Rather, the relevant question posits a 
comparison of (a) a status quo that includes filtering software with (b) a change in that 
status quo that adds to it an age-verification screen requirement. Given the existence of 
filtering software, does the problem Congress identified remain significant? Does the Act 
help to address it? These are questions about the relation of the Act to the compelling 
interest. Does the Act, compared to the status quo, significantly advance the ball? (An 
affirmative answer to these questions will not justify “[a]ny restriction on speech,” as the 
Court claims, for a final answer in respect to constitutionality must take account of burdens 
and alternatives as well.) 
 
The answers to these intermediate questions are clear: Filtering software, as presently 
available, does not solve the “child protection” problem. It suffers from four serious 
inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its voluntary 
use. First, its filtering is faulty, allowing some pornographic material to pass through 
without hindrance. Just last year, in American Library Assn., Justice STEVENS described 
“fundamental defects in the filtering software that is now available or that will be available 
in the foreseeable future.” He pointed to the problem of underblocking: “Because the 
software relies on key words or phrases to block undesirable sites, it does not have the 
capacity to exclude a precisely defined category of images.” That is to say, in the absence of 
words, the software alone cannot distinguish between the most obscene pictorial image and 
the Venus de Milo. No Member of this Court disagreed. 
 
Second, filtering software costs money. Not every family has the $40 or so necessary to 
install it. By way of contrast, age screening costs less. See supra, at 2800 (citing costs of up 
to 20 cents per password or $20 per user for an identification number). 
 
Third, filtering software depends upon parents willing to decide where their children will 
surf the Web and able to enforce that decision. As to millions of American families, that is 
not a reasonable possibility. More than 28 million school age children have both parents or 
their sole parent in the work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at home without 
supervision each week, and many of those children will spend afternoons and evenings with 
friends who may well have access to computers and more lenient parents.  
 
Fourth, software blocking lacks precision, with the result that those who wish to use it to 
screen out pornography find that it blocks a great deal of material that is valuable. As 
Justice STEVENS pointed out, “the software’s reliance on words to identify undesirable 
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sites necessarily results in the blocking of thousands of pages that contain content that is 
completely innocuous for both adults and minors, and that no rational person could 
conclude matches the filtering companies’ category definitions, such as pornography or sex.” 
Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), one of the respondents here, told 
Congress that filtering software “block[s] out valuable and protected information, such as 
information about the Quaker religion, and web sites including those of the American 
Association of University Women, the AIDS Quilt, the Town Hall Political Site (run by the 
Family Resource Center, Christian Coalition and other conservative groups).” The software 
“is simply incapable of discerning between constitutionally protected and unprotected 
speech.” It “inappropriately blocks valuable, protected speech, and does not effectively block 
the sites [it is] intended to block.” 
 
Nothing in the District Court record suggests the contrary. No respondent has offered to 
produce evidence at trial to the contrary. No party has suggested, for example, that 
technology allowing filters to interpret and discern among images has suddenly become, or 
is about to become, widely available. Indeed, the Court concedes that “[f]iltering software, of 
course, is not a perfect solution to the problem.” 
 
In sum, a “filtering software status quo” means filtering that underblocks, imposes a cost 
upon each family that uses it, fails to screen outside the home, and lacks precision. Thus, 
Congress could reasonably conclude that a system that relies entirely upon the use of such 
software is not an effective system. And a law that adds to that system an age-verification 
screen requirement significantly increases the system’s efficacy. That is to say, at a modest 
additional cost to those adults who wish to obtain access to a screened program, that law 
will bring about better, more precise blocking, both inside and outside the home. 
 
The Court’s response—that 40% of all pornographic material may be of foreign origin—is 
beside the point. Even assuming (I believe unrealistically) that all foreign originators will 
refuse to use screening, the Act would make a difference in respect to 60% of the Internet’s 
commercial pornography. I cannot call that difference insignificant. 
 
The upshot is that Congress could reasonably conclude that, despite the current availability 
of filtering software, a child protection problem exists. It also could conclude that a 
precisely targeted regulatory statute, adding an age-verification requirement for a narrow 
range of material, would more effectively shield children from commercial pornography. 
 
Is this justification sufficient? The lower courts thought not. But that is because those 
courts interpreted the Act as imposing far more than a modest burden. They assumed an 
interpretation of the statute in which it reached far beyond legally obscene and borderline 
obscene material, affecting material that, given the interpretation set forth above, would 
fall well outside the Act’s scope. But we must interpret the Act to save it, not to destroy it. 
So interpreted, the Act imposes a far lesser burden on access to protected material. Given 
the modest nature of that burden and the likelihood that the Act will significantly further 
Congress’ compelling objective, the Act may well satisfy the First Amendment’s stringent 
tests. Indeed, it does satisfy the First Amendment unless, of course, there is a genuine 
alternative, “less restrictive” way similarly to further that objective. 
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III 
 
I turn, then, to the actual “less restrictive alternatives” that the Court proposes. The Court 
proposes two real alternatives, i.e., two potentially less restrictive ways in which Congress 
might alter the status quo in order to achieve its “compelling” objective. 
 
First, the Government might “act to encourage” the use of blocking and filtering software. 
The problem is that any argument that rests upon this alternative proves too much. If one 
imagines enough Government resources devoted to the problem and perhaps additional 
scientific advances, then, of course, the use of software might become as effective and less 
restrictive. Obviously, the Government could give all parents, schools, and Internet cafes 
free computers with filtering programs already installed, hire federal employees to train 
parents and teachers on their use, and devote millions of dollars to the development of 
better software. The result might be an alternative that is extremely effective. 
 
But the Constitution does not, because it cannot, require the Government to disprove the 
existence of magic solutions, i.e., solutions that, put in general terms, will solve any 
problem less restrictively but with equal effectiveness. Otherwise, “the undoubted ability of 
lawyers and judges,” who are not constrained by the budgetary worries and other practical 
parameters within which Congress must operate, “to imagine some kind of slightly less 
drastic or restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal with the 
harm that called the statute into being.” As Justice Blackmun recognized, a “judge would be 
unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little 
less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike 
legislation down.” Perhaps that is why no party has argued seriously that additional 
expenditure of government funds to encourage the use of screening is a “less restrictive 
alternative.” 
 
Second, the majority suggests decriminalizing the statute, noting the “chilling effect” of 
criminalizing a category of speech. To remove a major sanction, however, would make the 
statute less effective, virtually by definition. 
 
IV 
 
My conclusion is that the Act, as properly interpreted, risks imposition of minor burdens on 
some protected material—burdens  that adults wishing to view the material may overcome 
at modest cost. At the same time, it significantly helps to achieve a compelling 
congressional goal, protecting children from exposure to commercial pornography. There is 
no serious, practically available “less restrictive” way similarly to further this compelling 
interest. Hence the Act is constitutional. 
 
V 
 
The Court’s holding raises two more general questions. First, what has happened to the 
“constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures” that “is an integral and 
admirable part of the constitutional design”? After eight years of legislative effort, two 
statutes, and three Supreme Court cases the Court sends this case back to the District 
Court for further proceedings. What proceedings? I have found no offer by either party to 
present more relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated? I know the Court says that 
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the parties may “introduce further evidence” as to the “relative restrictiveness and 
effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.” But I do not understand what that new 
evidence might consist of. 
 
Moreover, Congress passed the current statute “[i]n response to the Court’s decision in 
Reno “ striking down an earlier statutory effort to deal with the same problem. Congress 
read Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet 
each and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. It 
incorporated language from the Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard, 
virtually verbatim. And it created what it believed was a statute that would protect 
children from exposure to obscene professional pornography without obstructing adult 
access to material that the First Amendment protects. See H.R. Rep., at 5 (explaining that 
the bill was “carefully drafted to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno”); S. Rep., 
at 2 (same). What else was Congress supposed to do? 
 
I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the view that 
the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area. Others 
believe that the Amendment does not permit Congress to legislate in certain ways, e.g., 
through the imposition of criminal penalties for obscenity. There are strong constitutional 
arguments favoring these views. But the Court itself does not adopt those views. Instead, it 
finds that the Government has not proved the nonexistence of “less restrictive alternatives.” 
That finding, if appropriate here, is universally appropriate. And if universally appropriate, 
it denies to Congress, in practice, the legislative leeway that the Court’s language seems to 
promise. If this statute does not pass the Court’s “less restrictive alternative” test, what 
does? If nothing does, then the Court should say so clearly. 
 
As I have explained, I believe the First Amendment permits an alternative holding. We 
could construe the statute narrowly—as I have tried to do—removing nearly all protected 
material from its scope. By doing so, we could reconcile its language with the First 
Amendment’s demands. We would “save” the statute, “not ... destroy” it. And in the process, 
we would permit Congress to achieve its basic child-protecting objectives. 
 
Second, will the majority’s holding in practice mean greater or lesser protection for 
expression? I do not find the answer to this question obvious. The Court’s decision removes 
an important weapon from the prosecutorial arsenal. That weapon would have given the 
Government a choice—a choice other than “ban totally or do nothing at all.” The Act tells 
the Government that, instead of prosecuting bans on obscenity to the maximum extent 
possible (as respondents have urged as yet another “alternative”), it can insist that those 
who make available material that is obscene or close to obscene keep that material under 
wraps, making it readily available to adults who wish to see it, while restricting access to 
children. By providing this third option—a “middle way”—the Act avoids the need for 
potentially speech-suppressing prosecutions. 
 
That matters in a world where the obscene and the nonobscene do not come tied neatly into 
separate, easily distinguishable, packages. In that real world, this middle way might well 
have furthered First Amendment interests by tempering the prosecutorial instinct in 
borderline cases. At least, Congress might have so believed. And this likelihood, from a 
First Amendment perspective, might ultimately have proved more protective of the rights 
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of viewers to retain access to expression than the all-or-nothing choice available to 
prosecutors in the wake of the majority’s opinion. 
 
For these reasons, I dissent. 
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VIII. Defamation and Information Torts 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive 
material. 
 
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
 
(b) Policy 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control 
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
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to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict 
access to material described in paragraph (A). 
 
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with 
a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed 
appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control protections (such as 
computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may 
assist the customer in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice 
shall identify, or provide the customer with access to information identifying, current 
providers of such protections. 
 
(e) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of 
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal 
criminal statute. 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property. 
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing 
any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section. 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments 
made by such Act, or any similar State law. 
 
(f) Definitions 
As used in this section: 
(1) Internet 
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both 
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
(2) Interactive computer service 
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
(3) Information content provider 
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
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information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service. 
(4) Access software provider 
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including 
client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the 
following: 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, 
organize, reorganize, or translate content. 
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Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Wilkinson, Chief Judge. 
 
Kenneth Zeran brought this action against America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), arguing that AOL 
unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third 
party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings 
thereafter. The district court granted judgment for AOL on the grounds that the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”)—47 U.S.C. § 230—bars Zeran’s claims. 
Zeran appeals, arguing that § 230 leaves intact liability for interactive computer service 
providers who possess notice of defamatory material posted through their services. He also 
contends that § 230 does not apply here because his claims arise from AOL’s alleged 
negligence prior to the CDA’s enactment. Section 230, however, plainly immunizes 
computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that originates with 
third parties. Furthermore, Congress clearly expressed its intent that § 230 apply to 
lawsuits, like Zeran’s, instituted after the CDA’s enactment. Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
 
I. 
 
“The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers,” currently used by 
approximately 40 million people worldwide. One of the many means by which individuals 
access the Internet is through an interactive computer service. These services offer not only 
a connection to the Internet as a whole, but also allow their subscribers to access 
information communicated and stored only on each computer service’s individual 
proprietary network. AOL is just such an interactive computer service. Much of the 
information transmitted over its network originates with the company’s millions of 
subscribers. They may transmit information privately via electronic mail, or they may 
communicate publicly by posting messages on AOL bulletin boards, where the messages 
may be read by any AOL subscriber. 
 
The instant case comes before us on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, so we accept 
the facts alleged in the complaint as true. On April 25, 1995, an unidentified person posted 
a message on an AOL bulletin board advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts.” The 
posting described the sale of shirts featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the 
April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Those 
interested in purchasing the shirts were instructed to call “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone 
number in Seattle, Washington. As a result of this anonymously perpetrated prank, Zeran 
received a high volume of calls, comprised primarily of angry and derogatory messages, but 
also including death threats. Zeran could not change his phone number because he relied on 
its availability to the public in running his business out of his home. Later that day, Zeran 
called AOL and informed a company representative of his predicament. The employee 
assured Zeran that the posting would be removed from AOL’s bulletin board but explained 
that as a matter of policy AOL would not post a retraction. The parties dispute the date 
that AOL removed this original posting from its bulletin board. 
 
On April 26, the next day, an unknown person posted another message advertising 
additional shirts with new tasteless slogans related to the Oklahoma City bombing. Again, 
interested buyers were told to call Zeran’s phone number, to ask for “Ken,” and to “please 
call back if busy” due to high demand. The angry, threatening phone calls intensified. Over 
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the next four days, an unidentified party continued to post messages on AOL’s bulletin 
board, advertising additional items including bumper stickers and key chains with still 
more offensive slogans. During this time period, Zeran called AOL repeatedly and was told 
by company representatives that the individual account from which the messages were 
posted would soon be closed. Zeran also reported his case to Seattle FBI agents. By April 
30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately every two minutes. 
 
Meanwhile, an announcer for Oklahoma City radio station KRXO received a copy of the 
first AOL posting. On May 1, the announcer related the message’s contents on the air, 
attributed them to “Ken” at Zeran’s phone number, and urged the listening audience to call 
the number. After this radio broadcast, Zeran was inundated with death threats and other 
violent calls from Oklahoma City residents. Over the next few days, Zeran talked to both 
KRXO and AOL representatives. He also spoke to his local police, who subsequently 
surveilled his home to protect his safety. By May 14, after an Oklahoma City newspaper 
published a story exposing the shirt advertisements as a hoax and after KRXO made an on-
air apology, the number of calls to Zeran’s residence finally subsided to fifteen per day. 
 
Zeran first filed suit on January 4, 1996, against radio station KRXO in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. On April 23, 1996, he filed this 
separate suit against AOL in the same court. Zeran did not bring any action against the 
party who posted the offensive messages.1 After Zeran’s suit against AOL was transferred 
to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), AOL answered Zeran’s 
complaint and interposed 47 U.S.C. § 230 as an affirmative defense. AOL then moved for 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The district court granted AOL’s 
motion, and Zeran filed this appeal. 
 
II. 
A. 
 
Because § 230 was successfully advanced by AOL in the district court as a defense to 
Zeran’s claims, we shall briefly examine its operation here. Zeran seeks to hold AOL liable 
for defamatory speech initiated by a third party. He argued to the district court that once 
he notified AOL of the unidentified third party’s hoax, AOL had a duty to remove the 
defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers of the message’s false nature, and to 
effectively screen future defamatory material. Section 230 entered this litigation as an 
affirmative defense pled by AOL. The company claimed that Congress immunized 
interactive computer service providers from claims based on information posted by a third 
party. 
 
The relevant portion of § 230 states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”2 By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to 
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating 
                                                 
1 Zeran maintains that AOL made it impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate 
records of its users. The issue of AOL’s record keeping practices, however, is not presented by this appeal. 
2 …The parties do not dispute that AOL falls within the CDA’s “interactive computer service” definition and 
that the unidentified third party who posted the offensive messages here fits the definition of an “information 
content provider.” 
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with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining 
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits 
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are 
barred. 
 
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the 
threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning 
Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the 
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive 
government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust 
nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the 
medium to a minimum. In specific statutory findings, Congress recognized the Internet and 
interactive computer services as offering “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, 
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.” It also found that the Internet and interactive computer services “have flourished, 
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” (emphasis 
added). Congress further stated that it is “the policy of the United States ... to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (emphasis added). 
 
None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory 
messages would escape accountability. While Congress acted to keep government 
regulation of the Internet to a minimum, it also found it to be the policy of the United 
States “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” Congress made a 
policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of 
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ 
potentially injurious messages. 
 
Congress’ purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus evident. Interactive computer 
services have millions of users. The amount of information communicated via interactive 
computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such 
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service 
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with 
potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer 
service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. 
Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize 
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect. 
 
Another important purpose of § 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their services. In this respect, § 230 responded to a 
New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). There, the plaintiffs sued Prodigy—an interactive 
computer service like AOL—for defamatory comments made by an unidentified party on 
one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards. The court held Prodigy to the strict liability standard 
normally applied to original publishers of defamatory statements, rejecting Prodigy’s claims 
that it should be held only to the lower “knowledge” standard usually reserved for 
distributors. The court reasoned that Prodigy acted more like an original publisher than a 
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distributor both because it advertised its practice of controlling content on its service and 
because it actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards. 
 
Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the 
Stratton Oakmont decision. Under that court’s holding, computer service providers who 
regulated the dissemination of offensive material on their services risked subjecting 
themselves to liability, because such regulation cast the service provider in the role of a 
publisher. Fearing that the specter of liability would therefore deter service providers from 
blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230’s broad immunity “to 
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material.” In line with this purpose, § 230 forbids the imposition of 
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory 
functions. 
 
B. 
 
Zeran argues, however, that the § 230 immunity eliminates only publisher liability, leaving 
distributor liability intact. Publishers can be held liable for defamatory statements 
contained in their works even absent proof that they had specific knowledge of the 
statement’s inclusion. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 113, 
at 810 (5th ed. 1984). According to Zeran, interactive computer service providers like AOL 
are normally considered instead to be distributors, like traditional news vendors or book 
sellers. Distributors cannot be held liable for defamatory statements contained in the 
materials they distribute unless it is proven at a minimum that they have actual knowledge 
of the defamatory statements upon which liability is predicated. Id. at 811 (explaining that 
distributors are not liable “in the absence of proof that they knew or had reason to know of 
the existence of defamatory matter contained in matter published”). Zeran contends that he 
provided AOL with sufficient notice of the defamatory statements appearing on the 
company’s bulletin board. This notice is significant, says Zeran, because AOL could be held 
liable as a distributor only if it acquired knowledge of the defamatory statements’ existence. 
 
Because of the difference between these two forms of liability, Zeran contends that the term 
“distributor” carries a legally distinct meaning from the term “publisher.” Accordingly, he 
asserts that Congress’ use of only the term “publisher” in § 230 indicates a purpose to 
immunize service providers only from publisher liability. He argues that distributors are 
left unprotected by § 230 and, therefore, his suit should be permitted to proceed against 
AOL. We disagree. Assuming arguendo that Zeran has satisfied the requirements for 
imposition of distributor liability, this theory of liability is merely a subset, or a species, of 
publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230. 
 
The terms “publisher” and “distributor” derive their legal significance from the context of 
defamation law. Although Zeran attempts to artfully plead his claims as ones of negligence, 
they are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action. Because the 
publication of a statement is a necessary element in a defamation action, only one who 
publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b) 
(1977); Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 802. Publication does not only describe the choice by 
an author to include certain information. In addition, both the negligent communication of 
a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a statement when first 
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communicated by another party—each alleged by Zeran here under a negligence label—
constitute publication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577. In fact, every repetition of a 
defamatory statement is considered a publication. Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 799. 
 
In this case, AOL is legally considered to be a publisher. “[E]very one who takes part in the 
publication ... is charged with publication.” Id. Even distributors are considered to be 
publishers for purposes of defamation law: 
 
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to 
disseminate the writings composed, the speeches made, and the information 
gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to such an extent in 
making the books, newspapers, magazines, and information available to 
others as to be regarded as publishers. They are intentionally making the 
contents available to others, sometimes without knowing all of the contents—
including the defamatory content—and sometimes without any opportunity 
to ascertain, in advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in 
the matter published. 
 
Id. at 803. AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition of a publisher and, 
therefore, is clearly protected by § 230’s immunity. 
 
Zeran contends that decisions like Stratton Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), recognize a legal distinction between publishers and 
distributors. He misapprehends, however, the significance of that distinction for the legal 
issue we consider here. It is undoubtedly true that mere conduits, or distributors, are 
subject to a different standard of liability. As explained above, distributors must at a 
minimum have knowledge of the existence of a defamatory statement as a prerequisite to 
liability. But this distinction signifies only that different standards of liability may be 
applied within the larger publisher category, depending on the specific type of publisher 
concerned. See Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 799-800 (explaining that every party involved 
is charged with publication, although degrees of legal responsibility differ). To the extent 
that decisions like Stratton and Cubby utilize the terms “publisher” and “distributor” 
separately, the decisions correctly describe two different standards of liability. Stratton and 
Cubby do not, however, suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher for 
purposes of defamation law. 
 
Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence of the distinct notice element in 
distributor liability. The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original 
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law. To the contrary, once a computer service 
provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a 
traditional publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit, 
or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on AOL for 
assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes liability—the publisher role. 
 
Our view that Zeran’s complaint treats AOL as a publisher is reinforced because AOL is 
cast in the same position as the party who originally posted the offensive messages. 
According to Zeran’s logic, AOL is legally at fault because it communicated to third parties 
an allegedly defamatory statement. This is precisely the theory under which the original 
poster of the offensive messages would be found liable. If the original party is considered a 
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publisher of the offensive messages, Zeran certainly cannot attach liability to AOL under 
the same theory without conceding that AOL too must be treated as a publisher of the 
statements. 
 
Zeran next contends that interpreting § 230 to impose liability on service providers with 
knowledge of defamatory content on their services is consistent with the statutory purposes 
outlined in Part IIA. Zeran fails, however, to understand the practical implications of notice 
liability in the interactive computer service context. Liability upon notice would defeat the 
dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA. Like the strict liability imposed by the 
Stratton Oakmont court, liability upon notice reinforces service providers’ incentives to 
restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation. 
 
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential 
liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—from any 
party, concerning any message. Each notification would require a careful yet rapid 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment 
concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision 
whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information. 
Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of 
postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the 
Internet context. Cf. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992) 
(recognizing that it is unrealistic for network affiliates to “monitor incoming transmissions 
and exercise on-the-spot discretionary calls”). Because service providers would be subject to 
liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a 
natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were 
defamatory or not. Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the 
freedom of Internet speech. 
 
Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the 
dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any efforts by a service 
provider to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of 
potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for 
liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further possible lawsuits, service providers 
would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation. 
 
More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would 
provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever 
one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted over an interactive 
computer service, the offended party could simply “notify” the relevant service provider, 
claiming the information to be legally defamatory. In light of the vast amount of speech 
communicated through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an 
impossible burden for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of 
suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability. Because the probable 
effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider self-
regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes, we will not assume that 
Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact…. 
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Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
Kozinski, Chief Judge. 
 
We plumb the depths of the immunity provided by section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”). 
 
Facts1 
 
Defendant Roommate.com, LLC (“Roommate”) operates a website designed to match people 
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.2 At the time of the district 
court’s disposition, Roommate’s website featured approximately 150,000 active listings and 
received around a million page views a day. Roommate seeks to profit by collecting revenue 
from advertisers and subscribers. 
 
Before subscribers can search listings or post housing opportunities on Roommate’s 
website, they must create profiles, a process that requires them to answer a series of 
questions. In addition to requesting basic information—such as name, location and email 
address—Roommate requires each subscriber to disclose his sex, sexual orientation and 
whether he would bring children to a household. Each subscriber must also describe his 
preferences in roommates with respect to the same three criteria: sex, sexual orientation 
and whether they will bring children to the household. The site also encourages subscribers 
to provide “Additional Comments” describing themselves and their desired roommate in an 
open-ended essay. After a new subscriber completes the application, Roommate assembles 
his answers into a “profile page.” The profile page displays the subscriber’s pseudonym, his 
description and his preferences, as divulged through answers to Roommate’s questions. 
 
                                                 
1 This appeal is taken from the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, so we 
view contested facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. 
2 For unknown reasons, the company goes by the singular name “Roommate.com, LLC” but pluralizes its 
website’s URL, www.roommates.com. 
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[Editor’s note: three screenshots from the Roommates.com website in 2008:] 
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Subscribers can choose between two levels of service: Those using the site’s free service 
level can create their own personal profile page, search the profiles of others and send 
personal email messages. They can also receive periodic emails from Roommate, informing 
them of available housing opportunities matching their preferences. Subscribers who pay a 
monthly fee also gain the ability to read emails from other users, and to view other 
subscribers’ “Additional Comments.” 
 
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego (“Councils”) sued 
Roommate in federal court, alleging that Roommate’s business violates the federal Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”) and California housing discrimination laws. Councils claim that 
Roommate is effectively a housing broker doing online what it may not lawfully do off-line. 
The district court held that Roommate is immune under section 230 of the CDA and 
dismissed the federal claims without considering whether Roommate’s actions violated the 
FHA. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims. Councils appeal the dismissal of the FHA claim and Roommate cross-appeals the 
denial of attorneys’ fees. 
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Analysis 
 
Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive computer services6 against 
liability arising from content created by third parties: “No provider ... of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.” This grant of immunity applies only if the 
interactive computer service provider is not also an “information content provider,” which is 
defined as someone who is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of” the offending content. 
 
A website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider: If it passively 
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider 
with respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is “responsible, in 
whole or in part” for creating or developing, the website is also a content provider. Thus, a 
website may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but 
be subject to liability for other content. 
 
Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy responsible for a libelous 
message posted on one of its financial message boards. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished). The court 
there found that Prodigy had become a “publisher” under state law because it voluntarily 
deleted some messages from its message boards “on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad 
taste,’” and was therefore legally responsible for the content of defamatory messages that it 
failed to delete. The Stratton Oakmont court reasoned that Prodigy’s decision to perform 
some voluntary self-policing made it akin to a newspaper publisher, and thus responsible 
for messages on its bulletin board that defamed third parties. The court distinguished 
Prodigy from CompuServe, which had been released from liability in a similar defamation 
case because CompuServe “had no opportunity to review the contents of the publication at 
issue before it was uploaded into CompuServe’s computer banks.” Id.; see Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under the reasoning of Stratton 
Oakmont, online service providers that voluntarily filter some messages become liable for 
all messages transmitted, whereas providers that bury their heads in the sand and ignore 
problematic posts altogether escape liability. Prodigy claimed that the “sheer volume” of 
message board postings it received—at the time, over 60,000 a day—made manual review 
of every message impossible; thus, if it were forced to choose between taking responsibility 
for all messages and deleting no messages at all, it would have to choose the latter course.  
 
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this grim 
choice by allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated content without thereby 
becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or 
delete. In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, 
not the creation of content: “[S]ection [230] provides ‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil 
liability for providers ... of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict ... access to 
objectionable online material. One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule 
Stratton-Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such 
                                                 
6 … Today, the most common interactive computer services are websites. Councils do not dispute that 
Roommate’s website is an interactive computer service. 
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providers ... as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, the section is titled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material” and, as the Seventh Circuit recently held, the substance of section 
230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its caption. Chicago Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 
With this backdrop in mind, we examine three specific functions performed by Roommate 
that are alleged to violate the Fair Housing Act and California law. 
 
1. Councils first argue that the questions Roommate poses to prospective subscribers during 
the registration process violate the Fair Housing Act and the analogous California law. 
Councils allege that requiring subscribers to disclose their sex, family status and sexual 
orientation “indicates” an intent to discriminate against them, and thus runs afoul of both 
the FHA and state law.13 
 
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and designed its website 
registration process around them. Therefore, Roommate is undoubtedly the “information 
content provider” as to the questions and can claim no immunity for posting them on its 
website, or for forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services. 
 
Here, we must determine whether Roommate has immunity under the CDA because 
Councils have at least a plausible claim that Roommate violated state and federal law by 
merely posing the questions. We need not decide whether any of Roommate’s questions 
actually violate the Fair Housing Act or California law, or whether they are protected by 
the First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees; we leave those issues for the 
district court on remand. Rather, we examine the scope of plaintiffs’ substantive claims only 
insofar as necessary to determine whether section 230 immunity applies. However, we note 
that asking questions certainly can violate the Fair Housing Act and analogous laws in the 
physical world. For example, a real estate broker may not inquire as to the race of a 
prospective buyer, and an employer may not inquire as to the religion of a prospective 
employee. If such questions are unlawful when posed face-to-face or by telephone, they 
don’t magically become lawful when asked electronically online. The Communications 
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.15 
 
Councils also claim that requiring subscribers to answer the questions as a condition of 
using Roommate’s services unlawfully “cause[s]” subscribers to make a “statement ... with 
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates [a] preference, limitation, or 
                                                 
13 The Fair Housing Act prohibits any “statement ... with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
indicates ... an intention to make [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination” on the basis of a protected 
category. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). California law prohibits “any written or oral inquiry concerning 
the” protected status of a housing seeker. Cal. Gov. Code § 12955(b). 
15 The dissent stresses the importance of the Internet to modern life and commerce, and we, of course, agree: 
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by 
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has 
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach 
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by 
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must 
comply with laws of general applicability. 
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discrimination,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The CDA does not grant immunity for 
inducing third parties to express illegal preferences. Roommate’s own acts—posting the 
questionnaire and requiring answers to it—are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of 
the CDA does not apply to them. Roommate is entitled to no immunity. 
  
2. Councils also charge that Roommate’s development and display of subscribers’ 
discriminatory preferences is unlawful. Roommate publishes a “profile page” for each 
subscriber on its website. The page describes the client’s personal information—such as his 
sex, sexual orientation and whether he has children—as well as the attributes of the 
housing situation he seeks. The content of these pages is drawn directly from the 
registration process: For example, Roommate requires subscribers to specify, using a drop-
down menu provided by Roommate, whether they are “Male” or “Female” and then displays 
that information on the profile page. Roommate also requires subscribers who are listing 
available housing to disclose whether there are currently “Straight male(s),” “Gay male(s),” 
“Straight female(s)” or “Lesbian(s)” living in the dwelling. Subscribers who are seeking 
housing must make a selection from a drop-down menu, again provided by Roommate, to 
indicate whether they are willing to live with “Straight or gay” males, only with “Straight” 
males, only with “Gay” males or with “No males.” Similarly, Roommate requires subscribers 
listing housing to disclose whether there are “Children present” or “Children not present” 
and requires housing seekers to say “I will live with children” or “I will not live with 
children.” Roommate then displays these answers, along with other information, on the 
subscriber’s profile page. This information is obviously included to help subscribers decide 
which housing opportunities to pursue and which to bypass. In addition, Roommate itself 
uses this information to channel subscribers away from listings where the individual 
offering housing has expressed preferences that aren’t compatible with the subscriber’s 
answers. 
 
The dissent tilts at windmills when it shows, quite convincingly, that Roommate’s 
subscribers are information content providers who create the profiles by picking among 
options and providing their own answers. There is no disagreement on this point. But, the 
fact that users are information content providers does not preclude Roommate from also 
being an information content provider by helping “develop” at least “in part” the 
information in the profiles. As we explained in Batzel, the party responsible for putting 
information online may be subject to liability, even if the information originated with a 
user. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003). 
  
Here, the part of the profile that is alleged to offend the Fair Housing Act and state housing 
discrimination laws—the information about sex, family status and sexual orientation—is 
provided by subscribers in response to Roommate’s questions, which they cannot refuse to 
answer if they want to use defendant’s services. By requiring subscribers to provide the 
information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-
populated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of 
information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that 
information. And section 230 provides immunity only if the interactive computer service 
does not “creat[e] or develop[ ]” the information “in whole or in part.” 
 
Our dissenting colleague takes a much narrower view of what it means to “develop” 
information online, and concludes that Roommate does not develop the information because 
“[a]ll Roommate does is to provide a form with options for standardized answers.” But 
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Roommate does much more than provide options. To begin with, it asks discriminatory 
questions that even the dissent grudgingly admits are not entitled to CDA immunity. The 
FHA makes it unlawful to ask certain discriminatory questions for a very good reason: 
Unlawful questions solicit (a.k.a. “develop”) unlawful answers. Not only does Roommate ask 
these questions, Roommate makes answering the discriminatory questions a condition of 
doing business. This is no different from a real estate broker in real life saying, “Tell me 
whether you’re Jewish or you can find yourself another broker.” When a business enterprise 
extracts such information from potential customers as a condition of accepting them as 
clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for 
developing that information. For the dissent to claim that the information in such 
circumstances is “created solely by” the customer, and that the business has not helped in 
the least to develop it, strains both credulity and English.19 
 
Roommate also argues that it is not responsible for the information on the profile page 
because it is each subscriber’s action that leads to publication of his particular profile—in 
other words, the user pushes the last button or takes the last act before publication. We are 
not convinced that this is even true, but don’t see why it matters anyway. The projectionist 
in the theater may push the last button before a film is displayed on the screen, but surely 
this doesn’t make him the sole producer of the movie. By any reasonable use of the English 
language, Roommate is “responsible” at least “in part” for each subscriber’s profile page, 
because every such page is a collaborative effort between Roommate and the subscriber. 
 
Similarly, Roommate is not entitled to CDA immunity for the operation of its search 
system, which filters listings, or of its email notification system, which directs emails to 
subscribers according to discriminatory criteria. Roommate designed its search system so it 
would steer users based on the preferences and personal characteristics that Roommate 
itself forces subscribers to disclose. If Roommate has no immunity for asking the 
discriminatory questions, as we concluded above, it can certainly have no immunity for 
using the answers to the unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing. 
 
For example, a subscriber who self-identifies as a “Gay male” will not receive email 
notifications of new housing opportunities supplied by owners who limit the universe of 
acceptable tenants to “Straight male(s),” “Straight female(s)” and “Lesbian(s).” Similarly, 
subscribers with children will not be notified of new listings where the owner specifies “no 
children.” Councils charge that limiting the information a subscriber can access based on 
that subscriber’s protected status violates the Fair Housing Act and state housing 
discrimination laws. It is, Councils allege, no different from a real estate broker saying to a 
client: “Sorry, sir, but I can’t show you any listings on this block because you are 
[gay/female/black/a parent].” If such screening is prohibited when practiced in person or by 
telephone, we see no reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit 
from it online. 
                                                 
19 The dissent may be laboring under a misapprehension as to how the Roommate website is alleged to operate. 
For example, the dissent spends some time explaining that certain portions of the user profile application are 
voluntary. We do not discuss these because plaintiffs do not base their claims on the voluntary portions of the 
application, except the “Additional Comments” portion, discussed below. The dissent also soft-pedals 
Roommate’s influence on the mandatory portions of the applications by referring to it with such words as 
“encourage” or “encouragement” or “solicitation.” Roommate, of course, does much more than encourage or 
solicit; it forces users to answer certain questions and thereby provide information that other clients can use to 
discriminate unlawfully. 
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Roommate’s search function is similarly designed to steer users based on discriminatory 
criteria. Roommate’s search engine thus differs materially from generic search engines such 
as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live Search, in that Roommate designed its system to use 
allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to 
participate in its discriminatory process. In other words, Councils allege that Roommate’s 
search is designed to make it more difficult or impossible for individuals with certain 
protected characteristics to find housing-something the law prohibits. By contrast, ordinary 
search engines do not use unlawful criteria to limit the scope of searches conducted on 
them, nor are they designed to achieve illegal ends-as Roommate’s search function is 
alleged to do here. Therefore, such search engines play no part in the “development” of any 
unlawful searches. 
 
It’s true that the broadest sense of the term “develop” could include the functions of an 
ordinary search engine—indeed, just about any function performed by a website. But to 
read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230 by swallowing up every 
bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides. At the same time, reading the 
exception for co-developers as applying only to content that originates entirely with the 
website—as the dissent would seem to suggest—ignores the words “development ... in part” 
in the statutory passage “creation or development in whole or in part.” (emphasis added). 
We believe that both the immunity for passive conduits and the exception for co-developers 
must be given their proper scope and, to that end, we interpret the term “development” as 
referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to 
its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and 
thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged 
illegality of the conduct. 
 
The dissent accuses us of “rac[ing] past the plain language of the statute,” but we clearly do 
pay close attention to the statutory language, particularly the word “develop,” which we 
spend many pages exploring. The dissent may disagree with our definition of the term, 
which is entirely fair, but surely our dissenting colleague is mistaken in suggesting we 
ignore the term. Nor is the statutory language quite as plain as the dissent would have it. 
Quoting selectively from the dictionary, the dissent comes up with an exceedingly narrow 
definition of this rather complex and multi faceted term.22 Dissent at 1184 (defining 
development as “gradual advance or growth through progressive changes”) (quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 618 (2002)). The dissent does not pause to 
consider how such a definition could apply to website content at all, as it excludes the kinds 
of swift and disorderly changes that are the hallmark of growth on the Internet. Had our 
dissenting colleague looked just a few lines lower on the same page of the same edition of 
the same dictionary, she would have found another definition of “development” that is far 
more suitable to the context in which we operate: “making usable or available.” The dissent 
does not explain why the definition it has chosen reflects the statute’s “plain meaning,” 
while the ones it bypasses do not. 
 
                                                 
22 Development, it will be recalled, has many meanings, which differ materially depending on context. Thus, 
“development” when used as part of the phrase “research and development” means something quite different 
than when referring to “mental development,” and something else again when referring to “real estate 
development,” “musical development” or “economic development.” 
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More fundamentally, the dissent does nothing at all to grapple with the difficult statutory 
problem posed by the fact that section 230(c) uses both “create” and “develop” as separate 
bases for loss of immunity. Everything that the dissent includes within its cramped 
definition of “development” fits just as easily within the definition of “creation”—which 
renders the term “development” superfluous. The dissent makes no attempt to explain or 
offer examples as to how its interpretation of the statute leaves room for “development” as a 
separate basis for a website to lose its immunity, yet we are advised by the Supreme Court 
that we must give meaning to all statutory terms, avoiding redundancy or duplication 
wherever possible. 
 
While content to pluck the “plain meaning” of the statute from a dictionary definition that 
predates the Internet by decades, compare Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
618 (1963) with Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 618 (2002) (both containing 
“gradual advance or growth through progressive changes”), the dissent overlooks the far 
more relevant definition of “[web] content development” in Wikipedia: “the process of 
researching, writing, gathering, organizing and editing information for publication on web 
sites.” Our interpretation of “development” is entirely in line with the context-appropriate 
meaning of the term, and easily fits the activities Roommate engages in. 
 
In an abundance of caution, and to avoid the kind of misunderstanding the dissent seems to 
encourage, we offer a few examples to elucidate what does and does not amount to 
“development” under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: If an individual uses 
an ordinary search engine to query for a “white roommate,” the search engine has not 
contributed to any alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing neutral tools 
to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to “development” for 
purposes of the immunity exception. A dating website that requires users to enter their sex, 
race, religion and marital status through drop-down menus, and that provides means for 
users to search along the same lines, retains its CDA immunity insofar as it does not 
contribute to any alleged illegality;23 this immunity is retained even if the website is sued 
for libel based on these characteristics because the website would not have contributed 
materially to any alleged defamation. Similarly, a housing website that allows users to 
specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of user-defined criteria might 
help some users exclude email from other users of a particular race or sex. However, that 
website would be immune, so long as it does not require the use of discriminatory criteria. A 
website operator who edits user-created content—such as by correcting spelling, removing 
obscenity or trimming for length—retains his immunity for any illegality in the user-
created content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the illegality. However, a website 
operator who edits in a manner that contributes to the alleged illegality—such as by 
removing the word “not” from a user’s message reading “[Name] did not steal the artwork” 
in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous one—is directly involved in the 
alleged illegality and thus not immune.24 
                                                 
23 It is perfectly legal to discriminate along those lines in dating, and thus there can be no claim based solely on 
the content of these questions. 
24 Requiring website owners to refrain from taking affirmative acts that are unlawful does not strike us as an 
undue burden. These are, after all, businesses that are being held responsible only for their own conduct; there 
is no vicarious liability for the misconduct of their customers. Compliance with laws of general applicability 
seems like an entirely justified burden for all businesses, whether they operate online or through quaint brick-
and-mortar facilities. Insofar, however, as a plaintiff would bring a claim under state or federal law based on a 
website operator’s passive acquiescence in the misconduct of its users, the website operator would likely be 
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Here, Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is direct and palpable: 
Roommate designed its search and email systems to limit the listings available to 
subscribers based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children.25 Roommate selected 
the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that the act of hiding certain listings 
is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits brokers from steering clients 
in accordance with discriminatory preferences.26 We need not decide the merits of Councils’ 
claim to hold that Roommate is sufficiently involved with the design and operation of the 
search and email systems—which are engineered to limit access to housing on the basis of 
the protected characteristics elicited by the registration process—so as to forfeit any 
immunity to which it was otherwise entitled under section 230. 
 
Roommate’s situation stands in stark contrast to Stratton Oakmont, the case Congress 
sought to reverse through passage of section 230. There, defendant Prodigy was held liable 
for a user’s unsolicited message because it attempted to remove some problematic content 
from its website, but didn’t remove enough. Here, Roommate is not being sued for removing 
some harmful messages while failing to remove others; instead, it is being sued for the 
predictable consequences of creating a website designed to solicit and enforce housing 
preferences that are alleged to be illegal. 
 
We take this opportunity to clarify two of our previous rulings regarding the scope of 
section 230 immunity. Today’s holding sheds additional light on Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018 (9th Cir. 2003). There, the editor of an email newsletter received a tip about some 
artwork, which the tipster falsely alleged to be stolen. The newsletter editor incorporated 
the tipster’s email into the next issue of his newsletter and added a short headnote, which 
he then emailed to his subscribers.27 The art owner sued for libel and a split panel held the 
newsletter editor to be immune under section 230 of the CDA.28 
 
Our opinion is entirely consistent with that part of Batzel which holds that an editor’s 
minor changes to the spelling, grammar and length of third-party content do not strip him 
of section 230 immunity. None of those changes contributed to the libelousness of the 
message, so they do not add up to “development” as we interpret the term. Batzel went on 
to hold that the editor could be liable for selecting the tipster’s email for inclusion in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
entitled to CDA immunity. This is true even if the users committed their misconduct using electronic tools of 
general applicability provided by the website operator. 
25 Of course, the logic of Roommate’s argument is not limited to discrimination based on these particular 
criteria. If Roommate were free to discriminate in providing housing services based on sex, there is no reason 
another website could not discriminate based on race, religion or national origin. Nor is its logic limited to 
housing; it would apply equally to websites providing employment or educational opportunities—or anything 
else, for that matter. 
26 The dissent argues that Roommate is not liable because the decision to discriminate on these grounds does 
not originate with Roommate; instead, “users have chosen to select characteristics that they find desirable.” 
But, it is Roommate that forces users to express a preference and Roommate that forces users to disclose the 
information that can form the basis of discrimination by others. Thus, Roommate makes discrimination both 
possible and respectable. 
27 Apparently, it was common practice for this editor to receive and forward tips from his subscribers. In effect, 
the newsletter served as a heavily moderated discussion list. 
28 As an initial matter, the Batzel panel held that the defendant newsletter editor was a “user” of an interactive 
computer service within the definition provided by section 230. While we have our doubts, we express no view 
on this issue because it is not presented to us. Thus, we assume that the editor fell within the scope of section 
230’s coverage without endorsing Batzel’s analysis on this point. 
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newsletter, depending on whether or not the tipster had tendered the piece to the editor for 
posting online, and remanded for a determination of that issue. 
 
The distinction drawn by Batzel anticipated the approach we take today. As Batzel 
explained, if the tipster tendered the material for posting online, then the editor’s job was, 
essentially, to determine whether or not to prevent its posting—precisely the kind of 
activity for which section 230 was meant to provide immunity.29 And any activity that can 
be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online is perforce immune under section 230. But if the editor publishes material that he 
does not believe was tendered to him for posting online, then he is the one making the 
affirmative decision to publish, and so he contributes materially to its allegedly unlawful 
dissemination. He is thus properly deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.30 
 
We must also clarify the reasoning undergirding our holding in Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), as we used language there that was 
unduly broad. In Carafano, an unknown prankster impersonating actress Christianne 
Carafano created a profile for her on an online dating site. The profile included Carafano’s 
home address and suggested that she was looking for an unconventional liaison. When 
Carafano received threatening phone calls, she sued the dating site for publishing the 
unauthorized profile. The site asserted immunity under section 230. We correctly held that 
the website was immune, but incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because “no 
[dating] profile has any content until a user actively creates it.” As we explain above, even if 
the data are supplied by third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the 
content’s illegality and thus be liable as a developer.31 Providing immunity every time a 
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the exception to 
section 230 for “develop[ing]” unlawful content “in whole or in part.”  
 
We believe a more plausible rationale for the unquestionably correct result in Carafano is 
this: The allegedly libelous content there—the false implication that Carafano was 
unchaste—was created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, without prompting 
or help from the website operator. To be sure, the website provided neutral tools, which the 
anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to 
encourage the posting of defamatory content—indeed, the defamatory posting was contrary 
                                                 
29 As Batzel pointed out, there can be no meaningful difference between an editor starting with a default rule of 
publishing all submissions and then manually selecting material to be removed from publication, and a default 
rule of publishing no submissions and manually selecting material to be published—they are flip sides of 
precisely the same coin. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (“The scope of [section 230] immunity cannot turn on whether 
the publisher approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method 
or degree, not substance.”). 
30 The dissent scores a debater’s point by noting that the same activity might amount to “development” or not, 
depending on whether it contributes materially to the illegality of the content. But we are not defining 
“development” for all purposes; we are defining the term only for purposes of determining whether the 
defendant is entitled to immunity for a particular act. This definition does not depend on finding substantive 
liability, but merely requires analyzing the context in which a claim is brought. A finding that a defendant is 
not immune is quite distinct from finding liability: On remand, Roommate may still assert other defenses to 
liability under the Fair Housing Act, or argue that its actions do not violate the Fair Housing Act at all. Our 
holding is limited to a determination that the CDA provides no immunity to Roommate’s actions in soliciting 
and developing the content of its website; whether that content is in fact illegal is a question we leave to the 
district court. 
31 We disavow any suggestion that Carafano holds an information content provider automatically immune so 
long as the content originated with another information content provider. 
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to the website’s express policies. The claim against the website was, in effect, that it failed 
to review each user-created profile to ensure that it wasn’t defamatory. That is precisely the 
kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of section 
230. With respect to the defamatory content, the website operator was merely a passive 
conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing to detect and remove it.32 
 
By contrast, Roommate both elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use 
of it in conducting its business. Roommate does not merely provide a framework that could 
be utilized for proper or improper purposes; rather, Roommate’s work in developing the 
discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and discriminatory search mechanism is 
directly related to the alleged illegality of the site. Unlike Carafano, where the website 
operator had nothing to do with the user’s decision to enter a celebrity’s name and personal 
information in an otherwise licit dating service, here, Roommate is directly involved with 
developing and enforcing a system that subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory 
housing practices. 
 
Our ruling today also dovetails with another facet of Carafano: The mere fact that an 
interactive computer service “classifies user characteristics ... does not transform [it] into a 
‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’” Carafano, like Batzel, correctly anticipated 
our common-sense interpretation of the term “develop[ ]” in section 230. Of course, any 
classification of information, like the sorting of dating profiles by the type of relationship 
sought in Carafano, could be construed as “develop[ment]” under an unduly broad reading 
of the term. But, once again, such a broad reading would sap section 230 of all meaning. 
 
The salient fact in Carafano was that the website’s classifications of user characteristics did 
absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to encourage 
defamation or to make defamation easier: The site provided neutral tools specifically 
designed to match romantic partners depending on their voluntary inputs. By sharp 
contrast, Roommate’s website is designed to force subscribers to divulge protected 
characteristics and discriminatory preferences, and to match those who have rooms with 
those who are looking for rooms based on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the 
FHA.33 
                                                 
32 Section 230 requires us to scrutinize particularly closely any claim that can be boiled down to the failure of an 
interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered for posting 
online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the section. 
The dissent coyly suggests that our opinion “sets us apart from” other circuits, carefully avoiding the 
phrase “inter-circuit conflict.” And with good reason: No other circuit has considered a case like ours and none 
has a case that even arguably conflicts with our holding today. No case cited by the dissent involves active 
participation by the defendant in the creation or development of the allegedly unlawful content; in each, the 
interactive computer service provider passively relayed content generated by third parties, just as in Stratton 
Oakmont, and did not design its system around the dissemination of unlawful content. 
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th 
Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held the online classified website craigslist immune from liability for 
discriminatory housing advertisements submitted by users. Craigslist’s service works very much like the 
“Additional Comments” section of Roommate’s website, in that users are given an open text prompt in which to 
enter any description of the rental property without any structure imposed on their content or any requirement 
to enter discriminatory information: “Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any 
particular listing or express a preference for discrimination....” We similarly hold the “Additional Comments” 
section of Roommate’s site immune. Consistent with our opinion, the Seventh Circuit explained the limited 
scope of section 230(c) immunity. More directly, the Seventh Circuit noted in dicta that “causing a particular 
statement to be made, or perhaps [causing] the discriminatory content of a statement “ might be sufficient to 
278. 
 
3. Councils finally argue that Roommate should be held liable for the discriminatory 
statements displayed in the “Additional Comments” section of profile pages. At the end of 
the registration process, on a separate page from the other registration steps, Roommate 
prompts subscribers to “tak[e] a moment to personalize your profile by writing a paragraph 
or two describing yourself and what you are looking for in a roommate.” The subscriber is 
presented with a blank text box, in which he can type as much or as little about himself as 
he wishes. Such essays are visible only to paying subscribers. 
 
Subscribers provide a variety of provocative, and often very revealing, answers. The 
contents range from subscribers who “[p]ref[er] white Male roommates” or require that 
“[t]he person applying for the room MUST be a BLACK GAY MALE” to those who are “NOT 
looking for black muslims.” Some common themes are a desire to live without “drugs, kids 
or animals” or “smokers, kids or druggies,” while a few subscribers express more particular 
preferences, such as preferring to live in a home free of “psychos or anyone on mental 
medication.” Some subscribers are just looking for someone who will get along with their 
significant other34 or with their most significant Other.35 
 
Roommate publishes these comments as written.36 It does not provide any specific guidance 
as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge subscribers to input discriminatory 
preferences. Roommate is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this 
content, which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate. 
Without reviewing every essay, Roommate would have no way to distinguish unlawful 
discriminatory preferences from perfectly legitimate statements. Nor can there be any 
                                                                                                                                                             
create liability for a website. (emphasis added). Despite the dissent’s attempt to imply the contrary, the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion is actually in line with our own. 
In Universal Communication Systems v. Lycos, Inc., the First Circuit held a message board owner 
immune under the CDA for defamatory comments posted on a message board. The allegedly defamatory 
comments were made without any prompting or encouragement by defendant: “[T]here is not even a colorable 
argument that any misinformation was prompted by Lycos’s registration process or its link structure.” 
Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003), falls yet farther from the mark. There, AOL was 
held immune for derogatory comments and malicious software transmitted by other defendants through AOL’s 
“Romance over 30” “chat room.” There was no allegation that AOL solicited the content, encouraged users to 
post harmful content or otherwise had any involvement whatsoever with the harmful content, other than 
through providing “chat rooms” for general use. 
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth 
Circuit held AOL immune for relaying inaccurate stock price information it received from other vendors. While 
AOL undoubtedly participated in the decision to make stock quotations available to members, it did not cause 
the errors in the stock data, nor did it encourage or solicit others to provide inaccurate data. AOL was immune 
because “Plaintiff could not identify any evidence indicating Defendant [AOL] developed or created the stock 
quotation information.”  
And, finally, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held 
AOL immune for yet another set of defamatory and harassing message board postings. Again, AOL did not 
solicit the harassing content, did not encourage others to post it, and had nothing to do with its creation other 
than through AOL’s role as the provider of a generic message board for general discussions.  
34 “The female we are looking for hopefully wont [sic] mind having a little sexual incounter [sic] with my 
boyfriend and I [very sic].” 
35 “We are 3 Christian females who Love our Lord Jesus Christ.... We have weekly bible studies and bi-weekly 
times of fellowship.” 
36 It is unclear whether Roommate performs any filtering for obscenity or “spam,” but even if it were to perform 
this kind of minor editing and selection, the outcome would not change. 
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doubt that this information was tendered to Roommate for publication online. This is 
precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was designed to provide immunity.  
 
The fact that Roommate encourages subscribers to provide something in response to the 
prompt is not enough to make it a “develop[er]” of the information under the common-sense 
interpretation of the term we adopt today. It is entirely consistent with Roommate’s 
business model to have subscribers disclose as much about themselves and their 
preferences as they are willing to provide. But Roommate does not tell subscribers what 
kind of information they should or must include as “Additional Comments,” and certainly 
does not encourage or enhance any discriminatory content created by users. Its simple, 
generic prompt does not make it a developer of the information posted.37  
 
Councils argue that—given the context of the discriminatory questions presented earlier in 
the registration process—the “Additional Comments” prompt impliedly suggests that 
subscribers should make statements expressing a desire to discriminate on the basis of 
protected classifications; in other words, Councils allege that, by encouraging some 
discriminatory preferences, Roommate encourages other discriminatory preferences when it 
gives subscribers a chance to describe themselves. But the encouragement that bleeds over 
from one part of the registration process to another is extremely weak, if it exists at all. 
Such weak encouragement cannot strip a website of its section 230 immunity, lest that 
immunity be rendered meaningless as a practical matter.38 
 
We must keep firmly in mind that this is an immunity statute we are expounding, a 
provision enacted to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove 
offensive content. Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close 
cases where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did 
encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of 
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten 
thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least 
tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties. Where it is very clear that the website 
directly participates in developing the alleged illegality—as it is clear here with respect to 
Roommate’s questions, answers and the resulting profile pages—immunity will be lost. But 
in cases of enhancement by implication or development by inference—such as with respect 
to the “Additional Comments” here—section 230 must be interpreted to protect websites not 
merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles. 
 
The dissent prophesies doom and gloom for countless Internet services, but fails to 
recognize that we hold part of Roommate’s service entirely immune from liability. The 
search engines the dissent worries about closely resemble the “Additional Comments” 
section of Roommate’s website. Both involve a generic text prompt with no direct 
encouragement to perform illegal searches or to publish illegal content. We hold Roommate 
                                                 
37 Nor would Roommate be the developer of discriminatory content if it provided a free-text search that enabled 
users to find keywords in the “Additional Comments” of others, even if users utilized it to search for 
discriminatory keywords. Providing neutral tools for navigating websites is fully protected by CDA immunity, 
absent substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such tools for 
unlawful purposes. 
38 It’s true that, under a pedantic interpretation of the term “develop,” any action by the website—including the 
mere act of making a text box available to write in—could be seen as “develop[ing]” content. However, we have 
already rejected such a broad reading of the term “develop” because it would defeat the purpose of section 230. 
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immune and there is no reason to believe that future courts will have any difficulty 
applying this principle.39 The message to website operators is clear: If you don’t encourage 
illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be 
immune. 
 
We believe that this distinction is consistent with the intent of Congress to preserve the 
free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing the 
enforcement of other important state and federal laws. When Congress passed section 230 
it didn’t intend to prevent the enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought to encourage 
interactive computer services that provide users neutral tools to post content online to 
police that content without fear that through their “good samaritan ... screening of offensive 
material,” they would become liable for every single message posted by third parties on 
their website. 
 
* * * 
 
In light of our determination that the CDA does not provide immunity to Roommate for all 
of the content of its website and email newsletters, we remand for the district court to 
determine in the first instance whether the alleged actions for which Roommate is not 
immune violate the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).40 We vacate the dismissal of the 
state law claims so that the district court may reconsider whether to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction in light of our ruling on the federal claims. We deny Roommate’s 
cross-appeal of the denial of attorneys’ fees and costs; Councils prevail on some of their 
arguments before us so their case is perforce not frivolous. 
 
REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED. NO COSTS. 
 
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, with whom RYMER and BEA, Circuit Judges, join, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part: 
 
The ubiquity of the Internet is undisputed. With more than 1.3 billion Internet users and 
over 158 million websites in existence, a vast number of them interactive like Google, 
Yahoo!, Craigslist, MySpace, YouTube, and Facebook, the question of webhost liability is a 
significant one. On a daily basis, we rely on the tools of cyberspace to help us make, 
                                                 
39 The dissent also accuses us of creating uncertainty that will chill the continued growth of commerce on the 
Internet. Even looking beyond the fact that the Internet has outgrown its swaddling clothes and no longer needs 
to be so gently coddled, some degree of uncertainty is inevitable at the edge of any rule of law. Any immunity 
provision, including section 230, has its limits and there will always be close cases. Our opinion extensively 
clarifies where that edge lies, and gives far more guidance than our previous cases. While the dissent disagrees 
about the scope of the immunity, there can be little doubt that website operators today know more about how to 
conform their conduct to the law than they did yesterday. 
However, a larger point remains about the scope of immunity provisions. It’s no surprise that 
defendants want to extend immunity as broadly as possible. We have long dealt with immunity in different, and 
arguably far more important, contexts—such as qualified immunity for police officers in the line of duty—and 
observed many defendants argue that the risk of getting a close case wrong is a justification for broader 
immunity. Accepting such an argument would inevitably lead to an endless broadening of immunity, as every 
new holding creates its own borderline cases. 
40 We do not address Roommate’s claim that its activities are protected by the First Amendment. The district 
court based its decision entirely on the CDA and we refrain from deciding an issue that the district court has not 
had the opportunity to evaluate. 
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maintain, and rekindle friendships; find places to live, work, eat, and travel; exchange 
views on topics ranging from terrorism to patriotism; and enlighten ourselves on subjects 
from “aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.”  
 
The majority’s unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers threatens 
to chill the robust development of the Internet that Congress envisioned. The majority 
condemns Roommate’s “search system,” a function that is the heart of interactive service 
providers. My concern is not an empty Chicken Little “sky is falling” alert. By exposing 
every interactive service provider to liability for sorting, searching, and utilizing the all too 
familiar drop-down menus, the majority has dramatically altered the landscape of Internet 
liability. Instead of the “robust” immunity envisioned by Congress, interactive service 
providers are left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability 
begins. 
 
To promote the unfettered development of the Internet, Congress adopted the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), which provides that interactive computer 
service providers will not be held legally responsible for publishing information provided by 
third parties. Even though traditional publishers retain liability for performing essentially 
equivalent acts in the “non-virtual world,” Congress chose to treat interactive service 
providers differently by immunizing them from liability stemming from sorting, searching, 
and publishing third-party information. As we explained in Batzel v. Smith: 
 
[Section] 230(c)(1)[ ] overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, 
distributors, and speakers under statutory and common law. As a matter of 
policy, “Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer 
services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or 
television and radio stations....” Congress ... has chosen to treat cyberspace 
differently. 
 
Now, with the stroke of a pen or, more accurately, a few strokes of the keyboard, the 
majority upends the settled view that interactive service providers enjoy broad immunity 
when publishing information provided by third parties. Instead, interactive service 
providers are now joined at the hip with third-party users, and they rise and fall together in 
liability for Internet sortings and postings. 
 
To be sure, the statute, which was adopted just as the Internet was beginning a surge of 
popular currency, is not a perfect match against today’s technology. The Web 2.0 version is 
a far cry from web technology in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, the basic message from 
Congress has retained its traction, and there should be a high bar to liability for organizing 
and searching third-party information. The bipartisan view in Congress was that the 
Internet, as a new form of communication, should not be impeded by the transference of 
regulations and principles developed from traditional modes of communication. The 
majority repeatedly harps that if something is prohibited in the physical world, Congress 
could not have intended it to be legal in cyberspace. Yet that is precisely the path Congress 
took with the CDA: the anomaly that a webhost may be immunized for conducting activities 
in cyberspace that would traditionally be cause for liability is exactly what Congress 
intended by enacting the CDA. 
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In the end, the majority offers interactive computer service providers no bright lines and 
little comfort in finding a home within § 230(c)(1). The result in this case is driven by the 
distaste for housing discrimination, a laudable endgame were housing the real focus of this 
appeal. But it is not. I share the majority’s view that housing discrimination is a troubling 
issue. Nevertheless, we should be looking at the housing issue through the lens of the 
Internet, not from the perspective of traditional publisher liability. Whether § 230(c)(1) 
trumps the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) is a policy decision for Congress, not us. Congress has 
spoken: third-party content on the Internet should not be burdened with the traditional 
legal framework. 
 
I respectfully part company with the majority as to Part 2 of the opinion because the 
majority has misconstrued the statutory protection under the CDA for Roommate’s 
publishing and sorting of user profiles. The plain language and structure of the CDA 
unambiguously demonstrate that Congress intended these activities—the collection, 
organizing, analyzing, searching, and transmitting of third-party content—to be beyond the 
scope of traditional publisher liability. The majority’s decision, which sets us apart from 
five circuits, contravenes congressional intent and violates the spirit and serendipity of the 
Internet. 
 
Specifically, the majority’s analysis is flawed for three reasons: (1) the opinion conflates the 
questions of liability under the FHA and immunity under the CDA; (2) the majority 
rewrites the statute with its definition of “information content provider,” labels the search 
function “information development,” and strips interactive service providers of immunity; 
and (3) the majority’s approach undermines the purpose of § 230(c)(1) and has far-reaching 
practical consequences in the Internet world. 
 
To begin, it is important to recognize what this appeal is not about. At this stage, there has 
been no determination of liability under the FHA, nor has there been any determination 
that the questions, answers or even the existence of Roommate’s website violate the FHA. 
The FHA is a complicated statute and there may well be room for potential roommates to 
select who they want to live with, e.g., a tidy accountant wanting a tidy professional 
roommate, a collegiate male requesting a male roommate, an observant Jew needing a 
house with a kosher kitchen, or a devout, single, religious female preferring not to have a 
male housemate. It also bears noting that even if Roommate is immune under the CDA, the 
issue of user liability for allegedly discriminatory preferences is a separate question. 
 
By offering up inflammatory examples, the majority’s opinion screams “discrimination.” 
The hazard is, of course, that the question of discrimination has not yet been litigated. In 
dissenting, I do not condone housing discrimination or endorse unlawful discriminatory 
roommate selection practices; I simply underscore that the merits of the FHA claim are not 
before us. However, one would not divine this posture from the majority’s opinion, which is 
infused with condemnation of Roommate’s users’ practices. To mix and match, as does the 
majority, the alleged unlawfulness of the information with the question of webhost 
immunity is to rewrite the statute…. 
 
The entire opinion links Roommate’s ostensibly reprehensible conduct (and that of its 
users) with an unprecedented interpretation of the CDA’s immunity provision. The majority 
condemns Roommate for soliciting illegal content, but there has been no determination that 
Roommate’s questions or standardized answers are illegal. Instead of foreshadowing a 
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ruling on the FHA, the opinion should be confined to the issue before us—application of § 
230(c)(1) to Roommate. The district court has not yet ruled on the merits of the FHA claim 
and neither should we. 
 
The Statute 
 
With this background in mind, I first turn to the text of the statute. Section 230 begins with 
a detailed recitation of findings and policy reasons for the statute. Congress expressly found 
that the “Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity 
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues 
for intellectual activity,” and that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive 
media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.” Congress 
declared that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to ... promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive 
media.”  
 
Unlike some statutes, subsections (a) and (b) set out in clear terms the congressional 
findings and policies underlying the statute. For this reason, it strikes me as odd that the 
majority begins, not with the statute and these express findings, but with legislative 
history. Granted, Congress was prompted by several cases, particularly the Prodigy case, to 
take action to protect interactive service providers. But that case does not cabin the scope of 
the statute, and the background leading up to enactment of the CDA is no substitute for the 
language of the statute itself. 
 
Section 230(c), the heart of this case, is entitled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking 
and screening of offensive material[.]” The substantive language of the statute itself is not 
so limited…. 
 
Since it was first addressed in 1997 in Zeran, this section has been interpreted by the 
courts as providing webhost “immunity,” although to be more precise, it provides a safe 
haven for interactive computer service providers by removing them from the traditional 
liabilities attached to speakers and publishers. 
 
We have characterized this immunity under § 230(c)(1) as “quite robust.” Five of our sister 
circuits have similarly embraced this robust view of immunity by providing differential 
treatment to interactive service providers…. 
 
Courts deciding the question of § 230(c)(1) immunity “do not write on a blank slate.” Even 
though rapid developments in technology have made webhosts increasingly adept at 
searching and displaying third-party information, reviewing courts have, in the twelve 
years since the CDA’s enactment, “adopt[ed] a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive 
computer service’ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider.’” 
As long as information is provided by a third party, webhosts are immune from liability for 
publishing “ads for housing, auctions of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis, 
biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth of politicians’ 
promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a web site.” We have 
underscored that this broad grant of webhost immunity gives effect to Congress’s stated 
goals “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
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services” and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services.” 
 
Application of § 230(c)(1) to Roommate’s Website 
 
Because our focus is on the term “information content provider,” and what it means to 
create or develop information, it is worth detailing exactly how the website operates, what 
information is at issue and who provides it. The roommate matching process involves three 
categories of data: About Me or Household Description; Roommate Preferences; and 
Comments. 
 
To become a member of Roommates.com, a user must complete a personal profile by 
selecting answers from drop-down menus or checking off boxes on the screen. The profile 
includes “location” information (e.g., city and state, region of the city, and data about the 
surrounding neighborhood); details about the residence (e.g., the total number of bedrooms 
and bathrooms in the home, and amenities such as air conditioning, wheelchair access, 
high-speed Internet, or parking), and the “rental details” (e.g., monthly rent charged, lease 
period, and availability). The last section of the profile is the “Household Description” 
section, which includes the total number of occupants in the home, their age range, gender, 
occupation, level of cleanliness, whether they are smokers, and whether children or pets are 
present. 
 
The remaining sections of the registration process are completely optional; a user who skips 
them has created a profile based on the information already provided. At his option, the 
user may select an emoticon to describe the “household character,” and may upload images 
of the room or residence. Next, users may, at their option, specify characteristics desired in 
a potential roommate, such as a preferred age range, gender, and level of cleanliness. If 
nothing is selected, all options are included. The final step in the registration process, 
which is also optional, is the “Comments” section, in which users are presented with a 
blank text box in which they may write whatever they like, to be published with their 
member profiles. 
 
Users may choose an optional “custom search” of user profiles based on criteria that they 
specify, like the amount of monthly rent or distance from a preferred city. Based on the 
information provided by users during the registration process, Roommate’s automated 
system then searches and matches potential roommates. Roommate’s Terms of Service 
provide in part, “You understand that we do not provide the information on the site and 
that all publicly posted or privately transmitted information, data, text, photographs, 
graphics, messages, or other materials (‘Content’) are the sole responsibility of the person 
from which such Content originated.” 
 
Roommate’s users are “information content providers” because they are responsible for 
creating the information in their user profiles and, at their option—not the website’s 
choice—in expressing preferences as to roommate characteristics. The critical question is 
whether Roommate is itself an “information content provider,” such that it cannot claim 
that the information at issue was “provided by another information content provider.” A 
close reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that Roommate is not an information 
content provider for two reasons: (1) providing a drop-down menu does not constitute 
“creating” or “developing” information; and (2) the structure and text of the statute make 
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plain that Congress intended to immunize Roommate’s sorting, displaying, and 
transmitting of third-party information. 
 
Roommate neither “creates” nor “develops” the information that is challenged by the 
Councils, i.e., the information provided by the users as to their protected characteristics 
and the preferences expressed as to roommate characteristics. All Roommate does is to 
provide a form with options for standardized answers. Listing categories such as geographic 
location, cleanliness, gender and number of occupants, and transmitting to users profiles of 
other users whose expressed information matches their expressed preferences, can hardly 
be said to be creating or developing information. Even adding standardized options does not 
“develop” information. Roommate, with its prompts, is merely “selecting material for 
publication,” which we have stated does not constitute the “development” of information. 
The profile is created solely by the user, not the provider of the interactive website. Indeed, 
without user participation, there is no information at all. The drop-down menu is simply a 
precategorization of user information before the electronic sorting and displaying that takes 
place via an algorithm. If a user has identified herself as a non-smoker and another has 
expressed a preference for a non-smoking roommate, Roommate’s sorting and matching of 
user information are no different than that performed by a generic search engine. 
 
Displaying the prompt “Gender” and offering the list of choices, “Straight male; Gay male; 
Straight female; Gay female” does not develop the information, “I am a Gay male.” The user 
has identified himself as such and provided that information to Roommate to publish. Thus, 
the user is the sole creator of that information; no “development” has occurred. In the same 
vein, presenting the user with a “Preferences” section and drop-down menus of options does 
not “develop” a user’s preference for a non-smoking roommate. As we stated in Carafano, 
the “actual profile ‘information’ consist[s] of the particular options chosen” by the user, such 
that Roommate is not “responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice 
responses with a set of [ ] characteristics.” 
 
The thrust of the majority’s proclamation that Roommate is “developing” the information 
that it publishes, sorts, and transmits is as follows: “[W]e interpret the term ‘development’ 
as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing 
to its unlawfulness.” This definition is original to say the least and springs forth untethered 
to anything in the statute. 
 
The majority’s definition of “development” epitomizes its consistent collapse of substantive 
liability with the issue of immunity. Where in the statute does Congress say anything about 
unlawfulness? Whether Roommate is entitled to immunity for publishing and sorting 
profiles is wholly distinct from whether Roommate may be liable for violations of the FHA. 
Immunity has meaning only when there is something to be immune from, whether a 
disease or the violation of a law. It would be nonsense to claim to be immune only from the 
innocuous. But the majority’s immunity analysis is built on substantive liability: to the 
majority, CDA immunity depends on whether a webhost materially contributed to the 
unlawfulness of the information. Whether the information at issue is unlawful and whether 
the webhost has contributed to its unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of the 
determination of immunity. Grasping at straws to distinguish Roommate from other 
interactive websites such as Google and Yahoo!, the majority repeatedly gestures to 
Roommate’s potential substantive liability as sufficient reason to disturb its immunity. But 
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our task is to determine whether the question of substantive liability may be reached in the 
first place. 
 
Keep in mind that “unlawfulness” would include not only purported statutory violations but 
also potential defamatory statements. The irony is that the majority would have us 
determine “guilt” or liability in order to decide whether immunity is available. This upside-
down approach would knock out even the narrowest immunity offered under § 230(c)—
immunity for defamation as a publisher or speaker. 
 
Another flaw in the majority’s approach is that it fails to account for all of the other 
information allegedly developed by the webhost. For purposes of determining whether 
Roommate is an information content provider vis-a-vis the profiles, the inquiry about 
geography and the inquiry about gender should stand on the same footing. Both are single 
word prompts followed by a drop-down menu of options. If a prompt about gender 
constitutes development, then so too does the prompt about geography. And therein lies the 
rub. 
 
Millions of websites use prompts and drop-down menus. Inquiries range from what credit 
card you want to use and consumer satisfaction surveys asking about age, sex and 
household income, to dating sites, e.g., match.com, sites lambasting corporate practices, 
e.g., ripoffreports.com, and sites that allow truckers to link up with available loads, e.g., 
getloaded.com. Some of these sites are innocuous while others may not be. Some may solicit 
illegal information; others may not. But that is not the point. The majority’s definition of 
“development” would transform every interactive site into an information content provider 
and the result would render illusory any immunity under § 230(c). Virtually every site 
could be responsible in part for developing content. 
 
For example, the majority purports to carve out a place for Google and other search 
engines. But the modern Google is more than a match engine: it ranks search results, 
provides prompts beyond what the user enters, and answers questions. In contrast, 
Roommate is a straight match service that searches information and criteria provided by 
the user, not Roommate. It should be afforded no less protection than Google, Yahoo!, or 
other search engines. 
 
The majority then argues that “providing neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful 
or illicit searches does not amount to ‘development.’” But this effort to distinguish Google, 
Yahoo!, and other search engines from Roommate is unavailing. Under the majority’s 
definition of “development,” these search engines are equivalent to Roommate. Google 
“encourages” or “contributes” (the majority’s catch phrases) to the unlawfulness by offering 
search tools that allow the user to perform an allegedly unlawful match. If a user types into 
Google’s search box, “looking for a single, Christian, female roommate,” and Google displays 
responsive listings, Google is surely “materially contributing to the alleged unlawfulness” of 
information created by third parties, by publishing their intention to discriminate on the 
basis of protected characteristics. In the defamation arena, a webhost’s publication of a 
defamatory statement “materially contributes” to its unlawfulness, as publication to third 
parties is an element of the offense. At bottom, the majority’s definition of “development” 
can be tucked in, let out, or hemmed up to fit almost any search engine, creating 
tremendous uncertainty in an area where Congress expected predictability. 
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“Development” is not without meaning. In Batzel, we hinted that the “development of 
information” that transforms one into an “information content provider” is “something more 
substantial than merely editing portions of an email and selecting material for publication.” 
We did not flesh out further the meaning of “development” because the editor’s alterations 
of an email message and decision to publish it did not constitute “development.”  
 
Because the statute does not define “development,” we should give the term its ordinary 
meaning. “Development” is defined in Webster’s Dictionary as a “gradual advance or growth 
through progressive changes.” The multiple uses of “development” and “develop” in other 
provisions of § 230 give texture to the definition of “development,” and further expose the 
folly of the majority’s ungrounded definition. Defining “development” in this way keeps 
intact the settled rule that the CDA immunizes a webhost who exercises a publisher’s 
“traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, 
or alter content.”11 
 
Applying the plain meaning of “development” to Roommate’s sorting and transmitting of 
third-party information demonstrates that it was not transformed into an “information 
content provider.” In searching, sorting, and transmitting information, Roommate made no 
changes to the information provided to it by users. Even having notice that users may be 
using its site to make discriminatory statements is not sufficient to invade Roommate’s 
immunity. 
 
The majority blusters that Roommate develops information, because it “requir[es] 
subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its services,” and 
“designed its search system so it would steer users based on the preferences and personal 
characteristics that Roommate itself forces subscribers to disclose.” But the majority, 
without looking back, races past the plain language of the statute. That Roommate requires 
users to answer a set of prompts to identify characteristics about themselves does not 
change the fact that the users have furnished this information to Roommate for Roommate 
to publish in their profiles. Nor do Roommate’s prompts alter the fact that users have 
chosen to select characteristics that they find desirable in potential roommates, and have 
directed Roommate to search and compile results responsive to their requests. Moreover, 
tagging Roommate with liability for the design of its search system is dangerous precedent 
for analyzing future Internet cases. 
 
                                                 
11 The majority’s notion of using a different definition of “development” digs the majority into a deeper hole. For 
example, adopting the Wikipedia definition of “content development”—”the process of researching, writing, 
gathering, organizing and editing information for publication on web sites”—would run us smack into the 
sphere of Congressionally conferred immunity. Both our circuit and others have steadfastly maintained that 
activities such as organizing or editing information are traditional editorial functions that fall within the scope 
of CDA immunity. Likewise, an alternative definition of “development” from Webster’s such as “a making usable 
or available” sweeps too broadly, as “making usable or available” is precisely what Google and Craigslist do. In 
an effort to cabin the reach of the opinion, the majority again goes back to whether the content is legal, i.e., a 
dating website that requires sex, race, religion, or marital status is legal because it is legal to discriminate in 
dating. Of course this approach ignores whether the claim may be one in tort, such as defamation, rather than a 
statutory discrimination claim. And, this circularity also circumvents the plain language of the statute. 
Interestingly, the majority has no problem offering up potentially suitable definitions of “development” by 
turning to dictionaries, but it fails to explain why, and from where, it plucked its definition of “development” as 
“materially contributing to [the] alleged unlawfulness” of content. 
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Even if Roommate’s prompts and drop-down menus could be construed to seek out, or 
encourage, information from users, the CDA does not withhold immunity for the 
encouragement or solicitation of information. The CDA does not countenance an exception 
for the solicitation or encouragement of information provided by users. 
 
A number of district courts have recently encountered the claim that an interactive 
website’s solicitation of information, by requiring user selection of content from drop-down 
menus, transformed it into an information content provider. Unsurprisingly, these courts 
reached the same commonsense solution that I reach here: § 230(c)(1) immunizes the 
interactive service provider. Simply supplying a list of options from which a user must 
select options “is minor and passive participation” that does not defeat CDA immunity. 
 
Carafano presented circumstances virtually indistinguishable from those before us, yet the 
majority comes to the exact opposite conclusion here in denying immunity for sorting and 
matching third-party information provided in response to webhost prompts. The website in 
Carafano, an online dating service named Matchmaker.com, asked its users sixty-two 
detailed questions and matched users according to their responses. We held that § 230(c)(1) 
immunized the dating service, and flatly rejected the proposition that matching, sorting, 
and publishing user information in response to webhost prompts abrogated CDA immunity. 
A provider’s “decision to structure the information provided by users,” which enables the 
provider to “offer additional features, such as ‘matching’ profiles with similar 
characteristics or highly structured searches based on combinations of multiple choice 
questions,” ultimately “promotes the expressed Congressional policy ‘to promote the 
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services.’” Now the 
majority narrows Carafano on the basis that Matchmaker did not prompt the allegedly 
libelous information that was provided by a third party. But the majority makes this 
distinction without any language in the statute supporting the consideration of the 
webhost’s prompting or solicitation. 
 
The structure of the statute also supports my view that Congress intended to immunize 
Roommate’s sorting and publishing of user profiles. An “interactive computer service” is 
defined to include an “access software provider.” The statute defines an “access software 
provider” as one that provides “enabling tools” to “filter,” “screen,” “pick,” “choose,” 
“analyze,” “digest,” “search,” “forward,” “organize,” and “reorganize” content. 
 
By providing a definition for “access software provider” that is distinct from the definition of 
an “information content provider,” and withholding immunity for “information content 
providers,” the statute makes resoundingly clear that packaging, sorting, or publishing 
third-party information are not the kind of activities that Congress associated with 
“information content providers.” Yet these activities describe exactly what Roommate does 
through the publication and distribution of user profiles: Roommate “receives,” “filters,” 
“digests,” and “analyzes” the information provided by users in response to its registration 
prompts, and then “transmits,” “organizes,” and “forwards” that information to users in the 
form of uniformly organized profiles. Roommate is performing tasks that Congress 
recognized as typical of entities that it intended to immunize. 
 
Finally, consider the logical disconnect of the majority’s opinion. The majority writes—and I 
agree—that the open-ended Comments section contains only third-party content. But if 
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Roommate’s search function permits sorting by key words such as children or gender, the 
majority would label Roommate’s use of such criteria as a “discriminatory filtering process.” 
 
At a minimum, the CDA protects the search criteria employed by websites and does not 
equate tools that “filter,” “screen,” “pick,” “choose,” “analyze,” “digest,” “search,” “forward,” 
“organize,” and “reorganize” with the “creation or development” of information. 
 
Ramifications of the Majority Opinion 
 
I am troubled by the consequences that the majority’s conclusion poses for the ever-
expanding Internet community. The unwise narrowing of our precedent, coupled with the 
mixing and matching of CDA immunity with substantive liability, make it exceedingly 
difficult for website providers to know whether their activities will be considered immune 
under the CDA. We got it right in Carafano, that “[u]nder § 230(c) ... so long as a third 
party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider 
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.” 
 
Significantly, § 230(e) expressly exempts from its scope certain areas of law, such as 
intellectual property law and federal criminal laws. Thus, for example, a webhost may still 
be liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party information that is alleged to infringe a 
copyright. Notably, the CDA does not exempt the FHA and a host of other federal statutes 
from its scope. The FHA existed at the time of the CDA’s enactment, yet Congress did not 
add it to the list of specifically enumerated laws for which publisher and speaker liability 
was left intact. The absence of a statutory exemption suggests that Congress did not intend 
to provide special case status to the FHA in connection with immunity under the CDA. 
 
Anticipating the morphing of the Internet and the limits of creative genius and 
entrepreneurship that fuel its development is virtually impossible. However, Congress 
explicitly drafted the law to permit this unfettered development of the Internet. Had 
Congress discovered that, over time, courts across the country have created more expansive 
immunity than it originally envisioned under the CDA, Congress could have amended the 
law. But it has not. In fact, just six years ago, Congress approved of the broad immunity 
that courts have uniformly accorded interactive webhosts under § 230(c). 
 
In 2002, Congress passed the “Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,” which 
established a new “kids.us” domain for material that is safe for children. Congress stated 
that the statutory protections of § 230(c) were extended to certain entities that operated 
within the new domain. The Committee Report that accompanied the statute declared: 
 
The Committee notes that ISPs have successfully defended many lawsuits 
using section 230(c). The courts have correctly interpreted section 230(c), 
which was aimed at protecting against liability for such claims as negligence 
(See, e.g., Doe v. America Online, 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)) and defamation 
(Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (2000); Zeran 
v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)). The Committee intends these 
interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities 
covered by H.R. 3833. 
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H.R. REP. No. 107-449 (emphasis added). These statements “reflect the Committee’s intent 
that the existing statutory construction,” i.e., broad immunity for interactive webhosts, “be 
maintained in a new legislative context.” This express Congressional approval of the courts’ 
interpretation of § 230(c)(1), six years after its enactment, advises us to stay the course of 
“robust” webhost immunity. 
 
The consequences of the majority’s interpretation are far-reaching. Its position will chill 
speech on the Internet and impede “the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media.” To the extent the majority 
strips immunity because of sorting, channeling, and categorizing functions, it guts the 
heart of § 230(c)(1) immunity. Countless websites operate just like Roommate: they 
organize information provided by their users into a standardized format, and provide 
structured searches to help users find information. These sites, and their attendant display, 
search, and inquiry tools, are an indispensable part of the Internet tool box. Putting a lid on 
the sorting and searching functions of interactive websites stifles the core of their services. 
 
To the extent the majority strips immunity because the information or query may be illegal 
under some statute or federal law, this circumstance puts the webhost in the role of a 
policeman for the laws of the fifty states and the federal system. There are not enough Net 
Nannies in cyberspace to implement this restriction, and the burden of filtering content 
would be unfathomable. 
 
To the extent the majority strips immunity because a site solicits or actively encourages 
content, the result is a direct restriction on the free exchange of ideas and information on 
the Internet. As noted in the amici curiae brief of the news organizations, online news 
organization routinely solicit third-party information. Were the websites to face host 
liability for this content, they “would have no choice but to severely limit its use” and 
“[s]heer economics would dictate that vast quantities of valuable information be eliminated 
from websites.” 
 
To the extent the majority strips immunity because a website “materially contributed” to 
the content or output of a website by “specialization” of content, this approach would 
essentially swallow the immunity provision. The combination of solicitation, sorting, and 
potential for liability would put virtually every interactive website in this category. Having 
a website directed to Christians, Muslims, gays, disabled veterans, or childless couples 
could land the website provider in hot water.14 
 
Because the statute itself is cumbersome to interpret in light of today’s Internet 
architecture, and because the decision today will ripple through the billions of web pages 
already online, and the countless pages to come in the future, I would take a cautious, 
careful, and precise approach to the restriction of immunity, not the broad swath cut by the 
majority. I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s judgment that 
Roommate is entitled to immunity under § 230(c)(1) of the CDA, subject to examination of 
whether the bare inquiry itself is unlawful. 
 
                                                 
14 It is no surprise that there are countless specialized roommate sites. See, e.g., 
http://islam.tc/housing/index.php, http://christian-roommates.com, and http://prideroommates.com. 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Compare the operation and coverage of 47 USC 230 and 17 USC 512: 
 
Online service providerICS provider/userWho
Registration + other 
formalities
NonePrerequisites
No safe harborNoneEffect of 
Scienter
Expeditious take downNoneDuty upon notice
CopyrightEverything but [federal] 
IP, federal crimes, 
ECPA
Claims covered
17 USC §512(c)47 USC §230
 
 
Denouement.  In 2012, nine years after the case started, the Ninth Circuit (in Judge 
Kozinski’s third opinion about the case) ruled that Roommates.com hadn’t violated the Fair 
Housing Act because the law didn’t apply to shared dwellings.  Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).  So even though 
Roommates.com lost some of the Section 230 battle, it won the war. 
 
Did Judge Kozinski fall into the trap predicted by Judge McKeown?  Recall Judge 
Kozinski’s pronouncement:  
 
If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users 
to input illegal content, you will be immune.  
 
The Ninth Circuit partially denied Roommates.com the Section 230 immunity presumably 
because it violated this standard; but as Judge Kozinski himself ultimately concluded, 
Roommates.com neither encouraged illegal content nor designed its website to require 
users to input illegal content.  So it seems like Roommates.com should have qualified for 
the immunity all along.  Note that if we have to adjudicate the defendant’s substantive 
liability to determine if the immunity applies, and it only applies if there’s no substantive 
immunity, the immunity is effectively worthless. 
 
Section 230 can make a difference by expediting the dismissal of immunized cases, e.g., 
enabling cases to be terminated on a motion to dismiss rather than getting to summary 
judgment or trial.  In fact, many Section 230 cases end on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
The Roommates.com case was a good candidate for early dismissal, because the litigants 
spent a lot of time and money litigating over nine years and two trips to the Ninth Circuit 
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(which produced three Ninth Circuit opinions)—only to conclude that Roommates.com was 
in the clear all along.  Judge Kozinski himself hints at the virtue of early dismissal of 
immunized cases when he frets about “death by ten thousand duck-bites.”  Did he let 
Roommates.com get duck-bitten here? 
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IX. Privacy 
 
In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003). 
Lynch, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case raises important questions about the scope of privacy protection afforded internet 
users under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 
2520. 
 
In sum, pharmaceutical companies invited users to visit their websites to learn about their 
drugs and to obtain rebates. An enterprising company, Pharmatrak, sold a service, called 
“NETcompare,” to these pharmaceutical companies. That service accessed information 
about the internet users and collected certain information meant to permit the 
pharmaceutical companies to do intra-industry comparisons of website traffic and usage. 
Most of the pharmaceutical companies were emphatic that they did not want personal or 
identifying data about their web site users to be collected. In connection with their 
contracting to use NETcompare, they sought and received assurances from Pharmatrak 
that such data collection would not occur. As it turned out, some such personal and 
identifying data was found, using easily customized search programs, on Pharmatrak’s 
computers. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the purported class of internet users whose data 
Pharmatrak collected, sued both Pharmatrak and the pharmaceutical companies asserting, 
inter alia, that they intercepted electronic communications without consent, in violation of 
the ECPA. 
 
The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on the basis that 
Pharmatrak’s activities fell within an exception to the statute where one party consents to 
an interception. The court found the client pharmaceutical companies had consented by 
contracting with Pharmatrak and so this protected Pharmatrak. The plaintiffs dismissed 
all ECPA claims as to the pharmaceutical companies. This appeal concerns only the claim 
that Pharmatrak violated Title I of the ECPA. 
 
We hold that the district court incorrectly interpreted the “consent” exception to the ECPA; 
we also hold that Pharmatrak “intercepted” the communication under the statute. We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. This does not mean that plaintiffs’ case will 
prevail: there remain issues which should be addressed on remand, particularly as to 
whether defendant’s conduct was intentional within the meaning of the ECPA. 
 
I. 
 
Pharmatrak provided its NETcompare service to pharmaceutical companies including 
American Home Products, Pharmacia, SmithKline Beecham, Pfizer, and Novartis from 
approximately June 1998 to November 2000. The pharmaceutical clients terminated their 
contracts with Pharmatrak shortly after this lawsuit was filed in August 2000. As a result, 
Pharmatrak was forced to cease its operations by December 1, 2000. 
 
NETcompare was marketed as a tool that would allow a company to compare traffic on and 
usage of different parts of its website with the same information from its competitors’ 
websites. The key advantage of NETcompare over off-the-shelf software was its capacity to 
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allow each client to compare its performance with that of other clients from the same 
industry. 
 
NETcompare was designed to record the webpages a user viewed at clients’ websites; how 
long the user spent on each webpage; the visitor’s path through the site (including her 
points of entry and exit); the visitor’s IP address; and, for later versions, the webpage the 
user viewed immediately before arriving at the client’s site (i.e., the “referrer URL”). This 
information-gathering was not visible to users of the pharmaceutical clients’ websites. 
According to Wes Sonnenreich, former Chief Technology Officer of Pharmatrak, and 
Timothy W. Macinta, former Managing Director for Technology of Pharmatrak, 
NETcompare was not designed to collect any personal information whatsoever. 
 
NETcompare operated as follows. A pharmaceutical client installed NETcompare by adding 
five to ten lines of HTML code to each webpage it wished to track and configuring the pages 
to interface with Pharmatrak’s technology. When a user visited the website of a 
Pharmatrak client, Pharmatrak’s HTML code instructed the user’s computer to contact 
Pharmatrak’s web server and retrieve from it a tiny, invisible graphic image known as a 
“clear GIF” (or a “web bug”). The purpose of the clear GIF was to cause the user’s computer 
to communicate directly with Pharmatrak’s web server. When the user’s computer 
requested the clear GIF, Pharmatrak’s web servers responded by either placing or accessing 
a “persistent cookie” on the user’s computer. On a user’s first visit to a webpage monitored 
by NETcompare, Pharmatrak’s servers would plant a cookie on the user’s computer. If the 
user had already visited a NETcompare webpage, then Pharmatrak’s servers would access 
the information on the existing cookie. 
 
A cookie is a piece of information sent by a web server to a web browser that the browser 
software is expected to save and to send back whenever the browser makes additional 
requests of the server (such as when the user visits additional webpages at the same or 
related sites). A persistent cookie is one that does not expire at the end of an online session. 
Cookies are widely used on the internet by reputable websites to promote convenience and 
customization. Cookies often store user preferences, login and registration information, or 
information related to an online “shopping cart.” Cookies may also contain unique 
identifiers that allow a website to differentiate among users. 
 
Each Pharmatrak cookie contained a unique alphanumeric identifier that allowed 
Pharmatrak to track a user as she navigated through a client’s site and to identify a repeat 
user each time she visited clients’ sites. If a person visited www.pfizer.com in June 2000 
and www.pharmacia.com in July 2000, for example, then the persistent cookie on her 
computer would indicate to Pharmatrak that the same computer had been used to visit both 
sites.5 As NETcompare tracked a user through a website, it used JavaScript and a 
JavaApplet to record information such as the URLs the user visited. This data was recorded 
on the access logs of Pharmatrak’s web servers. 
 
                                                 
5 Pharmatrak’s cookies expired after ninety days. 
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[Editor’s note: consider if the following diagram helps you visualize the interactions:] 
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Pharmatrak sent monthly reports to its clients juxtaposing the data collected by 
NETcompare about all pharmaceutical clients. These reports covered topics such as the 
most heavily used parts of a particular site; which site was receiving the most hits in 
particular areas such as investor or media relations; and the most important links to a site. 
 
The monthly reports did not contain any personally identifiable information about users. 
The only information provided by Pharmatrak to clients about their users and traffic was 
contained in the reports (and executive summaries thereof). Slides from a Pharmatrak 
marketing presentation did say the company would break data out into categories and 
provide “user profiles.” In practice, the aggregate demographic information in the reports 
was limited to the percentages of users from different countries; the percentages of users 
with different domain extensions (i.e., the percentages of users originating from for-profit, 
government, academic, or other not-for-profit organizations); and the percentages of first-
time versus repeat users. An example of a NETcompare “user profile” is: “The average 
Novartis visitor is a first-time visitor from the U.S., visiting from a .com domain.” 
 
While it was marketing NETcompare to prospective pharmaceutical clients, Pharmatrak 
repeatedly told them that NETcompare did not collect personally identifiable information. 
It said its technology could not collect personal information, and specifically provided that 
the information it gathered could not be used to identify particular users by name. In their 
affidavits and depositions, executives of Pharmatrak clients consistently said that they 
believed NETcompare did not collect personal information, and that they did not learn 
otherwise until the onset of litigation. Some, if not all, pharmaceutical clients explicitly 
conditioned their purchase of NETcompare on Pharmatrak’s guarantees that it would not 
collect users’ personal information. For example, Pharmacia’s April 2000 contract with 
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Pharmatrak provided that NETcompare would not collect personally identifiable 
information from users. Michael Sonnenreich, Chief Executive Officer of Pharmatrak, 
stated unequivocally at his deposition that none of his company’s clients consented to the 
collection of personally identifiable information. 
 
Pharmatrak nevertheless collected some personal information on a small number of users. 
Pharmatrak distributed approximately 18.7 million persistent cookies through 
NETcompare. The number of unique cookies provides a rough estimate of the number of 
users Pharmatrak monitored.9 Plaintiffs’ expert was able to develop individual profiles for 
just 232 users. 
 
The following personal information was found on Pharmatrak servers: names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders, insurance statuses, education 
levels, occupations, medical conditions, medications, and reasons for visiting the particular 
website. Pharmatrak also occasionally recorded the subject, sender, and date of the web-
based email message a user was reading immediately prior to visiting the website of a 
Pharmatrak client. Most of the individual profiles assembled by plaintiffs’ expert contain 
some but not all of this information. 
 
The personal information in 197 of the 232 user profiles was recorded due to an interaction 
between NETcompare and computer code written by one pharmaceutical client, Pharmacia, 
for one of its webpages. Starting on or before August 18, 2000 and ending sometime 
between December 2, 2000 and February 6, 2001, the client Pharmacia used the “get” 
method to transmit information from a rebate form on its Detrol website; the webpage was 
subsequently modified to use the “post” method of transmission. This was the source of the 
personal information collected by Pharmatrak from users of the Detrol website. 
 
Web servers use two methods to transmit information entered into online forms: the get 
method and the post method. The get method is generally used for short forms such as the 
“Search” box at Yahoo! and other online search engines. The post method is normally used 
for longer forms and forms soliciting private information. When a server uses the get 
method, the information entered into the online form becomes appended to the next URL. 
For example, if a user enters “respiratory problems” into the query box at a search engine, 
and the search engine transmits this information using the get method, then the words 
“respiratory” and “problems” will be appended to the query string at the end of the URL of 
the webpage showing the search results. By contrast, if a website transmits information via 
the post method, then that information does not appear in the URL. Since NETcompare 
was designed to record the full URLs of the webpages a user viewed immediately before and 
during a visit to a client’s site, Pharmatrak recorded personal information transmitted 
using the get method. 
 
There is no evidence Pharmatrak instructed its clients not to use the get method. The 
detailed installation instructions Pharmatrak provided to pharmaceutical clients ignore 
entirely the issue of the different transmission methods. 
 
                                                 
9 Different users might have the same cookie (if, say, family members shared a computer and browser) or one 
user might have multiple cookies (if, for example, he used separate work and home computers to visit sites 
employing NETcompare, or if he revisited a NETcompare site after his first cookie expired). 
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In addition to the problem at the Detrol website, there was also another instance in which a 
pharmaceutical client used the get method to transmit personal information entered into an 
online form. The other personal information on Pharmatrak’s servers was recorded as a 
result of software errors. These errors were a bug in a popular email program (reported in 
May 2001 and subsequently fixed) and an aberrant web browser. 
 
II. 
 
On June 28, 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated class action complaint13 against 
Pharmatrak; its parent company, Glocal Communications, Ltd.; and five pharmaceutical 
companies: American Home Products Corp., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., Pharmacia 
Corp., and SmithKline Beecham Corp. Plaintiffs alleged nine counts including violation of 
Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; violation of Title II of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. 
2701 et seq.; violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; violation of 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99; violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A; invasion of privacy; 
trespass to chattels and conversion; and unjust enrichment…. 
 
The plaintiffs employed computer scientist C. Matthew Curtin and his company, Interhack, 
to analyze Pharmatrak’s servers between December 17, 2001 and January 18, 2002. In 
about an hour, Curtin wrote three custom computer programs, including “getneedle.pl,” to 
extract and organize personal information on Pharmatrak’s web server access logs, which 
he “colloquially termed ‘haystacks.’” Curtin then cross-referenced the information he 
extracted with other sources such as internet telephone books…. 
 
III…. 
 
B. Elements of the ECPA Cause of Action 
 
ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act by extending to data and electronic transmissions 
the same protection already afforded to oral and wire communications. The paramount 
objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect effectively the privacy of communications. 
 
The post-ECPA Wiretap Act provides a private right of action against one who 
“intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept 
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” The Wiretap Act 
defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, 
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 
Thus, plaintiffs must show five elements to make their claim under Title I of the ECPA: 
that a defendant (1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured 
another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic 
communication (5) using a device. This showing is subject to certain statutory exceptions, 
such as consent. 
 
                                                 
13 Originally, eight lawsuits were filed in the District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of New York. 
The two lawsuits in the District of Massachusetts were filed on August 18, 2000. On April 18, 2001, the Judicial 
Panel on Multi-District Litigation issued an order transferring the six New York cases to the District of 
Massachusetts. The purported class, which has never been certified, consists of all persons who visited one of 
the defendants’ websites “and who, as a result thereof, have had Pharmatrak ‘cookies’ placed upon their 
computers and have had information about them gathered by Pharmatrak.” 
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In its trial and appellate court briefs, Pharmatrak sought summary judgment on only one 
element of § 2511(1)(a), interception, as well as on the statutory consent exception. We 
address these issues below. Pharmatrak has not contested whether it used a device or 
obtained the contents of an electronic communication. This is appropriate. The ECPA 
adopts a “broad, functional” definition of an electronic communication. This definition 
includes “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,” with certain exceptions 
unrelated to this case. Transmissions of completed online forms, such as the one at 
Pharmacia’s Detrol website, to the pharmaceutical defendants constitute electronic 
communications. 
 
The ECPA also says that “‘contents,’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of 
that communication.” This definition encompasses personally identifiable information such 
as a party’s name, date of birth, and medical condition. Finally, it is clear that Pharmatrak 
relied on devices such as its web servers to capture information from users. 
 
C. Consent Exception 
 
There is a pertinent statutory exception to § 2511(1)(a) “where one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act....” Plaintiffs, of 
course, bear the burden of establishing a violation of the ECPA. Our case law is unclear as 
to who has the burden of showing the statutory exception for consent….We think, at least 
for the consent exception under the ECPA in civil cases, that it makes more sense to place 
the burden of showing consent on the party seeking the benefit of the exception, and so 
hold. That party is more likely to have evidence pertinent to the issue of consent. Plaintiffs 
do not allege that Pharmatrak acted with a criminal or tortious purpose. Therefore, the 
question under the exception is limited to whether the pharmaceutical defendants gave 
consent to the interception. Because the district court disposed of the case on the grounds 
that Pharmatrak’s conduct fell within the consent exception, we start there. 
 
The district court adopted Pharmatrak’s argument that the only relevant inquiry is 
whether the pharmaceutical companies consented to use Pharmatrak’s NETcompare 
service, regardless of how the service eventually operated. In doing so, the district court did 
not apply this circuit’s general standards for consent under the Wiretap Act and the ECPA 
set forth in Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d 112. It also misread two district court opinions on which 
it purported to rely. 
 
This court addressed the issue of consent under the Wiretap Act in Griggs-Ryan. A party 
may consent to the interception of only part of a communication or to the interception of 
only a subset of its communications. “Thus, ‘a reviewing court must inquire into the 
dimensions of the consent and then ascertain whether the interception exceeded those 
boundaries.’” Consent may be explicit or implied, but it must be actual consent rather than 
constructive consent. Pharmatrak argues that it had implied consent from the 
pharmaceutical companies. 
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Consent “should not casually be inferred.” “Without actual notice, consent can only be 
implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that the party knew about 
and consented to the interception.” 
 
The district court made an error of law, urged on it by Pharmatrak, as to what constitutes 
consent. It did not apply the standards of this circuit. Moreover, DoubleClick and Avenue A 
do not set up a rule, contrary to the district court’s reading of them, that a consent to 
interception can be inferred from the mere purchase of a service, regardless of 
circumstances. If these cases did so hold, they would be contrary to the rule of this circuit 
established in Griggs-Ryan. DoubleClick and Avenue A, rather, were concerned with 
situations in which the defendant companies’ clients purchased their services for the 
precise purpose of creating individual user profiles in order to target those users for 
particular advertisements. This very purpose was announced by DoubleClick and Avenue A 
publicly, as well as being self-evident. These decisions found it would be unreasonable to 
infer that the clients had not consented merely because they might not understand 
precisely how the user demographics were collected. The facts in our case are the mirror 
image of those in DoubleClick and Avenue A: the pharmaceutical clients insisted there be 
no collection of personal data and the circumstances permit no reasonable inference that 
they did consent. 
 
On the undisputed facts, the client pharmaceutical companies did not give the requisite 
consent. The pharmaceutical clients sought and received assurances from Pharmatrak that 
its NETcompare service did not and could not collect personally identifiable information. 
Far from consenting to the collection of personally identifiable information, the 
pharmaceutical clients explicitly conditioned their purchase of NETcompare on the fact 
that it would not collect such information. 
 
The interpretation urged by Pharmatrak would, we think, lead to results inconsistent with 
the statutory intent. It would undercut efforts by one party to a contract to require that the 
privacy interests of those who electronically communicate with it be protected by the other 
party to the contract. It also would lead to irrational results. Suppose Pharmatrak, for 
example, had intentionally designed its software, contrary to its representations and its 
clients’ expectations, to redirect all possible personal information to Pharmatrak servers, 
which collected and mined the data. Under the district court’s approach, Pharmatrak would 
nevertheless be insulated against liability under the ECPA on the theory that the 
pharmaceutical companies had “consented” by simply buying Pharmatrak’s product. Or 
suppose an internet service provider received a parent’s consent solely to monitor a child’s 
internet usage for attempts to access sexually explicit sites—but the ISP installed code that 
monitored, recorded and cataloged all internet usage by parent and child alike. Under the 
theory we have rejected, the ISP would not be liable under the ECPA. 
 
Nor did the users consent. On the undisputed facts, it is clear that the internet user did not 
consent to Pharmatrak’s accessing his or her communication with the pharmaceutical 
companies. The pharmaceutical companies’ websites gave no indication that use meant 
consent to collection of personal information by a third party. Rather, Pharmatrak’s 
involvement was meant to be invisible to the user, and it was. Deficient notice will almost 
always defeat a claim of implied consent. Pharmatrak makes a frivolous argument that the 
internet users visiting client Pharmacia’s webpage for rebates on Detrol thereby consented 
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to Pharmatrak’s intercepting their personal information. On that theory, every online 
communication would provide consent to interception by a third party. 
 
D. Interception Requirement 
 
The parties briefed to the district court the question of whether Pharmatrak had 
“intercepted” electronic communications. If this question could be resolved in Pharmatrak’s 
favor, that would provide a ground for affirmance of the summary judgment. It cannot be 
answered in favor of Pharmatrak. 
 
The ECPA prohibits only “interceptions” of electronic communications. “Intercept” is 
defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  
 
Before enactment of the ECPA, some courts had narrowed the Wiretap Act’s definition of 
interception to include only acquisitions of a communication contemporaneous with 
transmission. There was a resulting debate about whether the ECPA should be similarly 
restricted….Other circuits have invoked the contemporaneous, or “real-time,” requirement 
to exclude acquisitions apparently made a substantial amount of time after material was 
put into electronic storage. These circuits have distinguished between materials acquired in 
transit, which are interceptions, and those acquired from storage, which purportedly are 
not. 
 
We share the concern of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits about the judicial interpretation 
of a statute written prior to the widespread usage of the internet and the World Wide Web 
in a case involving purported interceptions of online communications. In particular, the 
storage-transit dichotomy adopted by earlier courts may be less than apt to address current 
problems. As one court recently observed, “[T]echnology has, to some extent, overtaken 
language. Traveling the internet, electronic communications are often—perhaps 
constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’ simultaneously, a linguistic but not a 
technological paradox.” 
 
The facts here do not require us to enter the debate over the existence of a real-time 
requirement. The acquisition by Pharmatrak was contemporaneous with the transmission 
by the internet users to the pharmaceutical companies. Both Curtin, the plaintiffs’ expert, 
and Wes Sonnenreich, Pharmatrak’s former CTO, observed that users communicated 
simultaneously with the pharmaceutical client’s web server and with Pharmatrak’s web 
server. After the user’s personal information was transmitted using the get method, both 
the pharmaceutical client’s server and Pharmatrak’s server contributed content for the 
succeeding webpage; as both Curtin and Wes Sonnenreich acknowledged, Pharmatrak’s 
content (the clear GIF that enabled the interception) sometimes arrived before the content 
delivered by the pharmaceutical clients. 
 
Even those courts that narrowly read “interception” would find that Pharmatrak’s 
acquisition was an interception. For example, Steiger observes: 
 
[U]nder the narrow reading of the Wiretap Act we adopt ..., very few seizures 
of electronic communications from computers will constitute ‘interceptions.’ ... 
‘Therefore, unless some type of automatic routing software is used (for 
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example, a duplicate of all of an employee’s messages are automatically sent 
to the employee’s boss), interception of E-mail within the prohibition of [the 
Wiretap Act] is virtually impossible.’ 
 
NETcompare was effectively an automatic routing program. It was code that automatically 
duplicated part of the communication between a user and a pharmaceutical client and sent 
this information to a third party (Pharmatrak). 
 
Pharmatrak argues that there was no interception because “there were always two 
separate communications: one between the Web user and the Pharmaceutical Client, and 
the other between the Web user and Pharmatrak.” This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, as a matter of law, even the circuits adopting a narrow reading of the Wiretap Act 
merely require that the acquisition occur at the same time as the transmission; they do not 
require that the acquisition somehow constitute the same communication as the 
transmission. Second, Pharmatrak acquired the same URL query string (sometimes 
containing personal information) exchanged as part of the communication between the 
pharmaceutical client and the user. Separate, but simultaneous and identical, 
communications satisfy even the strictest real-time requirement. 
 
E. Intent Requirement 
 
At oral argument this court questioned the parties about whether the “intent” requirement 
under § 2511(a)(1) had been met. 
 
We remand this issue because it was not squarely addressed by both parties before the 
district court. When Pharmatrak moved for summary judgment, it did not do so on the 
grounds that the statutory requirement of intent was unmet. At most, it raised the issue in 
passing at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. 
 
Plaintiffs, in their motion for summary judgment, did raise the issue and argued that any 
interception was intentional; but the district court neither granted the motion nor 
addressed the issue. In its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, Pharmatrak relied on its own 
motion for summary judgment, and so did not address intent. The issue has not been 
briefed to us. 
 
While it is true that we can affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground 
presented by the record, we will usually do so only when the issue has been fairly presented 
to the trial court. Here it was not, and we are reluctant to determine ourselves whether 
there was adequate opportunity for discovery on this issue and whether there are material 
facts in dispute, and to resolve an issue without briefing. 
 
Still, we wish to avoid uncertainty about the legal standard for intent under the ECPA on 
remand, and so we address that point. Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2511 in 1986 to 
change the state of mind requirement from “willful” to “intentional”. Since “intentional” 
itself may have different glosses put on it, we refer to the legislative history, which states: 
 
As used in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the term “intentional” 
is narrower than the dictionary definition of “intentional.” “Intentional” 
means more than that one voluntarily engaged in conduct or caused a result. 
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Such conduct or the causing of the result must have been the person’s 
conscious objective. An “intentional” state of mind means that one’s state of 
mind is intentional as to one’s conduct or the result of one’s conduct if such 
conduct or result is one’s conscious objective. The intentional state of mind is 
applicable only to conduct and results. Since one has no control over the 
existence of circumstances, one cannot “intend” them. 
 
S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986). Congress made clear that the purpose of the amendment 
was to underscore that inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for criminal or civil 
liability under the ECPA. An act is not intentional if it is the product of inadvertence or 
mistake. There is also authority suggesting that liability for intentionally engaging in 
prohibited conduct does not turn on an assessment of the merit of a party’s motive. That is 
not to say motive is entirely irrelevant in assessing intent. An interception may be more 
likely to be intentional when it serves a party’s self-interest to engage in such conduct. 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
What should Pharmatrak and its attorneys have done differently?  What should Pharmacia 
and its attorneys have done differently? 
 
How did the consumers whose data was intercepted suffer any harms? 
 
If Pharmacia had told users that it was using Pharmatrak’s services in Pharmacia’s privacy 
policy but didn’t present its privacy policy to users as a mandatory non-leaky clickthrough 
agreement, would users have “consented” to Pharmatrak’s operations for ECPA purposes?  
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X. Spam 
 
Eric Goldman, Where’s the Beef? Dissecting Spam’s Purported Harms, 22 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 13 (2003). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After many failed attempts over the past six years, Congress finally enacted a law 
regulating unsolicited commercial e-mails, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (the “CAN-SPAM Act” or “CAN-SPAM”). CAN-
SPAM follows significant state-based efforts to regulate spam; from 1997 to 2003, nearly 
three quarters of the states adopted some spam regulation, most of which are now 
preempted by CAN-SPAM.  
 
CAN-SPAM, like the state laws preceding it, takes a multi-faceted approach to regulating 
spam. Among other provisions, CAN-SPAM contains provisions that regulate the e-mail 
content, restrict specific notorious spammer practices, give spam recipients the ability to 
opt-out, and attack the spammer’s funding by creating advertiser liability. 
 
The diversity of regulatory approaches inherent in CAN-SPAM (and, before that, the 
superseded state statutes) prompts a fundamental question: exactly what harms are caused 
by spam that these regulations attempt to redress? There is no consensus answer to this 
question. Just about everyone seems to agree that spam is a problem that needs to be 
addressed, but no one seems to agree on why. Without clearly understanding the targeted 
harms, policy-makers cannot craft regulations designed to fix them. 
 
This Essay examines the purported harms caused by spam in an effort to isolate bona fide 
areas needing legislative intervention. However, few such needs exist. Instead, most 
purported harms are illusory, already adequately addressed by existing laws or best left to 
market solutions. This analysis thus undercuts many of the purported justifications for 
regulating spam. 
 
II. DEFINING THE HARMS OF SPAM 
 
A. Defining Spam 
 
Any attempt to intelligently discuss spam is immediately hampered by the word’s 
imprecision. Simply put, the term “spam” lacks a single well-accepted definition. Usually 
“spam” refers to some form of unwanted e-mail, although some users generalize the term to 
describe all forms of unwanted advertising, both in e-mail and other media. CAN-SPAM 
defines “commercial electronic mail message” as “any electronic mail message the primary 
purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or 
service.” Building on this definition, this Essay refers to “spam” as unsolicited “commercial 
electronic mail messages.” However, this definition is both under- and over-inclusive 
because the definition includes e-mails recipients want and does not include all e-mails not 
wanted by recipients, and thus it may not track recipient expectations. 
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B. Spam is Annoying 
 
1. Distinguishing Wanted and Unwanted Content 
Many e-mail recipients castigate spam as annoying, but the reasons why are less clear. 
Some annoyance is attributable to the objectionable content in spam, a point addressed 
infra in subsection II(D). Otherwise, the annoyance is based (among other factors) on the 
unsolicited, high-volume, time-consuming or unpreventable nature of spam.  
 
I believe these concerns all derive from the same source: spam is unwanted. A simple 
example may illustrate this. Assume Jane is ready to purchase a Canon PowerShot S400 
digital camera. An unsolicited e-mail arrives in Jane’s in-box from a trustworthy retailer 
that she has never transacted with. The retailer offers to sell her the camera for $100 less 
than any other retailer. Is this spam? 
 
Some recipients would say “yes” because the e-mail is unsolicited or otherwise invades their 
privacy. However, most e-mail recipients would consider this e-mail valuable instead of 
annoying, in which case they would want this e-mail because it will save them time and 
money. 
 
Perhaps this example gives us an important insight on the nature of spam. E-mail 
recipients want e-mail that saves money, saves time, educates on matters of interest, or is 
otherwise relevant and helpful. Thus, many e-mail recipients gladly would receive 
unsolicited e-mails that meet those specifications. In contrast, e-mail recipients are 
annoyed to receive a high volume of irrelevant and unhelpful e-mails.  
 
Unfortunately, frequently spam is irrelevant and unhelpful to recipients because it is 
relatively untargeted. Like any other marketers, spam advertisers will pay for targeted e-
mail lists that are more likely to yield higher results. However, the negligible marginal cost 
of sending spam lowers the optimal level of targeting for spammers. Thus, spammers can 
profitably use low-yield and untargeted practices such as e-mail harvesting and dictionary 
attacks.  
 
Even though spammers can profitably send very-low relevance e-mails to lots of recipients, 
not all spam is bad. Inevitably, some recipients will find a particular spam e-mail helpful 
and relevant. More specifically, recipients’ perceptions about each spam’s relevance usually 
sort into a bell curve: some will find the e-mail completely irrelevant, some will find the e-
mail very relevant, and others will find the e-mail somewhat relevant. 
 
Some empirical data supports this analysis. Several recent surveys show that seven to eight 
percent of those surveyed have purchased a product or service in response to spam and 
approximately thirty percent of those surveyed have responded to spam to get more 
information about the advertised product or service. While not high percentages, the 
statistics seemingly contradict spam’s abysmal reputation. For recipients who responded to 
spam (plus those who were educated but did not respond), the spam was relevant. For those 
who purchased in response to a particular spam, that e-mail helped the consumer find a 
desired product or service at an acceptable price. 
 
We should not trivialize these consequences. Spam plays an important role in the 
marketplace of ideas, perhaps filling gaps left by other media, and can contribute to 
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efficiently functioning economic markets. In some cases, spam creates transaction 
opportunities that otherwise would not occur due to prohibitive search costs or lack of 
consumer awareness about products available to solve their needs. 
 
Of course, these conclusions do not change the fact that most spam is unwanted by most 
recipients. However, it is unclear why individuals seem less tolerant of irrelevant spam 
than irrelevant ads in other media. Consumers routinely tolerate irrelevant ads in other 
media with less annoyance than they feel towards spam. 
 
Let us consider ad relevancy in a few media, starting with billboards. Billboard ads target 
viewers only by geography (if that), so they are fairly low-relevancy advertising tools, 
meaning that most billboard ads will be irrelevant to most viewers. 
 
The broadcast and newspaper media use differentiated content to segment consumers. 
Thus, a TV show will appeal to a certain demographic, and newspapers divide their content 
into topical sections (e.g. sports, business, metro) that are read by only some readers. This 
segmentation means that ads can be targeted to consumers attracted by the surrounding 
content. Nevertheless, even the most targeted content will appeal to multiple 
demographics, so the associated ads will be less relevant to non-majority audience 
segments. 
 
In these other media like billboards, broadcasting and newspapers, consumers do not 
vociferously demand regulation to minimize the irrelevancy of ads delivered through them. 
Why do consumers feel differently about spam? 
 
2. Sorting Spam Wastes Time 
Perhaps recipients penalize spam because it takes time to sort irrelevant spam from 
wanted e-mails. Sorting also creates the risk of Type I and Type II errors (i.e., legitimate e-
mail gets tossed or blocked as spam, and objectionable spam gets through the sorting).  
 
But once again, spam is not different from other media. Every medium that contains ads 
requires consumers to sort ads from content and wanted ads from unwanted ads. For 
example, sorting postal mail requires the recipient to evaluate the envelope’s exterior and, 
in some cases, open and review the contents. Broadcast ads are even more difficult to sort, 
because ads are interspersed with content and the viewer cannot reorder or skip the ads. 
 
So while spam does require sorting time, recipients can manually sort e-mail relatively 
efficiently by reviewing subject lines, and many recipients develop good skills doing so. 
Spam can also be automatically blocked without any manual sorting using e-mail filters. As 
a result, the amount of time “wasted” on the e-mail sorting process may very well be less 
than the time wasted in other media. 
 
All media containing ads demand sorting time and create some risk of erroneous sorting, 
and no regulatory scheme—other than banning a medium altogether—can eliminate that. 
Instead, time lost to sorting is unavoidable in a media-based society, and spam is just one of 
many manifestations of that phenomenon. Thus, the explanation for recipients’ antipathy 
towards spam must lie elsewhere. 
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3. Spam Causes Recipients to Lose Control of Their In-Boxes 
Evidence suggests that many recipients are bothered by their inability to stop spam and 
feel that spam is a loss of privacy. This suggests that recipient frustration with spam may 
be the result of a feeling that recipients have lost control over their in-boxes. 
 
However, once again this problem arises with other media. Recipients cannot stop spam 
except by eliminating their e-mail account altogether, but consumers of other media are 
similarly powerless to change what ads are delivered in that medium except by 
discontinuing use of that medium. For example, a newspaper or magazine reader cannot 
control what ads are published; the reader’s only choices are to ignore unwanted ads or stop 
reading the publication altogether. This argument holds true for broadcast media, 
billboards, and junk mail as well. 
 
Perhaps e-mail can be distinguished from other media because it delivers more important 
personal content to recipients than other media. Recipients seem to develop a special and 
personal relationship with their in-box, and this explanation might offer an insight about 
why telemarketing is so reviled. But this explanation is not totally satisfactory because it 
does not explain the seeming dichotomy between the outrage over spam and comparative 
tolerance of junk mail. 
 
A more satisfying explanation can be found by considering the relative adoption curves of 
spam and other media. We have had many years to develop ways to cope with ads in other 
media, but we are still developing ways to cope with e-mail ads. It seems likely that users 
will improve their ability to manage e-mail with more experience, at which point user 
frustration should decrease. Meanwhile, new generations who grow up using e-mail should 
be more tolerant of spam because they will develop coping strategies for spam (and media 
inputs generally) from an early age. 
 
Thus, current annoyance with spam could merely reflect that user experience with e-mail is 
evolving. Robust e-mail management tools also should reduce annoyance, and the current 
annoyance may also reflect that those tools are not yet adequately deployed. 
 
4. Conclusion on Annoyance 
Unwanted e-mails are annoying, but minor annoyances are a fact of life, and no law can 
eliminate them—from e-mail or otherwise. E-mail recipients’ annoyance at spam appears to 
be an overreaction when compared to their reactions to other forms of annoying ads. 
Meanwhile, regulation of spam creates significant risk that some relevant e-mails will be 
blocked from recipients who want them. It is troubling to regulate content to protect the 
majority from minor annoyances if the consequence is preventing minority interests from 
exchanging relevant content. 
 
C. Spammers Impose Costs on Third Parties 
 
As it moves from sender to recipient, spam generates bandwidth and server processing 
costs for the spammer’s IAP, the recipient and the recipient’s IAP. Depending on a 
spammer’s practices, they can also impose some costs on unsuspecting third parties, such 
as server operators with open mail relays and or whose domains are forged. We consider 
each cost in turn. 
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1. The Spammer’s IAP 
The spammer and its IAP have contractual privity, and the IAP can technologically 
constrain the spammer’s activities (i.e. capping the quantity of e-mails sent). As a result, a 
spammer’s IAP has the capacity to charge spammers for any spam-related costs, and there 
are no obvious market failures that require regulatory protection for the spammer’s IAP. 
 
2. Recipients and Their IAPs 
It is frequently claimed that recipients pay to receive spam, and sometimes spam is likened 
to junk mail sent with postage due. With respect to individuals with a consumer IAP 
account, this claim is no longer accurate. It was true prior to the mid-1990s, when many 
IAPs charged customers a time-based fee for Internet connectivity. Because each e-mail 
took some time to download, recipients paid a small fee for each e-mail they received. 
Today, consumer IAPs almost universally charge flat-rate pricing for unlimited usage, so 
consumer recipients do not pay for each e-mail received. 
 
However, recipient IAPs bear some bandwidth and server processing costs for each e-mail 
they process, plus preventative costs (like filtering) and remediation costs (like blocking or 
database repair) associated with pernicious e-mail. Unlike the spammer’s IAP, the 
recipient’s IAP has no contractual privity or technological relationship with the spammer. 
And where corporations provide Internet connectivity to their employees, they incur these 
costs as a recipient directly. As a result, recipient IAPs and corporations may benefit from 
legal systems that allow them to pass those costs back to spammers or avoid the costs 
altogether. 
 
Until recently, common law trespass to chattels was an important legal mechanism to 
accomplish that objective. However, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court 
recently scaled the doctrine back, rejecting trespass to chattels when a low-volume 
spammer’s e-mails did not threaten to impair (or actually impair) the functioning of Intel’s 
systems. It remains unclear how subsequent courts will interpret Intel, but in all likelihood 
some future spammers will avoid liability for trespass to chattels. 
 
Irrespective of trespass to chattels, corporations and recipient IAPs can use, and have 
successfully used, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to combat spam. CAN-
SPAM supplements the CFAA (and whatever is left of common law trespass to chattels) by 
providing recipient IAPs a direct cause of action when the IAP is “adversely affected” by a 
spammer who fails to comply with selected other provisions of CAN-SPAM. Depending on 
how broadly courts interpret the words “adversely affected,” this provision may moot 
Hamidi’s common law analysis by providing a statutory cause of action. At minimum, CAN-
SPAM expedites recipient IAP causes of action by providing statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees and by providing another basis (in addition to the CFAA) for federal court 
jurisdiction. As a result, CAN-SPAM should help recipient IAPs control some of the e-mail 
processing costs that are externalized to them. 
 
In addition to bandwidth, server, preventative and maintenance costs, some companies 
have sought legal recognition for the time employees waste on spam. Indeed, analysts claim 
that this lost time creates enormous costs. However, as discussed in Section II supra, time 
spent sorting or reading spam is not necessarily wasted, nor is it unique compared to the 
many other ways that employees waste time (e.g. personal e-mail, junk mail and personal 
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telephone calls). Therefore, lost productivity due to spam is a poor policy basis for 
regulating spam. 
 
3. Open Mail Relays 
Spammers can offload costs to third party computers who have open mail relays, which can 
cause those server operators to incur some costs like any other recipient IAP. Of course, 
operators wishing to avoid those costs can simply close their mail relays, and interestingly 
these operators are often considered part of the problem, not victims. Thus, forcing them to 
internalize the spam-created costs (rather than pushing those costs to a spammer) may 
motivate them to close the relays. 
 
4. Targets of Forged Headers 
Spammers also can offload costs to third parties using forged headers. A forged header 
occurs when a spammer manipulates an e-mail to make it look like the spam originated 
from X.com when it is really being sent from Y.com. The X.com domain name operator (or 
its IAP) incurs costs when undeliverable messages and recipient complaints are directed to 
the operator. 
 
The operator of a forged domain name lacks any contractual or technological way to prevent 
this activity, so regulatory protection is appropriate. Indeed, thirty states prohibited forged 
headers, and these state laws may not be preempted by CAN-SPAM. Meanwhile, CAN-
SPAM criminalizes forged headers and potentially sets up a private cause of action for some 
victims (“providers of Internet access services” who are “adversely affected”). The 
robustness of this private cause of action remains to be seen, but this CAN-SPAM provision, 
plus any coverage under non-preempted state laws and other existing doctrines like 
trademark law and the CFAA, should provide substantial protection to the victims of forged 
headers. 
 
5. Conclusion on Costs 
Far too much rhetoric is directed to the costs borne by individual spam recipients. These 
individuals no longer bear a financial cost to receive spam, and any “costs” associated with 
the consumption of their attention makes unsupportable assumptions about the e-mail’s 
relevancy to the recipient. Similarly, although sending IAPs may find it desirable to obtain 
regulatory protection against spam, they can control their financial exposure to spammers’ 
behavior through pricing and technology. 
 
Focusing on the costs borne by individual recipients and sending IAPs detracts from the 
parties who incur uncontrollable costs from spam, such as recipient IAPs, operators of open 
mail relays and victims of forged headers. CAN-SPAM provides some useful legal tools to 
protect these parties, although those tools may be incomplete. A crisper understanding of 
the real costs borne by these parties would have likely produced a more thoughtful legal 
solution. 
 
D. Spam Contains or Promotes Objectionable Content 
 
Many spam recipients complain about objectionable content of spam, especially 
pornographic spam. Due to deep feelings towards pornographic spam, Congress specifically 
targeted it in CAN-SPAM by requiring warning labels. But to understand the harms 
pornographic spam causes, it is useful to consider adults and minors separately. 
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For adults, pornographic spam is no different from any other form of unwanted content 
discussed in Section II(B) supra. Nevertheless, Congress has tried to help adults avoid 
unwanted pornographic spam by requiring special labeling of pornographic spam in the 
subject line. When implemented, this requirement can help recipients who automatically 
filter e-mail using the appropriate words because the spam will automatically be routed 
outside the recipient’s ordinary view. Until spammers regularly comply with this law, 
however, filtering will not be helpful. 
 
The mandatory labeling law may be even less helpful to recipients who manually sort e-
mail. These recipients may still see objectionable content if the subject line contains 
objectionable terms or the recipient’s e-mail software “previews” a message and the 
previewed content is objectionable. 
 
So how can regulatory intervention help recipients avoid objectionable e-mails? With widely 
varying perceptions of what constitutes objectionable content, regulating objectionable ads 
is no more feasible than regulating irrelevant ads. Thus, the only “solution” may be for 
recipients to manage their exposures themselves, either through technological measures or 
by looking elsewhere when something offends. 
 
Putting the burden on recipients to avoid pornographic spam is less satisfactory when 
recipients are minors. In that case, society may be harmed when minors view this 
inappropriate material.  
 
However, minors’ exposure to pornographic spam is a microcosm of a much greater 
problem: minors with e-mail accounts. This is a major social development because 
historically minors had few communication media that readily bypassed parental oversight. 
Today, minors can use e-mail, instant messenger, and cell phones to communicate with 
third parties without any parental oversight and knowledge. With this additional 
autonomy, minors can get into inappropriate and potentially very dangerous situations, 
such as interactions with sexual predators.  
 
Because of these risks, some parents restrict minors’ access to the Internet altogether, and 
other parents permit only supervised Internet use. The former prevents any risk of 
exposure to pornographic spam, and the latter approach gives parents the ability to pre-
screen pornographic spam or counsel the minor when seeing such spam. 
 
Otherwise, parents who let minors have unsupervised e-mail use make a huge decision, and 
it is not made lightly. Because these parents accept the risk that their children will engage 
in dangerous online behavior, the problem of pornographic spam seems almost trivial by 
comparison. If the parents trust their children enough to give them that autonomy, perhaps 
we should infer that the parents deem their children responsible enough to cope with 
pornographic spam. 
 
Regulation cannot easily solve these problems. Efforts to specifically ban pornographic 
spam are likely unconstitutional and do not affect e-mails from foreign jurisdictions. Lesser 
efforts, like mandatory labeling, have low efficacy. Ultimately, there can be no substitute 
for parental involvement in their children’s use of e-mail. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
Society is still evolving ways to cope with media saturation. Spam contributes to this 
problem, but so do other media. Yet, many recipients hate spam more than other ads. As 
explored by this Essay, this dichotomous attitude is hard to explain. Nevertheless, the 
anger has caused anti-spam rhetoric to reach hyperbolic levels. But, while many spam 
opponents decry spam as a system breakdown, the breakdown has been more political than 
technological. Most state-based attempts to regulate spam, a product of political 
grandstanding or legislator rage instead of rational policy-making, were ineffectual, 
reflecting their weak policy underpinnings. Early feedback on CAN-SPAM suggests the 
federal law will not be any more effective.  
 
Even if CAN-SPAM beneficially affects the flow of unwanted e-mails, any legislative 
solution seems inherently empty. Without legislative intervention, society will find ways to 
cope with spam, just as we have with other media. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs will continue 
to develop better tools to sort wanted and unwanted communications. Thus, more patience 
with the spam “problem” might have facilitated the development of superior results 
organically. 
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MySpace, Inc. v. theglobe.com, Inc., 2007 WL 1686966 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
Klausner, District Judge. 
 
…II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The following facts are alleged by the parties: 
 
Plaintiff is an online social networking service that allows members to create personal 
profiles in order to find and communicate with other people. Members of MySpace have 
access to the MySpace.com website, the MySpace.com Internet Messaging service, and the 
MySpace.com Mail service, where users can send and receive electronic mail messages 
(“MySpace e-messages”). 
 
To become a MySpace member, a person must set up an account on MySpace.com by 
creating a profile. The profile includes the user’s name, country, zip code, birth date, and 
gender. The user must also create a password and provide an alternate email address to 
which confirmations and notifications will be sent. To set up an account, the user must 
assent to the MySpace Terms of Service Contract (“TOS Contract”) by checking a box 
agreeing to the terms of the TOS Contract, and inputting a verification code. The TOS 
Contract prohibits spamming, automated use of its system, use of MySpace’s service for 
commercial endeavors, and promotion of information known to be false or misleading. 
 
A MySpace member accesses his e-message account on the internet, at the MySpace.com 
website. To send a MySpace e-message, the user may either click on a link for “Mail,” or go 
directly to the recipient’s unique URL assigned to each individual account. 
 
Defendant is a public company that provides internet-based communications services 
(“TGLO Products”). Defendant operates one or more websites under various domain names, 
including iglochat.com, tglophone.com, glotalk.com and digitalvoiceglo.com. 
 
Beginning January 2006, Defendant set up at least 95 identical or virtually identical 
“dummy” MySpace profiles, with corresponding e-message accounts. Defendant used these 
accounts to send almost 400,000 unsolicited commercial e-messages marketing TGLO 
Products to MySpace users via scripts. On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff sent a cease and 
desist letter to Defendant, demanding that Defendant stop sending its commercial e-
messages to MySpace members. Thereafter, Defendant ceased its transmission of e-
messages. However, the transmissions later resumed and continued through May 2006. 
 
On June 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed the current action against Defendant. In its Complaint, 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s activities violated both federal and state statutory laws, 
as well as state common laws. By way of its action, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining 
Defendants from the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff also seeks actual 
damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs…. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
At issue in these cross-motions are Count 1 (Violation of CAN-SPAM), Count III (Violation 
of Section 17529.5) and Count VI (Breach of Contract). 
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According to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue as to the following alleged facts: Defendant 
obtained 95 or more MySpace e-message accounts to circumvent MySpace’s daily mail 
limitations. To obtain these accounts, Defendant set up almost 100 separate email accounts 
at sites such as hotmail.com to fulfill MySpace’s requirement of providing an alternate 
email address. Then, Defendant used false information to set up the MySpace accounts 
with deceptive display names, and purported to use them for personal purposes. In fact, the 
accounts were used to initiate (via a script) 399,481 unsolicited commercial email messages 
to MySpace.com users to promote its TGLO Products. Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of 
this conduct, partial summary judgment should be granted in its favor as to all three 
counts. 
 
Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff has no standing under CAN-SPAM because it is not 
an ISP; (2) the messages sent over its private messaging system are not e-mail, and 
therefore neither CAN-SPAM nor Section 17529.5 apply; and (3) the TOS Contract, in 
general, is an unenforceable contract of adhesion, and the liquidated damages provision, 
specifically, is unenforceable because it is disproportionate to anticipated damages. 
 
For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and grants in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication. 
 
A. Claims Under CAN-SPAM 
 
CAN-SPAM regulates the manner in which unsolicited commercial emails may be 
transmitted. The statute also makes unlawful certain conduct relating to such 
transmissions, including the transmission of false or misleading information, and obtaining 
email addresses through dictionary attacks. Under CAN-SPAM, an Internet access service 
provider who is harmed by violations of Section 7704(a), (b) or (d) may seek to enjoin 
further violation by the defendant, or recover damages equal to the greater of: (1) actual 
monetary loss incurred by the internet access service provider or (2) statutory damages as 
provided by Section 7706(g)(3)…. 
 
1. Plaintiff Has Standing Under CAN-SPAM 
As an initial matter, CAN-SPAM, which is primarily a criminal statute, authorizes a 
private right of action only to a “provider of Internet access service.” Defendant contends 
that Plaintiff is not a provider of Internet access service, and therefore, has no standing to 
sue Defendant under the statute. 
 
a. Plaintiff is an Internet Access Provider 
Under Section 7702(11), “Internet access service” has the meaning given that term in 47 
U.S.C. § 231(e)(4) (“Section 231”). Section 231 defines “Internet access service” as “a service 
that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered 
over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and 
other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers.” 
 
The Ninth Circuit assumes that the legislative purpose of a statute is expressed by the 
ordinary meaning of the words used. The plain meaning of the statutory language is 
unambiguous; “Internet access provider” includes traditional Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”), any email provider, and even most website owners. Under this broad definition, 
Plaintiff is an “Internet access provider.” 
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b. MySpace E-Messages Are Electronic Mail 
Notwithstanding the broad definition given to “Internet access provider,” CAN-SPAM 
provides a private right of action to only those Internet access providers who are adversely 
affected by Section 7704. Since Section 7704 regulates and prohibits conduct involving 
electronic mail (“electronic mail” or “email”), a private right of action under CAN-SPAM is 
confined to only those Internet access services that provide access to electronic mail. 
 
CAN-SPAM defines “electronic mail message” as “a message sent to a unique electronic 
mail address.” “Electronic mail address” is defined as “a destination, commonly expressed 
as a string of characters, consisting of a unique user name or mailbox (commonly referred to 
as the ‘local part’) and a reference to an Internet domain (commonly referred to as the 
‘domain part’), whether or not displayed, to which an electronic mail message can be sent or 
delivered.” 
 
According to Plaintiff’s evidence, the mail of each MySpace user resides at a unique URL, 
consisting of a string of characters that includes a reference to a user name or number, and 
the Internet destination, www.myspace.com. This evidence shows that MySpace e-messages 
fall under CAN-SPAM’s definition of electronic mail, and Defendant has failed to present 
any evidence disputing Plaintiff’s evidence. 
 
However, Defendant maintains that MySpace e-messages do not constitute CAN-SPAM 
protected email because: (1) unlike email, MySpace e-messages have no real “route” because 
the messages always remain within the “walled garden” of MySpace; (2) MySpace e-
messages are not email because they do not use simple mail transfer protocol (“SMTP”); 
and (3) unlike email addresses, MySpace e-message addresses have no domain part. 
Defendant’s arguments are unavailing. 
 
First, nowhere does the statute specify the requirements set forth by Defendant. Moreover, 
argument as to these requirements are part and parcel of Defendant’s position that only 
traditional ISPs have a right to sue under CAN-SPAM, as these requirements are typically 
associated with email service provided by traditional ISPs. As discussed above, the Court 
rejects this position. Furthermore, CAN-SPAM’s Congressional findings indicates that 
exclusion of electronic messages that fall outside the ambit of Defendant’s specifications 
would subvert the legislative intent. Regardless of who has a private right of action under 
the statute, the overarching intent of this legislation is to safeguard the convenience and 
efficiency of the electronic messaging system, and to curtail overburdening of the system’s 
infrastructure. Limiting protection to only electronic mail that falls within the narrows 
confines set forth by Defendant does little to promote the Congress’s overarching intent in 
enacting CAN-SPAM. 
 
Nonetheless, Plaintiff has introduced evidence showing: (1) its e-message system uses both 
a routing method and a domain part, and (2) some MySpace e-messages are transmitted 
using STMP. First, according to Plaintiff’s evidence, every message must contain routing 
information letting MySpace servers know where to send that message. While the routing 
employed by MySpace may be less complex and elongated than those employed by ISPs, 
any routing necessarily implicates issues regarding volume of traffic and utilization of 
infrastructure—issues  which CAN-SPAM seeks to address. Similar to an ISP, there is only 
a finite volume of mail that MySpace can handle without further investment in 
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infrastructure. Second, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that each user’s mailbox includes a 
reference to, not only a user name, but also to myspace.com, the Internet domain or domain 
part. Finally, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that, while most MySpace e-messages are sent 
using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”), each time an HTTP message is sent by a 
MySpace user, a companion notification message is sent via SMTP to the recipient’s 
alternative email address. Additionally, MySpace users may send SMTP messages over the 
Internet from myspace.com when they invite someone who is not a MySpace member to join 
MySpace. Defendant has not presented any evidence to dispute the evidence set forth 
above. Therefore, Defendant’s argument fails, even under its improperly narrow 
interpretation of the statute. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendant under 
CAN-SPAM because, as defined under CAN-SPAM, Plaintiff is an Internet access provider 
whose electronic messages qualify as electronic mail. 
 
2. Violation of Section 7704(a)(1) 
Section 7704(a)(1) prohibits the transmission of commercial email that contains false or 
misleading header information. Under the statute, even if the header information is 
technically accurate, it is considered materially misleading if it includes an originating 
email address that was accessed through false or fraudulent pretenses, for purposes of 
initiating the commercial email message. 
 
According to Plaintiff’s evidence, Defendant’s employees created MySpace accounts using 
false identifying information, including fictitious email addresses and contact information. 
Defendant’s employees also set up MySpace accounts with the display names, “MySpace 
Phone,” “Chick,” and “Coppermine.” As indicated by this evidence, the accounts created by 
Defendant failed to identity the messages as originating from TheGlobe. Based on the plain 
language of Section 7704(a)(1), Plaintiff’s evidence establishes that Defendant violated this 
provision.  
 
In opposition, Defendant argues that the accounts did, in fact, identify TheGlobe as the 
originator of the e-messages. To support its argument, Defendant has introduced evidence 
that a document was used to assist employees in creating MySpace accounts. According to 
this evidence, the document instructed the employees to use “tglo” in the first name and 
“phone” as the last name. This evidence is unavailing, as it fails to dispute Plaintiff’s 
evidence or otherwise support its proposition. At most, the evidence indicates that, in 
addition to the false accounts described by Plaintiff’s evidence, some of Defendant’s other 
accounts may have had as their account identifiers the words “tglo” and “phone,” the 
product Defendant sought to market. Even so, this fact is irrelevant because Defendant has 
not offered any evidence showing that those words are readily associated with TheGlobe or 
its TGLO Products. As such, the Court finds no triable issue as to Defendant’s violation of 
Section 7704(a)(1). 
 
3. Violation of Section 7704(a)(2) 
Section 7704(a)(2) prohibits a person from transmitting commercial email containing a 
subject heading that he or she knows would likely mislead the recipient about a material 
fact regarding the content or subject matter of the message. Under Section 7706(g)(1), a 
private right of action under Section 7704(a)(2) is available only when there is a pattern or 
practice that violates this provision. 
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It is undisputed that Defendant sent MySpace e-messages with the subject headings, “the 
new MySpace phone,” “the new phone for MySpace,” and “the new tglo phone for MySpace.” 
The last heading does not violate the statute, as it references “tglo” in a way that accurately 
describes the content of the message and implies a product that is separate and distinct 
from MySpace. In contrast, the first two headings do violate the statute because they imply 
an affiliation with MySpace, likely misleading the recipient into believing that the 
marketed product is related to MySpace. In fact, it is undisputed that in late January 2006, 
an influential technology blogger on Zdnet.com inaccurately reported that MySpace had 
partnered with TheGlobe. Although Defendant was aware of this error, it never sought to 
correct the misinformation. Significantly, the undisputed evidence shows that the subject 
headings described above were attached to e-messages sent after Defendant learned of the 
blogger’s inaccurate report. As such, the Court finds that Defendant knew, or should have 
known, that its subject headings were misleading. 
 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show a pattern or practice. As to this provision, the 
Court agrees. The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant’s employees were provided 
written instructions on how to create MySpace accounts and what content to send through 
the messaging system. The instructions directed the employees to use “Call for FREE fast 
and easy” as the headline. This subject heading is consistent with the email content, and 
does not violate Section 7704(a)(2). As discussed above, notwithstanding the written 
instructions, as least a portion of the 399,481 e-messages sent by Defendant contained 
deceptive subject headings that violated the statute. However, without further evidence as 
to the number of such e-messages sent by Defendant, it is impossible to determine whether 
Defendant’s violation of this provision rose to the level of a pattern or practice. Therefore, a 
triable issue of fact exists as to whether the number of e-messages containing deceptive 
subject headings is substantial enough to constitute a pattern or practice. 
 
4. Violation of Section 7704(a)(5) 
Section 7704(a)(5) requires that unsolicited commercial emails contain: (1) clear notification 
that the message is an advertisement, (2) clear notice of the opportunity to decline receipt 
of further messages from the sender, and (3) a valid physical postal address for the sender. 
Again, under Section 7706(g)(1), a private right of action under Section 7704(a)(5) is 
available only when the defendant has a pattern or practice of violating this provision. 
 
It is undisputed that none of Defendant’s 399,481 e-messages contained clear notice of the 
opportunity to decline receipt of further messages from the sender, or a valid physical 
postal address for the sender. Therefore, Defendant clearly violated this statutory 
provision. 
 
Again, Defendant argues that its activities do not constitute a pattern or practice, as 
prescribed by Section 7706(g)(1). However, as stated above, the following is undisputed: (1) 
Defendant’s employees were given instructions on how to create a MySpace account, what 
information should be placed in the profiles, and what content to write in the messages; and 
(2) through its employees, Defendant created at least 95 MySpace accounts and sent 
399,481 unsolicited commercial emails over a course of five months. This evidence shows 
that, rather than an isolated or accidental event, Defendant sent these e-messages in a 
regular and repeated fashion, as a part of Defendant’s marketing practice. Since each one of 
the 399,481 messages violated Section 7704(a)(5), Plaintiff has shown that Defendant 
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engaged in a pattern or practice of violating this provision. As such, the Court finds no 
triable issue of fact as to Defendant’s liability for violation of Section 7704(a)(5). 
 
5. Violation of Section 7704(b)(1) 
Section 7704(b) makes it an aggravated violation to initiate the transmission of commercial 
email that is unlawful under Section 7704(a) where “the electronic mail address of the 
recipient was obtained using an automated means that generates possible electronic mail 
addresses by combining names, letter or numbers into numerous permutation.” 
 
Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Defendant randomly selected a range of MySpace ID 
numbers. Defendant then used a script to automatically generate a set of sequential IDs. 
Once these IDs were generated, the script automatically transmitted Defendant’s messages 
to those IDs. According to the evidence, some of the IDs correlated to MySpace profiles, and 
some did not. A total of 399,481 messages were sent using this script. Based on the evidence 
presented, Defendant violated Section 7704(1)(A)(ii). 
 
In opposition, Defendant argues that it did not violate the statutory provision because the 
script sent messages in sequence, rather than at random. Defendant further argues that 
the script sent the messages to a range of MySpace profiles by using a range of user IDSs 
that had already been assigned by MySpace. Defendant’s arguments are unavailing, as it is 
unclear how these distinctions change the fact that Defendant used “automated means that 
generates possible electronic mail addresses.” As such, the Court finds no triable issue as to 
Defendant’s violation of Section 7704(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 
B. Section 17529.5 Claim 
 
Section 17529.5 prohibits email transmissions to or from California email addresses 
containing “falsified, misrepresented or forged header information” or a subject line that 
would likely “mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a 
material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message.” Under the statute, 
an electronic mail service provider7 may bring an action against a person or entity that 
violates this section. 
 
It is undisputed that MySpace’s servers, which house all MySpace.com e-message accounts, 
are located in California. Furthermore, it is undisputed that every time a user logs on to 
MySpace.com to send, review or reply to an e-message, he or she is doing so by accessing 
the California servers. Based on this evidence, as well as the evidence and analysis 
discussed in Section III.A. above, the Court finds no triable issues as to Defendant’s liability 
for Plaintiff’s Section 17529.5 claim. 
 
C. Breach of Contract Claim 
 
To set up a MySpace account, a person must assent to the TOS Contract by checking a box 
agreeing to its terms. Plaintiff claims that, by setting up 95 accounts and sending its 
marketing e-messages through those accounts, Defendant breached the terms of the TOS 
                                                 
7 An “electronic mail service provider” is defined as “any person, including an Internet service provider, that is 
an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail or that provides to end users of the electronic mail 
service the ability to send or receive electronic mail.” 
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Contract. Furthermore, due to modified terms of the TOS Contract, Plaintiff contends that 
Defendant must pay $50 for each of its e-messages that were sent after March 17, 2006. 
 
1. Breach of the TOS Contract 
It is undisputed that Defendant’s e-messages were sent between January 2006 and May 
2006. During that time, the TOS Contract was modified three times. All four versions of the 
TOS Contract contain the following provision: MySpace is “for the personal use of Members 
only and may not be used in connection with any commercial endeavors except those that 
are specifically endorsed or approved by the management of MySpace.com. Also, each 
version prohibits: (1) content that involves the transmission of ‘junk mail,’ ‘chain letters,” or 
unsolicited mass mailing or ‘spamming;’ and (2) “any automated use of the system, such as 
using scripts to add friends.” 
 
Based on the evidence and analysis discussed in Section III.A above, the Court finds that 
Defendant used a script to transmit an unsolicited mass mailing to MySpace users for 
purposes of an unapproved commercial endeavor. This activity violates the terms of the 
TOS Contract. 
 
Defendant argues that the TOS Contract, as a whole, is entirely unenforceable because 
every relevant version is a contract of adhesion, such that the terms are unconscionable. 
This argument is not well-taken. 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability provides that a contract is unenforceable if it is both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability focuses on 
oppression and surprise due to unequal bargaining power. “Oppression” arises from the 
inequality of the parties’ bargaining power and an absence of real negotiation or a 
meaningful choice on the weaker party’s part. “Surprise” is found when “the terms to which 
the party supposedly agreed [are] hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party 
seeking to enforce them.” A contract is substantively unconscionable when its terms are so 
harsh, oppressive, or one-sided as to shock the conscience. 
 
A review of the TOS Contract shows that it is, in fact, a standardized contract that gives 
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. However, 
the facts indicate that Defendant had a reasonable alternative or meaningful choice in the 
matter, in that marketing through MySpace using the method employed was not its only 
choice. In fact, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Defendant had, in fact, considered 
purchasing advertising space on the MySpace website. Moreover, the Court finds that the 
contract is not written prolixly, particularly for an experienced, sophisticated business 
entity whose area of expertise involves Internet related technology. Even if the TOS 
contract was procedurally unconscionable, the terms, as a whole, are certainly not so harsh, 
oppressive, or one-sided as to shock the conscience. 
 
In light of the above, the Court finds that Defendant breached the TOS Contract. 
 
2. Liquidated Damages Provision 
On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff modified the TOS Contract and included the following 
provision: “Prohibited activity includes ... advertising to, or solicitation of, any Member to 
buy or sell any products or services through the Services. If you breach this Agreement and 
send unsolicited bulk email, ... or other unsolicited communications of any kind ... As a 
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reasonable estimation of such harm, you agree to pay MySpace.com $50 for each such 
unsolicited email ... you send through the Services;....” 
 
Plaintiff asserts that, under this provision, Defendant is liable for liquidated damages in 
the amount of $50 per message sent after March 17, 2006. Defendant argues that the $50 
liquidated damages clause is unenforceable because it is an impermissible contractual 
penalty. The Court disagrees. 
 
California law provides that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable where: (1) damages 
from a breach would be impracticable or extremely difficult to determine with certainty; 
and (2) the amount represents a reasonable estimation of what such damages might be. As 
stated above, the Court has found that Defendant breached the TOS Agreement by bulk 
transmission of unapproved, unsolicited commercial e-messages. The costs associated with 
this activity include not only infrastructure costs, such as additional bandwidth, and 
monitoring costs, they are also rife with large hidden costs. Such hidden costs include those 
associated with deterrence (legal fees, software, etc.), depletion of customer goodwill, and 
liability implications associated with the unlawfully advertised product. Therefore, the 
damages related to Defendant’s breach are, in fact, impracticable or extremely difficult to 
determine. As to the amount of liquidated damages, CAN-SPAM sets statutory damages for 
unsolicited commercial emails at $25-$300 per message. Moreover, while the costs 
associated with spamming are difficult to definitively assess, the costs listed above are 
certainly large, and only the tip the iceberg. Therefore, the Court finds $50 per message a 
reasonable estimation of Plaintiff’s damages. 
 
Defendant further argues that, even if the Court finds the liquidated provision enforceable, 
the provision should be applied only to those messages that were sent from accounts 
created after March 17, 2006. Plaintiff contends that, because the TOS contract specifically 
provides for modification of the agreement, the provision should apply to all messages sent 
after March 17, 2006, regardless of when the account was created. The Court agrees with 
Plaintiff. 
 
All four versions of the TOS Contract specifically provide: “MySpace.com may modify this 
Agreement from time to time and such modification shall be effective upon posting by 
MySpace.com on the Website. You agree to be bound to any changes to this Agreement when 
you use the Service after any such modification is posted.” (emphasis added). For the same 
reasons stated above, this contractual term is neither procedurally nor substantively 
unconscionable. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant created all 95 MySpace 
accounts, both before and after March 17, 2006. Therefore, at the time it created its post-
March 17 accounts, it knew, or should have known, that all messages, even those sent from 
pre-March 17 accounts, were subject to the liquidated damages provision. As such, the 
Court finds that the liquidated damages provision contained in the March 17, 2006 TOS 
Contract applies to all messages sent by Defendant after March 17, 2006…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Denouement.  The parties subsequently settled the case for $2.5 million—basically, all of 
theglobe.com’s remaining cash.  So effectively this was a bet-your-business decision by 
theglobe.com. 
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XI. Blogs and Social Networking Sites 
 
The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism 
By Eric Goldman 
Posted March 11, 2009 to http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm 
 
From the beginning, the Internet has been viewed as something special and “unique.” For 
example, in 1996, a judge called the Internet “a unique and wholly new medium of 
worldwide human communication.” 
 
The Internet’s perceived novelty has prompted regulators to engage in “Internet 
exceptionalism,” crafting Internet-specific laws that diverge from regulatory precedents in 
other media. Internet exceptionalism has come in three distinct waves: 
 
The First Wave: Internet Utopianism 
 
In the mid-1990s, some people fantasized about an Internet “utopia” that would overcome 
the problems inherent in other media.  Some regulators, fearing disruption of this possible 
utopia, sought to treat the Internet more favorably than other media. 
 
47 U.S.C. §230 (a law still on the books) is a flagship example of mid-1990s efforts to 
preserve Internet utopianism.  The statute categorically immunizes online providers from 
liability for publishing most types of third party content.  It was enacted (in part) “to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  The statute 
is clearly exceptionalist because it treats online providers more favorably than offline 
publishers—even when they publish identical content. 
 
The Second Wave: Internet Paranoia 
 
Later in the 1990s, the regulatory pendulum swung in the other direction.  Regulators still 
embraced Internet exceptionalism, but instead of favoring the Internet, regulators treated 
the Internet more harshly than analogous offline activity. 
 
For example, in 2005, a Texas website called Live-shot.com announced that it would offer 
“Internet hunting.”  The website allowed paying customers to control, via the Internet, a 
gun on its game farm.  An employee manually monitored the gun and could override the 
customer’s instructions.  The website wanted to give people who could not otherwise hunt, 
such as paraplegics, the opportunity to enjoy the hunting experience. 
 
The regulatory reaction to Internet hunting was swift and severe.  Over 3 dozen states 
banned Internet hunting. California also banned Internet fishing for good measure.  
However, regulators never explained how Internet hunting is more objectionable than 
physical space hunting. 
 
For example, California Sen. Debra Bowen criticized Internet hunting because it “isn’t 
hunting; it’s an inhumane, over the top, pay-per-view video game using live animals for 
target practice….Shooting live animals over the Internet takes absolutely zero hunting 
skills, and it ought to be offensive to every legitimate hunter.” 
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Sen. Bowen’s remarks reflect numerous unexpressed assumptions about the nature of 
“hunting” and what constitutes fair play.  In the end, however, hunting may just be 
“hunting,” in which case the response to Internet hunting may just be a typical example of 
adverse Internet exceptionalism. 
 
The Third Wave: Exceptionalism Proliferation 
 
The past few years have brought a new regulatory trend.  Regulators are still engaged in 
Internet exceptionalism, but each new advance in Internet technology has prompted 
exceptionalist regulations towards that technology. 
 
For example, the emergence of blogs and virtual worlds has helped initiate a push towards 
blog-specific and virtual world-specific regulation.  In effect, Internet exceptionalism has 
splintered into pockets of smaller exceptionalist efforts. 
 
Regulatory responses to social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace are a prime 
example of Internet exceptionalism splintering.  Rather than regulating these sites like 
other websites, regulators have sought social networking site-specific laws, such as 
requirements to verify users’ age, combat sexual predators and suppress content that 
promotes violence.  The result is that the regulation of social networking sites differs not 
only from offline enterprises but from other websites as well. 
 
Implications 
 
Internet exceptionalism is not inherently bad.  In some cases, the Internet truly is unique, 
special or different and should be regulated accordingly.  Unfortunately, more typically, 
exceptionalism cannot be analytically justified and instead reflects regulatory panic. 
 
In these cases, regulatory exceptionalism can be harmful, especially to Internet 
entrepreneurs and their investors.  It can distort the marketplace between web enterprises 
and their offline competition—occasionally advantaging the website (such as 47 USC 230), 
but typically hindering the web business’ ability to compete.  In extreme cases, such as 
Internet hunting, unjustified regulatory intervention may put companies out of business. 
 
Accordingly, before enacting exceptionalist Internet regulation, regulators should articulate 
how the Internet is unique, special or different and explain why these differences support 
exceptionalism.  Unfortunately, emotional overreactions to perceived Internet threats or 
harms typically trump such a rational regulatory process.  Knowing this tendency, perhaps 
we can better resist that temptation. 
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Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Clement, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jane and Julie Doe (“the Does”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims for 
negligence and gross negligence, and its finding that the claims were barred by the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C § 230, and Texas common law. For the 
following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
MySpace.com is a Web-based social network. Online social networking is the practice of 
using a Web site or other interactive computer service to expand one’s business or social 
network. Social networking on MySpace.com begins with a member’s creation of an online 
profile that serves as a medium for personal expression, and can contain such items as 
photographs, videos, and other information about the member that he or she chooses to 
share with other MySpace.com users. Members have complete discretion regarding the 
amount and type of information that is included in a personal profile. Members over the age 
of sixteen can choose the degree of privacy they desire regarding their profile; that is, they 
determine who among the MySpace.com membership is allowed to view their profile. Once 
a profile has been created, the member can use it to extend “invitations” to existing friends 
who are also MySpace.com users and to communicate with those friends online by linking 
to their profiles, or using e-mail, instant messaging, and blogs, all of which are hosted 
through the MySpace.com platform. 
 
Members can also meet new people at MySpace.com through user groups focused on 
common interests such as film, travel, music, or politics. MySpace.com has a browser 
feature that allows members to search the Web site’s membership using criteria such as 
geographic location or specific interests. MySpace.com members can also become online 
“friends” with celebrities, musicians, or politicians who have created MySpace.com profiles 
to publicize their work and to interface with fans and supporters. 
 
MySpace.com membership is free to all who agree to the Terms of Use. To establish a 
profile, users must represent that they are at least fourteen years of age. The profiles of 
members who are aged fourteen and fifteen are automatically set to “private” by default, in 
order to limit the amount of personal information that can be seen on the member’s profile 
by MySpace.com users who are not in their existing friends network and to prevent younger 
teens from being contacted by users they do not know. Although MySpace.com employs a 
computer program designed to search for clues that underage members have lied about 
their age to create a profile on the Web site, no current technology is foolproof. All members 
are cautioned regarding the type of information they release to other users on the Web site, 
including a specific prohibition against posting personal information such as telephone 
numbers, street addresses, last names, or e-mail addresses. MySpace.com members are also 
encouraged to report inaccurate, inappropriate, or obscene material to the Web site’s 
administrators. 
 
In the summer of 2005, at age thirteen, Julie Doe (“Julie”) lied about her age, represented 
that she was eighteen years old, and created a profile on MySpace.com. This action allowed 
her to circumvent all safety features of the Web site and resulted in her profile being made 
public; nineteen-year-old Pete Solis (“Solis”) was able to initiate contact with Julie in April 
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2006 when she was fourteen. The two communicated offline on several occasions after Julie 
provided her telephone number. They met in person in May 2006, and, at this meeting, 
Solis sexually assaulted Julie.2… 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
In October 1998*, Congress recognized the rapid development of the Internet and the 
benefits generated by Web-based service providers to the public. In light of its findings, 
Congress enacted the CDA for several policy reasons, including “to remove disincentives for 
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents 
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” To 
achieve that policy goal, Congress provided broad immunity under the CDA to Web-based 
service providers for all claims stemming from their publication of information created by 
third parties, referred to as the “Good Samaritan” provision. Indeed, “[n]o cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”  
 
Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly in all cases arising from 
the publication of user-generated content. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a Web-
based dating-service provider was not liable when an unidentified party posted a false 
online personal profile for a popular actress, causing her to receive sexually explicit phone 
calls, letters, and faxes at her home. Acknowledging that the immunity provision in § 
230(c)(1) of the CDA causes “Internet publishers [to be] treated differently from 
corresponding publishers in print, television and radio,” the Ninth Circuit held that 
“[u]nder § 230(c), ... so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published 
content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific 
editing or selection process.” 
 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a plaintiff’s claims on the pleadings, holding that 
the CDA protects Web-based service providers from liability even after the provider is 
notified of objectionable content on its site. The plaintiff in Zeran sued an Internet service 
provider for failing to remove upon notice a false advertisement offering shirts featuring 
tasteless slogans relating to the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building and 
instructing interested buyers to call the plaintiff to place orders. After analyzing the 
immunity provision of § 230, the Fourth Circuit wrote: 
 
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would 
face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially 
defamatory statement-from any party, concerning any message.... Because 
service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of 
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive 
simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were 
defamatory or not. Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a 
chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.... Because the probable 
                                                 
2 Julie’s mother reported the assault to Austin, Texas police, who arrested Solis and charged him with second-
degree sexual assault. 
* [Editor’s note: this date appears to be an error.  The DMCA was enacted in October 1998.  The CDA was 
enacted in February 1996.] 
323. 
effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service 
provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes, 
we will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice 
intact. 
 
Parties complaining that they were harmed by a Web site’s publication of user-generated 
content have recourse; they may sue the third-party user who generated the content, but 
not the interactive computer service that enabled them to publish the content online. 
 
The Does appear to agree with the consensus among courts regarding the liability 
provisions in § 230(c)(1). They argue, however, that their claims against MySpace do not 
attempt to treat it as a “publisher” of information; therefore, they argue that § 230 does not 
immunize MySpace from their claims and state tort law applies in full effect. The Does 
attempt to distinguish their case from Carafano, Zeran, and other contrary authority by 
claiming that this case is predicated solely on MySpace’s failure to implement basic safety 
measures to protect minors. The district court rejected the Does’ argument, stating: 
 
The Court, however, finds this artful pleading to be disingenuous. It is quite 
obvious the underlying basis of Plaintiffs’ claims is that, through postings on 
MySpace, Pete Solis and Julie Doe met and exchanged personal information 
which eventually led to an in-person meeting and the sexual assault of Julie 
Doe. If MySpace had not published communications between Julie Doe and 
Solis, including personal contact information, Plaintiffs assert they never 
would have met and the sexual assault never would have occurred. No matter 
how artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their claims, the Court views Plaintiffs’ 
claims as directed toward MySpace in its publishing, editorial, and/or 
screening capacities. 
 
The Does do not present any caselaw to support their argument. In fact, they rely upon the 
same line of cases listed above but point to § 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity to publishers of 
third-party content as evidence that their claims are somehow different. Other courts, 
however, have examined pleadings similar to the Does’ and have reached the same 
conclusion as the district court. For example, in Green, the plaintiff sued a Web-based 
service provider after he received a computer virus from a third party and endured 
derogatory comments directed at him by others in an online “chat room.” He made a failure-
to-protect argument similar to the Does’, claiming that “AOL waived its immunity under [§] 
230 by the terms of its membership contract with him and because AOL’s Community 
Guidelines outline standards for online speech and conduct and contain promises that AOL 
would protect [him] from other subscribers.” The Third Circuit, however, dismissed the 
claims as barred by § 230, after recharacterizing the plaintiff’s claims: 
 
There is no real dispute that Green’s fundamental tort claim is that AOL was 
negligent in promulgating harmful content and in failing to address certain 
harmful content on its network. Green thus attempts to hold AOL liable for 
decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from 
its network—actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role. Section 
230 “specifically proscribes liability” in such circumstances. 
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Green demonstrates the fallacy of the Does’ argument. Their claims are barred by the CDA, 
notwithstanding their assertion that they only seek to hold MySpace liable for its failure to 
implement measures that would have prevented Julie Doe from communicating with Solis. 
Their allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for 
publishing the communications and they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online 
third-party-generated content. 
 
The Does further argue for the first time on appeal that MySpace is not immune under the 
CDA because it partially created the content at issue, alleging that it facilitates its 
members’ creation of personal profiles and chooses the information they will share with the 
public through an online questionnaire. The Does also contend that MySpace’s search 
features qualify it as an “information content provider”, as defined in the CDA: “The term 
‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service.” 
 
Nothing in the record, however, supports such a claim; indeed, Julie admitted that she lied 
about her age to create the profile and exchanged personal information with Solis. In the 
February 1, 2007 hearing before the district court, the Does admitted that Julie created the 
content, disclosing personal information that ultimately led to the sexual assault, but 
stressed that their cause of action was rooted in the fact that MySpace should have 
implemented safety technologies to prevent Julie and her attacker from meeting: 
 
THE COURT: I want to get this straight. You have a 13-year-old girl who 
lies, disobeys all of the instructions, later on disobeys the warning not to give 
personal information, obviously, [and] does not communicate with the parent. 
More important, the parent does not exercise the parental control over the 
minor. The minor gets sexually abused, and you want somebody else to pay 
for it? This is the lawsuit that you filed? 
 
MR. ITKIN [Counsel for the Does]: Yes, your Honor. 
.... 
 
MR. ITKIN: The first point is we’re not complaining about any of the content 
that was transmitted between Julie Doe and Pete Solis. Our complaint is 
[that] the two of them never should have been able to meet because MySpace 
could have implemented technology very simple and technologically—not 
simple but technologically and inexpensive age verification software that has 
been asked for by attorneys general before the lawsuit happened, or even 
done the things they did right after the filing of the lawsuit that would have 
prevented these two people from ever meeting. We wanted to keep the foxes 
out of the hen house. That’s the first thing, your Honor, is that we’re not 
complaining about the content. 
 
Throughout the hearing, the Does stated they had one argument—that MySpace was 
negligent for not taking more precautions: 
 
MR. ITKIN: Pete Solis is liable for an assault. But what we’re trying to hold 
MySpace liable for isn’t the publishing of a phone number but, rather, we’re 
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trying to hold MySpace responsible for not putting in the safety precautions 
to keep the two of them separated. 
.... 
 
THE COURT: Now, I’ve heard all of your arguments on the negligence and 
the duty. Now the duty is something that’s bothering me and that’s my next 
question to you. But as I read your pleadings, they are just wholly 
inapplicable to the Federal Rules of Procedure on fraud. You’ve got no specific 
fraud here. And on your negligent misrepresentation, that’s just a rehash of 
what you’re already doing. So we’re really talking about one cause of action, 
and that is a negligence cause of action. You keep nodding. Do you agree with 
that? 
 
MR. ITKIN: I think that is a fair recommendation, a fair statement. 
.... 
 
MR. ITKIN: Thank you. Your Honor we are not—and I want to be very clear 
about this. We are not complaining about any of the content that was 
exchanged between Julie Doe and Pete Solis. We understand that that is 
something we cannot complain about. Our complaint is only that these two 
should have never been allowed to find each other, anyways, if reasonable 
safety precautions were put in place. And under congressional law and, we 
believe, Texas common law, that’s enough to state a claim. 
 
Although the Does’ complaint alleged that MySpace allowed or encouraged members to post 
information after a member’s profile had been created, counsel for the Does reiterated in 
the hearing time and again that they had no complaints or allegations regarding the 
content of the information posted by Julie or exchanged between Julie and Solis. It appears 
that the reference to MySpace’s solicitation of information was solely used to set up the 
Does’ argument that MySpace failed to protect Julie by declining to implement age-
verification software: 
 
THE COURT: But your client violated every single thing that MySpace says 
to do. 
 
MR. ITKIN: Which is your Honor—and true. That is correct, your Honor. But 
I will say that that’s a known risk to MySpace. And that’s not just me saying 
it, that’s the Attorney General saying it. 
 
THE COURT: Everyone knows people lie. So therefore, should you be liable? 
 
MR. ITKIN: No, your Honor. But when you know of the risk and you know 
that the people-there’s potential for lying, all you need to do is put some basic 
safety mechanisms in place to prevent—or to circumvent the lying. 
 
THE COURT: So you’ve got the Attorney General of the United States saying 
... don’t put your credit card on the internet, but you want them to do it to get 
a free space. That’s one of the things. 
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MR. ITKIN: That’s one of the things. 
 
THE COURT: Then a driver’s license. Do you know how many people I 
sentence here every Friday that have a fake driver’s license? 
 
MR. ITKIN: I can imagine a lot, your Honor. 
.... 
 
MR. ITKIN: What we really want, your Honor, is there’s a company out 
there—I’ll give you an example of one of the companies out there called 
Aristotle. Aristotle through public databases if you enter your name, your zip 
code, and your birth year can come back with, hey, this person’s real; or you 
can enter an e-mail and have verification. So there’s some things to do that 
are less intrusive as far as giving people your driver’s license or your Social 
Security number. 
.... 
 
MR. ITKIN: Your Honor, because if [MySpace] had the age verification 
software in place, [Julie and Solis] never would have talked in the first place. 
They never would have known about each other. 
 
At no time before filing their appeal in this Court did the Does argue that the CDA should 
not apply to MySpace because it was partially responsible for creating information 
exchanged between Julie and Solis. Because the Does failed to present this argument to the 
district court, they are barred from making this argument on appeal. We therefore hold, 
without considering the Does’ content-creation argument, that their negligence and gross 
negligence claims are barred by the CDA, which prohibits claims against Web-based 
interactive computer services based on their publication of third-party content. Because we 
affirm the district court based upon the application of § 230(c)(1), there is no need to apply § 
230(c)(2), or to assess the viability of the Does’ claims under Texas common law in the 
absence of the CDA…. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
What more should social networking sites do to authenticate their users’ ages?  See Nicole 
Perlroth, Verifying Ages Online Is a Daunting Task, Even for Experts, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2012. 
 
Allocation of Responsibility.  Consider all of the possible parties who might bear 
responsibility for these sexual assaults: 
 
* Pete Solis, the sexual predator.  Solis pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was 
sentenced to 90 days in jail.  From MySpace’s perspective, Solis was an intervening 
tortfeasor. 
* the teenage victim, who lied to MySpace and made questionable choices. 
* the victim’s parents.  Arguably, they did not supervise the victim’s online or offline 
activities.   
* the school.  Note that Solis allegedly picked the victim up from school. 
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* the parking lot operator where Solis and the victim went to have sex.   
* MySpace, which allowed the victim to lie, allowed Solis to find her, and enabled Solis and 
the victim to communicate.  
 
Which, if any, of these parties should be liable for the sexual assault?  All of them?  None of 
them?  Some subset?  When so many parties were “but for” causal contributors to a tragedy, 
how should we allocate responsibility among them? 
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Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, CV-09-1535 (Penn. Ct. Common Pleas 2011) 
Saylor, Judge. 
 
…The case at bar involves an accident that occurred on April 21, 2008 while Zimmerman 
was operating a forklift at Weis Markets’ warehouse located in Milton, Pennsylvania.  
Zimmerman seeks damages for the injuries caused to his left leg as a result of the accident, 
including lost wages, lost future earning capacity, pain and suffering, scarring and 
“embarrassment.”  He avers that “his health in general has been seriously and permanently 
impaired and compromised” and, that “he has sustained a permanent diminution in the 
ability to enjoy life and life’s pleasures.”  Weis Markets, upon review of the public portion of 
Zimmerman’s Facebook page, discovered that his interests included “ridin” and “bike 
stunts” and his MySpace page contains more recent photographs depicting Zimmerman 
with a black eye and his motorcycle before and after an accident.  Additionally, there are 
photographs of Zimmerman wearing shorts, and his scar from this accident is clearly 
visible.  Weis Markets argues that this is relevant because at his deposition, Zimmerman 
claimed he never wears shorts because he is embarrassed by his scar.  Based on what was 
observed on the publicly available portions of Zimmerman’s Facebook and MySpace pages, 
Weis Markets believes there may be other relevant information as to Zimmerman’s damage 
claims on the non-public portions of his Facebook and MySpace pages. 
 
Zimmerman argues that his privacy interests outweigh the need to obtain the discovery 
material.2… 
 
I… 
 
[The court discussed an analogous precedent, Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 
(Suffolk Co. 2010), which said:] 
 
Thus, it is reasonable to infer from the limited postings on Plaintiff’s public 
Facebook and MySpace profile pages, that her private pages may contain 
materials and information that are relevant to her claims or that may lead to 
the disclosure of admissible evidence. To deny Defendant an opportunity [to] 
access to these sites not only would go against the liberal discovery policies of 
New York favoring pre-trial disclosure, but would condone Plaintiff’s attempt 
to hide relevant information behind self-regulated privacy settings.  
 
II 
 
The plaintiff in Romano contended that production of her entries on Facebook and MySpace 
would violate her right to privacy, which outweighed the defendant’s need for the 
information.  However, as Romano aptly noted, “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy, 
protects people, not places” citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and the 
reasonableness standard imposed thereunder (i.e. a reasonable expectation of privacy).  As 
                                                 
2 In the alternative, Zimmerman also argued that the Court should conduct an in-camera review and decide 
what materials should be provided to Weis Markets. This argument is flatly rejected as an unfair burden to 
place on the Court, which would not only require the time and resources necessary to complete a thorough 
search of these sites, but also would require the Court to guess as to what is germane to defenses which may be 
raised at trial. 
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noted by Romano, it was stated by the United States District Court of New Jersey in Beye 
v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 06-5337 (D.N.J. December 14, 2007): 
“[t]he privacy concerns are far less where the beneficiary herself chose to disclose the 
information.”  Further, Romano found both California and Ohio courts that rejected the 
notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy as to MySpace postings.  See Moreno v. 
Hanford Sentinel Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2009) and Dexter v. Dexter, 
2007 WL 1532084 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2007).  All the authorities recognize that Facebook 
and MySpace do not guarantee complete privacy.  Facebook’s privacy policy explains that 
users post any content on the site at their own risk and informs users that this information 
may become publicly available.6  The Romano court therefore concluded: 
 
Thus, when Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she 
consented to the fact that her personal information would be shared with 
others, notwithstanding her privacy settings…Since Plaintiff knew that her 
information may become publicly available, she cannot now claim that she 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
In view of the sound, logical approach of the court in Romano, this Court is likewise 
persuaded that the argument of Zimmerman that his privacy interests outweigh the 
discovery requests is unavailing. 
 
It is well recognized that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, like New York, provide 
for liberal discovery: “Generally, discovery is liberally allowed with respect to any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the cause being tried.”  Zimmerman placed his physical 
condition in issue, and Weis Markets is entitled to discovery thereon.  Based on a review of 
the publicly accessible portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of additional relevant and material information on the non-public 
portions of these sites.  Zimmerman voluntarily posted all of the pictures and information 
on his Facebook and MySpace sites to share with other users of these social network sites, 
and he cannot now claim he possesses any reasonable expectation of privacy to prevent 
Weis Markets from access to such information.  By definition, a social networking site is the 
interactive sharing of your personal life with others; the recipients are not limited in what 
they do with such knowledge.  With the initiation of litigation to seek a monetary award 
based upon limitations or harm to one’s person, any relevant, non-privileged information 
about one’s life that is shared with others and can be gleaned by defendants from the 
internet is fair game in today’s society.  Accordingly, Weis Markets’ Motion to Compel is 
granted. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the following Order is entered: 
 
AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2011, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide 
all passwords, user names and log-in names for any and all MySpace and Facebook 
accounts to Defendant within twenty (20) days from the date hereof.  It is FURTHER 
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall not take steps to delete or alter existing information and 
posts of his MySpace or Facebook accounts. 
                                                 
6 It is well publicized that Facebook’s privacy policy and its revisions have been the subject of criticism and 
controversy that may be never ending. One need only “Google” search the terms “Facebook privacy” for an 
exhaustive list of access to articles on the topic. 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Does this court (and the Romano court) say that posting any public content to a social 
networking site eliminates any expectation of privacy in all private content in that account? 
 
Once defense counsel gets access to the account, can they post messages in the plaintiff’s 
name?  If someone sends the plaintiff/user an instant message/chat while the defense 
counsel is reviewing the account, what should defense counsel do? 
 
Assume that a social networking site’s user agreement says that a user cannot share 
his/her password with any third party.  Could the social networking site object to this 
court’s order?  Would it strike you as odd if the social networking site had better grounds to 
object to the court’s order than the plaintiff/user?  
 
Multiple Identities Are Increasingly Untenable.  The caselaw is filled with examples where 
litigants say one thing in court and something contrary online.  See, e.g., People v. Franco, 
2009 WL 3165840 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009): 
 
At about 10:30 a.m. on June 6, 2006, Franco and Henry Chavez were seen 
racing each other in their Mustang vehicles on the Ventura Freeway, each 
reaching speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour.  Franco applied her 
brakes while Chavez was directly behind her, causing him to lose control of 
his vehicle.  The vehicle travelled to the other side of the freeway, flipped, 
and landed in a strawberry field.  Chavez was killed.  Franco did not stop. 
 
Franco testified that she was driving approximately 75 miles an hour on the 
freeway when Chavez began tailgating her.  When she changed lanes, he 
followed her.  Noticing that her speed had increased, she tapped on her 
brakes to slow down.  Chavez veered to avoid hitting her, then lost control of 
his vehicle.  She saw a plume of dust but kept driving as her boyfriend 
advised when she called him on her cell phone.  The day before the accident, 
however, Franco had written on her MySpace page, “If you find me on the 
freeway and you can keep up I have a really bad habit of racing random 
people.” 
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In re Rolando S., 197 Cal. App. 4th 936 (Cal. App. Ct. 2011) 
Franson, Judge. 
 
…FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Appellant was one of several recipients of an unsolicited text message providing the 
password to the victim’s email account.  Appellant used the victim’s email password and 
account to gain access to her Facebook account, where he posted, in her name, prurient 
messages on two of her male friends’ pages (walls) and altered her profile description in a 
vulgar manner.2  The victim found out about the messages and informed her father, who 
removed the messages from her account and later called the police. 
 
Appellant admitted to the police that he posted the messages from the victim’s Facebook 
account and altered her profile.  A juvenile petition was filed alleging one count of violating 
section 530.5, subdivision (a) (willfully obtaining personal identifying information and 
using it for an unlawful purpose).  After a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed the crime charged and 
sustained the petition. 
 
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to reduce the crime 
from a felony to a misdemeanor, without prejudice.  The court noted its concern with the 
short time span between this offense and the disposition of a prior offense—assault with a 
deadly weapon (a car), where appellant had driven his car at three girls with the intent of 
scaring them.  The court found the maximum confinement time for the offense to be three 
years, and found the aggregated maximum confinement time to be three years and three 
months.  The court ordered appellant committed to the Kings County Juvenile Academy 
Alpha Program for 90 days to a year, and put him on probation. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 530.5(a) states in pertinent part: 
 
“Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information, as 
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of another person, and uses that 
information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to 
obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without 
the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense....” 
 
The offense is a “wobbler,” punishable either as a misdemeanor or a felony.  Section 530.55, 
subdivision (b) includes “unique electronic data” as “personal identifying information.” 
 
“[T]o be guilty under section 530.5, subdivision (a), the defendant must (1) willfully obtain 
personal identifying information of another person, and (2) use the identifying information 
                                                 
2 Appellant posted, as the victim, on a male classmate’s wall: “I want to stick your dick in my mouth and then in 
my pussy and fuck me really hard and cum on my face.” On another male classmate’s wall he posted: “When we 
were dating we should have had sex. I always thought you had a cute dick, maybe we can have sex sometime.” 
On the victim’s profile description, appellant posted: “Hey, Face Bookers, [ sic ] I’m [S.], a junior in high school 
and college, 17 years young, I want to be a pediatrician but I’m not sure where I want to go to college yet. I have 
high standards for myself and plan to meet them all. I love to suck dick.” 
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for an unlawful purpose without the person’s consent.”  The facts here are not in dispute.  
Appellant asserts the facts fail to satisfy the elements of section 530.5(a).  We disagree. 
 
A. Appellant Willfully Obtained the Victim’s Email Account Password 
Appellant essentially argues that because he made no effort to obtain the password, instead 
passively receiving the text message on his cell phone “without his prior knowledge or 
consent,” he did not “willfully” obtain the victim’s email account password for purposes of 
the statute.  Respondent focuses its argument on asserting that appellant “obtained” the 
password, and evidenced his willfulness by using the password, rather than deleting it 
when he received it.  We conclude appellant willfully obtained the victim’s password when 
he chose to remember the password from the text message, and later affirmatively used the 
password to gain access to the victim’s electronic accounts. 
 
…Appellant freely accepted the password information provided in the text message. While 
the text message itself was unsolicited, no evidence suggests appellant was forced to 
remember the password or otherwise keep a record of it so that he could use it later, as he 
admitted to doing.  On the record before us, we conclude that appellant willfully obtained 
the password information from the text message, knowing that he was continuing to 
possess the password, intending to do so, and was a free agent when securing the password 
for his future use. 
 
Moreover, appellant used the email password he willfully obtained from the text message to 
then willfully obtain the victim’s Facebook account password.  Facebook accounts are linked 
to a user’s email account.  If the user forgets his or her Facebook password, he or she can 
regain access to his or her Facebook account by having Facebook email a verification 
procedure to the user’s email address.  By completing the Facebook verification procedure, 
the user is directed to a Facebook page where they can then reset his or her Facebook 
password by entering a new one, which then logs him or her back into the Facebook account 
with the new password. 
 
The victim’s father testified the victim’s Facebook password was being changed dozens of 
times over several weeks and it was only after they deleted her email account that they 
were able to regain control over her Facebook account.  Appellant admitted to Officer Lucio 
that he used the email account password he received from the text message to gain access 
to the victim’s Facebook account.  By resetting the victim’s Facebook account password 
himself using the above-described process, appellant would have been able to log in to her 
account and pose as the victim as he posted on her friends’ walls and on her profile.  The 
record makes no indication appellant received the victim’s Facebook account password in 
another manner.  It is reasonable to infer he used this process of resetting the password 
through the victim’s email account to gain access to the victim’s Facebook account.  Not 
only did appellant willfully obtain the email password from the text message, he also 
willfully obtained the Facebook account password by purposely using the email account as a 
vehicle to alter the Facebook account password. 
 
B. Appellant Used the Victim’s Information for an Unlawful Purpose 
Appellant next contends his conduct fails to satisfy the second element of section 530.5(a), 
that he “use[d] [the victim’s] information for any unlawful purpose.”  He argues that at 
most he “possibly defamed” the victim, but asserts that civil torts do not constitute an 
“unlawful purpose” for purposes of the statute.  Respondent argues appellant’s conduct was 
333. 
unlawful under section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) (annoying or molesting a child).  In the 
alternative, respondent contends that civil torts constitute an unlawful purpose, and 
appellant’s conduct amounted to libel under Civil Code section 45.  We disagree with 
respondent that appellant’s conduct constituted unlawful behavior under section 647.6, 
subdivision (a)(1).  However, we hold that intentional civil torts, such as libel, constitute an 
“unlawful purpose” for purposes of section 530.5(a), and affirm the judgment. 
 
1. Appellant’s Conduct Was Not Unlawful Under Section 647.6 
Section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a misdemeanor when a person, “annoys or molests 
any child under 18 years of age.”  Our Supreme Court has held that the statute requires 
“(1) conduct a ‘“normal person would unhesitatingly be irritated by”‘ [citations], and (2) 
conduct ‘“motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest”‘ in the victim [citations].”  
We agree with appellant that the facts fail to demonstrate the prosecution satisfied the 
second element…. 
 
Here, appellant posted three sexually explicit comments from the victim’s account. The 
record makes no indication he attempted to contact the victim previously, or that he had 
prior encounters with her that would indicate he was motivated by his sexual interest, 
abnormal or otherwise.  The juvenile court noted he had a girlfriend, and the probation 
officer’s report indicates appellant intended his comments to be taken as a joke.  We 
conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the prosecution’s assertion that 
appellant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the 
victim and therefore unlawful under section 647.6. 
 
2. “Any Unlawful Purpose” Includes Causes of Action Under Civil Tort Law 
Appellant contends the Legislature intended to limit “any unlawful purpose” to strictly 
criminal conduct.  We disagree…. 
 
Prior to the amendment, identity theft was a misdemeanor crime and had to specifically 
involve the perpetrator’s use of the victim’s information “to obtain, or attempt to obtain, 
credit, goods, or services” in the name of the victim without his or her consent.  In adding 
“for any unlawful purpose, including” before the clause beginning “to obtain,” the 
amendment expanded the range of unlawful purposes for which a perpetrator could be 
found guilty of committing identity theft and specifically denoted the non-exclusive nature 
of the list of unlawful purposes set forth in the statute.  The Legislature clearly intended to 
greatly expand the scope of unlawful conduct underlying the identity theft offense.6… 
                                                 
6 In his reply brief, appellant raised for the first time the argument that section 528.5, which makes it a 
misdemeanor to impersonate another person through an internet website for the purposes of harming, 
intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person, makes appellant’s conduct criminal.  He argues that 
his conduct was not criminal before section 528.5’s effective date, that is, before January 1, 2011. 
We note, however, that section 530.5 has different elements from section 528.5. Section 530.5 requires 
that a person willfully obtain personal identifying information and use it for an unlawful purpose. Section 528.5 
does not include a requirement that a perpetrator obtain personal identifying information.  As a result, a person 
could violate section 528.5 by merely posting comments on a blog impersonating another person.  There is no 
requirement, under these circumstances, that the person obtain a password—a key distinction. 
Further, section 528.5 does not require the perpetrator act with an unlawful purpose—merely that he 
or she acted with the purpose of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding a person.  At least the terms 
“harming” and “intimidating” do not necessarily have to be done for an unlawful purpose. 
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Libel is an intentional tort.  Civil Code section 45 defines the civil tort of libel: “Libel is a 
false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed 
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure 
him in his occupation.”  Appellant practically concedes the point, arguing the “prosecution 
proved only that [appellant] humiliated, embarrassed, and defamed [the victim].”  Here, 
appellant wrote sexually explicit and vulgar comments on the victims’ friends’ walls, 
accessible by the victims’ friends and acquaintances, and purportedly as her.  Appellant 
clearly exposed the victim to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy with his actions.9 
 
3. Appellant’s Actions Establish an Unlawful Purpose Under Section 653m 
Even assuming that a civil intentional tort failed to constitute an “unlawful purpose” for 
purposes of section 530.5, appellant’s conduct was sufficient to satisfy section 530.5 based 
on his conduct constituting a criminal offense under section 653m, subdivision (a) 
(hereafter section 653m(a)). 
 
Section 653m(a) states in pertinent part: “Every person who, with intent to annoy ... makes 
contact by means of an electronic communication device with another and addresses to or 
about the other person any obscene language ... is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
 
Section 653m, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 653m(c)) states in pertinent part: “Any 
offense committed by use of an electronic communication device or medium, including the 
Internet, may be deemed to have been committed when and where the electronic 
communication or communications were originally sent or first viewed by the recipient.” 
 
Appellant’s fraudulent posts as the victim would have shown up on her personal Facebook 
page.  He also altered her profile on her personal Facebook page.  Section 653m(c) makes 
clear the offense is committed as of sending the communication.  Therefore, appellant 
willfully obtained the victim’s Facebook password and then used that information for the 
unlawful purpose of violating section 653m(a). 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Unquestionably, the defendant engaged in bad behavior.  Combined with the driving 
incident, it also appears the defendant was out-of-control for a period of time.  However, 
don’t lose sight of the conclusion.  This court says that the defendant feloniously stole the 
victim’s identity by misusing a password to log into someone else’s Facebook account and 
post fake messages in her name.  Do you know anyone who has ever done something like 
                                                                                                                                                             
The act of willfully obtaining someone else’s password, and then using it for an unlawful purpose, 
justifies more harsh treatment under section 530.5.  We believe if appellant had committed these same acts 
after January 1, 2011, he could have been charged under both sections 528.5 and 530.5. 
9 At the disposition hearing, the victim’s mother read a statement from the victim, which stated: “[l]ast year, 
when this started, I had people at school call me a slut and a whore. I had no idea what was going on or what I 
had done to be called those names. [¶] After [appellant] was found guilty, some of his friends at school started 
wearing “Team [Appellant]” shirts, saying I had made this up to get [appellant] in trouble.”  She further related 
that, “[appellant’s friends] have ruined half of my junior year and, now, my senior year of school.  I used to love 
going to school.  Now, I dread dealing with this every day.” 
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that?  Have you?  What percentage of teenagers would do something similar to Rolando’s 
prank if they obtained a high school peer’s Facebook password? 
 
Do you think there are, or should be, any constitutional limits on a prosecution like this?  
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Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009). 
Levy, Judge. 
 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an author who posts an article on 
myspace.com can state a cause of action for invasion of privacy and/or intentional infliction 
of emotional distress against a person who submits that article to a newspaper for 
republication. The trial court concluded not and sustained the demurrer to appellants’ 
complaint without leave to amend. 
 
Appellants contend the republication constituted a public disclosure of private facts that 
were not of legitimate public concern and thus was an invasion of privacy. Appellants note 
that the republication included the author’s last name whereas the myspace.com posting 
did not. Appellants further argue that the person who submitted the article to the 
newspaper did so with the intent of punishing appellants and thus they have a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 
As discussed in the published portion of this opinion, the trial court properly sustained the 
demurrer without leave to amend to appellants’ invasion of privacy cause of action. The 
facts contained in the article were not private. Rather, once posted on myspace.com, this 
article was available to anyone with internet access. As discussed in the nonpublished 
portion, the trial court should have overruled the demurrer to the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress cause of action. Under the circumstances here, a jury should determine 
whether the alleged conduct was outrageous. Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
 
BACKGROUND… 
 
Following a visit to her hometown of Coalinga, appellant, Cynthia Moreno, wrote “An ode to 
Coalinga” (Ode) and posted it in her online journal on myspace.com. The Ode opens with 
“the older I get, the more I realize how much I despise Coalinga” and then proceeds to make 
a number of extremely negative comments about Coalinga and its inhabitants. Six days 
later, Cynthia removed the Ode from her journal. At the time, Cynthia was attending the 
University of California at Berkeley. However, Cynthia’s parents, appellants David and 
Maria Moreno, and Cynthia’s sister, appellant Araceli Moreno, were living in Coalinga. 
Araceli was a student at Coalinga High School. 
 
Respondent, Roger Campbell, was the principal of Coalinga High School and an employee of 
respondent, Coalinga-Huron Unified School District. The day after Cynthia removed the 
Ode from her online journal, appellants learned that Campbell had submitted the Ode to 
the local newspaper, the Coalinga Record, by giving the Ode to his friend, Pamela Pond. 
Pond was the editor of the Coalinga Record. 
 
The Ode was published in the Letters to the Editor section of the Coalinga Record. The Ode 
was attributed to Cynthia, using her full name. Cynthia had not stated her last name in her 
online journal. 
 
The community reacted violently to the publication of the Ode. Appellants received death 
threats and a shot was fired at the family home, forcing the family to move out of Coalinga. 
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Due to severe losses, David closed the 20-year-old family business. 
 
Based on the publication of the Ode, appellants filed the underlying complaint alleging 
causes of action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
addition to respondents, appellants named Lee Enterprises, Inc., Lee Enterprises 
Newspapers, Inc., and Hanford Sentinel, Inc., the publishers of the Coalinga Record, as 
defendants. However, these publisher defendants were dismissed following their motion to 
strike the complaint as a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuits against public participation) 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Appellants abandoned their appeal 
from this judgment. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
1. Appellants did not state a cause of action for invasion of privacy. 
 
The right to privacy tort was recognized in 1890 based on the trend in tort law to extend 
protection to “‘the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person’s] thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.’” In other words, the tort 
protects “a ‘right “to be let alone.”‘“ In 1972, the right to privacy was added to the California 
Constitution by initiative. 
 
To state a claim for violation of the constitutional right of privacy, a party must establish 
(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest. Four distinct kinds of 
activities have been found to violate this privacy protection and give rise to tort liability. 
These activities are: (1) intrusion into private matters; (2) public disclosure of private facts; 
(3) publicity placing a person in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of a person’s name or 
likeness. Each of these four categories identifies a distinct interest associated with an 
individual’s control of the process or products of his or her personal life. However, to prevail 
on an invasion of privacy claim, the plaintiff must have conducted himself or herself in a 
manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy.  
 
Here, the allegations involve a public disclosure of private facts. The elements of this tort 
are: “‘(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable 
to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.’” The absence of 
any one of these elements is a complete bar to liability.  
 
a. Having been published on myspace.com, the Ode was not private. 
As noted above, a crucial ingredient of the applicable invasion of privacy cause of action is a 
public disclosure of private facts. A matter that is already public or that has previously 
become part of the public domain is not private. 
 
Here, Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting the Ode on myspace.com, 
a hugely popular internet site. Cynthia’s affirmative act made her article available to any 
person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no 
reasonable person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published 
material. 
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As pointed out by appellants, to be a private fact, the expectation of privacy need not be 
absolute. Private is not equivalent to secret. “[T]he claim of a right of privacy is not ‘“so 
much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one’s circle of intimacy—to choose 
who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.”‘ Information disclosed to a few people may 
remain private.” Nevertheless, the fact that Cynthia expected a limited audience does not 
change the above analysis. By posting the article on myspace.com, Cynthia opened the 
article to the public at large. Her potential audience was vast. 
 
That Cynthia removed the Ode from her online journal after six days is also of no 
consequence. The publication was not so obscure or transient that it was not accessed by 
others. The only place that Campbell could have obtained a copy of the Ode was from the 
internet, either directly or indirectly. 
 
Finally, Cynthia’s last name was not a private fact. Although her online journal only used 
the name “Cynthia,” it is clear that her identity was readily ascertainable from her 
MySpace page. Campbell was able to attribute the article to her from the internet source. 
There is no allegation that Campbell obtained Cynthia’s identification from a private 
source. In fact, Cynthia’s MySpace page included her picture. Thus, Cynthia’s identity as 
the author of the Ode was public. In disclosing Cynthia’s last name, Campbell was merely 
giving further publicity to already public information. Such disclosure does not provide a 
basis for the tort. 
 
b. The other members of Cynthia’s family do not have an independent cause of action for 
invasion of privacy. 
Based on the direct damages they allegedly incurred due to publication of the Ode, 
Cynthia’s parents, David and Maria, and Cynthia’s sister, Araceli, argue that they have 
standing to sue for invasion of privacy. However, because the publication of the Ode was 
not an invasion of Cynthia’s privacy, these appellants cannot state a claim based on the 
same alleged invasion. 
 
Moreover, the right of privacy is purely personal. It cannot be asserted by anyone other 
than the person whose privacy has been invaded. Thus, even if Cynthia did have an 
invasion of privacy claim, David, Maria and Araceli would not have standing. The Coalinga 
Record did not identify David, Maria and Araceli when it published the Ode. Their invasion 
of privacy claim is primarily based on their relationship to Cynthia and the community 
reaction to Cynthia’s opinions, not on respondents’ conduct directed toward them.  
 
In sum, because the Ode was not private, appellants’ claim is precluded under California 
privacy tort law.4 Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the 
invasion of privacy cause of action. 
 
                                                 
4 Whether the publication of the Ode infringed on any federal copyright protection the Ode may have had is not 
before this court and we express no opinion on that issue. 
339. 
2. A jury must determine whether respondents’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous to result in liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.*  
 
“The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) 
outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and 
proximate causation of the emotional distress.”  
 
To be outrageous, conduct must be so extreme that it exceeds all bounds of that usually 
tolerated in a civilized community. However, conduct that might not otherwise be 
considered extreme and outrageous may be found to be so if a (1) defendant abuses a 
relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the 
plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or 
unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through 
mental distress.  
 
It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether the defendant’s conduct may 
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. In making this 
determination, the court employs an objective standard applied to the actual conduct, i.e., 
how reasonable people might view it, excluding from that category those who are either 
overly sensitive or callous. But, “‘[w]here reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, 
subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct 
has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.’” Here, the trial court 
concluded that Campbell’s conduct did not meet the standard of outrageousness necessary 
to constitute a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of 
law.  
 
In stating their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellants alleged that 
Campbell submitted the Ode to the Coalinga Record, knowing he did not have permission to 
do so. Appellants further alleged that Campbell engaged in this act to punish appellants for 
the contents of the Ode and intended to cause them emotional distress. Appellants contend 
that this conduct was extreme and outrageous, especially in light of Campbell’s position as 
Araceli’s principal. 
 
Since this appeal is from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, this court 
must assume the truth of appellants’ allegations against Campbell. Based on these 
allegations, we conclude that reasonable people may differ on whether Campbell’s actions 
were extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, it is for a jury to make this determination. 
Thus, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress cause of action…. 
 
 
                                                 
* [Editor’s note: this portion of the opinion was not certified for publication.] 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
The Full Text of Moreno’s Post as Published in the Coalinga Record: 
 
An ode to Coalinga 
 
So, after three years, I decided to go to Coalinga for the football homecoming. 
I didn’t go to see who I would run into, because running into friends from the 
past is inevitable. I have to say, that the older I get, the more I realize how 
much I despise Coalinga. 
 
Every time I look at where I am at, where I am going and what I have 
become, I can’t help but look at everyone else as if they haven’t matured nor 
broken out of the Coalinga norms; I don’t blame them. Its actually a little 
pathetic and sad! These people have a lot, and I mean, a lot to learn, alot to 
experience, and more to overcome.  They are merely beginning new phases in 
their lives that will prove more difficult as time goes by. I don’t give them my 
sympathy for I was always two steps ahead of the game; always had the 
advantage of being far and secluded from everyone in Coalinga because I had 
ambitions and aspirations that kept me focused. I never diverted from what 
was more important in my life; and with that note, I still haven’t. 
 
I’m on my way to becoming a lawyer. One bad *** corporate latina lawyer 
who is not going to take *** from anyone, or anything. Ill be up there soon 
enough to help out mi rata in every way possible. Looking back at the people 
I saw in Coalinga this weekend...I pity them. They say that the friendships 
you make in college are the ones that are true and the ones that last a 
lifetime. I’m a firm believer in that. 
 
When I look back to my friends from Coalinga, I don’t miss a single moment 
with them because the moments were never real. Instead, I find that here in 
college, I am immersed in an intellectual environment where individuals here 
value hard work and commitment in all aspects of their lives, and who have 
worked their asses off to come to a school as prestigious as UCB...those are 
the friends I admire; the people who can hold conversations of substance and 
value…people whom are going to be doctors, and lawyers, politicians, 
psychologists, etc...in a society where we will all stand aside one another 
because we have all been through the educational struggles similarly. 
 
I don’t care much for Coalinga. or the people that reside there or the friends I 
used to have while being there. In comparison to my college friends, they are 
nothing, were nothing, and remain nothing. In a nutshell, their histories and 
reputations are so denigrating and their focuses are set on such superficial 
and unimportant things that breaking out of it for an instant scares 
them....it’s no wonder they always come back to Coalinga...they can never be 
strong enough to befriend any one else in other places, unless its through 
others, or stand alone or for themselves to become accomplished. They can’t 
do it without their “cliques” their “gossip” and especially their ‘jealousy.”  The 
sight of success is unbeknownst to them, just as much as their fervor for 
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being involved with others businesses abhors me. Why don’t they focus on 
themselves and see their status in society? Its nothing...so get over 
yourselves. How terribly sad. It must be a small town thing...or maybe a 
close-minded group of individuals who are afraid of change. I think inside 
these individuals (and you all know who you are) know they can’t make it in 
life. Their only way of success is by criticizing those around them, as if doing 
so will make them feel better about themselves. You all have alot to learn...I 
pray to God that you see the light one day. Because when you do, (even if you 
never do), we are all going to be on top. You think you got us fooled? Im a 
smarter cookie than you think. 
 
So for an ode to Coalinga; I have none. I only value the few that have 
contributed to my success, those teachers, mentors and family who have kept 
the positive path looking brighter and brighter. Who the hell wouldn’t want 
to get out of Coalinga to come to a school like CAL...and experience 
everything that I have thus far? That’s right ******...envy me because thats 
all you can do....literally, that is all you can do...and I mean that on more 
than one symbolic level and interpret and talk about this like you never have 
before, because that is all that you really can do...talk nonsense **** because 
you are nothing.... 
 
So glad to be out of that damn town! 
 
Gracias a dios, 
Cynthia Moreno 
 
Editor’s Note 
It saddens us to know that a product of this community, a community that 
takes such pride in its youth, would have such negative thoughts of what was 
once their home.  This article was found on the Internet and submitted for 
publication. 
 
Questions.  In addition to the claims discussed above, did Moreno have any other claims she 
could have brought?  Did MySpace have any legal claims? 
 
Denouement.  In September 2010, a jury ruled that Campbell acted outrageously but did 
not owe any damages.  Both Moreno and Principal Campbell have found greener pastures 
outside the courtroom.  Principal Campbell was promoted to superintendent of the 
Coalinga-Huron Joint Unified School District.  Moreno temporarily flunked out of UC 
Berkeley due to the stress, but she regained admittance after some time at a local 
community college.  As of 2010, she was a reporter for the Fresno Spanish-language 
newspaper Vida en el Valle, but she has not (yet) become a bad-ass corporate Latina lawyer. 
